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PREFACE AMP ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It might seem odd that an Irishman, studying in a 
European University situated in Italy, should study a small 
French island in the Mediterranean. The reason is that this 
study of Corsica began when I was completing a BA degree in 
French Studies and Politics at the University of Ulster. The 
year 1980-81 was to be spent in a French-speaking country with 
a view to perfecting the French language and preparing a final 
year project. I chose Corsica, not simply because of its 
position in the Mediterranean, but because I was vaguely aware 
that Corsican nationalist movements using armed struggle 
existed there. As, at the time, I was living in Belfast where 
an armed conflict was raging, I was interested in looking at 
other situations of violent conflict. Although my first period 
in Corsica was spent principally as an English Assistant in 
the lycée technique at Bastia and not doing full-time 
research, I was able to make many contacts among the local 
autonomists and nationalists as well as with people of other 
political tendencies. The fact that I was Irish, and not 
French, assisted my access to the nationalist groups and for 
several months I attended meetings of the Bastia section of 
the Consulta dei Cumitati Naziunalisti (CCN) which was my 
first period of participant observation. This was especially 
important as this was the period approaching the Presidential 
elections of May 1981. These elections provoked a serious 
debate within the Corsican regionalist movements, a debate
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which I could observe at first hand. In 1982, I enrolled as a 
doctoral candidate at the European University Institute, 
Florence, with Corsican regionalism as my research topic. This 
entailed a second long period on the island in 1983-4 when I 
returned to carry out my field research.
There are several difficulties which confront a 
researcher studying Corsican regionalism. First, there is the 
problem of gaining access to primary sources. Reports on the 
movements by groups such as the police judiciaire are covered 
by the thirty year rule. Furthermore, the archives of the 
militants were often destroyed because the large number of 
arrests and searches of domiciles by the police meant there 
was a risk of discovery. This might lead to imprisonment for 
possession of seditious literature or, at the very least, 
would give the police information concerning the movements. As 
a result there remain three principal methods for collecting 
the data: (i) archival research; (ii) participant observation; 
(iii) interviews with key informants. All three methods have 
been used in this thesis, although stress was laid on (i) and 
(ii) .
The author spent several weeks in 1982 in three archival 
resources in Paris: the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Versailles 
Annexe of the B.N. and the library of the Institut d'Etudes 
Politiques, rue St-Guillaume, Paris. This period was used 
principally to prepare Chapters One and Two. The archival
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research for the Corsican case-study was carried out in Paris 
and on Corsica itself. The Archives Départementales in both 
Ajaccio (Corse-du-Sud) and Bastia (Haute-Corse), the Salle de 
Documentation of the Préfecture in Ajaccio and of the 
Assemblée Régionale, also in Ajaccio; the Bibliothèque 
Municipale of Ajaccio, as well as some private collections 
were used. The principal types of source examined were several 
newspaper collections (Ajaccio and Versailles) and dossiers de 
presse (Rue St-Guillaume; private collections); Government 
reports (B.N. and Ajaccio). A full list of these sources may 
be found in the Bibliography.
The most important period of participant observation was, 
as mentioned above, in 1981-82 when the author was privileged 
to be accepted into a group of Corsican nationalists in 
Bastia: the CCN. This allowed him to observe the functioning 
of a Corsican nationalist group from the inside: to become 
aware of the different tendencies and tensions, the type of 
membership, and the degree of popular support. From October
1983 until June 1984, the author spent a further period of 
residence on the island. Although he kept in touch with 
members of the movements, he did not attempt to join the 
movement but instead observed at close hand but from the 
outside. In this way, a more detached observation could take 
place. During these two periods, the author conducted informal 
interviews with academics, journalists and militants.
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Much of this research has been already published. My 
undergraduate dissertation which looked at the problem from 
the standpoint of the theory of internal colonialism was 
published (with Paul Hainsworth) as "Le Problème corse", in 
the American review Contemporary French Civilization (for 
details, see Bibliography). However, as my doctoral research 
progressed and I tried to place Corsica within a wider 
comparative context, I abandoned this model. This change may 
be found in my chapter "Regionalist and ethnic nationalist 
movements in contemporary France" which appeared in Yves Mény 
and Vincent Wright, Centre-peripherv Relations in Western 
Europe in 1985. Material from this chapter may be found in a 
reworked form in Chapters One and Two of the thesis. Some 
material of a historical nature appeared in an Italian law 
review Rivista italiana di iurisprudenza co-authored with Yves 
Mény. The section of the thesis dealing with the Statut 
Particulier was first published as a European University 
Institute Working Paper. Some of the first section of this 
working paper has been incorporated in Chapter Six of the 
thesis.
Finally, I would like to thank all those who assisted me 
in the writing of this thesis. My supervisor, Dr Vincent 
Wright of Nuffield College, Oxford, and my first reader, 
Professor Yves Mény of the University of Paris, guided me 
through the complicated world of French regional politics and 
provided me with an excellent background of the wider problem
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of the regions in Europe. Both commented on my written work at 
various stages in a most constructive and helpful manner.
Susan Baker, formerly of the European University Institute and 
now at the University of Ulster, was a most stimulating critic 
of different parts of the manuscript. Dr Paul Hainsworth, of 
the University of Ulster, encouraged and supervised my 
original undergraduate, project on Corsica, and gave useful 
advice on the final version of the doctoral manuscript. Many 
other academics helped me along the way in friendly 
discussions and I can do no more than list some of them: Ian 
Budge, Michel Crozier, Luigi Graziano, Francis Pomponi,
Dorothy Carrington, Pierre Dottelonde, Henri Mendras, Bruno de 
Witte, Charles Tilly, L.J. Sharpe, Daniel Seiler, Philippe 
Schmitter, and many others. I would also like to thank the 
many Corsican militants and politicians who kindly gave their 
time and patience to an inquisitive Irishman despite their own 
pressing preoccupations.
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INTRODUCTION
Corsica, in the 1950's, was regarded by most Frenchmen as 
simply a quaint society whose strange customs had somehow 
survived into the modern age. Corsicans were seen as strange, 
violent creatures with a horror of physical labour and a 
proclivity for non-manual occupations such as the Civil 
Service, the Customs, and the Police. Such views were shaped 
to a large extent by nineteenth century Romantic authors such 
as Mérimée and by the fact that many Corsicans did indeed 
occupy such positions. There existed a mvthe corse which often 
influenced not only public perceptions but also government 
thinking.
One element of this mvthe was that few Frenchmen, 
including those in Government, thought that Corsicans, by 
themselves, were capable of taking control of their own 
development. Indeed, this too seemed to have a great deal of 
truth in it at least with regard to the Corsicans who remained 
behind on the island. The island society seemed to be 
characterized by a fatalistic torpor. When the Governments of 
the Fourth Republic did adopt a programme of economic 
development for the island its administration was largely in 
the hands of non-Corsicans. Despite this, most Corsicans 
approved of the Government's measures with enthusiasm.
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In the 1960's, however,a problème corse marked by a great 
deal of agitation and violence had emerged and, by the 1970's, 
the problem was high on the governmental agenda. It was also 
firmly implanted in the public consciousness. A good 
indication of this growing awareness may be found among the 
press files (1945 - ) at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in 
Paris. In the file on minorités nationales, the section on 
Corsica thickens as the years progress. By the 1980's, it is 
by far the thickest of all. In 1981, the problem was taken so 
seriously by the newly elected Socialist Government that the 
island was given a Statut Particulier as part of a wider 
programme of decentralization.
Why did the Corsican problem come to be placed so high on 
the agenda of the Governments of the Fifth Republic and 
particularly on that of the Socialist Government of 1981?
This is the principal question which this thesis tries to 
answer. Although the thesis is not an histoire événementielle, 
it will be nevertheless useful at this point briefly to 
summarize the recent history of the Corsican problem.
The emergence of the Corsican problem
Corsica was annexed by France in 1768, having been a 
colony of Genoa for several centuries. This annexation had 
been preceded by a revolt against Genoa which had lasted forty 
years. The most dramatic phase of this revolt was the attempt
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by Pascal Paoli to set up a rudimentary Republic along liberal 
democratic lines. Paoli had been influenced by writers of the 
Enlightenment such as Montesquieu and perhaps Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau who wrote a Constitution for the embryonic state. The 
Genoese, in decline as a great Mediterranean power, were 
unable to contain the revolt, asked the French for assistance 
and finally ceded de facto sovereignty to them in 1768. 
Although this was followed by some revolts, most Corsicans 
seem to have preferred French rule to Genoese, as the latter 
had left behind memories of cruel repression and injustice 
against the native Corsicans. In fact, when the French 
Revolution occurred in 1789, the first of the Corsicans' 
doléances was that their island become integrally French and 
not be returned to Genoa which still claimed de jure 
sovereignty. Total integration at the political level did, in 
fact, take place at this time. Another powerful source of 
identification was the fact that Corsica's most famous son was 
Napoleon Bonaparte. Although the Emperor did not allow any 
sentimental attachments to deflect him from cruelly repressing 
any revolts on the island if he considered this necessary, 
later generations looked with pride on his achievements. This 
became a strong element of identification with France and the 
mvthe napoléonien was at its strongest in Corsica.
This attachment to France on the part of the Corsicans 
seems to have been a dominant feeling among the islanders 
throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the
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twentieth. Many Corsicans realized the advantages of being 
attached to a powerful state even if that state often seemed 
indifferent to their lot. At least they were marginally better 
off than their Italian neighbours who were often forced to 
come to Corsica to find work. There were, nevertheless, those 
who questioned this attachment. At the end of the nineteenth 
century there appeared regionalist movements which accused 
the French Government of criminally neglecting the island.
Such discontent usually occurred in periods of economic 
hardship for the island. Nevertheless, attachment to France 
was reinforced by the blood sacrifice made by many Corsicans 
for the Mère-Patrie during the First World War. But there were 
also discontents during the inter-war period when autonomist 
and even separatist movements appeared. However, in both these 
periods these movements seem to have been confined to a tiny 
minority of intellectuals and failed to make a significant 
impact on the Corsican masses. Furthermore, some of their 
number flirted with extreme Right-wing ideas and espoused the 
irredentist cause of Mussolini. When the Italians invaded the 
island in 1942, some of these regionalists collaborated with 
them. This led to a discrediting of Corsican regionalism in 
the immediate post-war period. As in other French regions, 
such as Brittany and Alsace, where a similar collaboration and 
discrediting had occurred, regionalists confined their 
attention to cultural or economic issues and did not publicly 
advocate political reforms along regionalist lines.
- 10 -
Immediately after the War there followed a period of very 
strong pro-French nationalism. This was related to the fact 
that Corsica was the first and only French département to 
liberate itself by force of arms from the Occupant. This 
insurrection was led principally by the Corsican Federation of 
the French Communist Party, known for its extreme Jacobinism. 
This period of strong identification with France led the local 
economic and political élites to become aware of the moribund 
state of the island, especially as the French mainland was 
experiencing rapid economic growth. Fortunately, for the local 
elites, this coincided with a period when the Governments of 
the Fourth Republic were also becoming aware of the problem of 
the geographical dimension of economic disparities in France 
and were developing regionalization programmes to combat 
these. An important influence here was Jean-François Gravier 
whose book Paris et le désert français, calling attention to 
the excessively centralized nature of the French state and the 
adverse consequences this had for the provinces, appeared in 
1947 (1). Another important influence was the lobbying tactics 
of the Breton Comité de liaison des intérêts bretons (CELIB). 
The regionalization programme of the Fourth Republic, met some 
of the demands of the local Corsican elites for a Government- 
assisted economic development programme for the island. For 
the first time since the Second Empire, when the Government 
had adopted some measures in favour of the island, the French 
Government took the island's problems sufficiently seriously 
to adopt an important economic development programme: the
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Programme d'Action Régionale (PAR) adopted officially in 1957. 
Most of the islanders welcomed this.
Unfortunately, the expectations of economic development 
which this raised were not to be realized - at least not in 
the manner in which many of the islanders wished. The 
principal reason for this was the collapse of the Fourth 
Republic, the arrival of De Gaulle to power, and the 
establishment of the Fifth Republic. The regional policies of 
the new équipe differed considerably from those of the Fourth 
Republic in that they emphasized national rather than regional 
development. This affected the implementation of the PAR whose 
funds dried up. This, with other policies of the Gaullist 
Government, was the catalyst which sparked off organized 
regionalist protest on a scale never before seen in Corsica. 
The first phase of this protest is what may be called moderate 
regionalism: that is, the dominant regionalist movement was 
basically Jacobin in orientation. Moderate regionalism had 
some successes in reversing Government policies but eventually 
withered away. This was because it ultimately failed to 
realize its principal demands because of the intransigence of 
the Gaullist Government and several other reasons which are 
dealt with more fully in Chapter Seven below. This failure led 
to a radicalization of regionalism and the formation of new 
organisations. The latter were not, however, homogeneous but 
composed of several tendencies. These tendencies and the
- 12 -
political significance of the movements are analysed more 
fully in Chapter Eight below.
The 1960*s and 1970's saw a continual deterioration of 
the situation. The moderate regionalists were frightened at 
the growth of extra-parliamentary activities and the anti- 
Jacobin critiques of the French state and returned to the 
traditional channels of political behaviour. This left the 
field free for the radicals who developed extra-parliamentary 
tactics of both a legal and illegal nature.
The radical regionalists became involved in most of the 
social conflicts of the period, even if these were not 
directly connected with their own aims, and attempted, often 
with some success, to transform them into conflicts that 
questioned the relationship between Corsica and France. 
Occasionally, they too used violence, as at Aleria in August 
1975 when they occupied the vineyard of a pied noir (see 
below) who had been involved in a scandal of doctoring wines 
with excessive amounts of sugar. They also organized many 
marches and road blocks as peasants in Brittany were doing in 
the same period.
Clandestine separatists began a bombing campaign in the 
early 1960's which, except for that of the Spanish Basques, is 
probably the longest lasting in Western Europe. The targets 
have been principally property rather than people, the
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property being either Government buildings or installations 
connected with the economic development agencies.
Occasionally, targets on mainland France have been chosen. The 
slogan I francesi fori (IFF - French Out!) appeared 
increasingly all over the island.
Government responses to these events were a mixture of 
the carrot and stick. The central state continued to subsidize 
the island but not along the lines desired by some of its 
inhabitants. The agricultural programme of the PAR was revived 
in the early 1960's but principally in order to facilitate the 
return of about 20,000 repatriate pieds noirs (2) returning 
from newly independent Algeria. The preference given to these 
new settlers over native Corsicans was a powerful source of 
resentment especially among young Corsican farmers. The early 
Governments of the Fifth Republic often seemed to behave with 
extraordinary insensitivity. One of their first decisions with 
regard to the island was to threaten to close down its only 
railway. This was soon followed by an attempt to use the 
island as a test site for nuclear weapons! Grievances built up 
on a number of issues such as the closure of the remaining 
mining and manufacturing industries, and the failure to bring 
to task an Italian company which was dumping chemicals into 
the sea which polluted the island's shores. The attempts at 
reform, particularly during the Giscardian period, usually 
were too little too late, and disappointment at them further 
fuelled the grievances of the radical regionalists.
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Increasingly under President Giscard d'Estaing the 
Government resorted to outright police repression in the form 
of dozens of arrests and perquisitions. Even those who were 
unsympathetic toward Corsican nationalism and autonomy 
criticized the Government's heavy-handed manner with which it 
responded to the events of Aleria in August 1975. This 
consisted in sending a large contingent of security forces to 
surround a vineyard occupied by the autonomists. The 
circumstances still remain unclear but a fracas broke out 
during which a gendarme lost his life and an autonomist was 
seriously wounded. That evening serious rioting occurred in 
nearby Bastia when the Préfecture came under armed attack and 
another policeman was killed.
There was also the growth of counter-violence by 
terrorist barbouzes whom many Corsicans, including some who 
were not autonomists, claimed were supported by the 
Government. It later emerged that they had contacts with the 
notorious Service d'Action Civique (SAC), a violent quasi­
criminal group which had been set up by the Gaullists during 
the Algerian crisis. The most serious incident involving this 
group occurred in January 1980 when three barbouzes set out to 
kidnap and murder a leading autonomist living in a mountain 
village near Ajaccio called Bastelica. The group had, however, 
been infiltrated by an autonomist sympathizer who informed the 
autonomists of Bastelica of the intended kidnapping and
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murder. The latter, in their turn, kidnapped the would-be 
kidnappers and captured a large arsenal of weapons in their 
vehicle. They then wished to hold a press conference to 
publicize the existence of the barbouzes. The Government 
reacted in a way similar to their reaction in Aleria - by 
sending a large contingent of security forces to surround the 
village. Somehow the autonomists escaped with their captives 
to Ajaccio where they occupied the Hôtel Fesch. The security 
forces followed and again surrounded them. This time a crowd 
of autonomist sympathizers gathered outside the hotel and 
confronted the security forces. A shot rang out from the crowd 
and a police-man was shot dead. Later that night, at two 
separate road-blocks, nervous gendarmes killed a young man and 
young woman.
Events such as these raised the political temperature on 
the island and the heavy police tactics were an important 
cause for growth in sympathy for the radical regionalists.
Many young Corsicans were becoming increasingly alienated from 
the French state as is clear from the successful organizing of 
autonomist and nationalist groups in the island's lycées. By 
the time of the presidential elections in May 1981 the island 
was a tinder-box, with the threat of widespread violence if 
President Giscard d'Estaing were re-elected. As it turned out, 
François Mitterrand won the election and the comprehensive 
decentralization reforms which he introduced bring us to the 
present phase of the Corsican story.
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It might seem strange that a country such as France, 
which has often been regarded as the model of the unitary 
state, "the one and indivisible Republic", should experience 
such problems of peripheral minorities. Furthermore, this 
eruption seems to be part of a wider phenomenon of a revival 
of submerged ethnic or national minorities both in France - 
Bretons, Basques, Occitanians, Flemish - and in other European 
countries - the South Tyroleans in Italy, the Flemish in 
Belgium, the Basques and Catalonians in Spain, the Northern 
Irish Catholics, Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom.
This phenomenon of the revival of what has been various 
termed "ethnic nationalism", "micro-nationalism", "ethno- 
regionalism" and what is simply called in this thesis 
"regionalism" gives rise to questions important to the social 
sciences. In the French case, the most important question is: 
why is it that a unitary state such as France has suddenly 
experienced what seems to be an explosion of centrifugal 
forces. In answering this question the researcher may help to 
elucidate the nature of the French state itself and the 
relations between state and society in France. Furthermore, he 
may contribute to a wider body of literature which is 
questioning the validity of, or at least seriously modifying, 
concepts such as unitary and federal systems: this literature 
includes theories such as Intergovernmental Relations. The 
nature of nationalism, too, might become clearer in studying
- 17 -
what seems to be the clash of two nationalisms: the official 
nationalism of the nation-state and the nationalisme 
contestataire of at least some of the regionalist movements. A 
second question is: why did it occur at this particular time 
in these particular regions? The answer to this question may 
give us a greater understanding of the territorial dimension 
in politics and of the geographical diversity of French 
society. A third question is: how strong were these movements 
and what effect did they have on Government regional policy? 
This is important, as many authors, including academics, 
simply accept, in a rather uncritical manner, the self­
explanations of the movements themselves. Part of this self- 
explanation often takes the form of inflated claims about the 
movements' representativeness of the local population. In 
other words, the movements promote a mobilizing myth of their 
own leadership of an ethnic or national group which challenges 
the dominant myth of the nation-state. To answer the question 
as to the impact they have on Government policy, it is 
necessary to deal with another related one: how have 
Governments dealt with the phenomenon in practice - what are 
the range of options open to a Government which seeks to 
reduce regional or ethnic conflict? In answering this question 
important aspects of governmental policy-making and policy- 
implementation will be studied and, in particular, the success 
or failure of governmental regional policies.
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This thesis attempts to answer these questions in the 
case of Corsica, although, for reasons outlined below, it does 
so by putting the Corsican case in the wider context of France 
as a whole. There are several reasons why Corsica is of 
particular interest. First, as is evident from the brief 
historical resumé given above, it is a region which has 
experienced a wide range of regionalist movements and types of 
protest from elitist bargaining between local notables and 
central politicians and administrators to the attempt to set 
up an independent Republic by extreme nationalist movements 
using armed struggle. This is useful because it allows an 
analysis of a wide range of movements in a small setting. 
Secondly, being an island, Corsica has preserved many features 
of traditional society which help to explain the revival of 
regionalism as an important force. This makes it a kind of 
"laboratory" in which many of the factors which have caused 
the ethnic revival may be more easily observed than in other 
regions where they may have disappeared or exist only in a 
diluted form. Thirdly, there has been a paucity of research on 
the Corsican case by political scientists particularly in 
English. Valuable research by English-speaking researchers 
such as Jack Hayward, Suzanne Berger and Malcolm Anderson has 
been conducted on regions such as Brittany and Alsace (see 
bibliography for these and the following authors). Practically 
nothing has been done on Corsica. Some studies of a partial 
nature, such as the work of Savigear, Koffman and Hainsworth 
and Loughlin, have appeared. More substantial historical
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studies have been published by Dorothy Carrington. In French, 
most studies of Corsica have fallen into one of three 
categories: historical, as in the work of Pomponi and 
Dottelonde; sociological, and in particular the work of 
Dressler-Holohan on autonomist movements; or polemical, as in 
the works of regionalist sympathizers such as Pascal Marchetti 
and journalists such as Jean-Paul Delors and Stéphane 
Muracciole. There has, however, been no comprehensive attempt 
by a political scientist to provide an explanation of the 
emergence and political significance of Corsican regionalism 
or to apply to it any of the models developed in the social 
sciences in recent years to explain the phenomenon of 
regionalism and ethnic nationalism.
This thesis attempts to make a contribution toward 
filling this lacuna. One of its primary concerns is to develop 
a framework within which the wider phenomenon of regionalism 
may be described and explained. The thesis then attempts to 
use this framework to analyse the roots of this phenomenon in 
the Corsican case. It is also used to describe and explain the 
factors which led to its recent emergence and ensured that it 
was put on the political agenda and remained there. The 
framework is developed through a critique of some of the 
principal existing models. It tries to provide a set of 
concepts which help to answer the questions why regional 
diversity has survived in a unitary state like France, why 
regional conflict occurred when it did, who the principal
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protagonists are, and the significance it has for an 
understanding of the French state. However, it is hoped that 
the model will be flexible enough both to describe and to 
explain what Corsica has in common with other similar cases 
and where it differs from them. It is hoped that the model 
will be useful for comparative work on the wider phenomenon 
including countries outside France.
But it is also important to point out what the thesis 
does not try to do. It is not an attempt to write either a 
political or an economic history of Corsica. For such 
treatments the author is referred to excellent works by 
journalists such as Paul Silvani, La Corse des années ardentes 
or Jean-Paul Delors and Stéphane Muracciole, Corse : La 
Poudrière and the works of historians such as Francis Pomponi 
and Dorothy Carrington. Particularly valuable is the doctoral 
thesis of Pierre Dottelonde which gives a "blow by blow" 
account of the movements from 1959 to 1973/4. Dottelonde's 
painstaking reconstruction of the biographies of many of the 
principal protagonists of the Corsican problem as well as his 
detailed analysis of the internal structures of the movements 
themselves are especially valuable. Nor is this thesis an 
anthropological treatise on Corsican society. For this the 
reader is referred to the works of authors such George Ravis- 
Giordani and José Gil. Finally, it is not a sociological 
analysis of the movements themselves. The first steps toward 
such an analysis have taken by Wanda Dressler-Holohan. In
- 21 -
summary, it is essentially a political analysis which lays 
stress on the system of public administration at the local 
level.
Plan of the thesis
The thesis is organized in the following manner. Section 
One, which includes Chapters One and Two, attempts to define 
the correct theoretical and empirical frameworks. Chapter One 
is a search for the correct empirical framework. It rejects 
frameworks more appropriate to other disciplines such as 
geography, sociology and anthropology and, since the thesis is 
a thesis in political science, it chooses to examine Corsica 
within the context of the French political system. By a 
comparative analysis of similar movements within the French 
system, it searches out the relevant questions to be answered 
in the French case. As the bulk of the rest of the thesis is a 
case-study of Corsica, this is dealt with only briefly in this 
Chapter. Chapter Two then attempts to find a suitable 
theoretical framework which will help us to anwer the 
questions raised in Chapter One. Several models, drawn from 
both academic research - Centre-periphery theories (Rokkan and 
Urwin), theories of Nationalism and micro-Nationalism (A.D. 
Smith), the uneven development thesis (Ernest Gellner), 
theories of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) (Jean-Claude 
Thoenig), which is an application of organisation theory to 
political institutions, and theories of decentralization (L.J.
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Sharpe)- and the theorizing efforts of political militants - 
the theory of internal colonialism (Robert Lafont), theories 
of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism (Guy Héraud), theories of 
federalism and corporatism (Alain Greilsammer) - are examined 
in a critical manner and those parts of them useful for the 
French case are retained. Finally, these concepts are combined 
to produce a model that may be useful not simply for the 
examination of particular cases such as Corsica but also for 
comparative work.
The bulk of the case-study of Corsica may be found in 
Section Two, comprising Chapters Three, Four and Five, and 
Section Three, comprising Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. These 
two sections are complementary and examine the Corsican 
problem from two different directions. Section Two. "Les 
amibiguités de la Corse française" is an attempt to anwer the 
question: why is it that a unitary state such as France, with 
allegedly Jacobin tendencies toward a complete assimilation of 
all differentiated territorial units, yet contains units such 
as Corsica, each marked by a strong differentiation. The 
section thus explores the phenomena of assimilation and 
differentiation. Chapter Three, using the vertical dimension 
of the model, looks at the way in which institutions such as 
the préfectoral system, designed to promote assimilation and 
integration, become means by which the local society, in this 
case Corsica, may preserve its identity. Chapter Four examines 
how economic developments, or the lack of them, emanating from
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the centre can also produce a sense of assimilation or 
differentiation in the periphery. Chapter Five takes different 
forms of political "statements” which the centre has made 
about Corsica during the period the latter has belonged to 
France. Once again, it is demonstrated that Corsicans, like 
their French masters, finished with a sense of ambivalence 
about Corsica's place in the French nation. Curiously, the 
very intensity with which Corsicans, supported by some French 
leaders such as De Gaulle, proclaimed their "Frenchness" was 
itself a cause of differentiation. Not only were Corsicans 
French, they were super-français.
Section Three. "Le problème corse", looks at the problem 
from the point of view of the islanders themselves. It 
explores the consequences for the island's politics of the 
existence of a dual identity as the island experienced the 
phenomenon of rapid social, economic and cultural changes. 
Chapter Three is a short historical treatment of economic, 
social and political developments on the island. This 
corresponds to the "horizontal" dimension of our model: the 
socio-economic backdrop against which the regionalist 
movements emerged. Particular attention is paid to the 
existence of a distinct Corsican culture and to the socio­
economic roots of the clan system: the Corsican system of 
mediation between the local society and the state. This 
provides us with an indispensable framework within which the 
different forms of regionalist movement may be placed. The
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following two chapters deal with two distinct kinds of 
regionalism, each of which corresponds to a different 
dimension of the dual Corsican identity. Chapter Seven on 
moderate regionalism analyses the way in which the strong 
identification with the French state of certain socio-economic 
groups gave rise to certain demands based on a Jacobin 
understanding of French-Corsican relations. This was the 
position of the leaders of the movement who did not radically 
question these traditional relations. The movement itself, 
however, was a coalition of forces, and it enabled other 
groups more alienated from the traditional system and anti- 
Jacobin in ideology to reintegrate into the mainstream of 
political life. Chapter Eight is an analysis of this tendency 
which may be called radical regionalism: its different 
tendencies and its successes and failures. It is called 
radical because it radically questions the traditional Jacobin 
relationships between Corsica and France. Both types of 
regionalism are analysed in relation both to the socio­
economic background of the island and to the system of 
mediation between the local society and the state.
Section Four is a detailed analysis of the Socialist 
reforms of 1982 and, in particular, of the Corsican Statut 
Particulier. This should be regarded a kind of epilogue. The 
previous sections analysed the roots of the Corsican problem 
and described and attempted to explain the emergence of 
regionalist movements. This section looks at the governmental
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response which, to date at least, seems to be going some way 
toward providing a solution to the problem: the creation of 
local administrative institutions controlled, through 
democratic elections, by the local populations. These new 
institutions have had the effect of drawing into one 
democratically elected assembly all the political groups of 
the island including those, such as the extreme nationalists, 
who had been most alienated from the traditional system.
Finally, the Conclusion will try to draw together the 
main findings of the thesis and point out the contribution 
they make to the wider field of studies in "ethno-nationalism" 
and state responses to regional conflict.
The general argument of the thesis is as follows. Corsica 
became French in 1768. Thereafter most Corsicans have been 
happy to remain French: there has been an identification with 
France. However, the island has remained highly differentiated 
socially, economically, politically and culturally. The most 
distinctive political phenomenon peculiar to the island was 
the clan system of mediation. This situation led to the 
creation of an ambivalence or dual identity on the part of 
Corsicans. In the period following the Second World War rapid 
political, social and economic changes took place on the 
island and disrupted the traditional relationships within the 
island and between the island and France. These stresses led 
to the emergence of regionalist movements which exploited, in
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their different ways, the ambivalence of the Corsican 
identity: the moderates based their demands on the pro-French 
or Jacobin dimension; the radicals based their demands on the 
Corsican or anti-Jacobin element. To describe and explain the 
emergence of these movements a model with two dimensions has 
been constructed: the vertical dimension allows us to position 
the movements in relation to the system of mediation (the 
system of public administration); the horizontal dimension 
allows us to analyse them in relation to the socio-economic 
context. This model allows us take account of the complexity 
of the movements, and to assess both the degree of support for 
them and their effects on Government policy toward the region. 
The following hypotheses have emerged from the research:
- the movements grew up in response to rapid changes in 
traditional society;
- the strength of the movements is directly proportional 
to the degree of traditionality and to the rapidity of 
the changes;
- the changes led to a crisis in the system of mediation: 
the movements' ideologies and tactics must be seen in 
relation to this system of mediation: the more moderate 
the ideology and tactics the closer the movement to the 
system of mediation; the more radical the ideology and 
tactics the more alienated the movement from this.
The implications of these findings for the wider field of 
studies in regionalism and ethnic nationalism will be drawn 
out more fully in the Conclusion.
The period examined by the thesis is 1943 to 1984, 
although reference is made to earlier periods when this is 
necessary. It might be objected that the regionalist movements 
did not first appear until 1959: this, for example, is the 
starting point chosen by Pierre Dottelonde. The problem is 
that it ignores what may be called the phenomenon of proto- 
reaionalism which was developed by the Corsican Communists 
just after the Second World War in Corsica. It also ignores 
the fact that, while 1959 was indeed the date when the 
movements made their first organized appearance with DIECO and 
the Mouvement du 29 Novembre the disparate elements of these 
movements already existed throughout the the period of the 
Fourth Republic. It is necessary to analyse this early period 
in order fully to appreciate the roots and political 
significance of later splits in regionalism. The cut-off point 
chosen is 1984 although some reference will be made to later 
events. Once again this differs from the thesis of Dottelonde 
which finishes its treatment of the regionalist movements in 
1973/4.
The reason for this difference is that while Dottelonde 
is concerned principally with a micro-analysis of the
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movements themselves, one of the principal focuses of this 
thesis is to analyse the movements in the context of state 
responses to the phenomenon with a view to increasing our 
understanding of the French state itself and especially how it 
integrates or fails to integrate differentiated territorial 
units. Throughout the period of the Fifth Republic may be seen 
different governmental responses, ranging from massive 
financial subsidization of the clientelistic system of 
mediation to outright police repression. The period following 
the Socialist victories of 1981 and the decentralization 
reforms which began in 1982 represent a quite distinct 
governmental response from previous responses by the state. 
These have had important consequences for Corsica and, indeed, 
Corsica was being used as a kind of "guinea pig", testing the 
decentralization reforms for the benefit of the rest of the 
country. It was felt important, therefore, that these 
developments be analysed in some detail in this thesis. By
1984 two elections to the Corsican Assembly had been held. In 
the period between the elections the new institutions began to 
function and in the light of this experience the Government 
modified the system of proportional representation. This 
enables us to make some tentative judgements on the experiment 
to date. Elections also took place in 1986. However, it was 
felt that to analyse these in any detailed way would produce 
an unwieldy thesis.
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SECTION ONE: EMPIRICAL AMD THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Section One attempts to find the correct empirical and 
theoretical and frameworks within which to analyse the 
Corsican problem. Chapter One deals with the empirical 
framework which is the French nation-state and presents a 
comparative analysis of regionalist movements which have 
arisen within the "Hexagon". Chapter Two attempts to provide 
the appropriate theoretical framework which will help to 
answer the questions which arise from the analysis presented 
in Chapter One.
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CHAPTER ONE: REGIONALIBT AND ETHNIC NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN
FRANCE
The subject of this thesis is the emergence and political 
significance of the regionalist movements in contemporary 
Corsica. In order to examine this phenomenon, it is necessary 
to find the correct empirical and theoretical frameworks and 
this Chapter will be concerned with the problems of defining 
that framework. The next will concern itself with the 
appropriate theoretical framework.
Several empirical frameworks are possible for the 
examination of the Corsican problem which, for instance, could 
be examined within the contexts of "the problem of islands", 
"the Mediterranean basin", "Italianate civilization and 
culture", or "the French political system". It is clear that 
Corsica could fit into any of these empirical frameworks but 
that each would present different kinds of questions and 
demand, therefore, different theoretical frameworks to answer 
these. For instance, the problem of islands could be seen 
primarily as a problem of geography even if this is prefixed 
by the terms "social" or "political". Corsica as a subsystem 
of the Mediterranean might entail an anthropological approach. 
Since our concern here is with the political significance of 
social phenomena, the appropriate framework for examining the 
Corsican problem is the political system of which Corsica is a
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part and other frameworks should be used only in so far as 
they help to elucidate this.
The political system of which Corsica is part is French 
state and society. This is its primary political definition 
even if it occupies a peculiar position within the system. The 
secondary frameworks, such as island, Mediterranean,
Italianate civilization, are useful as ways of elucidating 
distortions within this system. The question then arises: if 
Corsica is part of the French political system, are Corsican 
political phenomena, such as regionalist movements, sui 
generis or are they one instance of a more widespread 
phenomenon. A preliminary step in answering this question is 
to conduct an empirical search of similar phenomena in France 
and, having found them, to analyse them comparatively. In 
this way the ground will be cleared for formulating the 
significant questions and finding the appropriate theoretical 
framework for answering them.
Before doing so, it would be useful at this point to 
clarify the terminology used in this thesis. The first 
distinction is between regionalism and regionalization♦ 
Regionalism is the ideology of groups on the periphery, or of 
their sympathizers at the centre, which postulates that the 
periphery should have some control over its own affairs. 
Regionalization may be defined as the regional policies 
adopted by central Government toward the periphery. It may
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take the form of an economic decentralization which entails an 
admini strative deconcentration, but may not necessarily 
include political decentralization. Regionalism may or may not 
coincide with Governmental regionalization. It, in turn, may 
be broken down further. Moderate regionalism does not seek to 
put into question the attachment of the region to the French 
state but wishes to maintain in existence the existing 
administrative structures even if these may be improved. 
Radical regionalism does put into question the attachment of 
the region to the state at least implicitly. It may take the 
form of autonomism, federalism, or nationalism. Usually, these 
are positions along a continuum. However, these distinctions 
are not water-tight. They represent merely general tendencies.
THE PLURALITY OF FRANCE
France has usually been considered the archetypal example 
of the unitary state: from the time of the monarchy through 
the Revolution and Empire until the present day the state has 
played a centralizing role to create a unified nation. Yet 
regionalists, and others such as federalists, have pointed to 
the existence of a diversity or plurality in France which the 
official ideology of unity and indivisibility at times 
ignores. One of the manifestations of this diversity is the 
existence of distinct cultural or linguistic minorities within 
the ’'Hexagon". This thesis is primarily concerned with such 
groups.
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A useful criterion for distinguishing the existence of an 
ethnic minority is the presence of a distinct language (1). 
Today, after centuries of assimilation and/or repression, 
several different languages are still spoken within the 
boundaries of the French state: one Celtic language, Breton; 
Basque, which is a language sui generis; two Germanic 
languages, Flemish and Alsatian; and four Romance languages, 
French, Occitan, Catalan and Corsican (2). The territories of 
two of these linguistic groups, Brittany and Occitania, are 
found entirely within the confines of the "Hexagon". The 
French Basque Country, French Catalonia and French Flanders 
are minority parts of larger linguistic groups which straddle 
its borders. Alsace and Corsica, each possessing a distinct 
dialect or language, nevertheless share a common linguistic 
and cultural heritage with the German and Italian-speaking 
peoples respectively. It is in these areas that different 
forms of regionalism have arisen, although not to the same 
extent in all of them.
Catalonia (3)
French Catalonia, which formed part of a larger unit 
which was divided between France and Spain, was attached to 
France in 1659 by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. The area became 
partially integrated economically into the wine-growing 
economy of the French Midi, and the Catalonian peasants shared
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much in common with their counterparts in Languedoc (4). 
Because of this economic integration, Catalonians have tended 
to look northward toward Paris as their cultural, political 
and economic reference point, rather than southward toward 
Barcelona, even when the latter was the capital of the 
largely autonomous Spanish Catalonia. Regionalism in 
Catalonia has been at a low level and has been mainly 
concerned with preserving the area's language and culture, 
although there have been some attempts to give the movement a 
political expression. The Grup Rossellones d'Estudis Catalans 
(GREC) was founded in the 1960's. In 1969, the group held a 
"Université catalane d'été", in which several subjects were 
taught in the Catalan language. In 1975, the town council of 
Perpignan (the principal town of French Catalonia) created the 
Centre de Documentation et d'Animation culturelles catalanes 
(CDACC). An attempt to translate these cultural activities 
into the political arena was made by setting up the Comitat 
Rossellones d'Estudis e d'Animacio (CREA), created in 1970 
mainly by extreme-leftists in the wake of the events of Hay 
1968. But such political initiatives found little response 
among the local population and the region has been quite calm 
compared with other regions.
Flanders (5)
French Flanders is the southernmost tip of a Flemish­
speaking area which is today divided among three states -
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France, Belgium and Holland. Unlike Catalonia or the Basque 
Country, however, this area was never united into a 
homogeneous society. The French portion, especially, consisted 
of a series of separate regions which were mingled with 
French-speaking areas. Nevertheless, a moderate regionalist 
movement existed in the nineteenth century, and between the 
wars of this century there existed a radical regionalist 
movement which sought the unification of all Flanders. This 
movement was distinguished by its extreme right-wing views: 
during the war some of its members collaborated with the 
Nazis. It was this collaboration which resulted in the 
movement being discredited after the war, and it is one of the 
principal reasons why regionalism and autonomism have been 
slow to develop in the area.
It is only in recent years that there has been some 
development of regionalism and, as in Catalonia, the concern 
is mainly with the preservation of the culture and language. 
Today, there are two main tendencies within the regionalist 
movement. The Cercle Michel de Swaan has its roots in the 
Right-wing groups of earlier periods. It refuses both the 
'•American way of life" and Marxism. The other tendency emerged 
under the influence of the theories of "internal colonialism" 
which had been developed in other regions (see below). At 
first it did not have its own organisation, but, in 1977, the 
Vlaemsch Zomervolkeshoogeschoole (Flemish Summer University), 
directly influenced by its Catalonian counterpart, was held.
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After the university sessions, an association called "Menschen 
Lyk Wyder" was created to develop the idea of a statute of 
autonomy for French Flanders. So far it has had marginal 
impact.
Alsace (6)
Alsace is unique among the ethnic regions of France in 
that, for quite long periods of its modern history, it has 
lived under two different states, France and Germany. 
Incorporated into France under the ancien régime in 1648, it 
was annexed to Germany by Bismarck in 1870 and remained German 
until 1918 when it was returned to France by the victorious 
Allies. In 1940, Hitler again annexed it, and thousands of 
Alsatians were drafted into the German Army. It was these 
fluctuations, as well as the fact that both German and the 
Alsatian dialect were spoken by many Alsatians that gave to 
the region a strong particularity. This was so even at the 
level of administration. In the inter-war period the Concordat 
which had been signed by the German Reich and the Vatican was 
retained even after re-incorporation into France. A 
Commissariat général (21 March 1919), aided by a Conseil 
consultatif (9th September 1920), was created to facilitate 
the region's re-integration into the French Republic but in 
fact served to maintain the unity and sense of specificity of 
the region. In the interwar period the hardening attitude of 
French Governments, hostile to any form of particularism
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within the Republic (particularly in Alsace), combined with 
the worsening economic situation to provoke strong regionalist 
and autonomist movements. The French Communist Party supported 
the latter and then split, with the setting up of an Alsatian 
Communist Party. However, as in Flanders, an important number 
of the Alsatian autonomists showed more sympathy for Nazi 
ideology than for Marxism and eventually collaborated with 
Hitler during the Occupation.
The experience of Alsace under Hitler differed 
considerably from the period between 1870 and 1918. In the 
earlier period, Germany had given to the region a large degree 
of autonomy. Hitler made no concessions. The result was that 
the nostalgia which had been one of the main causes of the 
development of autonomism in the 1920's and 1930's was absent 
in the post-war period. Furthermore, most Alsatians were weary 
of the insecurity involved in the shifts from one state to 
another. Moreover, Alsace participated fully in the economic 
upsurge of post-war France. For all these reasons, as well as 
the discredit thrown on the idea of autonomism because of the 
collaboration of some autonomists with the Nazis, regionalist 
demands have been confined mainly to defense of the language 
and to promoting the right to learn German in school (this had 
been suppressed under the Fourth Republic but was later 
restored).
- 38 -
Several groups have been created for this purpose. These 
include the Cercle René Schickele, the Front culturel alsacien 
(1974), the Comité pour le droit au dialecte à la maternelle 
(1978), the Groupe des militants de la culture alsacienne 
(1980), and Unsar Gerachtigkeit - mouvement pour l'autogestion 
culturelle en Alsace, which supported Mitterrand in the 
Presidential elections of May 1981.
Small groups, dedicated to a more political expression of 
regionalism, have come into existence. The Mouvement 
régionaliste d'Alsace-Lorraine, founded in 1970 by Dr Iffrig, 
is frankly neo-Nazi in inspiration (7). It has advocated 
"l'indépendance de 1'Alsace-Lorraine" within an "empire 
européen des peuples germaniques". The group split in 1975 
when those who rejected Iffrig's Nazism set up the Mouvement 
EL-Front autonomiste de Libération, seeking autonomy within 
the French state. These groups, however, have failed to gain 
significant support from among the local population.
Occitania (8)
This is the term used to describe the area of France 
south of the Loire, where the "Oc" dialects are spoken. The 
langue d'Oc is so called because of the way in which the word 
for "yes" was pronounced. French is the langue d'Oil 
(pronounced "oui"). Occitania was gradually absorbed into the 
French Kingdom from the time of the Albigensian Crusades in
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the thirteenth century which were used by the Capetian Kings 
as a pretext to expand their territorial control.
A form of regionalism existed here in the nineteenth 
century as a Romantic literary movement called the Félibrige, 
led by the Provençal poet Mistral. Today there are two main 
cultural movements. The first is the Institut d'Etudes 
occitanes (IEO) which was founded in 1945. It has concerned 
itself with consolidating the linguistic forms of the Occitan 
language. Robert Lafont has tried to give this movement a 
political expression and has advocated the ideas of autonomy 
and autogestion. It is he who has popularized the "internal 
colonialism" thesis (9). There does exist a nationalist 
tendency whose leader is Yves Rouquette, but the majority 
tendency seems to be that of Lafont. The other movement is the 
latter-day Félibréens who see themselves as successors of the 
nineteenth century movement of Mistral. Their main activity is 
the study of the latter's works and the preservation of local 
customs. They are not directly involved in political activity 
perhaps because of the diversity of their members' political 
positions, ranging from the extreme-right to the centre-left.
The Occitanian movement resembles those of the first 
three regions in as much as it has largely been a movement for 
the preservation of the culture and language of the region. 
Where it differs is in its size and the extent to which it 
has given rise to theorizing. It has also had more success in 
making links with social protest movements such as the fight
- 40 -
of the Larzac peasants against the establishment of a military 
base on their lands and the agitation of the wine-growers in 
the Midi. Nevertheless, political mobilization on purely 
regionalist grounds has remained minimal and the movement has 
been confined mainly to intellectuals.
The French Basque Country (10).
The French Basque Country, situated at the western 
extremity of the Pyrenees, comprises three of the seven 
historic provinces of Euskadi. When Henri of Navarre became 
Henri IV of France in 1589, the three northern provinces were 
attached to the French Kingdom. The French provinces, unlike 
their Spanish counterparts, have seen little industrial 
development but have remained essentially rural. The Basque 
society has been marked by social and political conservatism 
and its leaders have been the Church and the local notables. 
These élites have exercised a mediating function between the 
local society and the state.
The first manifestation of regionalism in the modern 
period was the founding of the group Enbata (Association des 
Etudiants basques) in 1953 by Basque students at the 
University of Bordeaux (11). The group at first concerned 
itself with preserving Basque culture and local customs, 
nostalgically seeking to recreate a society which they had 
left behind - the peasant society of the Basque country, in
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1956, it transferred its headquarters to the Musée Basque in 
Bayonne (the principal town of the French Basque Country).
This act may be seen as an anticipation of the stirrings of 
radical regionalist sentiment.
There existed several tendencies within the group at this 
period, ranging from moderate regionalism to a radical 
regionalism which included nationalism. The more conservative 
adherents, mainly notables and local businessmen, wished to 
use it as a vehicle for promoting moderate regionalist ideas. 
This was a response to the break-up of the traditional Basque 
society through economic decline and emigration. Furthermore, 
the traditional mores of Basque society, based on the family 
and the Catholic faith, were under threat from the penetration 
of modern ideas through the mass media. The other main 
tendency was made up of young intellectuals who were 
influenced by the struggle for national liberation being waged 
by ETA in the Spanish Basque Country. This tendency wished to 
show support for their fellow Basques suffering under the 
repression of the Franco régime. Furthermore, they gave a 
sympathetic hearing to ETA refugees living on the French side 
of the border.
Enbata's public face changed at different periods, as 
these two tendencies struggled for control of the group. In 
1960, the radicals managed to force the group to adopt some 
more nationalist positions. In 1963, Enbata became a political
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party, but its leadership remained in the hands of the 
moderate regionalists who tried to discourage contact with ETA 
members. In 1967, this element was overthrown and the radical 
regionalist or nationalist element took over. From this 
period, the group also began to develop theses sympathetic to 
socialism. Then contacts with ETA increased and there was a 
spilling over of violence from the southern provinces, 
although ETA did not always look kindly on this violence. 
Between April 1975 and January 1979, there were 53 violent 
incidents, including bomb attacks against police stations, 
tourist offices and secondary residences. Much of this 
violence came from Ipparetarrek ("those of ETA from the 
north"), a tiny group dedicated to "liberating" the northern 
provinces from French rule and uniting them with the south. 
There was also, however, violence from right-wing Spanish 
extremists, such as the GAL (Groupe Anti-terroriste de 
Libération), which resulted in the deaths of several ETA 
refugees and innocent bystanders (12) .
The French Basque Country is interesting because here may 
be found a more developed form , as it were, of regionalist 
activity than in the regions just examined. The Basque 
movement has included moderate and radical regionalism making 
political and economic demands as well as cultural demands for 
the preservation of the language and culture, while its 
tactics have ranged from attempts at mobilizing the masses, 
electoral activity and separatist violence. It would be wrong,
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however, to exaggerate the strength of this movement. In 
electoral terms, it failed to make any significant impact. In 
1967, when Enbata was at the height of its influence, it 
obtained very little support in the elections of that year. In 
the rural areas the results were the following: in Mauleon, 
1,879 votes out of 40,126 cast, or 4.6 per cent; in Basse 
Navarre, 1,058 out of 31,109 cast or 3.4 per cent; in Soule, 
821 out of 9,107 cast, or 9.01 per cent. In Bayonne, the 
result was only 3,156 out of 70,007 cast, or 4.58 per cent 
(13). Today, Enbata has declined to such an extent that only a 
journal of the same name exists. Separatist violence, too, has 
been on a much lower scale than in Corsica and Brittany. It 
may be concluded, therefore, that the Basque regionalist 
movement failed to obtain a significant foothold in the masses 
of the population. The latter has remained unmoved by appeals 
to its "national" identity and has continued to give its 
support to conservative politicians, either Christian Democrat 
or Gaullist, although in 1981 a Socialist candidate, Jean- 
Pierre Destrade was elected.
Brittany (14)
This region, situated on a peninsula in the North West, 
was an ancient Celtic society incorporated into the French 
Kingdom in 1532 by a Treaty between its rulers and the French 
monarchy. Hitherto, it had been a semi-autonomous state, 
although it already had close relations with the French.
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Before the French Revolution it had been allowed to retain 
much of this semi-autonomous character, and the Church and 
nobility were the main agents in maintaining the cohesiveness 
of its society. After the Revolution these élites used the 
society's cultural distinctiveness as a defense against the 
encroachments of the central power. This was one of the main 
factors in the preservation of the Breton language.
Suzanne Berger has described traditional Breton society 
as being rural and conservative in which Christian social 
doctrine served as the basis of a corporatist ideology which 
was the cement holding the society together (15). This society 
related to the French state through the mediation of its 
élites - nobility, Church, and notables each fulfilling this 
function at different periods of its history. Regionalist 
movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were 
promoted by these groups as a means of defense against changes 
from outside which threatened to break up the society and as a 
means of conserving their own power base (16).In the 1930's 
and 1940's, some of these regionalists, influenced by the 
partially successful struggle for Irish independence and the 
strong Alsatian autonomist movement, adopted autonomist and 
separatist positions. During the Second World War most of the 
regionalists cooperated with the decentralization programme of 
the Vichy régime, and some of the separatists even actively 
aided the Nazi occupants against the Resistance (17).
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This collaboration and the heightened French nationalism 
in the post-war period resulted in the repression of the 
Breton movement and, as in Flanders and Alsace, the 
discrediting of the idea of autonomism. Brittany, however, did 
not share in the economic upsurge of post-war France as did 
the latter two regions. The result was that regionalism 
appeared much sooner in the former than in the latter. At 
first, the movement confined itself to promoting cultural 
activities without putting forward any economic or political 
programme. Groups such as the Bodadeg ar Somerian (1946) and 
the Kendal'ch (1951) were formed with such purely cultural 
aims.
The most famous expression of Breton regionalism was the 
Comité d'Etudes et de Liaison des Intérêts Bretons (CELIB),
created officially in 1949 (18). The CELIB was founded by
Breton notables whose economic and societal interests were 
threatened as traditional Breton society began to disintegrate 
under the impact of modern capitalism. It set itself two 
tasks: to act as a study group which would analyse Brittany's
economic problems and to become a pressure group attempting to
influence Parliament in order to resolve these problems in its 
own interests. Its programme of action had a twofold strategy: 
to gain the support of prominent individuals and organisations 
and to persuade the central Government to draw up a plan which 
would provide an economic framework for regional development. 
What was at stake, in fact, was an attempt by the notables to
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control what they saw as the inevitable break-up of Breton 
society so that they would suffer least from its consequences. 
In the early period of their existence they were successful in 
their attempt both to mobilize the Breton population and to 
exert pressure on the central Government. The early 
Governments of the Fourth Republic agreed to develop a 
regional "Plan", and the idea was subsequently applied to 
other French regions.
The group reached the peak of its influence at the 
beginning of the 1960's, after which it went into decline. 
Hervé Guillorel lists the reasons for this (19): after the 
accession to power of General De Gaulle, the Government ceased 
to take into account the CELIB's proposals and especially the 
fact that, after the success of the Gaullists in the 1962 
elections, most of the CELIB leadership became unconditional 
Gaullists (a conversion which was regarded by the radical 
regionalists as the trahison des notables). They thus deprived 
themselves of their position as an intermediary between local 
society and the state or, rather, Parliament. Furthermore, 
this provoked a split with the departure of important left- 
wing members such as Michel Phlipponneau. The CELIB became a 
model for other moderate regionalists in that it sought to 
preserve the position of the notables in the local society 
without calling into question the attachment of the region to 
the French Republic: its discourse was based on the fact that 
Bretons were French and therefore entitled to the same
- 47 -
treatment as other Frenchmen. It confined its demands 
therefore to purely economic matters.
A more radical regionalist group had been in existence 
since 1957. This was the Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la 
Bretagne (MOB), founded mainly by young intellectuals and 
cultural activists, which advocated a solution to Brittany's 
problems which would take a more political form. The MOB 
sought to create different political structures between 
Brittany and the rest of France. Its long-term aim was 
independence, and autonomy was seen as a step in the 
realisation of that goal. Its concept of independence was in 
the context of a federalist Europe, and is summed up in the 
phrase: "aménager l'appartement Bretagne, dans 1'immeuble 
France, du quartier Europe" (20). In other words, the MOB saw 
itself as part of that section of the European movement which 
proposed a form of integration based on a federal system (21). 
With regard to the internal organisation of the economic and 
political structures of Brittany, it declared itself to be "ni 
rouge, ni blanc", that is, in favour of neither capitalism nor 
socialism.
It was this ambivalence about which political solution to 
adopt (capitalist or socialist) which led the left-wing 
members of the MOB to break away. In 1963, they founded the 
Union démocratique Bretonne (UDB). Its programme was socialist 
and internationalist and its political philosophy is summed up
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in the words of Yann Sohier (an early Breton nationalist who 
was also a Marxist): "Le travailleur breton est doublement 
exploité: il est exploité en tant que Breton est en tant que 
travailleur" (22). The UDB adopted the internal colonialist 
thesis, describing the relationship between Brittany and 
France as a colony occupied by an imperialist power (23). But 
its aims were more moderate than those of earlier Breton 
nationalists and it rejected the idea of separatism (although 
it has supported Breton political prisoners including those 
imprisoned for separatist violence). Its strategy was to 
cooperate with the parties of the French left and its members 
have stood for elections as part of Union de la Gauche lists.
After the break-up, the right-wing members of the MOB 
formed the Strollard ar Vro (SAV) or "parti national breton et 
fédéraliste européen". This group, however, has almost 
disappeared from the Breton political arena. Other smaller 
groups include the Parti Communiste Breton and the extreme 
right-wing Stourm Breizh. But the principal representative of 
the Breton nationalist movement remains the UDB.
Separatism in Brittany has also taken a violent form with 
the setting up of the Front de Libération de la Bretagne 
(FLB). The FLB was founded in 1966 and set up an armed wing, 
the Armée Républicaine Bretonne (ARB). The FLB-ARB has 
attacked what it regarded as the symbols of "French 
occupation" - army barracks, police stations, Government
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buildings - but avoided injuring persons. Dismantled once in 
1969, the FLB-ARB resumed its activities until 1972 when there 
was a new series of arrests. Today there are only sporadic 
outbursts of armed activity in Brittany.
Brittany is important because, not only is it an area in 
which regionalist activities have been at a relatively high 
level, but also because it provided a model for other regions. 
This is particularly true of the CELIB whose organisation and 
strategy were imitated although not always with the same 
success. But just how much support did the Breton regionalists 
garner? As already noted, the CELIB was largely successful in 
the early phase of its mobilization of individuals and groups. 
These included business associations, peasants' groups, and 
trade unions such as the CGT and CFDT. But the unity of such 
diverse groups was an ephemeral one and did not survive the 
crisis of the organisation when some of its leadership rallied 
to Gaullism.
The most successful radical regionalist group has been 
the UDB. This success is, however, relative to the other 
nationalist groups such as the MOB, SAV and FLB. In relation 
to the Breton population as a whole, it has been quite 
unsuccessful in mobilizing mass support, which is surely the 
criterion of "success" for a party which describes itself as 
socialist and which seeks, in some sense, to mobilize the 
Breton "nation" or "people". Electoral achievement is one way
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of judging the success or failure of this mobilization (24). 
The UDB has been least successful in general elections: in 
1973, five candidates stood and received an average of 2.20 
per cent of the total number of votes cast. In 1978, there 
were seventeen candidates who received an average of 1.87 per 
cent of the total votes cast. In 1981, sixteen candidates 
received an average of 2.19 per cent of the votes cast. 
However, the party fared slightly better in local elections.
In the municipal elections of 1971, it stood on Union de la 
Gauche lists in four towns - Vannes, Auray, Lorient and 
Quimper - and presented 37 candidates an a UDB list at Brest. 
Its overall score was 4.8 per cent of the votes cast. This 
pattern has repeated itself. In the cantonal elections of 
1973, eight candidates received an average of 4.45 per cent of 
the votes cast; in those of 1976, nine candidates received an 
average of 5.63 per cent of the votes cast; in those of 1979, 
34 candidates received an average of 5.63 per cent of the 
votes cast. The most interesting result was that of the 
municipal elections of 1977 when the UDB had 35 councillors 
elected, twenty-one of whom were elected on the first round 
and eleven in seven towns of more than 30,000 inhabitants. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess whether these 
candidates were elected on the basis of their "Breton" 
programme or because they were part of left-wing lists. In 
conclusion, it may be said that while moderate regionalism in 
Brittany did experience a temporary success, there has been 
wide indifference to the theses of radical regionalism or
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nationalism. Rather, the majority of Bretons have continued to 
vote mainly for candidates whose attachment to the Republic is 
manifest - traditionally Christian Democrat or Gaullist, but 
recently also Socialists who made important gains in the 1981 
general elections. This tendency to vote for traditional 
French parties was confirmed at the recent 1986 parliamentary 
and regional council elections, although these fall outside 
the time-scale of this thesis.
Corsica
Since the bulk of this thesis is devoted to Corsica this 
section will be brief. It suffices to say that Corsica, too , 
has produced moderate and radical regionalist movements which, 
like Brittany and the Basque Country, have adopted the entire 
range of tactics from peaceful mass mobilization to violent 
separatism. Corsica, in fact, has been the region where the 
regionalist phenomenon has been strongest, as this thesis 
hopes to demonstrate. However,at this point we shall not 
anticipate. Instead, we shall see what problems arise from our 
survey of the regionalist movements in contemporary France.
We are now in a position to ask certain questions 
concerning the nature of this phenomenon. The most relevant 
question is: why did it arise in the first place at this 
particular time and with this amount of support?, we have seen 
that the amount of support the movements received was small.
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It was, nevertheless, greater than had been the case in 
previous periods of French history since the Revolution. In 
the period following the Second World War, ethnicity became 
politically salient and, in certain regions, highly so. The 
second interesting question that may be asked is: why did it 
arise in some regions but not in others where it might have 
been expected? More exactly, why did it have a "strong" 
expression in some regions such as Corsica, Brittany and the 
French Basque Country (although the strength varied in each of 
these regions), while it had a "weak" expression in others 
such as Alsace, French Flanders, French Catalonia and 
Occitania? The third question is: why the movements took the 
forms and ideologies that they did? We have seen that these 
ranged from moderate to radical regionalism and that tactics 
varied from elitist consociational bargaining, through 
attempted mass mobilization to the use of political violence. 
Connected with this question is the question: which socio­
economic groups, if any, adopted which sets of ideologies and 
tactics? We have given a tentative response to this question 
in the preceding survey. However, it is necessary to make the 
analysis more precise and to put forward some hypotheses in 
answer to these questions. Finally, the question arises as to 
the nature and role of the state in these phenomena. One of 
our principal concerns in answering these questions is throw 
light on the nature of the modern state and its relation with 
society, in this case local society. In other words, the 
answer to such questions may help us to understand the nature
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and functioning of the French system of public administration 
at the local level.
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to 
ask them in the context of a theoretical framework. The next 
Chapter attempts to elaborate such a framework.
- 54 -
COPTER TWO: THEORETICAL 18SUES
The comparative analysis presented in Chapter One ended 
with a series of questions concerning the regionalist 
phenomenon in France. In order to answer these questions, it 
is necessary to find an appropriate theoretical framework.
This Chapter will attempt to construct this. It will do so by 
critically analysing different theoretical models that have 
been used in the social sciences to study the problem of 
regionalism and ethnic nationalism. It will then assess what 
elements of these models are useful to study the French case. 
Other elements from other theoretical approaches will then be 
combined with these to produce an appropriate model.
INTRODUCTION
Ernest Gellner has noted that the emergence of ethnic 
nationalist movements in western societies , took by surprise 
both "liberalism" and Marxism, the two principal traditions in 
the social sciences (1). One of the basic assumptions of 
these traditions, according to Gellner, was that society, 
moving from pre-industrial to industrial forms, would follow 
a pattern of political, social and cultural homogenization.
The consequence should have been that phenomena such as the 
local society, regionalism and local nationalism would 
disappear. A similar assumption was made by at least three of 
the major theories of "integration": functionalism (Mitrany),
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neo-functionalism (Haas and Schmitter) and transactionalism 
(Deutsch) (2). Federalism, on the other hand, has included a 
recognition of the regional question as an essential component 
of integration.
The assessment by Gellner seems exaggerated, at least 
with regard to Marxism, but does have a large core of truth. 
This may be because social scientists have great difficulty in 
seeing beyond the parameters and tendencies established by 
their own societies, cultures and civilizations. Thus the 
softening of cleavages within societies at certain periods - 
the general rise in the standard of living since the turn of 
the century and the arrival of mass welfarism since the Second 
World War - created the assumption in the minds of many that 
such cleavages had disappeared for ever. For this reason, in 
the 1960's, the end of ideology was proclaimed which, in 
essence, meant that the reality of class struggle had 
disappeared (3). It is no accident that this ideology of the 
end of ideology should have occurred at a period of consensus 
politics made possible by the post-war economic boom which 
attenuated class divisions. In other words, this 
interpretation of reality was made according to the political 
exigencies of the classes in power at the time and there was a 
sufficient phenomenological correspondence with what was 
actually happening in Western societies to make it seem 
plausible. The mistake was to elevate the interpretation of 
what were essentially transitory phenomena to the status of
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"science” by giving them a predictive value which today can be 
seen as being quite unjustified, as events such as the rise of 
the highly ideological Margaret Thatcher at the head of a 
transformed Conservative Party in Britain, and the highly 
ideological miners' strike, testify.
A similar process seems to have occurred with regard to 
the possibility of the continuing survival of cultural and 
linguistic minorities and the salience of political and social 
movements claiming to represent the interests of these groups. 
Despite the efforts of both integrationists and radical 
regionalists, the nation-state remains the basic framework in 
which political life, both domestic and international, is 
acted out (4). From the nineteenth century onwards, those in 
positions of political, social, economic and cultural power 
have exercised this power either within the nation-state (in 
domestic affairs) or from it (in international affairs). The 
official interpretation of political and social reality (the 
Liberal version) and the principal opposition to this 
(Marxism, at least in the twentieth century) were also 
elaborated within this context. It was, therefore, assumed 
that societal units which hindered the process of building 
nation-states, which even Marxists saw as "progressive" in the 
sense of the progress of history, should disappear (5).
Within this latter category were "survivals" such as 
those societies marked by ethnic differentiation which seemed
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to deny the unity and indivisibility of the "nation" 
identified with the modern state. The next step, the 
glissement of normative into explanatory analysis, proclaimed 
that such entities had, indeed, disappeared or would do so 
very shortly. As in the question of class mentioned above, 
there seemed to be sufficient phenomenological evidence to 
support such an assertion at certain periods. The apparent 
contradiction of these expectations by the survival of 
moribund societal units is the basis of the surprise spoken of 
by Gellner.
In any case, questions such as regionalism, ethnicity, 
ethnic nationalism, emerged once again onto the political 
agenda and, as a consequence, onto that of the social 
sciences. The implicit challenge to the afore-mentioned 
traditions led some social scientists to look again at the 
premises of their disciplines and this has led in turn to an 
enrichment of these disciplines. Concepts such as "nation", 
"nation-state", "federalism and federation", "the region", 
which were taken for granted or were given a nebulous 
treatment in political theory, were looked at in a fresh way.
These attempts at theorizing may be placed into two broad 
categories which may be called: (i) the "militant" variety and
(ii) the "academic" variety. These two categories are not 
mutually exclusive and, indeed, often overlap. The distinction 
is useful, nevertheless, because it permits us to distinguish
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two basic approaches to political analysis: a normative one 
and an attempt toward objectivity. On the hand, there is 
analysis which forms part of a political project, and is the 
ideological underpinning, justification and mobilizing tool of 
that project. On the other, there is analysis which pretends 
to a certain detachment, standing back from the situation in 
order to grasp more clearly the elements of that situation. 
This distinction, however, does not correspond completely with 
that found in Marxism between ideology and science , which in 
turn corresponds to a difference between error and truth, or 
between false consciousness and true consciousness. On the 
contrary, in both the militant and scientific varieties there 
is both ideology and science in the Marxist senses of these 
terms. In other words, both may reveal something new about the 
nature of political and social reality. But both also have 
ideological shortcomings which serve to mask these social 
realities. This is why it useful for both approaches to be 
confronted in a dialectical manner and this is the approach 
chosen in this Chapter.
MODELS OF INTERPRETATION
Academic models have often tended tended to be 
applications of general theories of either conflict or 
harmonization (6). One theory of conflict, mentioned above, is 
Marxism. This, at least in its orthodox form, could analyse 
the problem of regionalist and ethnic nationalist movements
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only with difficulty, given its emphasis on the class struggle 
as the primary determinant of conflict. This meant that ethnic 
or regional conflict had to interpreted in these terms, 
whereas, in fact, ethnicity might be more salient than class 
(7).
However, certain approaches, developed within the Marxist 
tradition, such as the theory of uneven development, have been 
used and found to be valuable analytical tools. An example of 
this is Ernest Gellner himself who uses the uneven development 
thesis to explain the rise of nationalism (8). According to 
this thesis, industrialisation has not spread or been diffused 
evenly, so that some regions have not benefited from its 
consequences - a higher standard of living and greater 
participation in the benefits of culture and political 
control.
A variation of the thesis of uneven development is the 
theory of internal colonialism . Internal colonialism may be 
seen as encompassing both the academic and militant approaches 
to theory. As was noted above in Chapter One, internal 
colonialism was first developed in France by ethnic activists 
themselves, and in particular by Robert Lafont (9). It was 
conceived there under the direct influence of the 
decolonization process engaged in by France since the Second 
World War and especially the disengagement from Algeria. If 
Algeria had been considered as part of the "one and
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indivisible Republic" by those opposed to its secession, then 
its subsequent separation put this notion in question. This 
process was seen as one of decolonization. Ethnic activists 
concluded, therefore, that their regions, equally considered 
to be part of the "one and indivisible Republic", might also 
be considered as "colonies". This led to a re-interpretation 
of relations between the local society and the state which 
emphasizes certain structural features such as unequal 
economic exchanges, dependency, and cultural, social and 
political inferiority.
However, the most ambitious attempt to combine the 
internal colonialism thesis with that of uneven development 
has been made by Hechter, who tested it in the context of the 
British Isles. Hechter's thesis is summed up in the following 
paragraph :
The spatially uneven wave of modernisation over state 
territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced 
groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous 
advantage, there is a crystallization of the unequal 
distribution of resources and power between the two 
groups... This stratification system, which may be termed 
a cultural division of labour, contributes to the 
development of a distinctive ethnic identification of the 
two groups (10).
Beer (11) has attempted to explain the rise of ethnic 
nationalism in France by combining this thesis with the theory 
of relative deprivation as defined by Gurr : "Marginal 
increases in value capabilities among deprived groups tend to
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increase the salience of the group's expectations" (12). After 
attempting to test these two theses by correlating independent 
and dependent variables, Beer concludes : "While internal 
colonialism explains the preservation of ethnic regions, rapid 
economic development and its attendant rising expectations 
explains the extra-electoral ethnic protests of the present 
time" (13).
Sharpe criticizes Hechter's thesis on the grounds that it 
does not explain why ethnic nationalism did not reach 
significant proportions in Scotland and Wales before the 1960s 
and does not explain why Ulster has consistently refused to 
leave the United Kingdom (14). The internal colonialism thesis 
seems to have even less applicability to France and it could 
be seen as a political slogan rather than as a theory which 
explains social and political phenomena. Internal colonialism 
as developed in France is a good example of the "militant" 
approach to theorizing about the problem. The basic assumption 
of French exponents of the theory is that there exist distinct 
"nations" or "peoples" which have been colonized by an 
imperialist power - the centralizing French state. This 
assumption, however, simply begs the question that has to be 
answered.
Another approach which shares this assumption has been 
developed by ethnic activists who have attempted to develop a 
theory of "ethnicity". A leading exponent of this approach is
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Guy H6raud, a conservative federalist, who argues that France 
is a collection of "ethnies", each distinguished by its own 
language, culture and history (15). The full development of 
these "peoples" has been arrested by the constraints of the 
centralized French state ; for H£raud, this situation can be 
reversed only by the creation of a federalist Europe in which 
the nation-state no longer exists.
A key assumption of theories of "ethnicity" is that there 
exist distinct societal units, possessing their own 
territories and with distinct features such as language, 
customs and religion. This assumption is shared by another 
approach which sees "ethno-nationalism" as part of the larger 
phenomenon of nationalism (16). The ethnic groups within 
existing nation-states are seen as submerged "nations" 
sometimes called "micro-nations" or "nations without states". 
It is the last description which provides the key to 
understanding this approach: the "micro-nations" are 
understood as basically smaller versions of the larger units 
referred to by the "nation" in "nation-state". But, since the 
nineteenth century, the doctrine of nationalism associated 
with liberalism stated that nations ought to have states. The 
leap is made, therefore, to claim that submerged nations ought 
also to have states. The problem with this mode of analysis is 
that it assumes that like entities are being dealt with. But, 
the very literature on nationalism makes clear that the term 
"nation" may be used in quite distinct senses (17). The
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nineteenth century concept referred to above uses nation in 
the sense of a voluntary association of citizens in a 
democratic state. This derives from the liberal doctrines of 
the French Revolution. The ethnic groups, however, may not 
constitute nations in this sense but in a more ancient sense 
of the word: meaning simply the place where a group is born 
(Latin = natus). On the level of voluntary association, such 
groups often identify with the so-called oppressor nation. On 
the other hand, as in Ireland, these identifications may 
change over time and in certain circumstances, so that such 
groups may in time constitute nations in the modern sense of 
the word. But, as with theories of ethnicity, ethnic 
nationalism tends to beg the question which should be 
answered.
A more academic approach to the problem is developed by 
Sharpe. He has recognised the importance of the uneven 
development thesis but considers that, by itself, it does not 
explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in Western Europe. For 
Sharpe, this is part of a general trend towards 
decentralization, other manifestations of which are the rise 
of neighbourhood councils and the reform of local government. 
Factors other than that of uneven development may explain this 
trend. With regard to the rise of ethnic nationalism, Sharpe 
lists these as: the presence of ethnicity; the tendency 
towards the disintegration of states because of the rise of 
international organisations and the lessening of the need for
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internal cohesion because of East-West détente; the presence 
of states (for example, Libya) and groups (for example, Irish 
Northern Aid) which materially support the terrorist wings of 
ethnic nationalist groups; the reaction against the socio­
economic forces of standardization and centralization; the 
fact that promotion of one's own culture may be a form of 
"psychic income”; small states may have economic advantages 
over large ones; and finally, and most importantly, the rise 
of representative democracy and the concept of equality:
"There has to be a prior and necessary condition of regional- 
cum-ethnic differentiation and a degree of democratization 
before unevenness, of either a positive or negative kind, 
takes effect" (18).
The above-mentioned theories are examples of wider 
theories being applied to a particular problem. Theories of 
ethnicity and ethnic nationalism draw on anthropological 
models and political science models such as nationalism. The 
uneven development and internal colonialist theses may be seen 
as applications of wider theories such as Marxism to the 
problem of regionalism and ethnic nationalism. They may also 
be related to such macro-theories as the centre-periphery 
theories developed by André Gundar Frank, who sees centre- 
periphery relations on a world scale as a phenomenon of 
imperialism (19) and Immanuel Wallerstein, who analyses 
differences between elites at the centre and elites at the 
periphery (20).
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Another "macro" approach is that of Stein Rokkan and 
Derek Urwin who also saw the rise of regionalist movements as 
part of a more general problem of "centre- periphery" 
relations (21). Rokkan and Urwin have made a valuable , 
contribution to the field of regional studies by clarifying 
the existence of different kinds of centre and different kinds 
of peripheries. These occur in the political, economic and 
cultural fields:
The key characteristics of peripheries ... are distance, 
difference and dependence. A periphery is located at some 
distance from the dominant centre or centres, and its 
transactions with the latter are fraught with costs. A 
periphery is also different from the central areas on one 
or more scores: while the degree of distinctiveness will 
vary, being to some extent a function of distances and 
dependence, there will invariably be some minimum level 
and sense of separate identity. Finally, a periphery is 
dependent upon one or more centres in at least one of ... 
three domains of behaviour: in political decision-making, 
in cultural standardization, and in economic life.
Corresponding to these different kinds of periphery are 
different kinds of centre:
Centres can be minimally defined as privileged locations 
within a territory. ... The location of military- 
administrative, economic and cultural institutions gives 
the first and most obvious clue to the identification of 
territorial centres.
Using these definitions, the authors then distinguish between 
countries described as monocephalic structures (all three 
centres are grouped near each other, as in France) and 
polvcephalic centres (the three kinds of centre are dispersed,
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as in Germany and Italy). This leads to the construction of a 
simple model of centre-periphery relations with different 
kinds of interaction - integration/resistance- between the 
centre and the periphery.
The model of Rokkan and Urwin is useful in so far as it 
helps us to distinguish different kinds of interactions 
between the centre and the periphery. Its drawback is that it 
tends to view the problem too much from the point of view of 
the periphery - a reaction against excessive centrist 
orientation of previous studies. This means that at times they 
underestimate the close identification with the centre by the 
periphery. Another problem is that, although they see 
different kinds of centres and peripheries, these tend to be 
viewed as discreet, homogeneous units. As this thesis hopes to 
demonstrate, the "periphery" is less homogeneous that this 
seems to imply.
Another valuable part of these authors' work is their 
"conceptual map of Europe". This attempts to place each nation 
or part of a nation on two axes: a north-south axis and an
east-west axis: the north-south axis is the "state-culture" 
dimension, the east-west the "state-economy" dimension (22). 
The status of each unit could be determined by its position on 
the "conceptual map". Another way in which the centre- 
periphery model of Rokkan and Urwin is useful is that it
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elucidates the long-term historical trends of state and 
nation-building.
All of these theories are useful in so far as they 
provide a useful historical or economic developmental 
background to particular conflicts. They also may help to 
elucidate the processes of nation- and state-building and the 
relations between nations and states in these processes. 
However, a general criticism that may be made of them is that 
they are "grand theories" which may be of limited value in 
interpreting events in particular countries. Tagil is correct 
in pointing to the necessity of a "middle range theory" that 
will combine historical perspectives with concrete empirical 
analysis (23). This is the approach which this thesis tries to 
follow, although rather differently from Tagil.
The approach developed by Sharpe is already an attempt to
develop a middle range level of analysis. However, while he is
correct in seeing the rise of ethnic nationalism as part of a
general trend, it is necessary to examine each case
individually in order to assess fully its causes and 
significance. It would be truer to say that the causes in each 
country are unique and that only after ethnic nationalism has 
arisen in a particular country does it become part of a 
general trend by tuning into or using wider tendencies such as 
the process of decentralization. Or rather it is necessary to 
distinguish two sets of causes : indigenous and external, each
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reacting on the other. One of the main aims of this Chapter is 
to analyse some of these indigenous causes in the case of 
ethnic nationalism in France. These are of three kinds : 
historical, socio-economic and political. An examination of 
these may provide the beginnings of a conceptual framework 
which will make it possible to answer the questions posed in 
the first Chapter: why did regionalism arise in such a 
centralized state as France?; why did it emerge in some places 
and not in others?; why was it stronger and take different 
forms in some places than in others?. An attempt will then be 
made to construct such a conceptual framework.
Tagil suggests that, as the prerequisite for a middle 
range analysis of regionalism and ethnic nationalism, it is 
necessary to isolate the long-term historical factors in a 
particular country. The following section will attempt to do 
this.
HISTORICAL FACTORS: NATION-AND STATE-BUILDING IN FRANCE
The centralizing character of the French state is well 
known and was commented upon by Tocqueville and Marx in the 
nineteenth century as well as by contemporary writers (24).
The main outlines of the modern French state may be seen 
emerging from the time of Richelieu, and then Louis XIV in the 
subjugation of the French nobility and of all Frondiste 
tendencies. The absolute monarch was taken to personify the
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"nation" and the Revolutionaries of 1793 transferred this 
concept of the king's person and applied it to the "people" - 
the "nation" then became identified with the "one and 
indivisible Republic" (25). The dynamism of centralization was 
retained by the Jacobins as a response to internal dissension 
and external attack against the Revolution itself. Finally, 
Napoleon carried centralization to its logical conclusion by 
setting up the administrative system of prefects which lasted, 
with minor alterations, until the recent changes made by the 
Mitterrand regime.
If the centralized French state was thus a reality, at 
least in its administrative structures, it also became the 
basis of an ideology that was in part mythical. This is the 
ideology of French nationalism. But in France le mvthe has the 
power of becoming a "fact" in the sense of becoming a factor 
which influences political and social behaviour. Nevertheless, 
it remains mythical, and when placed under the gaze of 
critical observation, can be shown to be an incomplete 
interpretation of reality. This is so in the case of French 
nationalism which conceived of the "nation" as an organic 
whole - the "one and indivisible Republic" of the Jacobins. 
Michelet expressed the same idea in his Histoirede la France: 
"L'Angleterre est un empire; l'Allemagne un pays, une race; 
la France est une personne." This idea of France as "person", 
borrowed from Rousseau (who had, however, applied it to small 
societies), was developed by Renan in his Ou'est-ce une
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nation? In more recent times it was developed by De Gaulle 
who, as is well known, had a love affair with "la France", 
that is, with an organic abstraction, but was alleged to have 
despised "les Français", who might not live up to its 
"grandeur".
The myth of French nationalism was developed in response 
to a reality, and it was designed in some way to overcome that 
reality. In France, the myth of the "one and indivisible 
Republic" was an ideological tool meant to overcome the fact 
that France, at the time of the Revolution, was many and 
divided, composed of several societies distinguished by 
language, culture and ethnic origins. The centralizing nature 
of the French state and the ideology which justified it were 
attempts by those who controlled the state to arrest the 
potentially centrifugal forces that might develop in such a 
situation. At the time of the French Revolution there was no 
French "nation" but a state whose function was to create one. 
Thus the revolutionaries developed the concept of the "nation­
state" as a weapon to be used in a political struggle. Those 
who used this weapon were the enlightened bourgeoisie in 
control at the centre of power and those local bourgeoisies 
seeking to overthrow the remnants of feudalism in their 
regions.
This historical precedence of the state over the "nation" 
has, in fact, been recognised by recent French leaders.
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General De Gaulle, for example, in a speech delivered in Lyons 
on 24 March 1968, that is, before the "events" of May, 
declared :
L'effort multiséculaire de centralization gui fut 
longtemps nécessaire pour réaliser et maintenir son 
unité, malgré les divergences des provinces qui lui 
étaient successivement rattachées, ne s'impose plus 
désormais (26).”
President Pompidou took up the same theme :
Depuis plus de mille ans, il n'y a eu de France que parce 
qu'il y a eu l'Etat pour la rassembler, l'organiser, la 
défendre ...L'histoire nous montre que notre peuple, voué 
par nature aux divisions et à l'individualisme le plus 
extrême, n'a pu, au cours des siècles, constituer la 
nation française que par l'action de l'Etat (27).
Finally, President Giscard d'Estaing, in a televised speech on 
4 December 1975, expressed it thus :
La France est un très ancien pays, dans lequel 
l'administration centrale a toujours exercé une influence 
importante ... Grâce à cette action nous avons été le 
premier pays à réaliser notre unité (28).
The first three presidents of the Fifth Republic approved 
of this process and felt that the "nation" had indeed been 
created, and that some form of decentralization was possible. 
This idea was also shared by the mainstream of the French 
left, including the Communist and Socialist parties, which 
were traditionally faithful in their majority to the Jacobin 
tradition of centralization (29).
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It must be noted that the building of the French 
"nation", that is, of an entity whose members distinguish 
themselves by a common language, culture and history, and who 
live together in voluntary association, has been largely 
completed. The vast majority of those who live within the 
boundaries of the French state think of themselves as 
"French", as opposed to being German, British, or Italian.
This includes those who live in the so-called ethnic regions.
Two points, however, should be made. First, the notion of 
"national identity" is, by definition, a subjective one in 
part imposed from above by a nationalistic cultural system. 
Secondly, the nation-building process in France has not been 
entirely successful. There has remained, to some extent, the 
ancient substratum of a patchwork of peoples, described in the 
previous Chapter, in which the French national identity has 
been superimposed on a more ancient identity, which, too, was 
once distinguished by a different language, culture and 
history. In other words, large numbers of French people have a 
double identity (30). It is the combination of these two 
factors, the incompleteness of the imposition of the French 
identity and the persistence in some areas of a more ancient 
identity, which has left an "ideological space" which various 
forms of regionalism have tried to fill in competition with 
the dominant culture. Struggles for this "space" took place in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by regionalist 
movements led mainly by clericals and conservatives as a means
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of attacking the central government, especially when this was 
Republican and anti-clerical. And it is the persistence of 
this "space" which has left open the possibility of a 
resurgence of these movements in the period following the 
Second World War. Although there is, therefore, a continuity 
between earlier movements and the present ones, there are also 
differences. The more specific reasons why these movements 
have arisen in the contemporary period may now be examined.
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS: THE DISINTEGRATION OF TRADITIONAL 
SOCIETIES
Renaud Dulong has explained the rise of Breton 
regionalism as being the result of the disintegration of 
traditional society, characterised by a pre-capitalist mode of 
economic production, because of the penetration of monopoly 
capitalism (31). The essential point is that in France there 
co-existed two kinds of society, each characterised by a 
different mode of production. In the ethnic regions of 
Brittany, Corsica and the Basque Country there existed a kind 
which Dulong describes as a "mode de production marchande", by 
which he seems to mean an autarkic economic system with a 
localised market and the remnants of a system of barter 
exchange. Relations within these societies were marked by 
conservatism, and the society was held together by a kind of 
corporatist ideology. In Brittany and the Basque Country it 
was based on the social doctrines of the Catholic Church (for 
instance the encyclical Rerum novarum of Leo XIII), while in
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Corsica it was the solidarity of a clan system. In each of 
these societies local elites - the notables - played an 
intermediary role between what was basically an apolitical 
society and the central power. Gr6mion defines a notable as:
"A man who has the power to act on the state apparatus at 
certain privileged levels and who, in return, sees his own 
power reinforced by the privileges which these contacts, so 
far as they are sanctioned by results, confer" (32) . During 
the nineteenth century and for most of the Third Republic 
(1870-1940) these societies were tolerated by the central 
power, since they represented a force for conservatism in the 
country. It was only when the central power threatened the 
prerogatives of the local elites that regionalist movements 
developed. This happened, for example, during the anti­
clerical campaign of the Third Republic.
Modern regionalism has its origins in the response of 
these elites faced with the disintegration of their societies 
whether by economic decline or by the radical restructuring 
which has resulted from the penetration of modern capitalism. 
It is the attempt by the notables either to resist this (as in 
the Basque Country) or to ensure it is to their advantage (as 
in Brittany and Corsica). In other regions - Flanders, 
Catalonia, Alsace and Occitania - the local elites have not 
been directly threatened or have more quickly come to terms 
with the problem. This was so in Flanders and Alsace, which 
shared in the post-war economic development of France, along
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with other parts such as the north, the Paris region and the 
Rhone Valley. In Catalonia the integration of its economy with 
that of the wine growers of the Midi, has eroded over a longer 
period the existence of a pre-capitalist economy, and this is 
probably a principal reason why there has been little 
regionalist agitation in this area. Finally, "Occitania" is 
more of an idea than a coherent society, and so it has been 
difficult for regionalists to organize a cohesive movement.
The development of regionalism by the local notables 
produced a process of radicalization. Firstly, it allowed more 
radical forms of regionalism discredited after the Second 
World War, to re-emerge. Secondly, it was ambivalent: while it 
did not wish to call into question the attachment of the 
region to the Republic, it nevertheless implied a critique of 
this. This critique was then carried further by a new 
generation of intellectuals (who developed it first in their 
student days) up-rooted from the traditional society.
The latter found themselves pulled in two directions. On 
the one hand, living in an urban milieu (Paris, Bordeaux, 
Marseilles), they experienced a nostalgia for a lost world 
(their "nation") and tried to recapture it through the 
preservation of their culture and language. On the other hand, 
the mere fact of attending university exposed them to a new 
universalistic way of looking at things. Thus, in the late 
1950's and early 1960's they were influenced by two wider
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factors : Marxism and the process of decolonization, 
especially the successful struggle for independence in 
Algeria. They were led to criticise the moderate regionalism 
of their elders and developed a radical regionalism which was 
a potential nationalism different from the nationalism of 
earlier periods. Marxism allowed them to analyse the economic 
and political relations between their local societies and what 
they conceived to be the imperialism of the centralized 
Jacobin state. The process of decolonization gave them a model 
of action: the "national liberation struggle". However, such
a nationalist approach found its greatest success only in 
those areas - Brittany, Corsica and the Basque Country - where 
the traditional society had survived longest and where the 
process of disintegration had been most rapid. In the other 
regions it was less evident for the reasons given above to 
explain the weakness of moderate regionalism. Where it did 
exist, for example, in Occitania, in a very weak form, this 
may be explained by a "contagion" effect. The result was the 
ideology of internal colonialism which should be regarded as 
being more a political weapon than a theory.
In those areas where violence has been used to promote 
regionalist ends there have been traditions of violence which 
the radical regionalists could refer to. In Brittany, 
separatists had used violence in the 1930s and the example of 
Ireland (a Celtic cousin) was not far away. In Corsica 
violence is part of the island's mores. In the Basque Country,
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the activities of the Spanish ETA were a strong influence but 
it would be wrong to exaggerate the extent of this violence or 
the amount of support for it even among other regionalists.
Ethnic nationalism and theories of ethnicity may be 
criticised on the ground that there are, in fact, no "national 
minorities" in France, in the sense that the term itself begs 
the question. There do exist the remnants of societies, some 
more intact than others, that may once have had the 
possibility of becoming "nations" as France did. But all these 
minorities have been largely assimilated into the French 
polity. It is the "ideological space" which allowed 
regionalists and nationalists to gain a certain audience in 
these regions, and certain social classes used the notion of 
"region" or "nation" to defend or promote their own interests. 
By seeing ethnic nationalism as an ideological tool used in a 
particular socio-economic context it is possible to see more 
clearly the status of the different groups involved. That 
French nationalism has been almost completely victorious is 
borne out by the fact that the nationalists, as was noted in 
the previous Chapter, have failed to mobilize significant 
support around the concept of the Corsican, Breton, or Basque 
"nations". This is true a fortiori of the other regions.
POLITICAL REASONS
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It has been argued that regionalism arose most strongly 
in those regions where a traditional society was undergoing a 
drastic restructuring of its internal and external structures. 
But what brought about such changes (33)? In the period of the 
Fourth Republic, France experienced an economic upsurge, as 
the Marshall Plan began to take effect and as the process of 
European integration facilitated the expansion of capitalism. 
The political leaders of the Fourth Republic encouraged these 
tendencies, which necessitated a break-up of the traditional 
system of the coexistence of two modes of production of which 
we have already spoken. It is this process which brought about 
the disintegration of the traditional societies. Dulong has 
described it as the "deterritorializationH of France (34). It 
is this which provided the external impulse for regionalism.
It has been argued that the advent of the Fifth Republic was, 
in some ways, the "rationalisation" of this process by 
providing the economic infrastructure with political 
structures more suited to it (35). In other words, the purpose 
of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was to end the 
political system in which the local notables could hinder the 
forces of economic change which were taking place. General De 
Gaulle encouraged this process because it was ideally suited 
to his programme of promoting the grandeur of France.
It was in this context of a rationalisation of the 
spatial dimension of economic growth that the various attempts 
at decentralization took place in France. Hayward has
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described this as a "functional regionalism" whose purpose was 
to "incorporate the periphery" (36), while Wright has spoken 
of the "triumph of the functional approach" (37). In other 
words, regionalization in France was a means of reinforcing 
the control over the periphery by the centre, an 
administrative deconcentration rather than a decentralization 
which would have involved the devolution of real power to the 
regions. While the notables quickly came to terms with these 
developments, they provoked the process of radicalization 
described above. Once in existence, these movements could then 
feed into the other movements of revolt which developed in 
France especially in the period following May 1968 - 
autogestion, ecology, feminism, anti-authoritarianism, and so 
on. However, it is important to point out that the radical 
regionalist movements are not simply other expressions of the 
May 1968 movement (38). Finally, it should be noted that 
repression has played an important role in keeping these 
movements alive. This, in fact, is more important than the 
outside supporters of "terrorism" mentioned by Sharpe, such as 
Libya, whose interference in French affairs has never been 
proved. Repression reached its highest level under Giscard 
d'Estaing and his Ministers of the Interior, Poniatowski and 
Bonnet. This is especially true in Corsica where the heavy- 
handed tactics of the government confronted the island's 
traditional solidarity a^ id ensured a continual flow of 
recruits into the FLNC (see Chapter Eight).
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The factors outlined above provide a useful historical 
framework for understanding the rise of regionalist movements 
in France. It remains, however, too general and crude. It is 
necessary to refine it further by providing a conceptual 
framework which elucidates the articulation between the local 
society and the state.
THE STATE AND LOCAL SOCIETY IN FRANCE: ft.
France was traditionally regarded as the model of the 
unitary state, occupying one end of a spectrum at the other 
end of which is found the federalist state. In this schema, 
attention was paid to the degree of administrative 
centralization and to the locus of political sovereignty. In 
both these areas France is indeed at the opposite end of the 
scale from a federal system. Its administrative structures 
were characterised by the system of préfectoral tutelle set up 
by Napoleon. Political sovereignty remained (and remains) 
firmly at the centre. Strictly speaking, France has no local 
governments but rather administrative entities - communes. 
départements and, more recently, regions. These entities are 
juridically incapable of passing laws binding on the central 
power. Their powers were and remain subject to strict control 
either by the Prefect, the courts or the Parisian ministries. 
Nevertheless, this interpretation of the French state, while 
valid as a description of France's administrative structures,
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masked another possible interpretation of the state and its 
relationship with society, particularly local society.
The local society and the state
A useful method of going beyond the constitutional-legal 
relationships within and between administrative institutions 
and those who operate them is the approach known as 
Intergovernmental Relations (IGR). This was developed in the 
United States of America by authors such as Deil Wright and 
then applied to the United Kingdom by authors such as Rod 
Rhodes (39). Basically, the IGR approach postulates that 
relationships within and between institutions may not 
correspond to their constitutional and legal frameworks. On 
the contrary, power networks and policy communities may 
diverge considerably from what one might expect from such 
frameworks. This is what has been termed the "hidden 
dimension" of government. In order to analyse this "hidden 
dimension", scholars have used a game theory approach. The 
emphasis here is on the relationships between persons rather 
than structures and the recurring patterns of relationships 
and power games that take place between them.
Motivated by a desire to reform a société bloquée Michel 
Crozier and his associates Thoenig and Worms founded a school 
of organisation theory in France (40). Crozier began toy 
applying these models of organisation theory which had been
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developed in the United States to a study of the French 
bureaucracy. His concern was to go beyond the French tradition 
of basing political analysis on the idealist approach of 
interpreting social and political reality according to the 
ossified categories of past political debates. His method 
would be careful empirical analysis. The central notion that 
emerged from his study of the French bureaucracy is that of 
complicity: the idea that the actors involved in the 
bureaucratic framework are caught up in a network of mutually 
dependent and mutually reinforcing relationships.
These relationships are, however, indirect since the 
bureaucratic system is a complex of self-enclosed entities 
which are isolated from each other. Communication occurs via 
third parties. This leads to the convenient situation for 
everyone involved (except perhaps the public) that there is 
little need for anyone to take responsibility for his actions. 
The buck can be passed up or down as need be. Crozier points 
to the conservative and immobilist character of such a system 
and suggests ways of changing it, although he rejects any 
revolutionary method of doing so.
This model was then applied by Thoenig and Worms to the 
relations between the institutions and actors of the state - 
the prefects and civil servants - and the local politicians.
In his seminal study, Worms emphasised the complicity that 
exists between the Prefect and his notables. Thoenig then
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developed this analysis by constructing what is known as a 
"honey-comb" model, which describes the relations between the 
centre and periphery as consisting of a series of ascending 
pyramids. In each of these a more powerful actor regulates the 
affairs of less powerful actors. This series rises toward the 
centre in a zigzag fashion between the political and 
administrative domains.
There are exceptions to the system such as politicians 
holding many offices (known as the cumul de mandats) or mayors 
of large towns. But these exceptions, according to Thoenig, 
merely confirm and maintain the system since their privileges 
are defined in relation to it. Thus the Prefect, far from 
being a kind of imperialist governor (41), as federalists and 
regionalists claimed, is caught up in a system of mutual 
dependence with the local politicians. It is in the interests 
of both to maintain this system. For the Prefect there is the 
advantage that order is maintained among the local population 
(his principal function), while for the local politicians 
there is a channel by which they may tap the resources of the 
state for their clientèles - the main basis of their 
legitimacy as politicians.
Sidney Tarrow tried to develop these insights in a study 
comparing local politicians in France and Italy (42) . Tarrow 
explained the differing relations between local politicians 
and the state in both countries by referring to their
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different patterns of state development. In France, the 
process of centralization dates from a much longer period than 
in Italy. The consequence is that in the former country the 
administration is more coherent and efficient while in the 
latter it is more diffuse and inefficient. This means that in 
France local politicians are more integrated into the system 
and cooperate with it at the local level by what he calls 
policy brokerage. This means simply that the local politicians 
behave as brokers for their constituents. According to Tarrow, 
however, this should not be defined as clientelism since they 
are not involved in individualistic bargaining for clients. 
Instead they are involved in policy-making (in the sense of 
being consulted about policies) with the state actors. Their 
concern is to direct these policies in such a way that their 
commune or region benefits from them. In Italy, on the other 
hand, local politicians must bypass the local levels of the 
administration and go straight to Rome or to a higher level to 
plead their clients' demands. This Tarrow defines as 
clientelism in the stricter sense, since it involves 
bargaining on an individualistic basis or for individual 
favours. It might be remarked with regard to Tarrow's 
distinction that policy brokerage seems to be nothing more 
than clientelism adapted to a French context, since a French 
mayor who seeks favours for his commune is not exactly 
concerned with the common will but with a particularistic set 
of demands. Furthermore, in what Tarrow calls policy brokerage 
one finds the same assymetrical power relationship that is
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characteristic of clientelism in its essence. Policy 
brokerage, therefore, may be simply another form of patron- 
client relations, but collective rather than particularistic 
and individualistic (43).
Nevertheless, the value of this analysis is that it 
brings out clearly the existence of local interests not 
identical with that of the state and of a system of mediation 
between these local interests and the state. It is probably 
not important whether we call this system policy brokerage or 
clientelism. It is the concept of Intergovernmental Relations, 
with games such as policy brokerage and mediation being 
played, that allows us to go beyond the simple notion of the 
unitary state. It also gives us a more sophisticated analysis 
than the excessively normative approach of the federalists and 
regionalists. The concepts of complicity and mediation are 
valuable in that they reveal some of the sources of immobilism 
within the French administrative system - the resistances of 
the préfectoral corps, civil servants and local politicians to 
changes within this system such as decentralization programmes 
(44). Although it is important not to exaggerate the notion of 
immobilism, nevertheless, it does remain a tendency within any 
bureaucratic system. This immobilism, in turn, is one factor 
which helped the diversity of France to survive despite the 
official Jacobin ideology which proclaimed the unity and 
indivisibility of the Republic.
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There are two major criticisms which may be levelled at 
this model of state/ local society relations. First, it is 
concerned mainly with the relations between the state and the 
representatives of local society, less with the relationships 
between the latter and other groups within the local society 
itself (45). Second, it conceives of the state as a self­
enclosed system (46). While it very usefully describes the 
internal functioning of this system, it does not account for 
changes that occur within it because of external forces. This 
is because it ignores the existence and influence of other 
variables such as economic structures, modes of production, 
and processes of change in these structures and modes. In 
other words, while there is an underlying normative concern 
for reform of immobilist structures in this approach, the 
model is trapped in its own immobilism.
It is here that another approach to understanding 
state/local society relations may be useful. This is the neo- 
marxist approach of Renaud Dulong, already referred to above, 
who has proposed an explanation in terms of what he calls the 
territorialization of French society (the existence of a dual 
economy) and the relations between this and state development 
(47). What this means, basically, is that the economic 
development of France has occurred in such a way that there 
existed alongside each other two modes of production. On the 
one hand, the industrial capitalism of regions such as the 
Paris area, the North and the East. On the other, a
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traditional rural form, which Dulong describes as a "mode de 
production marchande", characterised by autarkic societies 
based on small holdings. The conservative classes who 
controlled the French state, until the period following the 
Second World War, needed this coexistence. One of the main 
reasons for this was because the conservative societies of 
rural France provided a useful bulwark against the influence 
of the urban working classes impregnated with different kinds 
of revolutionary ideas and, worse still, projects. The result 
was the preservation of the traditional societies alongside 
the urban formations.
This approach allows us to modify the Crozerian/Tarrovian 
model in two ways. First, it gives us a basis from which to 
analyse the internal relationships within the local societies. 
This is because it enables us to distinguish the existence of 
different classes and groups (rich or small peasants, large 
landowners, notables, intellectuals) and relate them to a 
particular form of society at a particular phase of 
development. Secondly, it introduces a dynamic element into a 
static model which allows us to interpret changes within the 
system in the context of wider processes of change. These 
processes are the economic development of France since the 
Second World War, with its accompanying programmes of 
industrial decentralization and administrative deconcentration 
but not political decentralization. These changes brought 
about a disruption of the traditional societies and a
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consequent crisis in the regions as the subsequent breakup of 
the traditional relationships led to a loss of societal 
control by the elites.
The growth of different forms of regionalist movements 
with different support bases within the regions and different 
ideologies may be interpreted as the responses of these 
particular groups to this crisis. What is of interest here is 
the significance of this for our analysis of state/local 
society relations. The model allows us to interpret the 
changes within the local societies as resulting from the 
economic deterritorialization of France which has led to the 
disruption of these societies (48). Consequently it will be 
possible to identify the political and ideological responses 
of the specific classes and groups within the local society to 
the crisis. These responses vary according to the societal 
positions and relationships of these groups. This, in turn, 
allows us a better understanding of the nature of the system 
of mediation as being based on sets of economic relationships 
in a particular form of society.
There is thus a model which combines two dimensions, a 
vertical one, which has a tendency toward immobilism and a 
horizontal. dynamic one, which introduces changes into the 
system. The first describes the system of meditation between 
the local society and the state. The second explains the 
changes in this system, and introduces the element of group
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relationships within the local society and how these in turn 
relate to the state. Nevertheless, we still need a concept to 
explain the mechanism by which such societies, which, as we 
have seen, are heterogeneous, are cemented together in seeming 
harmony.
A further refinement of the model along these lines may 
be made by introducing the notion of corporatism. In French, 
le corporatisme may be used in two senses. First, it is a 
pejorative term to describe groups - such as trade-unions, 
administrative corps - who promote their own interests against 
the national interest (the Rousseauesque concept of general 
will). When French lorry-drivers, for example, blocked roads 
they were described in the French press as being part of "la 
montée des corporatismes". The second way in which the term 
may be used is related to an understanding of society which 
derives from Christian social doctrine. In France, the main 
exponents of this theory were, in the nineteenth century, 
reactionaries such as Le Maistre. In the modern period, it may 
be found among federalists, regionalists and ethnic 
nationalists even though these groups may not call it 
corporatism but communalism, regionalism, ethnicity. There 
have been both left- and right-wing versions of the theory 
(49) .
The theory of corporatism is both normative and 
descriptive. It is normative because its exponents (this
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includes those who do not use the term but approve the idea) 
wish to preserve and promote their "organic" societies against 
what they see as the levelling and dehumanizing influences of 
the modern nation-state and the industrial, formally 
democratic society associated with it. These influences are 
described by some federalists thinkers as bringing about the 
"proletarianization" or "massification" of society. The 
political expression of this process is the system of 
representative and parliamentary democracy which many of the 
federalists despise. This also explains the abhorrence for 
both Marxism and Liberalism felt by traditionalist federalists 
and regionalists. The former social theory postulates not only 
the existence of social classes but explains all social 
reality in terms of class struggle. The latter, in their 
opinion, sees society as being composed of individual units 
(citizens) who relate to the state directly without passing 
through intermediary bodies such as the family, the commune. 
the region or the ethnie. The theory is descriptive because it 
does describe certain features of the rural societies which 
the corporatists wish to preserve. This refers to the fact 
that relations within these societies seem to be based on a 
natural harmony where each individual and group has his or its 
"natural" place. It is true that rural societies in France 
have traditionally been characterised by the existence of a 
large number of small peasants, mostly illiterate or ill- 
educated, economically separated from one other (the "sack of 
potatoes" of Marx's 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte). These
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peasants did not, therefore, constitute a class conscious of 
itself, but remained only dimly aware of the existence of the 
state and its institutions (50). It seemed natural, then, that 
the Minterests" of these groups would be "represented" by the 
articulate and politicized classes - the priests, lawyers and 
teachers who form the social grouping known as the notables.
In other words, the kinds of relationships in such societies 
may be described as "corporatist" since they seem to portray a 
natural harmony between classes and groups. Often this 
corporatist system is made explicit by a direct reference to 
the teachings of the Church who control peasant sydicates such 
as the Breton Office de Landernau, as Suzanne Berger has 
illustrated in her work on Breton peasants and their 
relationship to the French state (51).
There is now a middle range theoretical framework for 
understanding state/local society relationships. This model 
has two dimensions. The horizontal dimension is provided by 
the concepts of plurality and economic territorialization. 
These two concepts go beyond the traditional understanding of 
France as simply a unitary state and are a reminder that this 
is also characterised by diversity. They provide an 
explanation as to why this diversity exists and has survived. 
The horizontal dimension also allows us to understand the 
socio-economic changes which this system has undergone and to 
interpret the actions of the different actors within the 
context of these changes. The concept of corporatism explains
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the ideological nature of the cement by which such societies 
maintain an internal coherence. The vertical dimension of the 
model provides us with a set of concepts which help explain 
the articulation between the local society and the state. It 
is concerned with the system of public administration at the 
local level. The key concepts are complicity and mediation and 
these include the notions of policy brokerage and clientelism.
The next two sections of the thesis are an examination of 
the Corsican regionalist movements within this conceptual 
framework. Section Two examines the vertical dimension: the 
links between the local society and the state. It explores the 
phenomenon of integration-cum-differentiation and analyses the 
mechanisms by which the local society has preserved certain 
peculiarities. It is based on the three types of centre and 
periphery interactions referred to by Rokkan and Urwin: the 
administrative-political, the economic and the politico- 
symbolic. However, it is developed in a way that brings out 
the complexity of the interactions more than is the case in 
their model. The perspective taken in this Section is that of 
the centre to the periphery. Section Three begins with an 
application of the horizontal dimension of the model. It 
examines the socio-economic foundations of the local society 
and relates these to the vertical dimension. It then relates 
the emergence of moderate and radical movements to these and 
to the vertical dimension. In other words, Section Two takes 
the perspective of the local society to the state.
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SECTION TWO; "LBS AMIBIGPITBS PE LA CORSE FRAK9AI8E»
Section Two looks at the Corsican problem from the point of 
view of the attempt by the centre to integrate a geographical 
territory differentiated in culture, language and history from 
the dominant French culture, into the French nation. It is 
based on the three-fold typology of centre-periphery relations 
advanced by Rokkan and Urwin: administrative (but not the 
military), economic and politico-symbolic. Chapter Three 
examines this phenomenon from the point of view of 
institutional development. Chapter Four examines it from the 
angle of economic developments in France and Corsica. Chapter 
Five looks at the political "statements" about Corsica made by 
elites at the centre.

CHAPTER THR^Eî FRENCH INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CORSICA
This Chapter explores the phenomenon of integration-cum- 
differentiation on Corsica from the point of view of 
institutional developments on the island. It first of all 
examines the function of institutional development in general 
terms. Then it examines the role of institutions in relations 
between the centre and periphery in France. In particular, it 
notes that institutions designed to assimilate differentiated 
territorial units into a common polity or nation may, in fact, 
help to maintain differentiation. Finally, it analyses the 
phenomenon of institution-building in the Corsican case.
Eisenstadt has suggested that "institutions or patterns 
of institutionalization can be defined ... as regulative 
principles which organize most of the activities of 
individuals in a society into definite organizational patterns 
from the point of view of some perennial, basic problems of 
any society or ordered life" (1). Political and administrative 
institutions, therefore, may be seen as concrete ways in which 
societies have attempted to meet some of the "perennial, basic 
problems" of that society in a political manner, that is by an 
organization of the state. Politicians create new institutions 
or elaborate policies within existing ones, while 
administrators or civil servants operate within these 
institutions in implementing these policies.
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In the case of France, one of these fundamental problems 
has been the contradiction between the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces within French society (2). The former 
include the Frondiste. regionalist and micro-nationalist 
tendencies with which this thesis is primarily concerned. The 
latter include monarchist, Jacobin Republican and imperialist 
tendencies. The nature of French institutional development at 
the local level has been to a large extent determined by this 
tug-of-war, and different régimes, with their various 
political and administrative institutions, present different 
ways of attempting to solve the problem.
Nevertheless, there seems to be one constant element in 
the history of French institutional development: those groups 
- monarchists, Republicans, or Bonapartists, whether of the 
left or the right - which actually held the reins of power 
have either created institutions or maintained preexisting 
ones which have reinforced the control of the centre over the 
periphery. This is true even if such groups have professed 
anti-centralist or regionalist positions prior to taking 
power. The differences between groups and régimes lie in the 
way they have actually exercised control from the centre. A 
student of the French administrative system, Georges Dawson, 
has expressed it thus:
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"L'etude de l'histoire des institutions administratives 
locales montre que, suivant les régimes politiques, il y 
a prédominance des institutions déconcentrées ou des 
institutions décentralisées. Dans un régime d'inspiration 
théocratique, dont la conception métaphysique considère 
que le pouvoir politique est transcendant à la société, 
on aura évidemment une prédominance des institutions 
déconcentrées. Dans un régime démocratique, dont la 
conception métaphysique considère que le pouvoir 
politique est immanent à la société, on assistera au 
contraire à une prédominance des institutions 
décentralisées" (3).
The same author provides the following distinction between 
décentralisation and déconcentration:
"...les pouvoirs de décision abandonnés par 
l'administration peuvent être remis, soit à des agents 
dépendant directement du pouvoir central et nommés par 
lui - on dit alors qu'il y a déconcentration - soit remis 
à des organes relativement indépendants du pouvoir 
central et le plus souvent élus par les habitants de la 
circonscription - on dit alors qu'il y a 
décentralisation" (4).
The point is that these are two ways by which the centre 
has attempted to solve the basic contradiction between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces within French society. In 
the first case, deconcentration, it does so authoritatively 
from above without necessarily consulting or involving the 
population of the periphery. In the second case, it attempts 
to do so with the explicit collaboration of the periphery. 
Some, for example M. Flory, would argue that in the long term 
it does not really matter which method is chosen: the result 
is still the same - excessive centralisation (5). The position 
taken in this thesis, however, is that "content follows 
context", that is, the nature of local politics and policy­
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making derives from the type of institutions themselves. The 
outcome depends on the type of institutions adopted and indeed 
integration into, or differentiation from, the centre depends 
on this.
One of the primary functions of the institutions of local 
administration in France has been to integrate local societies 
into the French polity or nation. In more historical terms, it 
could be said that these institutions have been the tools by 
which the French state, or at least those élites who 
controlled the key power positions within the state, attempted 
to create the French nation. As has been argued above, it was 
the former which created the latter (6). However, the regular 
resurfacing of the centrifugal forces at frequent intervals in 
French history is an indication that this process of 
integration has not been totally successful. There still 
remain décalages between the state and the nation, 
administrative or political "spaces" which these forces may 
attempt to fill. The "strength" or "weakness" of such 
movements, in terms of popular support or disruptive capacity, 
may taken as indications of the degree of integration or 
décalage.
Paradoxically, however, this disintegrative potentiality 
may exist because of the very institutions which were created 
to overcome them. A striking example of this, mentioned above 
in Chapter One, is Alsace-Lorraine in the period following the
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First World War, when the region was returned to France after 
being German since 1870. In order to reintegrate the region 
into the French Republic two special committees were set up 
(7). In practice, these committees helped to maintain a sense 
of Alsatian difference from the rest of France and thereby 
contributed to the upsurge of autonomism which experienced an 
important growth in the interwar period (8). This phenomenon 
is true even in regions without the strong sense of ethnic 
identity such as Alsace-Lorraine possesses. The work of Worms, 
Thoenig and Grémion, mentioned in the previous chapter, has 
shown how local élites such as prefects, civil servants and 
notables are caught up in a set of institutions which tends 
toward an immobiliste situation (although it is true that 
important changes did occur after the Second World). It is 
true that this tendency toward immobilism is an integrating 
factor, since it discourages change in any direction. However, 
it also ensures that local societies are protected from the 
centre, even when the latter is dominated by a Jacobin 
ideology which proclaims the necessity of abolishing all local 
differences which interfere with the complete integration of 
the periphery into the centre.(9).
THE PREFECTORAL SYSTEM
This integrating-cum-differentiating character of the 
French administrative system may become clear by a brief 
glance at the prefectoral system. This is the centre-piece of
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the system and was set up by Napoleon by the Law of 28
pluviôse An 8 (17 February 1800) (10). This law established
the geographical units of local administration - the
département and the commune. both created during the
Revolution- and the kind of administration - an official
appointed by the central Government who would act as a kind of
governor directing all the administration in his département.
All other officials - Sub-prefects and mayors - were
theoretically subordinate to the prefect. Chaptal described
this system in the following terms:
"The prefect ... transmits orders to the Sub-prefect; 
this latter, to the Mayors of towns, boroughs and 
villages... in such a way that the chain of command 
descends without interruption from the Minister to the 
subject and transmits the law and orders of the 
Government ... with the rapidity of electric fluid" (11)
Machin's work, The Prefect in French Public
Administration. has shown that this system has generated a
certain number of myths which do not always correspond with
the realities of the everyday administration of the
départements by the prefect. This was particularly true of the
functions of the prefect as outlined above by Chaptal. The
seemingly all-powerful position of the prefect in his
département was modified in several important ways. First, by
control from the Government itself - legislation increasingly
determined the scope and nature of the prefect's powers,
thereby imposing limits on them. Secondly, they were limited
by social groups within the département itself: local
politicians, national politicians with a popular base,
pressure groups. The prefect could not afford to be on bad
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terms with Deputies or Government ministers who might also be 
maires or members of the Conseil Général. It was often the 
latter who controlled the prefect and not vice versa.
This analysis is confirmed in the study by Worms which 
stressed the almost affective relationship between the prefect 
and his notables (12). Thoenig's model, known as the 
"honeycomb model", describes the transmission belt from the 
summit (the Government) to the base (the local authorities and 
the notables) as consisting of a series of interlocking 
relationships, which ascend and descend in a "zig- zag" 
fashion, between local politicians, civil servants and the 
prefect (13). The value of such studies is that they provide a 
conceptual framework which describes with great finesse the 
actual working of the system. They also lay bare one of the 
principal causes of immobilism in the French administrative 
system: those within the system benefit in different ways from 
it and are concerned to maintain the status quo since this 
would endanger their prerogatives. The concept, formulated by 
Michel Crozier to explain relationships within the system of 
bureaucracy, that encapsulates these relationships is that of 
ÇpuppUçjtY (14) .
There have, nevertheless, been changes in the system 
brought about mainly by the imperatives of changes of régime. 
These are the approaches which emphasize either 
decentralization or deconcentration, in the sense these terms
- 101 -
been described above. Machin also noted the secular 
tendency of a reduction in the powers of the prefect and a 
corresponding increase in the powers of local politicians. 
These power relationships have been expressed principally 
within the institutions of local Government.
The institutions of local administration have, then, a 
double aspect: they are the means by which local societies are 
integrated into the French polity; at the same time they are 
the means by which certain élites within the local society 
maintain the status quo, that is, they defend the local 
society from the centre. It is this ambiguity (15) which makes 
it possible for centrifugal forces to emerge and put into 
question the very institutions themselves. This is why, to 
appreciate the full significance of these movements, it is 
necessary to situate them historically and sociologically 
within the context of institutional development and 
functioning. On the other hand, a study of the movements 
themselves reveals how the system itself functions. The 
remainder of this Chapter is an exploration of this ambiguity 
as it has been expressed in the development of French 
institutions in Corsica. Firstly, it will examine those 
institutions common to the rest of France. Secondly, it will 
examine what is peculiar to Corsica. Finally, it will attempt 
to assess the extent to which institutions have contributed to 
Corsica being integrated into or differentiated from the rest 
of the French nation.
m
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But before looking at French institutions in Corsica, it 
will be useful to examine the situation before the French took 
possession of the island.
PRE-FRENCH CORSICA
It is impossible to appreciate the nature of French 
institutions in Corsica without seeing the continuity with, 
and differences from, what went before. Before the Corsican 
revolt of 1729-1769 and the annexation by France in 1768-9, 
both de jure and de facto sovereignty over the island was 
exercised by Genoa. The status of the island in the Genoese 
system was that of a colony which the Republic wished to 
exploit agriculturally because its own hinterland was 
unsuitable for producing foodstuffs. Native Corsicans were 
largely excluded from the administration of the island (16).
It was this, as well as attempts by the Genoese to mettre en 
valeur the island but to exclude Corsicans from this 
development process which led to the rebellion which lasted 
from 1729 until 1769 (17).
This thesis cannot give a full account of this rebellion: 
its concern is rather with its effects on subsequent 
institutional development under France. The main point is that 
during the pre-French period the principal concern of the 
rebels and even of those loyal to Genoa was to find places
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within the system of administration of their island. The 
Paolian period (1755 -69) during which "Republican'* 
institutions were set up may be interpreted as an attempt to 
create a set of autonomous institutions by which the island 
could then be integrated into any great power which would 
accept it. At first, they sought such an arrangement with 
Genoa. When this failed they approached other powers and 
finally France (18).
The French did not accept this "offer" on the terms in 
which Paoli presented it. When annexation did occur, 
however,the French were more astute than their Genoese 
predecessors, and took into account this desire on the part of 
Corsicans to participate in their own administration. This 
took the form of coopting the principal clan leaders and also 
some of those who had fought with Paoli against both the 
Genoese and the French. The sons of such leaders were sent to 
the French continent to complete their studies and become 
loyal Frenchmen. A good example of this is Charles Buonaparte, 
father of Napoleon, who had been an ardent paolista but 
quickly became a good friend of the French military governor, 
Marboeuf. Napoleon's career began in a French military academy 
on the mainland.
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FRENCH INSTITUTIONS IN CORSICA
When the French occupied Corsica in 1769, the juridical 
status of the island was highly ambiguous. The Genoese ceded 
de facto sovereignty by the Treaty of Versailles signed 
between the two powers in 1768. It retained, however, de jure 
sovereignty. The French agreed to pay a sum of two million 
livres over a number of years for the occupation of the 
island. Strictly speaking, therefore, the island was not 
"bought" as Voltaire claimed at the time and as anti-French 
Corsicans have repeated ever since (19). It was rather leased 
by the French from Genoa. Nevertheless, the French knew that 
the island would never be returned to the latter and proceeded 
to set up institutions as if it were also the de jure 
occupant. The problem was that the Corsicans themselves were 
unsure of their status and it seems that many wished to remain 
French and feared a return to Genoa.
The French regarded their new possession in the same way 
that it did other colonies and saw it as a champ d'expérience 
of institutional reform and of economic development (20).
These experiments are revealing as they illustrate some of the 
continuities of institutional development in Corsica. The aim 
of the movement was "l'application de mesures éclairées visant 
à plus d'efficacité et d'ordre dans les institutions" (21). 
Corsica may have been chosen because of the challenge its 
peculiar traditions presented to the reformers. Eventually,
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the good intentions of the reformers were modified by taking 
into consideration "certaines structures préexistantes" which 
contributed to "conférer des traits originaux à cet ensemble 
[d'institutions] par rapport aux autres provinces du royaume" 
(22). Thus, we find the two basic elements of institutional 
development in Corsica: the imposition of the same structures 
as are found in the rest of France (or, at this period, in the 
provinces) and a continuity with what went before.
Responsibility for the island was confided to the 
Secrétariat d'Etat à la Guerre, then to the Contrôle général 
des Finances and then, just before the Revolution, back to the 
Secrétariat à la Guerre. Authority was shared in an ill- 
defined way between an Intendant and a military Commandant en 
chef (23). The island was given the status of pays d'Etat with 
a representative assembly elected at various levels and in 
hierarchical order (nobility, clergy and Third Estate). This 
was the situation until the Revolution.
The erection into a pays d'Etat is an example of the 
island's integration into the Kingdom, since this was the 
status of many of the ancient provinces. At first, however, a 
part of the Corsican population reacted to this situation with 
violence which explains why the island was attached to the War 
Ministry and had a military governor as well as an intendant. 
This represented the element of differentiation. The violence 
was both traditional banditry and vendettas, but also
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"l'expression d'une volonté de rejet à l'égard d'une 
domination étrangère oppressive et brutale" (24). This, 
however, was only temporary and, as time passed, a "nombre de 
notables s'accommodaient de la nouvelle situation où ils 
cherchaient à se faire une place" (25).
REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE IN CORSICA
It was during the Revolution and the Empire periods that 
the ambiguity of Corsica's constitutional status and its 
relationship with the rest of France was resolved, at least on 
the juridical and institutional levels, that is, at the level 
of the island's administrative structures. Formally at least, 
the island became French à part entière. This "integration", 
however, was not achieved without serious obstacles from both 
within and without the island. Furthermore, the formal or 
legal integration was not immediately translated onto the 
sociological and political levels.
The most serious obstacle to integration came from within 
the island itself. Corsican society was riven by clan rivalry 
and the great events of the Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars 
taking place in Europe were recast on the island in the terms 
of clan politics (the origins and nature of the clan system 
will be analyzed more fully below in Chapter Six). Thus, some 
clans supported the ancien régime, others the Revolution; 
among the latter some supported the Girondins, others the
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Jacobins. At the beginning, however, almost all sections 
within Corsican society were united in one desire: to shake 
off Genoa forever and be attached definitively to France (26).
This desire to be treated as Frenchmen, equal to all 
other Frenchmen, is evident in the satisfaction with which 
Corsicans responded to the invitation to send Deputies to the 
Etats généraux in 1789. This was a concrete manifestation on 
the part of the French monarchy that Corsicans were recognized 
as fully French. As Pomponi comments:
Les quatre députés de la Corse, porteurs des doléances de 
leur compatriotes, rejoignirent l'Assemblée de Versailles 
en se faisant les interprètes d'un large consensus pour 
exprimer la satisfaction d'avoir été admis à déliberer au 
même titre que les représentants des autres provinces sur 
les affaires générales du royaume" (27).
Furthermore, the first of the list of doléances carried 
by the Corsican Deputies asked that the island become "partie 
intégrante de cette monarchie". It is true that behind this 
demand was the desire of the Corsican middle classes to occupy 
those positions in the administration of the island now 
occupied by French fonctionnaires. As Pascal Marchetti 
expresses it: "On relève aussi la revendication de l'égalité 
entre les Français et les Corses" (28). However, this was 
simply another way of asking to be fully integrated into the 
kingdom since the desire for integration was based on an 
appreciation of the advantages that it would bring. When the
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Constituent Assembly was set up one of the Corsican Deputies, 
Cristofanu Saliceti, tabled a motion that:
"L' île de Corse est déclarée partie intégrante de 
l'Empire français; ses habitants seront régis par la même 
constitution que les autres Français. Dès ce moment, le 
Roi sera supplié d'y faire parvenir et publier tous les 
décrets de l'Assemblée nationale" (29).
This resolution was adopted by the Assembly and, as 
Pomponi remarks, the decree putting it into effect "fut salué 
en Corse dans une atmosphère de fête jusque dans les villages" 
(30). Despite a protest from Genoa, still theoretically 
sovereign over Corsica, the island now became wholly 
integrated constitutionally into France. Another way of saying 
this is that the island became fully part of the French nation 
by a voluntary act on its part and was accepted by the nation.
Corsica received the same administrative institutions as 
the rest of France. In January 1790, it became a département 
with Bastia as the .chef-lieu on the grounds that Bastia had 
been the administrative centre during the Genoese period.
There was no concession made to the Paolian attempt to make 
Corte, the geographical centre in the interior, the capital. 
The département was divided into nine districts each of which 
was divided into cantons, based on the old pievi, or parish 
boundaries which had been the administrative units in the 
Genoese, Paolian and ancien régime periods. In 1793, two 
départements. the Golo and the Liamone, corresponding to the 
geographical division caused by the range of mountains running
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down the centre of the island, were created. It might be 
remarked that these administrative divisions tend to confirm 
the argument of "departmentalists" such as Bourjol who claim 
that the départments created at the time of the Revolution 
correspond largely to natural human and geographical 
boundaries as opposed to certain regionalists who see this as 
an attempt to divide such natural communities (31). In effect, 
the pieve may be traced back to administrative divisions 
existing in Roman times and subsequently taken over by the 
Church, while the two départements correspond to the natural 
division of the island as well as to the existence of two 
different kinds of communities known as the Terra dei Communi 
(the north-east) and the Terra dei Signori (the south-west) 
(see below Chapter Six). Thus, the setting up in Corsica of 
the institutions of modern France was marked by both 
continuity and change. The continuity lay in the actual 
geographical units chosen. The change lay in the kinds of 
institutions themselves.
Integration, however, in a social and political sense, 
that is the conformity of the local population to the social 
mores of the ruling élites and in the willing acceptance of 
their right to rule, would not take place by the simple 
passing of a decree and the setting up of new institutions. 
Before this could happen, the acceptance by important sections 
of the Corsican population had to be won or forced. As has 
been already remarked, the most serious obstacle to this was
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the persistence of clan rivalry which tended to try to play 
off nations (France, England, Spain) or factions (Royalists 
vs. Republicans; Girondins vs. Jacobins) against one another. 
The most serious incident was the attempt by Pascal Paoli to 
lead a rebellion against the Jacobin Revolutionaries and 
eventually to ask for English help to set up an Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom (32). Paoli had returned from twenty years exile in 
London, and was acclaimed by the French Revolutionaries as a 
hero of liberty (a mvthe paolien had grown up). He had, 
however, mellowed in his old age and identified with the 
moderate Girondins rather than with the more radical Jacobins. 
He protested, for example, at the execution of Louis XVI. When 
the Jacobins came to power in 1793, he was already under a 
cloud of suspicion and moves were being made by radical 
Corsicans close to the Jacobins to replace him. In reaction, 
in 1794, he invited the English, who had important strategic 
interests in the Mediterranean, to set up the Anglo-Corsican 
kingdom which attempted to combine the traditional Corsican 
administrative structures (the pievei with the tradition of 
English parliamentarism. In reality, this became simply 
another set of institutions which served as the setting for 
clan rivalry. Paoli was eventually ousted by the English 
administrators, who feared his influence, and by rival clan 
forces. In 1796, the island was finally recaptured by the 
French with troops under the command of Napoleon who stated 
that "Il faut que la Corse soit une bonne fois française"
( 3 3 ) .
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This, however, did not occur easily. While it is true 
that Corsicans had wished to be French, they objected to the 
repression that followed their re-entry into the Republic. 
Charles Santoni has pointed out that during the Napoleonic 
period there were several important revolts by Corsicans 
against the French (34). Napoleon feared that the island would 
degenerate into a second Vendée and become a support base for 
the English in the Mediterranean, fears which were justified 
by the affair of the Anglo-corsican kingdom. When he became 
First Consul, he placed the island under a régime d'exception 
to prevent this happening. But this was the principal cause of 
the revolts. The Constitution of An VIII was not at first 
applied to the island and its administration exhibited several 
peculiarities (35). A decree of 1801 appointed Miot as 
administrateur général with wide powers, of the two 
départements . In January 1803, Morand became military 
governor and instituted what the historian Renucci, a 
contemporary, described as "un véritable despotisme militaire 
et policier" (36). At the beginning of the nineteenth century 
the two départements were reunited into one with Ajaccio, the 
home of the Emperor, as the chef-lieu. It was felt that Bastia 
was too oriented, economically and culturally, towards the 
Italian peninsula and that, by choosing Ajaccio, the island 
would be more easily integrated into France.
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The period just outlined is important because it was at 
this time that Corsica received the institutions which formed 
its basic administrative system for most of the modern period. 
During the Revolution it became a département. then was 
divided into two départements. and finally, became one again. 
It is true that the island was under a réaime d'exception 
during much of the Napoleonic period but, eventually, it 
received a prefect like the other départements of France.
During this period, too, may be observed the basic 
sociological and political realities which have characterized 
modern Corsica. First of all, there is the element of 
continuity. Despite the different sets of institutions set up 
during different periods - ancien réaime. Revolution, Anglo- 
Corsican Kingdom, Empire - the administrative units always 
remained basically the same and were based on the old pieve 
system. This often corresponded to the geographical boundaries 
of natural human communities. Secondly, the basic sociological 
realities of the island did not change. The system of clans 
remained and was not destroyed by a new system whatever form 
this took. Thirdly, this translated itself politically by the 
institutions becoming the settings for clan struggles. 
Fourthly, some groups of Corsicans (or clans) revolted when 
they felt excluded from the benefits of attachment to the 
mainland. But this, at root, was based on a fundamental 
acceptance of, and attachment to, the French state. Fifthly, 
the state responded by trying to coopt some clans at the
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expense of others but with the long-term aim of integrating 
all of Corsican society. Finally, while the institutions 
succeeded in "integrating" Corsicans at the formal or 
voluntaristic level, the peculiar interpretation they received 
on the island served to reinforce the sense of 
"differentiation".
ASSIMILATION AND DIFFERENTIATION IN MODERN CORSICA
This is not the place to give a complete history of 
Corsica from the Revolution until the present day. Our concern 
in this Chapter is rather to see how the basic features of 
institutional development in Corsica have either hastened 
integration into the French nation or strengthened the sense 
of differentiation of the local society. From what has been 
said above, it should now be clear that the situation was, to 
say the least, ambivalent. However, this ambivalence was 
present mainly on the sociological and political levels. On 
the level of a voluntary identification with France, most 
Corsicans seem to have been quite decided in their choice of 
France. For instance, despite attempts by modern Corsican 
nationalists (e.g. Marchetti) to give a nationalist 
interpretation to the above mentioned revolts or to the 
phenomenon of banditry, these would seem to have little 
explicit political content and should seen more as jacqueries 
or inter-clan warfare. In Corsica, there was no massive 
rejection of the state such as occurred in Southern Italy and
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the Italian islands in the period 1860-70: in Sardinia, for 
example, there was, during this period, a flourishing of local 
literature which sought to affirm the local identity against 
the Italian state. In Corsica, on the contrary, the local 
population largely identified with the French state and 
produced little literary output seeking to affirm a local 
identity (37).
Did the institutions, therefore, transform Corsicans into 
Frenchmen, to paraphrase Eugen Weber (38)? This is clearly not 
the case if to be French means to belong to a culturally and 
sociologically homogeneous community. This kind of 
assimilation was a much longer process than the voluntary 
association mentioned above. On this level, the institutions 
of the French state actually served to hinder rather than 
accelerate the process of assimilation.
It has already been seen that the local clan leaders 
quickly came to terms with the new institutions of whatever 
régime was in power, and their principal concern was to occupy 
the most important positions within them. This was the case 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
institutions of modern France were invested in Corsica with 
what one nineteenth observer, Paul Bourde, in his invaluable 
work on the Corsican clan system, called the esprit de clan
(39). The esprit de clan meant simply that the interests of 
one's clan came uppermost. The notion of "intérêt général" was
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absent. Or rather, it was invoked by the rival clan when it 
was in opposition and complaining about the particularistic 
practices of the clan in power, When it, in its turn, came to 
power, the situation was reversed.
The primary unit of local administration was the commune 
and it was here that the esprit de clan was most evident (40). 
The struggles of the clan were fought out in the municipal 
elections as if the two clans were going to war with the
mairie as the prize for the victor (41). This influenced the
actual functioning of the communal institutions. First of all, 
all means were fair in the winning of the prize. When
elections were the means to do so, as in the Third Republic
(1870-1940), these were marked by massive corruption.
Secondly, the maire was not regarded and did not regard 
himself as the père de la commune, that is as someone whose 
position was not regarded in a partisan manner (42). On the 
contrary, his first duty was to protect and promote the 
interests of his own clan. The interests of the rival clan 
were to be systematically blocked, and this was to be done in 
a public manner.
This manner of running the local institutions was 
repeated at every level right up to the Conseil Général. As 
Delors and Murraciole describe it:
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MIls [les clans] accaparent les présidences et dévorent 
les sièges électifs. Les mairies, les conseils généraux, 
la direction des administrations locales, la présidence 
des sociétés d'économie mixte, rien ne semble leur 
échapper" (43).
This approach to running local affairs was largely 
tolerated by the French state. The prefect in Corsica 
eventually became a figure much less important than the local 
politicians who often were Government ministers, thus 
confirming Machin's analysis outlined above. This was 
especially so from the Second Empire on when Napoleon III, 
who, for sentimental reasons, showed a great interest in the 
island's welfare, encouraged Corsicans to enter the 
administration and established the tradition of having a 
Corsican minister in his cabinet. During the Third Republic, 
the Corsican minister was Emmanuel Arène, known as "U Re 
Manuele", who was responsible for the modern system of 
political clanism (44). In effect, real power on the island 
was in the mairies and in the Conseil Général. With the 
tradition of cumul des mandats the latter institution usually 
contained the local Deputies and Senators and was known as Le 
petit parlement. In Corsica, it was the prefect who often 
followed the instructions of these powerful figures and not 
vice versa. Another reason for the lack of prestige of the 
Corsican prefect was that the island was regarded within the 
préfectoral corps as a posting of low status. The aim of most 
Corsican prefects on arriving on the island was to leave as 
soon as possible. They were soon astounded by the political
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mores of the island and, if they objected, could be abused, 
even physically, by the islanders. The result was an 
indifference to political corruption and an apathy with regard 
to reforming it. This ensured the survival of corrupt 
practices.
CONCLUSION;
This Chapter has shown that institutional development in 
Corsica was characterised by the phenomenon of 
integration/differentiation. The former occurred by the mere 
fact that the island's population recognized that their 
material interests lay with France and that material resources 
were channelled by means of the institutions of local 
administration. They wished, therefore, to occupy the most 
important positions within them. On the other hand, they 
imbued the institutions themselves with the esprit de clan, a 
clientelistic mentality similar to that of Southern Italy and 
the other islands of the Western Mediterranean (45). The 
phenomenon of complicity was also present: the central state 
tolerated this situation of irregularity; the local notables 
in turn ensured the loyalty to the French state on the part of 
the local population. This gave to the institutions a 
character which, in French terms, was specifically Corsican.
In turn, this helped to preserve the local Corsican culture 
and identity. Thus, the institutions helped to maintain a 
sense of differentiation.
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This institutional level is important as it was the 
context within which other developments of a political, 
economic or cultural nature occurred. The following two 
Chapters will continue this exploration of the phenomenon of 
integration/differentiation. Chapter Four will examine the 
effect of initiatives of an economic nature. Chapter Five will 
look at political initiatives.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CORSICA IN THE FRENCH ECONOMY
In the previous Chapter, it was suggested that the 
structures of local administration served both to integrate 
Corsican society into the French nation and, paradoxically, to 
preserve its specific character. Such structures are the 
framework within which other aspects of Corsican society, such 
as the economic and political, found their expression. But the 
island received from the centre influences of an economic and 
political nature which also served either to reinforce the 
integration or accentuate the differentiation, or both at the 
same time. This Chapter will deal with this phenomenon on the 
economic level. However, it should be pointed out that the 
analysis presented here is a sociological and political one 
rather than one based on economic theory. This means that the 
question of "successes" or "failures", in the sense of whether 
a particular economic policy produced the results it was 
designed to produce, is secondary to the question of its 
social and political effects on the local society.
The development of Corsica's economic structures was 
determined by two principal factors. The first was the 
internal geographical, topographical and societal conditions 
of the island itself: these will be described at greater 
length in Chapter Six. The second was the economic conditions 
and development on mainland France. The latter affected 
Corsica sometimes in a negative way, either by leaving the
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island as it was through indifference, or by disrupting the 
local economy by, for example, a massive influx of cheap goods 
from the continent as was the case at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The influence was occasionally positive as 
when the regional economic policy of the centre brought 
benefits to the island. In this Chapter, therefore, we shall 
examine economic development in France itself to see how it 
affected Corsica.
The main characteristic of economic development in France 
and what distinguishes it from, say, Britain and Germany, is 
the slowness with which change occurred (1). It is even 
debatable whether there occurred an economic "take-off" in the 
Rostovian sense of the word (2). It is out of place here to 
discuss this problem. What is important is to recognise that 
the slowness with which economic change occurred meant that 
many parts of France retained traditional peasant societies 
based on a subsistence economy and polyculture, many of which 
lived in autarkic isolation from one another. Even those 
regions marked by the development of industrial capitalism in 
the nineteenth century such as upper Normandy and Lorraine, 
tended to live in a kind of protectionist autarky. The 
conservative nature of some elements of French capitalism is 
well known. It could be described as the peasant mentality 
adapted to industrial conditions. This meant that societies 
such as Brittany, the French Basque Country and, a fortiori, 
Corsica, all marked by geographical isolation, retained their
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traditional economies for long periods of time without being 
threatened by outside economic forces.
This system began to break down during the Second Empire 
with the development of the railways (3) and accelerated 
toward the end of the nineteenth century with the expansion of 
capitalism on a world-wide scale including France (4). The 
Third Republic, nonetheless, continued to be marked by 
economic conservatism and by Malthusian demographic trends
(5). This had the effect of limiting les dégâts in the 
traditional societies which continued to be shielded from 
excessively brutal change. It is significant that even the 
crash of 1929 reached France later than other countries, and 
then it was in an attenuated form. Economic change was 
occurring and was affecting the local societies, but these 
were cushioned from its potentially disruptive effects by a 
compromise worked out between the local élites and those in 
control at the centre. A good example is the working 
relationship between the Front populaire of 1936 and the 
right-wing Office de Landernau. a peasant syndicate in 
Brittany, which has been described by Suzanne Berger (6). 
Furthermore, those who were affected by the changes and who 
were forced to emigrate from their region could be absorbed 
into the administrative system or into the French colonialist 
system.
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THE FRENCH ECONOMY AND CORSICAN INTEGRATION
These trends were also true of Corsica. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, the island remained dominated by its 
traditional economic structures (see below), which were not 
simply traditional but archaic, in the sense that the 
techniques in use sometimes dated from neolithic times (7). 
Nevertheless, some economic development of a more modern 
nature did occur in the nineteenth century. As Edouard Perrier 
puts it: "La Corse connaît des années 1815 aux années 1870 un 
développement économique complexe, contradictoire, mais 
incontestable" (8). This development was, however, of a 
limited and uneven nature and the more archaic agro-pastoral 
economy tended to predominate. Its political and social 
effects were to reinforce the islanders' identification with 
the centre, since the development often occurred with the help 
of subsidies from the mainland. This was especially true 
during the July Monarchy and the Second Empire periods (9).
When these progressive sectors of the economy collapsed 
in the 1880's, there was a regression to the more subsistence 
form of economy. However, during the nineteenth century, the 
population of the island had increased from 255,000 in 1861 
to 273,000 in 1881 (10). The reversion to a subsistence 
economy meant that the island could no longer support this 
excess population. The result was that emigration, which had 
hitherto been a trickle, turned into a flood. Janine Renucci
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used another metaphor, taken from medical terminology, and 
called it the virus miarateur. (11), that is, a kind of 
disease which ravaged the island affecting every family.
This had important political and social effects. First, 
the French state had to step in to assist the local 
population. It did so by direct subsidies which were 
proportionately greater than for any other French region. It 
also facilitated access for Corsicans into the police, army, 
customs and civil service, and to the Colonies, especially in 
North Africa (12). Secondly, it allowed the local clan leaders 
to administer this system. Thus, while many parts of France 
lived in economic torpor during the Third Republic, Corsica 
lived in the isolation of its svsteme assistenciel. The most 
important political effect was that almost all Corsicans 
identified completely with the French state. The exceptions 
were a few intellectuals who tried to stir the population into 
a consciousness of their situation by adopting regionalist 
slogans. However, they seem to have had little success in this 
enterprise (13). These tendencies were accentuated by the 
catastrophe of the First World War when Corsica, like other 
rural regions of France, suffered a heavy loss of man-power. 
This loss, however, simply reinforced the identification with 
France, in the sense that Corsicans were proud of the fact 
that they had fought for their country. Finally, although 
Corsicans were deprived economically, they were still better 
off than their Italian neighbours. In fact, each year about
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twenty thousand of these, pejoratively referred to by 
Corsicans as Lucchesi (as many of them originated from Lucca 
in Tuscany), arrived to perform the seasonal work which many 
Corsicans despised. The latter preferred the more attractive 
positions within the state bureaucracy. It may be concluded, 
therefore, that integration, in the sense of identification 
with the French state, which is in itself a French identity, 
was reinforced by these economic trends, whether they were of 
a negative or positive nature.
THE FRENCH ECONOMY AND CORSICAN DIFFERENTIATION
On the other hand, Corsica occupied a peculiar place 
within the French system. First of all, it was the 
metropolitan département which received the most assistance 
(14). Secondly, it seemed to many Frenchmen that Corsicans 
were characterised by an unwillingness to work. This was based 
on their predilection for non-manual positions within the 
administrative system. In fact, this opinion was exaggerated. 
It is true that Corsicans preferred non-manual over manual 
work. But such a predilection seems to be shared by most of 
the human race including those who criticised Corsicans. 
Furthermore, by failing to develop the Corsican economy and by 
operating the système assistenciel. the French state 
encouraged this phenomenon. Finally, the Corsican economy 
which did survive - the agro-pastoral economy of the 
mountainous interior - was, as we have seen, of the most
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retrograde type and marked by primitive techniques and low 
yields. This marked Corsicans off from other rural regions 
which had more advanced systems. All of this heightened the 
sense of specificity which Corsicans felt towards themselves 
and which other Frenchmen felt toward them. Such attitudes 
mutually reinforced each other. Thus, their economic situation 
made Corsicans identify strongly with the French state, nation 
and empire, while at the same time it reinforced their sense 
of specificity. The latter, however, led to a feeling of 
inferiority which made Corsicans try to reinforce the former. 
That is, they wished to show they were super-français as we 
shall see in Chapter Seven on moderate regionalism.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1945
It is generally recognised that France, for thirty years 
after 1945 fies Trente Glorieuses), experienced rapid and 
important economic changes. As Fohlen expresses it:
The recovery (from the devastation of World War II) was 
undeniably spectacular, particularly after 1948...
Changes as radical and fundamental as these had been 
unknown since Napoleon III. Indeed, so radical and 
fundamental are they that we may wonder whether we are 
not witnessing a veritable industrial revolution (15).
The same analysis is shared by Maurice Niveau:
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L'histoire économique de la France depuis la fin de la 
dernière guerre est celle de sa croissance et de son 
développement. Malgré les échecs rencontrés ici ou là, 
malgré les méfaits de l'inflation, le redressement 
économique français amorcé depuis vingt ans a été 
considérable ... Jamais dans notre histoire nous n'avions 
connu une telle prospérité continue, une telle hausse du 
niveau de vie et, peut-être, une telle "révolution 
économique" (16).
The rapid economic growth following the Second World War 
brought about important changes in French society and 
politics. Our concern here is principally with its effects on 
Corsican society and its relationship with the French state 
and how it affected the problem of centre-periphery 
relationships, that is, the processes of integration and 
differentiation.
This problem may become clearer by placing it within the 
context of the different phases in which the French economic 
miracle took place (17). Firstly, there was the phase 1945- 
55/6 in which national recovery was emphasised. This was to be 
achieved by reconstructing the most important economic sectors 
(steel, coal, transport, related external economies) by means 
of indicative planning. The great architect of this was Jean 
Monnet who was responsible for drawing up the First Plan. This 
phase of economic planning paid little attention to the 
regional aspects of economic planning.
There was, nevertheless, a growing awareness of the 
regional dimension of planning and in particular of the
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disparities between the regions and the Parisian metropolis. 
The best known work which drew attention to this was Paris et 
le désert français by Jean-François Gravier (18). There was 
also at this period a flourishing of interest groups within 
the regions which began to compile dossiers on the economic 
and social plight of their societies (e.g. the CELIB - see 
Chapter One above). Such groups, or rather those in control of 
them at this time, emphasised the economic dimension of the 
regional problem and played down political demands, that is, 
demands for constitutional change. One of the results of this 
movement was that around the mid-1950's, a series of Plans 
d'Action régionale (PAR's) were drawn up by the central 
Government to form the basis of regional economic policy. 
Although these plans were related to the overall national 
plan, they were not yet fully integrated into it (19). 
Furthermore, their principal concern was to reduce 
unemployment in, and slow down emigration from, the regions. 
There was a fear of the potentially dangerous political and 
social effects of the rural exodus which began to accelerate 
all over Western Europe. This was especially important in 
still heavily rural France. The Government, in response to 
this situation, promoted a policy of industrial 
decentralization (20). Nevertheless, there was still little 
awareness of the importance of regional policy as a dimension 
of national policy .
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This awareness came about in the period following 1958, 
that is with the advent of the Fifth Republic, and may be 
found in the Third and Fourth Plans. From then on there would 
be a continuing attempt to integrate regional policy and 
national economic planning. However, the result of this 
approach was a diminution of the control of the periphery over 
its own economic development, and certain regions which had 
been favoured under the previous approach were quietly 
forgotten. This was because in the policy approach developed 
by the Gaullists priority was given once again to national 
economic development, and those regions (including Paris) 
which were already strong or showed potential to be, were 
favoured over the weaker ones. This is expressed in a comment 
on regional development by Michel Debré, De Gaulle's first 
Prime Minister: "L'aménagement du territoire a pour premier 
objectif de maintenir et de développer la prospérité des 
régions florissantes. La seconde ligne d'action capitale ... 
c'est l'aménagement de la région parisienne” (21).
This economic Darwinism was tempered only by the growing 
recognition that Paris was in danger of becoming an economic 
liability, as the number of its inhabitants and the social 
costs of further industrial development had passed a certain 
threshold. Accordingly, the policy of industrial 
decentralization was continued, but in the regions themselves 
the approach of "growth centres" was adopted. This was based 
on the idea that large cities in the provinces should be
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developed so that they might act as a counter-weight to Paris 
and at the same time stimulate growth in the areas surrounding 
them. The twenty-two economic regions of the PAR's were 
reduced to seven ’'growth areas".
The early regional policy of the Fourth Republic had an 
underlying technocratic philosophy which interpreted economic 
development in terms of capitalist growth. Nevertheless, this 
was constrained by the influence of the regional notables who 
remained aware of the societal and human aspects of economic 
development. Under the Fifth Republic many such constraints 
were swept aside with the decline of influence of the notables 
and the priority given to overall national development. It is 
at this time, as we shall see below in the Chapter on radical 
regionalism, that the radicalization of the regionalist 
movements took place.
CORSICA AND FRENCH REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
How did this affect Corsica? First of all, Corsica, in 
the period following the Second World War, was left behind by 
the economic reconstruction which, as we have seen, paid 
little attention to the regional dimension. The island's 
already moribund economy had received a severe blow as a 
result of the heavy fighting which accompanied the Liberation 
in 194 3 and which had caused serious damage to the island's 
infra-structure (22). Roads were damaged, bridges destroyed,
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and an entire section of the small railway put out of service. 
Furthermore, American bombers dropped their load on the port 
of Bastia - destroying the harbour and killing many of the 
town's inhabitants who gathered after the Germans had left! 
Since Corsica was the first département of French soil to be 
liberated from the Occupant and since this liberation had 
taken place mainly on the initiative of the Corsicans 
themselves, the latter felt that the central Government should 
take swift action to repair the damage caused.
Governmental action was taken, but only very slowly. The 
first serious assessment of the island's economic situation 
did not take place until 1949 (23). And it was not until 1957, 
that the island, although it was officially attached to the 
economic region of Provençe-Côte d'Azur, received its own Plan 
d'Action Régionale, as part of the regional policy initiatives 
outlined above. This became law in 1957 and began to be 
implemented in 1958 (24).
This period from 1943 until 1957 is important from the 
point of view of this thesis since it was then that the seeds 
which would sprout as the regionalist movements were being 
sown. Indeed, the latter existed in embryonic form but needed 
something to catalyze them into action and unity. First of 
all, the islanders developed a sense of disappointment based 
precisely on their strong identification with the French 
nation and state. They had proved their "Frenchness” by
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helping to liberate themselves in 1943 and yet the nation 
seemed unconcerned with their economic plight. This 
corresponded to the first phase of economic policy outlined 
above and may be called the period of relative deprivation. 
However, the very strength of the Corsicans' identification 
with France also reinforced their feeling of differentiation, 
since the old feeling of being abandoned by the state was 
dominant. At this period, however, few wished to question the 
attachment of the island to the French Republic. The granting 
of the PAR in 1957 raised hopes, and reinforced the 
identification but, in a subtle way, maintained the sense of 
differentiation, as we shall see below. Finally, the Gaullist 
period led to a sense of frustration which led some Corsicans 
to call into question the attachment of the island to France 
or at least the nature of the link. Central to these 
developments was the Plan d'Action régionale and it is 
therefore necessary to examine this in some detail.
THE CORSICAN PLAN D'ACTION REGIONALE OF 1957
The Corsican PAR of 1957 deserves special attention for 
several reasons. First, it represents the most important 
effort by any French Government to develop economically the 
island since annexation in 1769. Second, this mise en valeur 
has borne fruits, even if these fruits have had a. bitter taste 
for some of the islanders. Third, the form of economic 
development, and especially the change after 1958, have had
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important effects on the island's traditional societal 
structures. Fourth, the development brought into the open more 
than ever before the ambiguities of French/Corsican relations. 
It is, thus, one of the basic factors which has led to the 
rise of contemporary regionalism. The effects of these points 
will be seen in greater detail in the Chapters on the 
regionalist movements. This Chapter is principally concerned 
with the integration/differentiation factor.
The PAR for Corsica was an instance of a general 
programme and at the same time recognised the island's 
specificity. It was one of the series of PAR's made possible 
by a decree of 30th June 1955 (25). The purpose of the PAR's 
was to promote "l'expansion économique et sociale des 
différentes régiones et en particulier de celles qui souffrent 
de sous-emploi ou d'un développement économique insuffisant" 
(Art 1). They would coordinate the activities of the different 
dénartments of the administration with projects "dus aux 
initiatives locales publiques et aux initiatives privées 
bénéficiant du concours financier de l'Etat ou d'une 
collectivité publique" (Art 2). The PAR's, then, were to 
reduce unemployment and economic backwardness in the regions 
by an economic development based on collaboration between the 
state, the local authorities and private enterprise.
It was recognised, however, that Corsica had specific 
problems not to be found in other regions. This was why the
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island was detached from the economic region of Provençe-Côte 
d'Azur. As the Corsican PAR puts it:
La Corse est, du fait de son insularité, l'unique 
département de la France métropolitaine qui constitue à 
lui seul une région naturelle incontestable, à la 
différence de ceux du continent dont il y aurait eu très 
souvent autant de raisons valables de rattacher les 
franges au département voisin" (26)
Nevertheless, this mise en valeur should take place in 
the context of France as a whole, as part of "une expansion 
harmonieuse en toutes ses composantes de l'ensemble de 
l'économie française" (27). Thus the aim was to integrate more 
fully the island into France as a whole while at the same time 
recognizing its specificity.
THE AIMS OF THE CORSICAN PAR
The authors of the PAR saw the continuing depopulation of 
the island as being the most serious symptom of its dire 
economic situation. The seriousness of this problem became 
clear by a comparison with other islands in the Western 
Mediterranean, such as Sardinia and the Balearic Islands. In 
1955, Corsica's population density was 20 inhabitants/sq.km, 
if the two main towns of Ajaccio and Bastia were included and, 
if they were excluded, the density of its rural population was 
15 inh/sq km. The population density of Sardinia was 53 
inh/sq.km, while that of the Balearic Islands was 90 
inh/sq.km. In absolute terms, Corsica's population fell from a
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maximum of about 260,000 reached during the Second Empire to 
180,000 at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, that is, its 
population had diminished by about one third. In Sardinia, on 
the other hand, the population rose from 853,000 at the turn 
of the century to 1,274,000 in 1951 - an increase of 50 per 
cent. That of the Balearic Islands progressed from 313,000 to 
around 450,000 in the same period (28) This decrease in the 
case of Corsica was not due to Malthusian factors. On the 
contrary, there was an excess of live births over deaths by 
about five or six thousand. The reality was that between 1000 
and 1200 Corsicans were obliged to leave the island each year.
The PAR gives the reason for this exodus with brutal 
honesty: "L'émigration s'explique en grande partie par la 
faiblesse du niveau de vie insulaire, qui est probablement 
aussi le plus bas de la métropole" (29). The emigration 
reinforced, in turn, the economic degradation: "Ainsi la 
raréfaction du peuplement, loin de se traduire par une 
amélioration du pouvoir d'achat individuel de ceux qui 
restaient, n'a fait qu'aggraver l'enlisement de 1' île dans 
des structures archaiques et y a entrainé à son tour une 
dégradation de plus en plus profonde des conditions 
d'existence" (30).
It then outlines the reasons for this economic 
degradation. The primary reason is the archaic agricultural 
system and the abandonment of large areas of land that could
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be productive. Once again, the comparison is made with 
Sardinia: in the latter island, only 16.7 per cent of the 
surface area was unproductive, while in Corsica it was 64 per 
cent. The authors attack, as many previous observers had done, 
the survival of pastoralism which, in Corsica, was 
characterised by archaic techniques and poor yields in the 
breeds of livestock (31). Nevertheless, it stressed that 
Corsica has great agricultural potential: " ... il n'existe 
aucune discussion sur le fait que la Corse pourrait facilement 
nourrir sa population sédentaire et une importante clientèle 
touristique si elle était mise en valeur avec un minimum de 
soin" (32).
It is this conviction that was the basis of the proposed 
remedy. The above quoted phrase puts in a nut-shell the 
solution chosen. Agriculture would be developed but in the 
context of the development of tourism. In fact, it was the 
latter which was chosen to be the motor of the island's 
economic recovery: "tout fait de la Corse par prédestination 
un "gisement touristique" de classe internationale" (33). 
Rather patronisingly, the PAR felt that this option was more 
suited to the Corsican character: "Si les Corses manquent 
peut-être d"aptitudes agricoles et industrielles, ils se sont 
ainsi montrés parfaitement capables de gérer des hôtels et des 
industries touristiques" (34).
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It was hoped that other sectors of the economy would be 
stimulated as a consequence of this development of tourism:
"Ce rôle de multiplicateur économique, c'est évidemment au 
tourisme qu'il peut le mieux etre demandé de le remplir. Il 
n'y a pas en effet de plus sur moyen d'attirer les hommes et 
les capitaux, de créer en peu de temps des débouchés, des 
emplois, des revenus et d'élever ainsi le niveau de vie de 
tous" (35). It was claimed that this had already worked in the 
Alpes-Maritimes , Savoy and the Balearic Islands.
However, those responsible for the PAR were concerned 
that it should not remain at the level of voeux pieux as had 
happened so often with previous governmental development 
projects for Corsica. For this reason, care was taken to 
provide the means by which the orientations of the Plan could 
be put into effect. It was decided that the best means were 
those provided by legislation already passed several years 
before. These were the sociétés d'économie mixte, made 
possible by the law of the 24 May 1951 which allowed the 
creation of institutions whose function was to promote major 
projects of regional development (organismes responsables de 
grands améagements régionaux) and the decree-law of 10 
November 1954 authorizing the setting up of semi-state bodies 
(sociétés d'économie mixte). The Corsican PAR defines the rôle 
of these bodies as follows.
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For agriculture:
En Corse, ces deux textes devront etre utilisés dans le 
domaine agricole pour mener à bien, grâce à 
l'intervention d'un maître d'oeuvre associant l'Etat et 
les intérêts locaux, des opérations n'ayant aucune chance 
de se réaliser autrement, comme les aménagements 
hydrauliques et le défrichement des surfaces cultivables 
actuellement improductives(36).
For tourism:
Le décret-loi du 10 novembre 1954 permet la mise sur pied 
d'une autre société d'économie mixte ayant, celle-ci, 
pour objet l'aménagement de l'infrastructure touristique: 
constructions destinées à l'hébergement, plages, 
établissements thermaux, etc., l'exploitation étant 
ensuite confiée à l'initiative privée (37).
The names given to these two bodies were the Société de 
la mise en valeur agricole de la Corse (S.O.M.I.V.A.C.), set 
up in 1957, and the Société de l'éouipment touristique de la 
Corse (S.E.T.C.O.), set up in 1958.
THE RESULTS OF THE CORSICAN PAR
It would take us too far outside the scope of this thesis 
to analyse the success or failure of this programme in purely 
economic terms (38). Our concern is principally with its 
effects on the traditional society and the rise of regionalist 
movements. Nevertheless, it is relevant to point out that 
within its own terms of reference, which may be described as 
development according to a neo-functionalist diffusionist 
model, the PAR did produce some spectacular results. Since
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these results have constituted an important element in the 
ideological battle between governmental Jacobins and radical 
regionalists, it is necessary here to present their main 
features.
It is undeniable that the previous secular trend 
toward depopulation of the island was stopped and, indeed, 
reversed:
General rate of growth 
Year Population Corsica (%) France (%)
1954 170,000
1962 175,000
1968 209,000
(Source: INSEE) (39).
Furthermore, several other indicators reveal an important 
economic growth. Between 1961 and 1971, deliveries of cement 
increased at an annual rate of 11.9 per cent (6.9 per cent 
for France as a whole). This represented an average of 79 
tonnes per head of population (France = 55t). The number of 
Telex lines increased by 56 per cent between 1961 and 1971 
(France = 22.5 per cent). Of the forty-two bank branches in 
existence at the end of 1971, twenty had been opened since 
1969. Between 1966 and 1971, bank deposits increased by 237 
per cent (Provincial France = 127 per cent) while credits
0.4
3.0
1.0
1.1
- 139 -
per cent (Provincial France = 127 per cent) while credits 
increased by 234 per cent (Provincial France = 113 per cent).
(40) .
More specifically, each of the areas targeted for 
development by the planners showed a spectacular growth. In 
agriculture, the value of gross agricultural product fproduit 
brut aaricole) increased by 12.4 per cent from 1957 to 1971;
10 per cent from 1957 to 1967, and 19 per cent from 1967 to
1971 (41). Tourism also showed an amazing growth in purely 
quantitative terms. As the PAR points out, the number of 
travellers arriving in Corsica went from 144,000 to 201,000 
per annum between 1953 and 1956 - an increase of 40 per cent. 
In 1955 alone, 18 new hotels were opened (42). The PAR, 
therefore, sought to continue and rationalise existing trends. 
The success of their policy may be seen in the figure given by 
the Rapport Neuwirth (43), although the figures for 1956 are 
slightly different from those given above:
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YEAR SEA ARRIVALS AIR ARRIVALS TOTAL
1949 75,000
1953 144,000
1954 112,516 40,744 153,000
1955 118,409 55,255 173,664
1956 123,235 70,261 193,496
1957 143,839 65,709 209,548
1958 143,776 74,093 217,869
1959 170,787 90,450 261,237
1960 183,577 92,406 275,983
(44)
These figures may be completed up to the early seventies
(45):
YEAR NUMBER OF TOURISTS INCOME
(thousands) fmlns of frs)
1967 341 118
1968 369 137
1969 404 171
1970 445 200
1971 512 254
1972 557 301
It is clear, then, that the Corsican economy "took off" 
in a very dramatic way, much to the satisfaction of the
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planners. Looking behind the figures, nevertheless, it becomes 
clear that this form of "development” despite its "miraculous" 
character in purely quantitative terms, contained serious 
contradictions. While the fact that the programme itself was 
defined and then actually implemented tended to be an 
integrating factor in Corsican - French relations, it also 
emphasised Corsican specificity and, more seriously, excluded 
certain sections of the local population.
The integrative force of the PAR lay in the fact that 
Corsica was at last taken seriously by the central Government, 
just as it had been in 1789 when Corsicans were invited to 
participate in the Etats Généraux. Firstly, Corsica was 
regarded as part of the national territory and, indeed, it was 
recognised that it had special problems which called for 
specific solutions to enable it to "catch up" with the rest of 
France. Secondly, some of the local politicians (e.g. the 
Deputy and Minister Jean Filippi) and some business leaders 
(e.g. Michel Martini who founded DIECO in 1960 - see Chapter 
on moderate regionalism) were involved in drawing up the PAR. 
The advice of these leaders seemed to be taken seriously (e.g. 
their warnings about the continuing loss of population) and 
some of their recommendations (the improvement of the 
transport system, the development of agriculture and tourism) 
were incorporated into the Plan. Finally, and most 
importantly, the Plan actually began to be implemented, and 
the semi-state bodies, the SOMIVAC and SETCO actually set up.
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The local clan leaders, François Giacobbi and Jean-Paul de 
Rocca-Serra, both sat in the board which was common to both 
bodies, although they did not occupy the key positions which 
were reserved for non-Corsicans.
On the other hand, the PAR itself reinforced the sense 
that Corsica was different. It has already been seen how the 
first article recognised the island's specificity based on the 
fact of insularity. A specific response was required for a 
specific set of problems:
"... les caractères qu'elle présente et surtout les 
problèmes qu'elle pose sont si particuliers qu'il 
s'imposait, pour l'application du décret no 55-873 du 30 
juin 1955, d'en faire l'objet d'un programme spécial 
d'action régionale, exceptionnellement limité en 
l'occurrence au cadre départemental" (46).
There is thus the affirmation that, while Corsica is 
French, it is not like the rest of France when considered as a 
geographic entity.
There is also reference to a specific Corsican character 
or set of attitudes: " ... l'individualisme insulaire et 
l'absence d'initiative économique..." (47); "Si les Corses 
manquent peut-être d'aptitudes agricoles et industrielles, ils 
se sont ... montrés parfaitement capables de gérer des hôtels 
et des industries touristiques" (48); " —  l'erreur fut —  de 
postuler une révolution dans les moeurs des populations 
intéressées sans rien faire pour les amener à modifier
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d'elles-mêmes leur comportement" (49). The condescending tone 
of these remarks is in line with a long tradition of 
superciliousness of the continentaux towards the islanders. 
The underlying assumption is that the Corsicans, by 
themselves, are incapable of taking charge of their own 
development. This, however, was in itself a reinforcement of 
the notion that Corsicans are a group distinct from other 
Frenchmen, and are even somewhat inferior to the latter.
If the PAR itself seems in this way to stress the 
difference between Corsicans and other Frenchmen, the way in
which it was implemented and the results of this
implementation strengthened this emphasis. The choice of the
sociétés d'économie mixte rather than the traditional
administrative institutions (the Conseil Général and communes) 
implied that the latter were unsuited to the task of carrying 
out economic development. The PAR describes the sociétés as 
"organismes moteurs suppléant à l'absence trop fréquente 
d'initiatives locales" (50). This analysis was repeated in 
the Rapport Neuwirth which states: "Au surplus, des tâches 
comme la mise en valeur des plaines littorales et 
l'aménagement rationnel des zones montagnardes excèdent 
manifestement les possibilités techniques et financières des 
collectivités corses" (51). Despite the assurance of M.
Marcel Savreux, prefect of Corsica in 1957 and responsible for 
implementing the PAR, that "la rénovation agricole de la Corse 
a été voulue et entreprise par les Corses eux-mêmes" and that
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"on ne saurait considérer que la Société d'Economie Mixte 
intervient comme un reproche et qu'elle rapelle les conseils 
judiciaires dont le Code Civil dote les citoyens incapables de 
gérer leurs biens" (52), this is, in fact, how it was 
interpreted by many Corsicans. This feeling of being regarded 
as inferior and incapable was reinforced by the exclusion of 
Corsicans from the key administrative posts which were 
confided to reclassified civil servants from North Africa 
(53) .
THE PAR AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC
Despite these objections which pertain to the very early 
period of the PAR's existence, most Corsicans were basically 
favourable to the programme which they saw as an important 
opportunity for the island. This became clear with the change 
of regime in 1958. The new Government backtracked on its 
support for the PAR and failed to provide the promised 
funding, as the Rapport Neuwirth later admitted (54). The 
SOMIVAC did little more than carry out the preliminary studies 
which represented only the first stage of the development 
process. This enraged those who basically supported the 
programme. As shall be seen in the Chapter on moderate 
regionalism, one of the first demands of the early regionalist 
movement was the implementation of the PAR. What concerns us 
at this point in our analysis is the effect of this decision 
on the Corsicans' sense of integration or differentiation. It
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is clear that the latter regarded this as a betrayal, 
especially as they had, in their majority, been firm Gaullists 
(see next Chapter). Thus, the arrival to power of a man whose 
main purpose was to restore the unity and greatness of France 
resulted, because of an economic policy which, as we have seen 
above, ignored the weaker regions, in a greater sense of 
alienation and differentiation in the region which had most 
supported him.
The continuing war in Algeria, however, with its growing 
exodus of pied noir settlers back to France, gave the 
Government an opportunity to make a gesture which they hoped 
would conciliate the Corsicans and at the same time solve the 
problem of the resettlement of the returning pieds noirs. The 
Government decided to reactivate the SOMIVAC by providing it 
with the necessary funding. However, the aim now was, not so 
much the mise en valeur of Corsica, as the resettlement of the 
pieds noirs. These repatriates, between 15 and 17,000, were 
destined to become the driving force behind the agricultural 
renewal. The climate of Corsica and the conditions of the 
Oriental Plain were similar to those of North Africa, and it 
was thought that the pieds noirs could use their experience of 
working in these conditions to develop agriculture in Corsica.
While the authorities denied that the repatriates were 
shown special favour, the Rapport Neuwirth provides figures 
which suggest that this was, indeed, the case: out of 100
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applications made for the first allotments, SOMIVAC granted 16 
to repatriates, one to an ex-colon from Guinea, and only one 
to a Corsican (55). This pattern repeated itself (56). There 
were, in fact, good reasons for this, as the Rapport Neuwirth 
points out: the Corsican origins of the repatriates, their 
superior technical skills, and the fact that candidates were 
required to possess the 60,000NF necessary to buy the basic 
equipment and which Corsican farmers were unlikely to possess.
Nevertheless, these "good reasons" did not alter the 
actual impact on Corsican feelings. Corsican peasants were 
infuriated at not being given priority over outsiders, even if 
the latter were of Corsican origin. Most of all, many 
Corsicans felt excluded from their own development despite the 
promises of Marcel Savreux mentioned above. Moreover, it did 
not help that this approach actually worked. As Janine 
Renucci, the analyst of the transition from the old to the new 
Corsica, has commented: "Ainsi le changement n'est pas 
d'origine insulaire. Il provient d'une initiative étatique, 
puis de l'installation des rapatriés. Il a été stimulé 
spontanément aussi par le gonflement progressif du courant 
touristique après 1960-65" (57).
After the arrival of the repatriates there was a 
spectacular growth in the agricultural sector similar to that 
in the tourist sector. As the following figures show:
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Evolution of gross agricultural product (thousands of francs
19711
1963 1965 1967 1969 1971
Vineyards 38,100 51,274 68,705 156,097 200,000
Fruit - 12,547 19,713 26,529 -
Other products 45,346 28,530 25,875 30,284 -
Total vegetable
products 83,446 92,351 114,293 212,910
Animal Products 33,920 39,500 45,845 43,007 -
Overall Total 117,366 131,851 160,138 255,917 317,000
Proportion of
vineyard (%) 32.5 38.9 42.9 61.0 63.1
(58)
The Corsican boom benefited some, who were not always 
Corsicans, while it excluded whole sections of the Corsican 
population. It was from these excluded sections as well as 
from parties such as the French Communist Party that a more 
radical critique of the development programme itself was made. 
Previously, moderate regionalism had accepted the basic 
approach of the PAR and simply demanded that it be 
implemented. Now, the critique was aimed precisely at the 
basic philosophy of the PAR itself. This will be dealt with 
more fully in the Chapter on radical regionalism. Here, it 
will suffice to draw on some elements of this critique as an
- 148 -
Previously, moderate regionalism had accepted the basic 
approach of the PAR and simply demanded that it be 
implemented. Now, the critique was aimed precisely at the 
basic philosophy of the PAR itself. This will be dealt with 
more fully in the Chapter on radical regionalism. Here, it 
will suffice to draw on some elements of this critique as an 
illustration of how the development process itself helped or 
hindered integration.
First, it became clear that economic development was to 
be limited and in two ways: in the economic sectors to be 
stimulated and in their geographical location. This approach, 
based on the philosophy of encouraging "areas of growth" noted 
above as part of the regional policy of the Fifth Republic, 
found expression in the Schéma d'Aménagement de la Corse 
published in 1972 which simply made explicit what had been the 
implicit policy for the previous decade (59). Thus, tourism 
was given priority, agriculture came second, while industry 
was barely considered. Development was to take place only in a 
few locations on the island, mainly on the coast-line. This 
was interpreted as an acceptance of the abandonment of the 
interior, the home of the traditional society and culture.
More seriously, the benefits of development were limited 
to certain groups. The favour shown to the pieds noirs in the 
agricultural sector has already been noted. In the tourist 
sector too, native Corsicans did not always benefit. Those to
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benefit most were large banks and multi-national corporations. 
As Perrier puts it: "Le marchepied construit pour faciliter 
l'entrée en action du grand capital a bien fonctionné, 
notamment pour la Banque Rothschild, la Banque de Suez, la 
Compagnie Paquet, la chaîne américaine Sheraton (ITT)" (60). 
Furthermore, the same author points out that "les plus grands 
hôtels et les villages de vacances fonctionnent en vase clos, 
sans aucune relation avec le commerce local". (61). Thus, 
entire sections of the peasantry and petite bourgeoisie were 
excluded from the economic boom.
CONCLUSION
This Chapter has shown the Corsica's sense of integration 
into or differentiation from the French polity on the economic 
level was influenced by economic initiatives or the lack of 
them on the part of the centre. The lack of initiatives left 
Corsica economically dependent on the mainland. This 
reinforced the identification with France. But, it also was a 
source of differentiation in so far as the Corsican economy 
was characterised by archaic methods and low productivity.
This marked it off even from the poorest regions of mainland 
France. When economic initiatives were taken by the 
Government, as in the PAR of the middle 1950's, they may be 
said to have had a double effect. On the one hand, they served 
as an integrating force by virtue of being part of an overall 
plan of reconstruction for all of France. Most Corsicans were
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in favour of the measures taken and interpreted them as a 
genuine attempt, at last, by the French state to take account 
of their very real economic problems.
But this integrating aspect contained within itself an 
element of differentiation. This is because the basis of the 
Plan was a recognition of Corsica's special problems deriving 
from its insularity. There were also disparaging references to 
the peculiar character of Corsicans. These differences implied 
that Corsicans were not, indeed, like other Frenchmen. There 
was also the implication that the traditional mediation system 
operated by the clans had served its day and should be 
supplanted by other means of channelling resources from the 
centre to the periphery. This threatened the basis for the 
legitimacy of the old system. These feelings were reinforced 
by the arrival on the island and the success of the North 
African pied noir repatriates. Finally, the actual manner of 
development and the limited sectors of those who benefited 
from it increased the alienation.
It might be said that while the institutional development 
described in the previous Chapter reinforced integration while 
maintaining differentiation, the economic initiatives 
described in this Chapter tended to increase differentiation 
more than integration. Or rather, institutional structures 
integrated almost the totality of the Corsican population, 
while economic development helped integrate some sections or
- 151 -
benefit most were large banks and multi-national corporations. 
As Perrier puts it: "Le marchepied construit pour faciliter 
l'entrée en action du grand capital a bien fonctionné, 
notamment pour la Banque Rothschild, la Banque de Suez, la 
Compagnie Paquet, la chaîne américaine Sheraton (ITT)" (60). 
Furthermore, the same author points out that "les plus grands 
hôtels et les villages de vacances fonctionnent en vase clos, 
sans aucune relation avec le commerce local". (61). Thus, 
entire sections of the peasantry and petite bourgeoisie were 
excluded from the economic boom.
CONCLUSION
This Chapter has shown the Corsica's sense of integration 
into or differentiation from the French polity on the economic 
level was influenced by economic initiatives or the lack of 
them on the part of the centre. The lack of initiatives left 
Corsica economically dependent on the mainland. This 
reinforced the identification with France. But, it also was a 
source of differentiation in so far as the Corsican economy 
was characterised by archaic methods and low productivity.
This marked it off even from the poorest regions of mainland 
France. When economic initiatives were taken by the 
Government, as in the PAR of the middle 1950's, they may be 
said to have had a double effect. On the one hartd, they served 
as an integrating force by virtue of being part of an overall 
plan of reconstruction for all of France. Most Corsicans were
- 150 -
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legitimacy of the old system. These feelings were reinforced 
by the arrival on the island and the success of the North 
African pied noir repatriates. Finally, the actual manner of 
development and the limited sectors of those who benefited 
from it increased the alienation.
It might be said that while the institutional development 
described in the previous Chapter reinforced integration while 
maintaining differentiation, the economic initiatives 
described in this Chapter tended to increase differentiation 
more than integration. Or rather, institutional structures 
integrated almost the totality of the Corsican population, 
while economic development helped integrate some sections or
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classes while it encouraged the alienation of others: which 
sections or classes will be treated more fully in our analysis 
of the regionalist movements themselves. Finally, from this 
analysis it clearly emerges that there is an element of 
periodization as there is a move from the Fourth to the Fifth 
Republic. This will become clearer in the following Chapter 
which deals with political initiatives from the centre to the 
periphery.
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CHAPTER PIVE: FRENCH POLITICO-SYMBOLIC »»INITIATIVES» TO 
CORSICA
This Chapter will look at the more explicit political 
statements made about Corsica by political actors at the 
centre. Its aim is to explore the phenomenon of what I have 
called the "super-French” character of the Corsican 
identity. In effect, this is an expression of a profound 
insecurity on the part of Corsicans with regard to their 
identity: what I have called "the Corsican phobia". It 
traces these statements through several different régimes 
from annexation by France until the Governments of the Fifth 
Republic.
From the time of annexation by France in the eighteenth 
century, Corsicans suffered from what might be described as 
"the Corsican phobia": the fear that the island might one 
day leave France and be returned to Italy. The ambiguity of 
Corsicans' status as Frenchmen was heightened by the 
contradictory messages they received from the centre. On the 
one hand, there was the reassurance that Corsica and 
Corsicans were really French, nay, super-francais. On the 
other, there was the message that Corsicans were somehow 
different from other Frenchmen. We have already seen in the 
previous two chapters how both institutional and economic 
development created and reinforced this ambiguity. Other 
kinds of symbolic messages also played their part. In 
literature, for example, the nineteenth century Romantics
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went to Corsica to look for a contemporary version of the 
bon sauvage. Novelists such as Mérimée in his Columba 
created what became the stereotype of Corsican society: a 
society riven by the irrational violence of banditry and the 
vendetta (1). In fact, this novel is a very intelligent and 
sympathetic treatment of the problem of the co-existence of 
two distinct cultures, French and Corsican. However, most 
Frenchmen retained only the more "folkloric" aspects, while 
contemporary Corsican nationalists resent it for what they 
consider its unfair portrayal of their island. What counts 
here are the actual effects: the creation in the minds of 
both Frenchmen and Corsicans of an ambivalence toward 
Corsica and Corsicans.
This Chapter, however, will examine this phenomenon on 
the level of how more directly politico-symbolic messages 
have affected our problematic - how they have reinforced 
either integration or differentiation. By political messages 
is meant statements by those holding political power at the 
centre. These "statements" may take the form of discourses 
during visits to the island of Presidents or government 
Ministers or official documents concerning the island drawn 
up by the latter. They also include policy initiatives or 
the lack of them on the part of the central Government. As 
shall be seen, such statements or messages vary according to 
the regime and according to the political complexion of the 
Government in power.
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MESSAGES FROM THE CENTRE PRIOR TO 1945
The most important statement concerning Corsica to come 
from the centre of political power in France was that of the 
Constituent Assembly of 1789 which declared Corsica to be an 
integral part of the French nation which has already been 
quoted above (see Chapter Three). This reassurance, however, 
was tempered by others such as that of the Jacobin Deputy 
Barrère which cast doubts on the revolutionary integrity, 
that is, on the true Frenchness, of those who did not speak 
the French language: for the Jacobins, being a revolutionary 
and belonging to the French nation were identical: "le 
fédéralisme et la superstition parlent bas-breton,
1'émigration et la haine de la République parlent allemand, 
la contre-révolution parle italien [i.e. Corsican], et le 
fanatisme parle basque" (2).
But those who spoke the French language in France at 
this time were probably a minority of the inhabitants of the 
French territory. As Eugen Weber has shown, it was only 
slowly that the inhabitants of the "Hexagon" assimilated the 
dominant French culture (3). This was true, a fortiori, of 
Corsicans whose insularity and inaccessible mountainous 
interior helped to preserve their traditional language and 
culture well into the twentieth century. However, although 
there was a certain amount of unofficial tolerance of these
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patois, at least until the Third Republic, the official 
disapproval led to feelings of guilt and uneasiness among 
some of those who spoke them (4).
Nevertheless, Corsicans were accepted as Frenchmen if 
they adapted to the dominant culture. This was especially 
true at the time of Napoleon III who showed favour to the 
island for sentimental reasons and encouraged Corsicans to 
enter the civil service. However, it led to problems when 
Louis-Bonaparte and his Empire fell in 1870. Some left-wing 
Republicans, irritated by the island's identification with 
Bonapartism suggested that the island be handed back to 
Italy. On 4 September 1870, for instance, Henri Rochefort, a 
left-wing journalist and member of the Government of 
National Defense, writing in the weekly newspaper La 
Lanterne, demanded "la restitution de la Corse à l'Italie 
pour un franc" (5). On the 15 February 1871, Dr Peyrussueau 
presented to the National Assembly a petition which urgently 
demanded "la séparation de la Corse d'avec la France et 
l'exclusion immédiate des députées corses de ses séances"
(6). On the 6th March of the same year, Georges Clemenceau, 
acting on behalf of the Club positiviste of Paris, tabled a 
motion in the National Assembly "que la Corse cesse 
immédiatement et irrévocablement de faire partie de la 
République française" (7). These statements and petitions, 
which represented a widespread feeling among the Republican 
left at this time, were rejected by the National Assembly.
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They nevertheless illustrate the ambivalence, over one 
hundred years after annexation by France, with which Corsica 
and Corsicans were regarded by at least some influential 
Frenchmen (although Clemenceau later changed his mind when 
he became Prime Minister). On the other hand, the statements 
could hardly be said to reassure the Corsicans themselves.
Despite this ambiguity, Corsicans later became closely 
involved in the colonial expansion of France (8). They also 
proved their identification with France during the First 
World War when they lost between 15 and 20,000 men on the 
battlefield (9). The dominant message which came from the 
centre after this event was that they were true Frenchmen 
and that Corsica was really French and would stay so. This 
became a live issue after Mussolini came to power in Italy, 
and Corsica was included as part of the Fascist regime's 
irredentist claims. In order to reassure the islanders, Paul 
Daladier arrived in Ajaccio on 2 January 1939. Paul Silvani 
describes the visit in the following terms:
Daladier débarque à Ajaccio sous les ovations et les 
cris de "A bas Mussolini, Mussolini au poteau!" La 
marée humaine déferle sur son passage. A ses côtés 
César Campinchi et les anciens ministres corses, chefs 
des clans qui régnent sur l'île, Adolphe Landry et 
François Pietri. "Comment ne retrouvierez-vous pas 
votre propre génie à travers le Génie de la France, 
vous Corses, alors que de cette île partit un jour un 
jeune homme qui s'appelait Bonaparte et qui devait 
devenir Napoléon I". (10)
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It was during this visit to the island that the people 
of Bastia swore the famous oath of loyalty to France: "Face 
au monde, de toute notre âme, sur nos gloires, sur nos 
tombes, nous jurons de vivre et de mourir Français" (11). 
But, despite these reassurances, Corsica was occupied by 
Italian forces on 11 November 1942 (12).
THE LIBERATION AND THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
During the Occupation, Corsica distinguished itself by 
the strength of its resistance movement, known as the 
maquis, a term which came to be applied to the entire French 
Resistance. Many Corsicans rallied either to De Gaulle in 
London, or to the Communists, the two leading components of 
the Resistance movement. However, even those who were loyal 
to the Communists showed an admiration for De Gaulle and saw 
in him the incarnation of the French nation. Corsica 
liberated itself from Fascist Occupation in 1943 (13), and
soon after, De Gaulle himself landed on the island. It is
from this date that an alliance was cemented between the 
General and the islanders, a relationship which expressed 
the strong desire of the latter to remain French. The 
General reciprocrated this loyalty and responded to the 
Corsicans with a great deal of flattery. The statements made 
by him at this time, either from Algiers or during visits to 
the island, express well how he thought of the island's 
relationship to France.
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On the 24 September 1943, a few weeks after the 
island's liberation, De Gaulle made the following statement 
in a radio broadcast from Algiers:
Après trois ans et demi d'odieuse oppression et 
d'épreuves indicibles, la Corse, la Corse française, la 
Corse aimée et si admirée, paraît à son tour au soleil 
de la libération. La France entière a tressailli, 
d'abord parce qu'en Corse l'ennemi recule en 
abandonnant, sur le terrain conquis par nous, des 
cadavres, des prisonniers, des armes; ensuite qu'au 
mesure que fuit l'envahisseur, reparaît de ville en 
ville et de village en village, le peuple français tel 
qu'il est, c'est-à-dire courageux, rassemblée, résolu à 
la liberté. (14)
In this broadcast, De Gaulle made clear that Corsicans 
were the French people and that their virtues were the 
virtues he desired for the rest of France: in other words, 
the French patriotism of the Corsicans was a model for other 
Frenchmen. The General justified this identification between 
the Corsicans and the French nation by referring to the 
notion of "volonté nationale", which is clearly derived from 
Rousseau's concept of the "general will" and which the 
Corsicans, by their actions, had proved they possess: in the 
same broadcast he noted that France rejoices "de voir en 
Corse la volonté nationale". On 19 January 1944, he returned 
to the same idea: "cette volonté profonde du peuple français 
... dans l'opération hardie de la libération de la Corse". 
(15) .
- 159 -
Two of De Gaulle's emissaries to the island repeated 
this message. André Philip, Commissaire à l'intérieur du 
Comité d'Alger, stated at Ajaccio on 30 September 1943:
par l'action hardie des patriotes de Corse, la France a 
reconquis le droit de parler avec les alliées sur un 
pied d'égalité absolu. (16)
And, in a speech to Corsicans on 4 October 1943,
General Martin stated: "Vous avez été ici les bons 
ambassadeurs et les bons ouvriers de la République. (17)
Finally, when De Gaulle himself eventually landed on 4 
October 1943, he said the following:
La Corse a la fortune et l'honneur d' être le premier 
morceau libéré de la France. Ce qu'elle a fait éclater 
de des sentiments et de sa volonté à la lumière de sa 
libération démontre ce que sont les sentiments et la 
volonté de la Nation tout entière. (18)
Thus, the message from De Gaulle was clear: not only 
was Corsica French, but it incarnated the virtues of the 
French nation. It was this identification of Corsica with 
France made by De Gaulle that helps explain the attachment 
of the islanders to the General until the period of his 
accession to power.
Nevertheless, if Corsicans were super-French, this 
marked them off from other Frenchmen, at least in their own 
eyes. At this point of its historical development, one of
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the principal manifestations of the island's difference was 
in the fervour of its attachment to France. This was 
recognized by De Gaulle in several speeches. During a visit 
to Ajaccio in 1948, he stated:
Non, la Corse n'est pas un département comme les 
autres. C'est un endroit ou l'on discerne mieux ce 
qu'est la grandeur française ... c'est parce qu'elle se 
sent vraiment française que la Corse m'est fidèle (19).
For Corsicans, the syllogism was satisfying: De Gaulle 
embodied France; Corsica identified with De Gaulle; 
therefore Corsica was French. This is one reason why many 
Corsicans remained loyal to De Gaulle when he quit public 
office and during his traversée du désert. This 
identification with De Gaulle and France also expressed 
itself during the Algerian crisis when many Corsicans 
identified with Algérie française and thought that De Gaulle 
did also. It was local Gaullists who carried out the 
attempted coup in Ajaccio in 1958 in sympathy with the pied 
noir rebels in Algeria itself (20). Subsequently, when De 
Gaulle came to power, Corsicans voted massively in favour of 
the referendums which brought into being the Fifth Republic 
and which were tests of his own popularity. This was true 
even when the voters supported anti-Gaullist candidates at 
the local level (21).
But, during the Fourth Republic, it was not only De 
Gaulle who encouraged Corsican identification with France.
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The centre-left Governments who replaced him also did so by 
their regional economic policy which has been dealt with in 
the previous Chapter.
CORSICA AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC
Paradoxically, it was the arrival of De Gaulle to power 
which led to the most serious souring of relations between 
the islanders and the French state in recent times. This may 
be interpreted mainly as the result of the different 
approach to regional policy from that of the Fifth Republic 
which has been outlined in the previous Chapter. This 
resulted in a different kind of message which the periphery 
was receiving from the centre. The new eouipe running the 
Fifth Republic was primarily concerned with creating a 
strong state in order to promote the grandeur of France.
This meant reducing the power of the rural notables, 
represented mainly in the Senate and National Assembly and 
in the party system, and encouraging a more technocratic 
approach to politics and policy-making. In fact, the latter 
had already existed during the Fourth Republic. The concern 
of the Gaullists was to better adapt the state to its logic. 
This led in some areas to a kind of social darwinism in 
which the strong were encouraged to become stronger while 
the weak were left to fend for themselves. We.have already 
seen this expressed in the statement of Michel Debre quoted 
in the previous Chapter.
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In Corsica, the immediate effect was the drying up of 
funding for the PAR, especially for the SOMIVAC. What is 
important here is the political message which the periphery 
was receiving from the centre. Corsicans now thought that, 
while they had shown their loyalty to France and had 
supported De Gaulle as the embodiment of France, Gaullist 
France was now refusing to carry out its promises to 
Corsica. Indeed, Corsica seemed to be regarded by this 
France as deserving little consideration and was regarded 
only as a very minor part of an overall plan to develop 
French grandeur.
This change of attitude on the part of the élites at 
the centre may be perceived in a series of decisions or 
events which occurred after De Gaulle came to power. On 14 
April 1960, Pierre Guillaumat, ministre-délégué for Atomic 
Energy, and Francis Perrin, High Commissioner, arrived in 
Ajaccio "en vue d'examiner sur place les possiblilités de 
création d'un centre d'expérimentations nucléaires 
souterraines" (22) . The two Government representatives 
envisaged carrying out underground atomic tests in the 
disused mines of Argentella, 15 kms south of Calvi. The 
response of the local politicians was immediately hostile, 
despite assurances that the tests would cause no danger to 
the local population. A local journalist, Aimé Pietri
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expressed the feelings of the latter in the title of an 
article: MLa solution au problème corse: la bombe atomique".
In the end, the Government backed down. But what is 
interesting are the underlying assumptions on the part of 
the Government which are revealed by this incident. First of 
all, the overriding concern of the technocrats was to 
improve France's force de frappe, which De Gaulle saw as 
being essential to the grandeur of France. Secondly, the 
fact that Corsica was chosen as the test-site illustrates 
that, for those responsible for the project, the island was 
regarded as being similar to any other island, such as those 
in the Pacific where tests were normally carried out. In 
other words, they did not really conceive of Corsica being 
part of France in the same way as, for example, Picardie or 
the Drôme. This, in any case, was the message received by 
many Corsicans.
This attitude was evident in other incidents which it 
will suffice to mention only briefly here. In December 1958, 
the Government threatened to suppress the local railway 
which ran between Ajaccio-Bastia-Calvi. The funding for the 
railway which was normally included in the national budget 
simply did not appear in the Finance Bill for 1959. The 
argument of the Government was that the transport system of 
the island would be more efficiently served by lorries 
rather than by the inefficient and slow railway. For
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Corsicans, however, the railway was a symbol of their 
département's attachment to France, since to suppress it 
would have meant that Corsica would be the only département 
without a railway. Once again, the technocratic criteria of 
economic efficiency and rationalization at the national 
level clashed with the local vision which was based on other 
criteria such as identification with France. Furthermore, to 
suppress the railway meant dealing a severe blow to the 
island's interior. For radical regionalists this was another 
"indication" that the French state wished to destroy the 
Corsican ethnie.
Another bone of contention was the island's fiscal 
statute which had followed a special regime since the time 
of Napoleon (23). On 18 December 1965, the Cour de Cassation 
decided that "le décret impérial du 24 avril 1811 demeure 
applicable en Corse aussi longtemps qu'un texte législatif 
contraire n'apporte pas de modifications au régime 
exceptionnel établi par le dit décret" (24). The Finance 
Minister, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, did not agree. For him, 
the decree guaranteed tax exemptions only in those cases 
established by the decree when it was promulgated. This 
refusal to respect a statute which tried to compensate for 
the fact of insularity sparked off a campaign of agitation 
and became one of the central concerns of moderate 
regionalism.
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What is interesting here is that while on the question 
of the railway, the Corsicans were demanding that they be 
treated on a par with the rest of France, on the question of 
the fiscal statute, they demanded to be treated differently. 
Giscard d'Estaing, on behalf of the Government, insisted 
that Corsica be treated on a par with the rest of France in 
all matters. Paradoxically, this led to a heightening of the 
islanders' consciousness of their own specificity.
In summary, then, the transition from the Fourth to the 
Fifth Republics and the accession of De Gaulle to power 
served to bring into the open latent tensions which existed 
in the Corsican identity. These tensions had been only 
faintly discernible during the Fourth Republic when 
Corsicans, after a slow start, were confirmed in their 
identity as Frenchmen. The PAR, despite its limitations and 
the fact that it emphasized Corsican specificity, 
strengthened Corsicans in the conviction that they were 
Frenchmen like others, since they were being invited to 
participate in the development of France as a whole. This 
was changed by De Gaulle's accession to power and a more 
technocratic approach to regional problems. Now, the very 
high expectations of Corsicans were disappointed and this 
led to a corresponding sense of alienation or feeling of 
differentiation from the whole. This pattern was accentuated 
in the following years of the Fifth Republic at least until 
the arrival to power of François Mitterrand and the
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Socialist Party. However, Corsicans remained largely 
faithful to De Gaulle as a man and tended to blame the 
Government rather than the President for these problems.
This is illustrated by the results of various referendums, 
including that of the 27th April 1969 to reform the Senate 
and on the regional question which led to the General's 
departure, when Corsicans tended to vote massively in favour 
of De Gaulle (25).
CORSICA UNDER POMPIDOU
President Pompidou wished to continue the Gaullist 
project of promoting French grandeur. What marks the 
Pompidolian period in particular is the emphasis on great 
industrial projects, many of which were carried out at the 
expense of aesthetic values. Pompidou shared De Gaulle's 
concern with creating a great industrial power, but 
dispensed with much of the General's rhetoric and more 
fanciful interpretations of the meaning of the French 
nation, adopting instead a more pragmatic approach.
This pragmatism and lack of concern for ideology, or 
the political implications of ideological terminology, 
became evident during the President's first visit to 
Corsica, on 15 August 1969, for the occasion of the 
bicentenary of Napoleon's birth. At the Hotel de Ville in 
Ajaccio, he made the following declaration:
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J'ai essayé, Monsieur le Maire d'Ajaccio, de répondre à 
votre attente en essayant de résoudre quelques 
problèmes qui vous tiennent à coeur. Il faut à la Corse 
une certaine autonomie. Elle se trouvait liée au 
référendum dont le rejet a apporté tant de 
bouleversements et de tristesse. Mais ce rejet 
n'entraine pas celui des légitimes revendications de la 
Corse [my emphasis] (26)
Pompidou was clearly unaware of the political effects of the 
word "autonomy" in the Corsican context. Later that 
afternoon, it was necessary for him to clarify his statement 
in a written note to the Corsican parliamentarians:
S'agissant du problème de la régionalisation, le 
président de la République a confirmé qu'il avait 
toujours été favorable à l'octroi d'un statut 
administratif particulier à 1' île et à son détachement 
de la région Provence-côte d'Azur. (27).
A gesture was made toward this by naming the Corsican 
CODER (see below) a CODEC, with slightly different powers 
and Corsica became a circonscription d'action régionale 
(28). However, this fell far short of the statute of 
autonomy which the radical autonomists were now demanding.
In fact, it was simply a return to the status quo ante since 
this was the administrative situation prior to the advent of 
the Fifth Republic. The result was that an initiative 
designed to placate some of the Corsican grievances did not 
go far enough and merely exacerbated the conflict. Other 
"initiatives" emanating from the centre fuelled further this 
conflict. Here we will simply outline the principal ones.
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In 1972, the Government published a schéma 
d'aménagement de la Corse, in line with similar schémas for 
other regions (29). The schéma. drawn up by a Mission 
interministérielle and the Mission régionale, betrayed an 
essentially technocratic view of development. It advocated 
an intensification of the previous form of development based 
on tourism and the kind of agriculture which the pieds noirs 
were promoting and an increase of population to 320,000. It 
was accepted by the local politicians only after they 
suggested serious modifications (30). These, however, were 
largely ignored by the Government. In other words, the 
latter had drawn up a programme to develop Corsica, without 
taking into consideration the advice of the local 
politicians. This, in turn, led to a further weakening of 
the political legitimacy of the latter. The reaction of the 
radical regionalists was even stronger: they asked, in 
particular, who the 320,000 inhabitants of Corsica were to 
be: Corsicans or non-Corsicans. This reaction betrayed the 
fear that the island community or ethnie was itself 
threatened.
This fear had been provoked by another "initiative" 
emanating from the centre. In 1970, the DATAR had 
commissioned the Hudson Institute to draw up a report on the 
Corsican situation (31). The results of the report were not 
officially published but copies were leaked to the
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autonomists. The Report suggested two solutions to the 
Corsican problem:
either:
accélerer la disparition de l'identité culturelle corse 
en encourageant, par exemple, une nouvelle immigration 
massive en provenance de la métropole. La période de 
transition serait ainsi plus brève et la Corse 
atteindrait un niveau élevé de peuplement, environ 
500,000, en majorité non corse.
or:
conserver et restaurer l'identité culturelle et les 
traditions corses en développant le potentiel de 1' île 
dans son contexte.
It added that:
ne choisir aucune de ces deux options accroîtrait les 
difficultés. La première est douloureuse, difficile et 
aléatoire; la seconde semble raisonnable, sans grands 
risques, et pourrait se révéler intéressante et 
passionnante ... sans changement décisif de la 
politique gouvernementale, on ne peut envisager 
d'actions locales ou privées susceptibles de ralentir 
ou de modifier la détérioration de la situation. Une 
politique de continuité, même si on y apporte des 
changements majeurs, développera selon toute 
vraisemblance un accroissement du malaise.
In fact, it was precisely this "politique de 
continuité" that the Government decided to pursue. Many 
Corsicans, however, concluded that the it had chosen the 
first option: the disappearance of the Corsiaan people and 
its replacement by another population. It is less important 
whether the Government actually made this choice than that
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some Corsicans really believed they did. This is because any 
further Government initiatives would be interpreted in this 
way by a sizeable minority. Thus, attempts to integrate 
further the island had as a consequence the alienation of a 
section of the population and the heightening of a sense of 
differentiation among many of the remainder.
In summary, then, the technocratic approach to French 
regional policy during the Fourth Republic and intensified 
under De Gaulle, was reinforced, or perceived as such, 
during the Pompidolian period. The approach continued to be 
applied to Corsica despite the promises of Pompidou 
mentioned above and despite the growing chorus of complaints 
from local politicians and the burgeoning radical 
regionalist movement. The former found their legitimacy 
questioned by the latter because resources were now 
channelled to the island by outside economic forces which 
escaped their control. The regionalists used this fact to 
attack the local politicians and the central Government whom 
they now accused of trying to wipe out the island community. 
At least, this is how they interpreted the Hudson Report. It 
was against this background of growing disquiet that, in 
1974, President Pompidou died and was succeeded by Valéry 
Giscard d'Estaing.
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CORSICA UNDER GISCARD D'ESTAING
During the early period of Giscard d'Estaing's 
septennat, the President wished to temper the 
authoritarianism of the Gaullist period and the 
technocratism of the Pompidolian with his own brand of 
"démocratie libérale avancée" (32) . In fact, he did 
introduce several important changes of a liberal nature into 
French society (33) . During the latter part of his 
septennat, however, the President became ever more distant 
from the French people retreating into a kind of monarchist 
isolation, and his Governments abandoned any liberalism 
except economic and introduced increasingly repressive 
measures (34).
These two phases of the Giscardian perod were evident 
in his Governments' approaches to Corsica. During the 
election campaign of 1974, Giscard d'Estaing as candidate 
stated during a visit to the island:
Il y a les réalités corses; il y a les besoins - réels
- de la Corse, et puis il y a le coeur de la Corse: 
souvenez- vous de moi et je me souviendrai de vous.(35)
This, of course, was nothing more than the traditional 
combination of promises and flattery which was necessary for 
politicians to receive votes in Corsica, and remained vague 
enough. However, the future President's thoughts on Corsica
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were clarified further in an interview given to the 
Corsican magazine Kyrn;
Q. Pensez-vous que l'on doive traiter comme des
séparatistes ceux qui réclament pour la Corse, dans le 
cadre de la Nation française, un statut d'autonomie 
interne lui permettant de protéger son identité 
culturelle et les particularismes de son économie?
VGE Bien évidemment, la réponse est négative. Je suis
favorable d'une façon générale à la décentralisation 
des décisions, inséparable de la liberté et seule 
capable de susciter des initiatives individuelles. Il 
me semble important dans cet esprit que la Corse se 
fasse avec les Corses. Quant aux séparatistes réels, 
ils doivent avoir assez de courage pour dire qu'ils le 
sont. Et le courage n'est pas une vertu rare en Corse.
Q. Les mouvements autonomistes ont avancé la notion de 
peuple corse et demandent à l'Etat de la reconnaître 
juridiquement. Cette reconnaissance vous paraît-elle 
compatible avec 1"unité nationale? A défaut de 
reconnaissance juridique, la notion de peuple vous 
paraît-elle concevable aux plans culturels et 
ethniques?
VGE La notion de peuple ne correspond à aucune
qualification juridique autre que celle d'habitants 
d'une patrie. A l'intérieur de la patrie existe le 
droit à la diversité, qu'elle soit géographique ou 
ethnique. Il y a en Corse des hommes ayant des qualités 
particulières et des traits de tempérament propres. 
Toute action tendant à valoriser ces éléments 
caractéristiques dans un souci de développement 
culturel mérite le respect. Elle contribue en effet à 
enrichir cette diversité des cultures et des hommes qui 
est un des atouts de la France.(36).
Giscard d'Estaing's statement was in line with his plan 
for a "liberal advanced democracy" and seemed to go some way 
at least toward recognizing the existence of a Corsican 
specificity. However, the future President was clear that 
there would be no juridical recognition of a Corsican
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peuple. The only peuple was the French one of which the 
Corsicans were a part. Once again, the ambiguity of 
Corsican-French relations is present in official thinking. 
This time, some hopes were raised but the limitations were 
also laid down.
In line with the liberal element of this approach, the 
Government, in 1975, sent Libert Bou, a civil servant with 
experience in solving regional problems, to examine the 
Corsican problem. Bou was appointed Chairman of the Mission 
interministérielle and of the Fonds d'expansion économique. 
The Government also appointed him Délégué au développement 
écomomique and Commissaire à la rénovation rurale - a 
formidable array of posts which underlined the importance of 
his mission.
One of Bou's first steps on arriving in Corsica was to 
consult the radical regionalists and to lend a sympathetic 
ear to their problems. He stated that he agreed with their 
analysis of the island's problems, but categorically refused 
their solution: "s'ils veulent poser comme préalable à toute 
discussion le problème de la réforme constitutionnelle de la 
République française dont la Corse fait partie intégrante 
... il [ne] sera [pas] possible de faire un travail en 
commun, car la constitution française n'est pas négociable" 
(37). and "...même 200,000 Corses autonomistes ne pourraient 
rien changer [de la Constitution française]" (38).
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The outcome of Bou's mission was the drawing up of a 
Charte de développement de la Corse, which contained the 
important phrase peuple corse in its preamble and 
recognised that "la crise de croissance se traduit par des 
déséquilibres graves, générateurs de tensions sociales, 
économiques et politiques contradictoires". The Charte 
recommended a new approach to development: "orienter le 
développement économique dans un sens plus conforme aux 
besoins de 1' île, de sa population et surtout de sa 
jeunesse" It stated that it was necessary to "répondre aux 
aspirations profondes d'un peuple trop souvent incompris" 
(39).
The Comité économique et social, on 23 June 1975, further 
recommended:
1. Mettre en place des institutions nouvelles et 
originales par l'élection du Conseil régional au 
suffrage universel et à la proportionnelle - ce qui est 
demandé par la plupart des formations politiques de 1' 
île, des autonomistes aux Républicains indépendants en 
passant par les parties de gauche et du centre - et par 
l'élargissement du Comité économique et social;
2. Mettre un terme à la pratique intitutionnalisée de 
la fraude électorale par l'adoption de dispositions 
appropiées.(40).
The Conseil général, however, while accepting the 
necessity of electing regional bodies by universal suffrage, 
rejected that this should be by proportional representation.
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The Government diluted the ideas of the document even 
further. The name was changed from the more solemn Charte to 
the simple programme. More importantly, from the point of 
view of the autonomists, was the dropping of any reference 
to the peuple corse.
The Libert Bou episode marks a further radicalization 
of the Corsican problem. At first, it seemed as if the
Government would adopt a more liberal approach, in line with
Giscard d'Estaing's promises. Bou raised such hopes and 
recognised the existence of a peuple corse. This reinforced 
Corsicans in the sentiment of differentiation. Having raised 
these hopes, however, the Giscardian Government did little 
to satisfy them. Indeed, they seemed to take away what 
little recognition had been given by Bou. This was done in 
the name of Corsica's status of being integrally a part of
France. But it further alienated those elements of the
population which were already alienated from it.
This, in fact, was the pattern for the remainder of 
Giscard d'Estaing's septennat; a liberalism which appeared 
willing to make some concessions combined with a heavy- 
handedness which eventually became police repression.
Other examples of the the liberal approach were the 
holding of an enquiry into the wine-growing problem, which 
had been directly responsible for the events of Aleria in
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August 1975, and the attempt to meet the problem of 
insularity by the granting of a statute of continuité 
territoriale on 1 April 1976. Heavy-handedness, on the 
other hand is evident in the Government's handling of the 
incidents of Aleria and Bastelica-Ajaccio which resulted in 
the loss of lives (41). There was also an insensitivity on 
the part of Government ministers such as Christian Beullac, 
who spoke disparagingly about the Corsican language, and 
Michel Poniatowski who did likewise about a mythical body 
known as the "Union Corse", allegedly involved in Mafia-type 
activities (42).
It was during the Giscardian period that the sense of 
alienation and differentiation on the part of many Corsicans 
was at its height. Corsican nationalism, as opposed to the 
more moderate autonomism, became an important political 
force during this period and entered more explicitly into 
competition with the official Jacobin nationalism. The rise 
of this pur et dur nationalism may be seen as a continually 
hard-line response to the growing repressiveness of the 
Giscardian regime. However, it also had the effect of 
forcing other Corsicans, including the moderate 
regionalists, to rethink their own attachment to France. In 
the end, most Corsicans were concerned to emphasize their 
Frenchness while, at the same time, many had a secret 
admiration for the autonomists. Thus, it might be said that 
the ambiguity remained with the different elements
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struggling for domination. It was not until Mitterrand was 
elected to power in 1981 that a more balanced attempt to 
reconcile these elements would be made (see Chapter Nine on 
Statut Particulier).
CONCLUSION
Since the time of its annexation by France, Corsica 
strongly identified with France. This identification was 
largely an expression of a deep-seated insecurity on the 
part of Corsicans with regard to their own identity. On the 
one hand, they wished to remain French and to differentiate 
themselves from their Italian neighbours. At certain 
periods, such as the period after the Second World War, they 
were encouraged in this identification by French leaders 
such as De Gaulle. However, this very strong identification 
with France served, paradoxically, to differentiate 
themselves from other Frenchmen. Furthermore, the fact that 
they did possess a distinct cultural identity closer to 
Italy than to France created an ambivalence in the minds of 
many Frenchmen including French leaders. This led to certain 
types of statement which emphasised Corsican differences. 
This, in turn, influenced the way in which Corsicans thought 
about themselves, in that it reinforced the ambivalence in 
their minds.
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Relations between Corsica and France have been marked 
by ambiguity and ambivalence. The ambiguity lies in the fact 
that initiatives of an institutional, economic and political 
nature, designed to integrate the island into the French 
polity, often served to protect its differentiation. This 
led to an ambivalence both on the part of Corsicans and on 
the part of other Frenchmen: Corsicans were formally French, 
but they were also different. Another way of saying this is 
that while Corsica was integrated into France on the formal 
and legal levels this did not translate itself culturally, 
economically and sociologically. This led to the creation of 
a dual identity; Corsicans are both French and Corsican. The 
vertical dimension of our model - the system of mediation 
between the local society and state - made it possible to 
describe and explain this phenomenon. The following section 
explores the islanders' reactions to these developments. It 
begins by developing the horizontal dimension of the model: 
the socio-economic context. Then it examines the regionalist 
movements in relation to the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions.
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8ECTION THREE! »LE PROBLEME CORSE”
Section Three will examine the Corsican problem from the 
perspective of the islanders', that is, from the bottom up. It 
begins, in Chapter Six, with a treatment of the horizontal 
dimension of the theoretical model: the socio-economic context 
of the region. In effect, it analyses the roots of the system 
of mediation known as the clan system. The different kinfis of 
regionalist movements are then analysed in relation both to 
this socio-economic context and to the system of mediation. 
Chapter Seven analyses moderate regionalism, while Chapter 
Eight analyses radical regionalism. The hypotheses that emerge 
from this treatment are that moderate regionalism comprises 
those socio-economic groups closest to the system of 
mediation: the Corsican middle-classes and their clienteles; 
while radical regionalism consists of those most alienated 
from it: old-style regionalists, the young Corsican 
intelligentsia, the petite bourgeoisie and peasants left out 
of the economic developments of post-war Corsica.
- 180 -
»-■'‘ • • a .  . ....... »• •■ •<• - :  .- At;-, \  .■*•. v  • : * .  • •  . ; v ‘ ■• ■■:•-•_ ■-; v '-'í- “*'*• • ‘ • V . r ' - -  •. .‘i / - *>\V• t*" - * • • / •sV/r-to)*;1
i-:-.v.. ' . v:;:/v y . 
■ ì:.iSv-'mmff ;.
si \<$* *&$&&# »$í SKnfS '$$di , 'aaaí»A«X«¿ *ri*:;f.©;
•,' / - i ‘édé W  "■"&.: '&£&.. iXÍM: *#ä%ätß. .'&¡t: ^
-.'Æ-3u-é^o*K;- '■
. -;■ «?pr ■ M :  ■; ’-'si v.* *si ; I«’ .
■ : .-0S&S>-»í¿f ‘ ;á>’Ó®if isäÄJjsxlji» 3x*
i «f tfjtetìf «r¿¿*t*!L «si rty» » :'
ImÁ &%$$.-:
:t.:< iogföfe
■-#^ íí!Í^ 5«9SE« «dV T . Insito. ■ a^v^s#*«, /
-';. -. ä^ '« differ .:
■’• - ; &yé&£¡í,;:
• V ':. i fâUfs ’ ■ ■»?£$' ■ t&ïfy'm:
■>-r;■ ■ S^-;-^ Â l i è i i à à *:îfâtât&&ÿpx:- Zmiimx
;?; ■-■'■".■y ,c- ■ m;o-:.
' - r^ o.Ls?t»3- $wt<s?% ftûz ss xáí smtä;
):~; ^ ÿÿr":- : y > ■ í y-Z^}^^pU'r-X^:*r : ':^';"'.v:r -:y‘~t' v:'-;/ V
sfííO i t * | - t e *  srifláwf'^tí«  ^ wiïj l ib is i
V  V ' 3î#s ^.}norm®& 5ö
5 - -1; I ,  •” •■ / ;  '•;■■'><, - t " : ' ' -  ’: ' ' :*‘ *’v .  : *'• ' ' v' “ , ~ : -■■ ■ : \ - :  '■' ;  -  ^ ; .’ ;. ' \ . V  ’ ■ •'•■ . . - .  •■■■-■,.-- .- ■ --... • ' v - ’’ -.-, . -.■- ■ ■•',
- i ' ' /r-^  :-';''^' , :-.,'^-L^ : ’^»¿tì.,; • < . ' . i--1 ■ •.•.■• '• ' ' •»• :• ;. 'i-r ■■■■:. •-• . :•.’ '-,t-' •:'• •'-.?:•> :- .!r‘'.-.v:,i/-^,í,:;í' • ;.f -■-,;:V,'-t'-.' -■ . !.'•. -S - ;. - - •_ : •-••<•.'.,.. -,
Jir:$.y. : '■*$ -.•■■'■. ■'■ '* ' *'’■ •. .'V'-V' ‘ 'V ;
* ■ f  ^rj ^ ^ ^   ^1 : ^ ‘■' ‘ ^1 • ' -^ . • ' i' \ ' ’' '■ ■■ _',; ^  ^ ’ '' 't-''";
"  ':(■■ : . • ' *  . ' , .'V..< .T  . î*V  .î " V; ' ;• , • • '■+ --'■ :.■:■*■?. V  ■’ . ■ ' x-- ■',"■■ \ -. r . ' .  ' “  ^ '" V I 'V  ‘ 'V :- :-  '<  . -  “ ._• •••. i- ¿fe-?;'.1 C r1: .•;>« ,•■• •'
CHAPTER SIX: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
This Chapter will apply the horizontal dimension of our 
model to the Corsican case: it will present and analyse the 
socio-economic context of the island. It begins by briefly 
summarizing the principal elements of Corsican history and 
geography. Then it looks at economic and demographic 
developments. This is the socio-economic background essential 
for understanding the emergence of distinct forms of society 
and culture. Finally, the Corsican political system - its 
internal features and its relation to the French state - is 
analysed in the light of these features of Corsican history 
and society. Particular attention is paid to the phenomenon of 
the clan system.
CORSICAN GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
Corsican history has been dominated by two principal 
factors: geography and topography. The more important of these 
is the former: Corsica is an island, the third largest in the 
Mediterranean, situated in the Gulf of Genoa (1). It is closer 
to Italy than to France, lying about 80 kms from Livorno 
(Leghorn) and 180 kms from Nice. Less than twenty kilometres 
to its south lies the island of Sardinia. But the second 
factor is also important. The German geographer Ratzel, in a 
celebrated phrase, described the island as a "mountain in the 
sea" (2). In fact, the island was formed when two separate
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mountain formations collided. This has led to a natural 
division between the eastern and western parts of the island. 
These are divided by a high mountain ridge which, until recent 
times, was impassable for part of the year. Ratzel's 
description is not an exaggeration: on the entire island there 
exists only one extensive plain, the Oriental Plain which is 
about 50 kms in length and about 20 kms in breadth at its 
widest point. The remainder of the island consists of 
mountains which often plunge directly and dramatically into 
the sea. Another important feature of these mountains is their 
height. The highest peak, Monte Cinto, reaches 2,710 m while 
about ten others are over 2,000 m in height.
Important prehistoric sites such as Filitosa testify to 
early human settlements (3). However, monuments similar to 
those in Corsica have been found in other parts of Western 
Europe such as Spain and Brittany, suggesting that the island 
was used as a stepping stone by peoples travelling from East 
to West (4). In any case, what is clear is that the island was 
settled from early times and that an indigenous Corsican 
population came into being, although little is known about it. 
Another group which settled on the island was a colony of 
Phocean Greeks driven from their home in Asia Minor by 
pressure from the Persians (5). The Greeks founded the city of 
Alalia (later Aleria) on the Oriental Plain around 600 BC at 
roughly the same time that Marseilles was founded by people of 
the same origin.
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The geographical position of Corsica as an island in the 
Western Mediterranean gave it great strategic importance for 
the different civilizations which grew up around the basin. As 
these civilizations grew in sophistication and complexity and 
especially when they developed great navies and extensive 
maritime commerce, the island became especially Prized as a 
landing stage between the Iberian and Italian peninsulas. It 
was for this reason that the town of Aleria was fought over by 
the Romans and Carthaginians in the 4th century BC. It was the 
Romans who finally captured it and, after devastating the old 
Greek city, rebuilt it along Roman lines (6). Using Aleria as 
a base, the Romans proceeded to conquer the remainder of the 
island and imposed a Pax Romanica which lasted for several 
centuries. Although Corsican slaves were not popular with the 
Romans because of their "untameable" disposition (7), the 
Corsicans seem to finally accept the Romans as their masters 
and adopted a version of Latin as their language (8), although 
some traces of the original language can still be noted in the 
Corsican dialect. Thus, Corsica became a part of Roman 
civilization and for most of this period was attached to 
Sardinia to form one province. Another integrating influence 
was the arrival of Christianity which was introduced to the 
island and accepted by its inhabitants at an early stage, 
although elements of older religious beliefs continued to be 
practised (9).
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This pattern repeated itself throughout Corsica's 
history. With the breakup of the Empire, under what is known 
as the Barbarian Invasions, the island was occupied by 
barbarian tribes who had occupied North Africa and moved back 
up through Europe to Italy (10). Then, for a long period, 
Corsica was under the protection of the Papacy. During the 
period of the Moslem conquests of the Mediterranean and part 
of Europe, Corsica remained Christian and was subjected to 
only a superficial Moorish or, later, Saracen presence. Pisa 
was given control in the eleventh century but, after a 
struggle in the fourteenth century between Pisa and Genoa, 
the island became the possession of the latter which treated 
it as a colony. The Genoese interest in the island lay in the 
fact that they themselves lacked a hinterland where they could 
grow foodstuffs to support the city republic. Corsica was to 
provide such a "bread basket" (11). Finally, after an 
ephemeral Republic was set up by Pascal Paoli in the 
eighteenth century, the Genoese ceded control to the French in 
1768 (12). Only twice since then has the island ceased to be 
controlled by France: once during the period of the Rovauroe 
Analo-corse in 1794 and then during the Italian occupation of 
1942-43 (13).
Topography has also influenced the island's history. This 
indeed is one of the principal explanations for "an important 
element of continuity of this history: the existence of a 
societal dualism between a more primitive society of the
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interior, based on village life and an agro-pastoral economy, 
and a more advanced urban society on the coast, in touch with 
continental civilization. The reason for this is the structure 
of the Corsican mountains. This is not fully captured by 
Ratzel's description which gives the impression that there is 
just one mountain. In fact, as noted above, there are two 
distinct mountain formations which meet in the centre of the 
island. This has created a high central ridge constituting a 
kind of spine, which runs from the north-west to the south­
east. Until recent times, this ridge closed off one part of 
the island from the other for much of the winter. Branching
.  .A *
off from this spine were ribs frhich descended, often abruptly, 
to the sea. In this way, deep valleys were formed. These 
valleys were often completely separated from one another. The 
inaccessibility of these valleys gave to the Corsicans safe 
retreats from the many invaders who arrived on the shores of 
the island. The latter, in their turn, tended to remain on the 
coast, especially on the Oriental Plain. The height of the 
mountains created three distinct sub-climates: an alpine 
climate; a temperate band; and a sub-tropical mediterranean 
climate (14). The original Corsicans tended to settle in the 
middle belt, and it is here that most of the villages are to 
be found (15). Besides being safer from outside attackers, 
another reason for settling in this region was that it was 
healthier than the malaria-infested coast which could only be 
inhabited only during the winter.
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ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS
Fernand Braudel, speaking of the incredible diversity of 
France, has pointed out that each region, even each micro- 
region, itself contains a great diversity of climate, 
language, social and economic habits (16). From what has been 
said above, it will be clear that there is no one set of 
economic features or unified society on Corsica, but rather 
several distinct social groups each with its particular 
economic activities and social habits. The different climates 
which led to different types of economic activities have 
already pointed out: in the high mountains, pastoral 
activities predominated, mainly sheep rearing; in the middle 
belt there was a more settled pattern of cultivation (mainly 
fruit and nut trees, especially sweet chestnuts - chataianes
- and olives); on the coast, vineyards were cultivated and a 
good quality Corsican wine was produced.
There was often conflict between the shepherds and the 
farmers. This arose because of the Corsican shepherd's 
practice of transhumance: the semi-nomadic herding of large 
flocks of sheep from one region to another, mainly between the 
high alpine meadows in the summer and the coast (what 
Corsicans refer to as the "plain") in the winter (17). At one 
time, transhumance took place between southern Corsica and 
northern Sardinia where several Corsican-speaking villages, 
peopled by the descendants of shepherds who remained behind,
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may still be found. The farmers, naturally, reacted against 
the ravages done to their crops by passing flocks of sheep and 
goats (18).
Despite these differences, the great majority of the 
economic activities of the interior had one feature in common: 
their primitive and often archaic nature. Some practices, such 
as the burning of the maauis by the shepherds, dated from 
neolithic times, and the agricultural techniques used by the 
farmers were often of the most primitive kind. For example, 
most of the mills in which olives were crushed used a 
horizontal water-driven wheel rather than a vertical one which 
demanded a more sophisticated degree of technology (19) . As a 
result of this backward agriculture the quality of live-stock 
was poor and the yields from them were derisory except in a 
few regions of the island.
In fairness to the Corsicans it must be said that the 
environment in which they lived was a harsh one despite the 
impression of luxuriousness which an occasional visitor might 
have (20). Although the existence of high mountains meant an 
abundant supply of rain water, this fell in torrential 
downpours during very short intervals. This meant it was hard 
to capture and, furthermore, was a source of erosion of the 
soil. Only in modern times has the technology for dam-building 
been available.
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Added to these natural difficulties was the continual 
insecurity and endemic violence (see below) which persisted 
throughout Corsican history. This made it difficult for 
farmers and shepherds to develop more sophisticated 
techniques. Finally, the very isolation of the island 
communities meant they remained unaware of, and unaffected by, 
technical progress. Thus, the dominant economic activity of 
the interior may be described as a primitive form of 
subsistence economy, based on agro-pastoral activities.
It might be thought that fishing would be a favoured 
activity of Corsicans, given their closeness to the sea. In 
fact, most Corsicans feared the sea and preferred to remain in 
the safety of their mountain villages. A Corsican dicton says: 
"U Corsu patisce tuttu da mare in la" (All of the Corsican's 
misfortunes come from across the sea). The major exception was 
in the Cap Corse, the finger pointing toward Genoa, where a 
maritime tradition grew up as well as a tradition of commerce 
between the Cap and the Italian peninsula.
The non-native inhabitants of Corsica (Genoese and 
French), who settled on the coastal regions, were often 
impressed by the seeming luxuriousness of the island, and 
tried to improve the traditional activities by introducing 
more modern techniques. The Genoese, whose intetest, as we 
have seen, was in turning the island into their "bread­
basket", made several attempts to mettre en valeur the island,
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none of which was very successful (21). Similar attempts were 
made by the French during the ancien réaime (22).
However, it was only in the nineteenth century that 
progress began to be made (23). A rising rural bourgeoisie, 
in regions such as the Cap Corse and the Balagne, began to 
introduce new agricultural techniques which produced better 
yields. There was even some industrial development, including 
the beginning of heavy industry, e.g. the production of steel 
in foundries near Bastia using iron-ore extracted from mines 
on the island of Elba between Corsica and Italy.
Unfortunately, these developments came to a halt toward 
the end of the nineteenth century. During this period there 
occurred, in the Western world, a dramatic improvement in 
transport and manufacturing techniques which led to a world­
wide expansion of capitalism with the creation of new markets. 
This expansion affected both the industrial and agricultural 
sectors on Corsica. Cheaply produced goods from outside found 
their way into the remotest Corsican villages to be sold at 
cheaper prices than the local produce. Furthermore, Corsican 
goods exported to the continent were penalized by a special 
tariff rate which favoured French produced goods (24). The 
result was that Corsican goods were unable to compete, and one 
productive sector after another, both industrial and 
agricultural, collapsed (25). The first to go were the 
industrial units followed by the more progressive agricultural
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regions. These reverted to the traditional methods of 
subsistence farming.
By the early twentieth century, the island was in a 
wretched condition. An official report, known as the Rapport 
Clemenceau, and published on 26 September 1908, describes the 
island in the following terms: "Il n'y a aucun pays d'Europe 
qui puisse donner une idée de la misère et du dénuement actuel 
de la Corse" (26).
These economic trends had serious effects of the number 
of inhabitants of the island. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, the population had steadily risen reaching a peak by 
the 1880's (see figures presented above in Chapter Four).
As in all Mediterranean regions there was a constant 
emigration flow but at this time this was, relative to what 
was to come, a mere trickle. When the economic collapse 
occurred, at the end of the century, this trickle turned into 
a flood. Janine Renucci has described it as a virus migrateur
- a kind of disease which affected every family. These trends, 
which were already depleting the island of its most active and 
valuable elements, received a disastrous impetus with the 
First World War. It is well known that this conflict affected 
principally the rural regions of France, but evten compared 
with these Corsica was affected particularly cruelly. It is 
impossible to give an accurate figure of the number of losses
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suffered by the island but it is safe to say that at least 
20,000 men were killed or wounded (27). This represents nearly 
10 per cent of a population of 270,218 thousand. The effect on 
the island's society was catastrophic. An already 
disadvantaged and moribund economy was pushed even further 
along an accelerating road of decline. Many Corsicans feared 
for the very survival of their society.
SOCIETY AND CULTURE
The forms taken by Corsican society and culture were 
determined, to a large extent, by these material constraints 
of geography and topography, and the modes of economic 
production that that were possible within them. These 
determinations were modified by extraneous factors such as the 
relations between the island and neighbouring states (28). 
Here, it is possible only to sketch the main features of 
Corsican society and culture and to examine them in so far as 
they shed light on our problematic: the duality and ambiguity 
of Corsican-French relations.
As mentioned above, there existed since Roman times two 
forms of settlement on the island which corresponded to the 
two types of society: an urban pattern on the coast; and a 
village pattern in the mountainous interior. The sizes of 
villages ranged from tiny hamlets, such as those which dot the 
Castagniccia region, to small towns such as Corte in the
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central mountains and Sartene in the south. The pattern of 
village settlement, however, was not evenly distributed. More 
villages were founded on the eastern side of the mountain 
ridge than on the western. This was based partly on the fact 
that the latter region was less amenable to cultivation and 
partly on the fact of different societal traditions on each 
side of the ridge. The eastern side, known as the En deca des 
Monts (i.e. with reference to the Italian peninsula) was more 
influenced by the Italian communalist movements and was also 
known as the Terra dei Communi. The feudal system broke down 
more quickly in this region than in the west and this gave 
rise to a system of elites known as the caporali who were 
drawn from the ordinary people (29). The Terra dei Communi was 
also more prone to insurrection against outside rulers, and 
many of the rebellions of Corsican history began and ended 
here. The Au-dela des Monts, on the other hand, was 
characterised by the longer survival of the feudal system and 
was dominated by great land-owning lords (in Corsican Sgio).
It was known as the Terra dei Signori.
These different patterns of authority had their roots in 
an institution which was even more important than the village: 
the Corsican family. This was the Mediterranean family with, 
at its head, the paterfamilias. It extended to several 
branches of cousins. The family in turn was at the root of the 
system of clans: a group of families with one dominant family 
at its head, which has survived to the present day and has
- 192 -
been a primary determinant in Corsican political life (see 
below). In fact, the primary loyalty of Corsicans has been to 
his family and clan rather than to another unit, even his 
village, but especially not his region, or island.
The material basis for this loyalty to the family was the 
necessity of eking out a precarious existence using 
subsistence methods in a harsh environment (30). This led to 
competition for scarce resources, and the unit best suited to 
this struggle was the united extended family. Such a struggle 
also took precedence over other more abstract loyalties such 
as loyalty to the state or to a system of law defined by 
outsiders. This competition between rival clans for resources 
is at the root of an important characteristic of Corsican 
society: its conflictual nature. Within each unit of 
habitation - the hamlet, the village, the region, the island 
as a whole - there were always two parties (in Corsican 
partitu = clan), the bianchi and the neri. bitterly opposed 
to each other.
The cement which bound together the family, what might be 
called the cultural expression of family unity, was the notion 
of honour. This was a kind of corporatism, similar to the 
Catholic corporatism found in regions like Brittany and the 
Basque Country, in the sense that the individual mattered less 
than a larger unit - the extended family. Again this is a 
phenomenon to be found in all Mediterranean societies, the
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best known being Sicily. "Honour" refers both to the 
individual's perception of himself and to his consciousness of 
belonging to a family unit. The two are so intertwined as to 
become almost indistinguishable: an affront to the honour of 
the individual is also an affront to the family and vice 
versa. An affront had to be avenged by the spilling of blood.
Here, we have the origin of another important feature of 
Corsican society: its propensity to violence. To kill a man 
who had, even trivially, affronted the honour of the family 
was regarded by Corsicans, not as a crime but as a duty which 
fell on the male members of the family. And to avenge such a 
killing by another death was a further obligation for the 
males of the family of the dead man. Such family feuds could 
last for generations, and the historical record shows 
fantastic numbers of people killed on the island at different 
periods, especially the Genoese period (31). What was at stake 
here was the ability of a family to survive against external 
attacks.
"Macho" behaviour did not always lead to deaths. As in 
southern Italy, this was often a ritualized form of behaviour 
where the protagonists knew the limits which they could not 
transgress. However, the younger, more impulsive members 
sometimes went beyond these limits and this sparked off the 
vendetta. What is remarkable is that Corsicans reserved this 
treatment almost uniquely for fellow-Corsicans. Visitors to
- 194 -
the island were usually treated with the greatest kindness and 
courtesy, and hospitality was considered to be both a duty and 
a privilege (32).
Related to this propensity to use violence was the 
phenomenon of banditry (33). Corsican males who had murdered a 
member of a rival family "took to the maguis". There they were 
supported by their own family. Sometimes bandits set up 
counter societies, controlling agricultural activities and 
collecting taxes from the local inhabitants. However, it would 
be wrong to see such phenomena as being an explicitly 
political reaction against legitimate authority as some later 
commentators have tended to do. Rather bandits often preyed on 
the local population in what was simply a criminal manner.
These social relations and habits may be described as 
part of Corsican culture, if the term culture is used in its 
anthropological sense (34). This may be seen as one expression 
of a more widespread Mediterranean culture - les grands faits 
méditerranéens - shared by the other peoples of the basin.
More specifically, Corsicans developed a particular set of 
traditions - of language, music and song, which are mainly 
part of what may be described as Italianate civilization. 
During the Roman period a form of vulgar Latin , with some 
traces of a more ancient language, was spoken. During the long 
period of Genoese rule, the official language became Tuscan 
Italian. An unwritten dialect or, rather, set of dialects
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(35), now called Corsican was also spoken. Without entering 
into the debate as to whether this is a dialect of Italian or 
a language in its own right (36), descended directly from 
Latin, it can be said that Italian and Corsican were so close 
that they existed in harmonious relationship with each other 
(37). Today, a Corsican speaking his own dialect has little 
difficulty understanding Italian or some dialects of Italian 
such as that found near Genoa. By contrast, there is as much 
difference between Corsican and standard French as there is 
between French and Sicilian. When French became the official 
language it had a conflictual relationship with Corsican (38). 
Among other features of Corsican culture were a distinctive 
musical tradition which seems to have been influenced by 
Italian and Arabic traditions. Finally, traditional Corsicans, 
despite their strong loyalty to Christianity, retained more 
ancient superstitions such as the mazzeri (these were 
individuals who could foretell the death of another by looking 
into the face of an animal such as a goat or sheep) (39).
The Church itself seems to have been less powerful in 
Corsica than in other French regions such as Brittany, French 
Flanders and the French Basque Country. During the Paolian 
period, the Corsican clergy met at a Franciscan convent in 
Orezza, in the Castagniccia region, to justify the revolt in 
their Justificazione della Revoluzione. But, although 
Corsicans remained loyal to the Church during the nineteenth 
century, the clergy does not seem to have played an important
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mediating role between the local society and the state. This, 
in fact, was played by the clan leaders. The sense of 
community solidarity which came from the social teachings of 
the Catholic Church in regions such as Brittany was provided 
in Corsica by the solidarity of the clan system and through 
the ancient notion of "honour".
The final relevant characteristic of Corsican society and 
culture of interest is its successful survival into modern 
times. This is a consequence first of Corsica's geographical 
isolation, the island being badly served in transports from 
mainland France, and because of the inaccessibility of its 
mountainous interior (40). It is also the consequence of the 
peculiar protection given by institutions meant to integrate 
the island - a phenomenon which has been analysed in Chapter 
Three. The result was the survival of a society with its own 
distinct cultural characteristics which were closer to the 
types of society found in southern Italy and the Italian 
islands. This survival was noted by nineteenth travellers such 
as Mérimée and Flaubert. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century many Corsican notables knew no French and spoke only 
Italian and Corsican . The literary intelligentsia around 
Bastia still retained many links with Italy and often 
expressed themselves in Italian (41). In the early years of 
the twentieth century the French courts in Corsica often had 
to employ interpreters as the local population often had no 
French. The last bandits were suppressed only in the 1930's
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(42). Finally, and most importantly from the point of view of 
this thesis, these traditional mores deeply affected the 
island's political life and habits and the relationship 
between the island and mainland France. To this we now turn.
CORSICAN POLITICS - THE DOMINATION OF THE CLANS
Corsican politics have been dominated by the system of 
clans or, in Corsican, partiti, alluded to above (43). A clan 
may de defined as a set of families grouped in a pyramidal 
structure with a dominant family at its head. The head of the 
dominant family is also the head of the clan. Some clan 
leaders in the twentieth century could trace their ancestry 
back to the period before the Revolution of 1789 (44). In line 
with the general mentality outlined above, a clan was 
primarily loyal to itself and to its own members. It was this 
which determined the actual functioning of a clan. The task of 
the clan leaders, the great family chiefs, was to procure 
scarce resources, mainly use of land or resources from the 
state such as subsidies and pensions, which they would then 
distribute to their clientèle. In turn, the clan followers 
pledged absolute loyalty to the chief. They would engage in 
any act, violent or not, to repay the favour shown by him to 
them. In other words, relations within the clan were 
clientelistic (45). In the nineteenth century, this 
clientelism was of an individualistic nature, but during the
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twentieth century it became increasingly collective and party 
based.
The institutions of public administration - the state, 
judiciary and the local collectivities - were regarded by the 
clans as instruments which they could control in order to 
obtain resources for their clients. This was true of all the 
successive régimes to which the island belonged from Genoese 
times until the present. In fact, the clans rarely, if ever, 
called into question the régime of any particular period: 
ancien régime. Revolution, Empire, Republic. What determined 
the "political" position of a clan was the position chosen by 
its rival - this often changed as the fortunes of a régime 
changed. In other words, the clan system was essentially 
apolitical. What mattered were the clans' clients and the 
necessity of controlling institutions which were the source of 
precious resources.
The institution most prized by the clan was the mairie 
(46). Controlling this meant controlling important resources 
such as the communal pastures which were rented out to 
shepherds. Local elections in Corsica, for this reason, became 
passionate and often violent affairs, not because of the 
Corsican's interest in politics or political ideas, but 
because the livelihood of a client depended on the outcome in 
a very direct way. The important thing was to win the 
election, and any means could be used to do so: these included
- 199 -
electoral corruption and violence or the threat of it. It is 
this which is behind the many ,,folkloric,, incidents of 
Corsican political history. This approach to politics was 
repeated at every level: the Conseil Général. posts in the 
judiciary, and posts in the civil service were all prizes to 
be captured by the clans. In the actual distribution of these 
resources, it was important that the victorious clan be 
actually seen to be victorious, and that the defeated clan be 
seen to be defeated. The humiliation of the rival gave to the 
winners a satisfaction that was almost as great as that 
derived from simply winning. This often led to physical 
violence in the desire to avenge this humiliation.
It is clear that this type of politics (see Appendix One 
for a survey of electoral behaviour) is far removed from any 
modern notion of politics based on a conflict of ideological 
or class positions. In fact, the Corsican clans adopted the 
political labels of continental parties but the behaviour of 
one clan was basically little different from that of its rival 
and could not be said to be based on ideological convictions 
(a fact which makes the study of Corsican politics extremely 
difficult as clans continually changed labels and 
allegiances). Nevertheless, the central Government made little 
effort to remedy the widespread political abuses that were 
found on the island at every level. Eventually, the clan 
leaders, dominating the Conseil Général (also known as the 
Petit Parlement) became more powerful than the prefect himself
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who generally acquiesced in their activities (see above 
Chapter Three).
This unspoken tolerance of the clan system was 
strengthened by the emergence of Emmanuel Arène, a lawyer 
turned politician who became associated with Gambetta's 
campaign of republicanization at the beginning of the Third 
Republic (47) . Arène, known on Corsica as U Re Manuele. became 
the most powerful Corsican of his time and instituted a system 
of political clientelism whose connections went to the very 
heart of the state. The central Government, in turn, turned a 
blind eye so long as Corsicans remained loyal to the state 
itself. This, in effect, is what occurred, and throughout the 
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries there 
were no serious challenges to the attachment of the island to 
France. On the contrary, Corsicans strongly identified with 
the French state.
Another factor which ensured the continuing survival of 
the clan system was the role it played following the period of 
economic decline and near collapse at the end of the 
nineteenth century, and especially its function as a kind of 
conduit by which Corsican emigrants found positions in the«
institutions of the state and administration (48). It was now 
that the "colonization" of the administration by the clan 
leaders began to pay off. Those forced to leave the island 
were given positions in the civil service, army, police and
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customs. Corsicans, like most other predominantly peasant 
groups, had always valued such positions, clean jobs with the 
security of pensions, to the hard grind and insecurity of farm 
life. Now, their procurement became a matter of the survival 
of the Corsican community as such. An extensive diaspora was 
created in cities such as Marseilles, Toulon, Nice, Lyons and 
Paris (49). This period also corresponded with an expansion of 
the French overseas Empire. Corsicans went as colonists to 
both North and black Africa. It is said that the clans divided 
the Maghreb into zones of influence and placed their own 
followers in their respective zones (50). Other Corsicans left 
for other parts of the world such as North and South America. 
Venezuela and Puerto Rico especially saw the establishment of 
important colonies of Corsicans (51). Recently, the election 
of a President of Venezuela of Corsican origin was fêted in 
his village of origin in the Cap Corse. Thus the clans helped 
to mitigate the worst consequences of the economic collapse of 
the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This 
has been described by one writer as a crise compensée (52).
Those who remained behind were not forgotten. The island 
became a real système assistenciel with the clans distributing 
favours to their followers as never before. The handouts took 
the form of state subsidies and pensions. Corsica became the 
département which received the greatest percentage of 
assistance in all of France (53). Again the central Government
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did little to try to remedy the abuses that came to be one of 
the principal characteristics of the Corsican system.
Thus, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of 
the twentieth centuries the basic features of the Corsican 
system and the relations between the island and the mainland 
were in place. These changed little in the period prior to 
World War II except in the sense that the economic and 
demographic trends deteriorated even further. During this 
period the masses of Corsicans seemed to have accepted their 
lot and only a small minority raised protests. Real changes in 
Corsican society and economy were introduced only from the 
outside and occurred after the Second World War (See Chapter 
Four).
CORSICA IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
Immediately after the Liberation of Corsica the economic 
and social situation on the island was appalling (53).
Although the official census figures of 1954 put the 
population at 240,000 inhabitants, the real figure was 
probably closer to 180,000. That meant that the population had 
decreased by at least fifty per cent in fifty years. This 
included a high proportion of active members of the 
population. Official figures put the exodus at around 1,000 - 
1,200 emigrants per year. The problem was that the crise was 
no longer compensated. The drain on the island's human
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resources had reached a point where the very existence of the 
island community itself was endangered.
One of the principal reasons for this exodus, admitted 
later in the Neuwirth Report, was the low standard of living 
on the island compared with the rest of France. This is clear 
from several indicators available for 1954. There was only one 
car per 90 inhabitants. 80Kwh of electricity was consumed on 
Corsica per head of the population, compared with 179Kwh in 
France as a whole. If a base line is set at 100, the average 
income per head on Corsica was 38, in Paris it was 166, in the 
East of France it was 118, and in the North it was 137. The 
decline in agriculture had also taken its toll: at the end of 
the eighteenth century, 144,000 hectares of cereals were 
cultivated, in 1833, 38,000h, in the 19507s, only 3,800h. 
Arable land, too, was under-utilized: of 23,000h around the 
Oriental Plain, only 4,000 were under cultivation.
Furthermore, Corsica imported more than it exported: in 1959, 
it imported 18,000 tonnes of flour and 4,5000 tonnes of meat? 
at the same time, it exported 15 tonnes of almonds and 379 
tonnes of artichokes. Primary materials such as minerals and 
cork were exported in their raw state since there were no 
enterprises to transform them into secondary products.
Finally, the region which had the lowest standard of living 
had the highest cost of living: 30 per cent higher than on 
mainland France. Janine Renucci summed up this situation as: 
"Agriculture moribonde, élevage amenuisé à l'êxtreme,
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industrie insignifiante, balance commerciale déficitaire ..." 
(54). In contrast to this moribund island, was a Diaspora that 
was successful and vibrant, as Pierre Dottelonde has pointed 
out (55). This would have important consequences in the 
revival of regionalism.
CONCLUSION
This Chapter has analysed the socio-economic context of 
the Corsican problem: the horizontal dimension of the model. 
The brief survey of the main historical, geographical, 
economic and cultural features of Corsica shows that the 
island possesses distinct forms of culture, society and 
political behaviour. These are, in some senses, closer to 
those of their Italian neighbours than to France. These 
distinctive features have also affected the nature of the 
island's political life: they have produced the peculiar 
system of mediation between the island and the state known as 
the clan system. This clan system - a form of clientelism - 
also dominates social and political relationships internally 
on the island.
The clans came to occupy a crucial position as mediators 
between the island and the French state. This they did by 
monopolizing the institutions of state and administration, 
controlling scarce resources, and distributing the goods in a 
clientelistic manner to their followers. This suited most
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Corsicans who needed the clans' protection and favours in a 
situation of extreme distress. It suited successive French 
Governments in so far as it ensured that Corsicans remained 
loyal to the state whichever type of régime this adopted: 
Corsicans became "super-French" in their identification with 
the French state. It suited the clans because it gave them the 
political and social power which was their raison d'être. This 
was even more important than money to the clan chiefs. Thus a 
tissue of complicity was woven, based on mutual self-interest. 
But this tissue was fragile.
At the heart of the clan system, however, was a 
contradiction. Their power was based on the existence of 
economic backwardness and even decline. It is true that, in 
one sense, they were a necessary protection against the worst 
consequences of these features of the Corsican problem. It 
might even be said that the clan system as it developed at the 
turn of the century saved the traditional Corsican society 
from extinction. However, the clans were also an obstacle to 
progress because of the very backwardness and decline on which 
their power was based. Any initiatives from the state were 
transformed into the inflationary and clientelistic mould of 
clan politics. The clan system in this way survived right up 
to the period following the Second World War and was the main 
brake on any progress developing from within Corsica itself. 
But in the period immediately following the Second World War, 
the island was in such a wretched condition that even the
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clans were forced to take steps to remedy it. This meant 
calling on the state for help. Unfortunately for the clans,
the way in which the state did respond, with the PAR of 1957
and the Gaullist approach after 1958, tended to undermine the 
legitimacy of the clans themselves. Furthermore, the kind of 
development that was adopted tended to break up the
traditional forms of Corsican society.
These developments led to challenges to the hegemony of 
the clans from various kinds of regionalist, movements. Before 
the First World War and in the inter-war period such movements 
had failed to gather significant following among the local 
population. It was only after the Second World War that they 
gained an important support base in the local population. The 
challenge came from those who were in some way excluded from 
this system of mediation. These forces, like the Corsican 
identity itself, were highly ambiguous and the next two 
chapters will analyse their significance.
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CHAPTER 8EVEN: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF MODERATE REGIONALISM
The previous Chapter outlined the basic socio-economic 
structures of Corsican society and how these have produced the 
peculiar form of mediation between the island and the state 
known as the clan system. The changes in this system (1), 
because of endogenous (economic decline and rural exodus)) and 
exogenous (rapid economic development) factors put the system 
itself under strain. The regionalist movements which appeared 
in the period following the Second World War may seen as 
symptoms of this strain. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
analysis will serve to illustrate the nature of the system 
itself and the way in which the elites who operate it have 
responded to crises which put it in danger.
Several hypotheses may be formulated with regard to the 
emergence of these movements. First, they originated in social 
groups which were excluded from the system of mediation. 
Second, the kind of movement - moderate or radical (2) - may 
be related to the degree of exclusion from the system.
Finally, these characteristics may be further related to two 
contextual factors: the socio-economic structures of the 
society and the periodization of a shift from the Fourth to 
the Fifth Republics.
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This Chapter will analyse the rise and decline of 
moderate regionalism by relating it these hypotheses while the 
following Chapter will examine radical regionalism.
THE BACKGROUND
Regionalist movements of both a moderate and radical kind 
existed in Corsica prior to 1945. Such movements appeared 
during periods of economic or social crisis, such as at the 
end of the nineteenth century (3) or during the interwar 
period (4). The most important of these was A Muvra, a group 
based around a newspaper of that name and founded in 1920. In 
1922, the Partitu Corsu d'Azzione (P.C.A.) was founded. In 
1927, this became the Partitu Corsu Autonomista (P.C.A.). What 
is relevant to this Chapter is that some members of these 
groups, sympathetic to Italian culture and attracted by 
irredentism and/or Fascism, collaborated with the Italians 
when the latter invaded and occupied Corsica in November 1942. 
A similar phenomenon occurred in Brittany, Flanders and 
Alsace, in France (5), and with the IRA in Ireland (6). It may 
be related to two factors: the explicitly conservative or 
reactionary nature of this kind of nationalism which leaned 
toward extreme right-wing political positions and the idea 
that "my enemy's enemy is my friend and my enemy's difficulty 
is my opportunity" (7).
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Although the number of such collaborators was probably a 
minority of the regionalists and autonomists (8), the 
phenomenon of collaboration was used by some of those who took 
power after Liberation - mainly the Communists and Gaullists - 
to discredit the very idea of regionalism. This was not 
totally successful, as there were federalists and regionalists 
among the other dominant group, the Christian Democrats (9). 
But the Vichy regime had also attempted to implement a form of 
decentralization (10) and there was a reluctance to show 
approval of this even though some of its features were adopted 
by the early Fourth Republic. In other words, the period 
immediately following the Second World War was marked by an 
increase of traditional Jacobinism while traditional 
regionalism and autonomism were forced to adopt a low profile. 
In Corsica, some of the collaborators went to prison, and the 
field seemed to be clear for the traditional Jacobins. 
Nevertheless, it was precisely this heightened sense of 
identification with France and the fact that Corsica had 
become a kind of model for other Frenchmen, as De Gaulle 
implied in the statements quoted above in Chapter Five, that 
created an awareness of specificity on the part of the 
islanders even among the Jacobins. This, in turn, gave rise to 
a kind of regionalist response which we propose to call 
"proto-regionalism" that is, it implicitly adopted many 
regionalist positions which would appear later in a more 
explicit manner. This was true mainly of the Corsican
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Federation of the Communist Party, but it can also be found 
among the Gaullists. It is to this that we now turn.
THE PERIOD OF "PROTO-REGIONALISM"
The Occupation of Corsica by the Italians destroyed the 
traditional system of clan/clientelistic relations between the 
island and the French state. One of the two clans supported 
the Vichy regime while some of the autonomists supported the 
Occupants. This "rupture" was the occasion for a return of the 
Corsican phobia - the fear of being cut off from the French 
state and returned to Italy. It was this, combined with 
traditional feelings of Italophobia which ensured a strong 
Resistance movement (11). Since the Communists were the most 
uncompromising Jacobins and also the leading component of the 
Resistance movement (12), many young Corsicans gave them 
support. Furthermore, the clientèle of the Pietri clan found 
themselves orphaned by the public discredit in which François 
Pietri found himself: he had supported the Vichy régime and
was its ambassador in Franco's Madrid. It seems that many of 
these aderenti transferred their allegiance to the Communist 
Party rather than give it to the rival clan (13). It was this 
support which led to the most serious challenge to the clan 
system in the modern period.
The growth of the Communist Party was spectacular (see 
Appendix Three for details of the party's electoral fortunes).
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From three to four hundred members before 1939, it progressed 
from 1200 in September 1943, to 2000 at the end of that year, 
4,500 in December 1944, 6,150 in 1945, 8,800 in April 1946, 
and 9,830 in December 1946 (14). This support was translated 
into control of the local political institutions. After the 
Liberation, the Front National (FN), led by the Communists, 
seized control of around two-thirds of the island's roughly 
three hundred and fifty mairies. Although this occurred at the 
point of a gun, support was subsequently confirmed in 
elections (see Appendix Three). In the municipal elections of 
13 May 1945, the Front National won 189 municipalities, the 
"qiacobbistes” (Gaullists) 112, Socialists 12, "pietrists11. 42
(15). By 1947, the Party had 10,000 members, 50 maires, one 
Deputy, one Senator and several conseillers généraux.
CORSICANS = "SUPER-FRANÇAIS”
The most important effect of the Occupation/Liberation 
experience is that it heightened the Corsicans' sense of 
identity with France. This was true both for Communist and 
non-Communist Corsicans. Some quotations from the local press 
at this period will illustrate this ultra-French identity. The 
newspaper of the Corsican Federation of the PC was Terre 
Corse, founded clandestinely in 1943. In it may be found what 
may be called the party's self-identity expressed publicly.
The paper called for May Day 1944 to be celebrated, not by an 
appeal to proletarian internationalism, but by asserting that:
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"En ce 1er Mai nous affirmerons, les armes à la main, par 
des actes, contre nos ennemis et Vichy, notre volonté de 
chasser l'envahisseur, d'exterminer les traîtres, de 
rester Français [my emph]" (16).
The Communists' loyalty, however, was to a special kind 
of France: "France d'hier, France d'aujourd'hui, France de 
demain. La France a toujours été le peuple de progrès" (17). 
And in this vision of a new progressive France, Corsica had a 
special place: "Vive la Corse française. Vive la Corse 
nouvelle, fille aimée de la France nouvelle" (18). Not only 
was Corsica French, it was an example for the rest of France 
since Corsica was the first and only French département to 
liberate itself (19).
The right, too, affirmed its attachment to France as can 
be seen from the columns of Le Petit Bastiais. Prior to 9 
September 1943, the sub-title of this paper had been: "Journal 
d'information et de Reconstruction régionales et nationales". 
That is, it had been a mouthpiece of Vichy France. It 
disappeared on 9 September 1943 to reappear on 16 December of 
the same year with a new editor , Martin Bianconi, and a new 
sub-title: "Quotidien Républicain d'information et de 
Libération nationale". In this period, it supported the party 
which the Republican clan, the "landryists", had adopted - the 
Parti Républicain et Socialiste. The intense loyalty to France 
of the new équipe may be seen in Bianconi's first editorial in 
which he paid homage to "Tous ces anonymes qui, non investis
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d'une mission officielle, ont payé de leur sang et de leur vie 
leur noble titre de Français [my exnph] (20) . A few days later, 
he wrote: 11 II n'est pas nécessaire, je crois, d'ajouter 
"française" dans un journal insulaire; l'équivoque n'est plus 
possible: nul au monde, sans excepter les chefs de l'Etat, les 
chefs du gouvernement qui ne sont pas toujours les mieux 
informés, ne sauraient douter de 1' AUTHENTICITE FRANÇAISE du 
coeur et du sol corses..." [emph in text] (21). On 26 
December, the paper announced that, on the following day, 
Bastia would celebrate "le décret d'incorporation du 30 
Novembre de la Corse à la France" (22). A year later, the 
paper reported a similar event: on the "30 Novembre 1944 
Bastia a commémoré dans le recueillement l'anniversaire du 30 
Novembre 1789" (23).
On both left and right, then, we find a strong sense of 
identity with France. But it was mainly the Communists who 
began to spell out the implications of this. First, there was 
total support for the nation still at war with the Germans: 
"Pour la France en bataille la Corse a répondu" (24).; "Faire 
la guerre! Rien Que la Guerre!" (25). But other implications 
could be drawn. One of these was that, if Corsicans are so 
French, then they have a right to demand special treatment 
from the Government. Thus, in 1946, we find in the Communist 
paper the following statement: "Il y a plus de deux ans que 
nous sommes libérés. Sur le continent, un effort considérable 
est fait dans tous les domaines, reconstruction,
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ravitaillement, etc. Ici la situation s'aggrave tous les 
jours” (26). In other words, there was a sense of relative 
deprivation.
The Communists did not simply limit their critique to 
empty complaining. They also proposed a programme of economic 
and social revival which is interesting as it anticipates many 
of the critiques and programmes of later regionalist 
movements. Perhaps the most interesting element of the
Communist analysis was that the island's ills were blamed not
principally on the central Government but on the local clan
system. Both right and left clans are put into the same
category, and both are seen as anti-Corsican: "Les clans
contre la Corse” (27) . It was the clans which prevented the 
establishment of a modern Republic on the island: "Votez pour 
la République! Le peuple de Corse ordonne: Arrière, les chefs 
de Clans!" (28). Secondly, the Corsican problem was an 
economic one linked to the clan system. The clans operated on 
behalf of the capitalist "trusts" to strangle the island's 
vital substance (29). The Communists proposed, therefore, an 
alternative economic development programme the details of 
which may be seen in the pages of Terre Corse.
The Communist upsurge and attack on the clan system was 
so serious that Paul Giacobbi, the Gaullist leader and head of 
the "left" clan, entered into a pact with the rival "pietrist" 
clan to head off the threat. The tactic was to win back from
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the Communists the pietrist aderenti which had gone over to 
them during the period of Resistance. To this end, Giacobbi 
invited Jacques Gavini, a cousin of François Pietri, to take 
over the leadership of the clan. A deal was made by which 
Giacobbi relinquished to a qaviniste the Presidency of the 
Conseil Général while Giacobbi himself would become a Senator
(30). From the cantonal elections of 1945, this tactic began 
to succeed. By the early 1950#s, the PC had lost most of its 
important electoral posts although it retained some of its 
bastions and remained an important force on the island (for 
details of electoral performance, see Appendix Three). What is 
important is that it was now excluded, by a pact made between 
the two clans, from the mainstream of political life. The 
traditional system of mediation had reasserted itself.
Nevertheless, this period and these events are important 
for several reasons. First, it was a period of intense pro- 
French nationalism in which the expectations of the islanders 
were at a peak. The old-style regionalists and autonomists 
were driven underground. Second, there was a serious threat to 
the traditional system of mediation from the Communists. This 
was beaten off by the system which reasserted itself but the 
effect was to exclude the Communists. Furthermore, the latter 
presented a coherent well-thought out critique of the island's 
problems which saw the traditional system of mediation - the 
clans - as being its root cause. This encouraged the
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traditional politicians to take seriously these problems and 
it is to this that we now turn.
THE LOCAL POLITICIANS AND THE FRENCH STATE
The local politicians realised that the traditional 
system was under threat. Furthermore, even they realised that 
the island's decline, had gone too far (see Chapter Six).
Their hold on the island society was partly based on this 
decline but they now realised that the decline itself 
threatened to undermine their own legitimacy. In other words, 
the success of the clan system was based on the ability of the 
clan leaders to "deliver the goods". Now, the goods to be 
delivered were nothing less than the halting of the decline
»
and a programme of economic reconstruction. The Communists had 
exposed the inefficacy of the clans. Now the clan leaders had 
to act to prove otherwise.
They did so, like the Breton CELIB, by trying to pressure 
the central Government into adopting economic measures in 
favour of the island. The first phase was to conduct a series 
of studies of the island's problems. In 1949, the Conseil 
Général requested that an Inventaire départemental be drawn 
up. In 1957 a Plan d'aménagement was produced (31). Commenting 
on the results of these enquiries, Janine Renucci remarks: "La 
dégradation de l'agriculture a fortement marqué les paysages 
insulaires. Il est vrai qu'elle était réduite, vers 1950-55, à
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une survie dérisoire [my emph] après avoir joué un rôle 
essentiel dans l'économie traditionnelle" (32). By the mid- 
1950's, then, the traditional politicians had a fuller 
appreciation of the island's problems.
The next phase was to put pressure on the Government to 
do something about this appalling situation. At this juncture, 
two factors worked in their favour. First, this was the period 
when the Governments of the Fourth Republic were developing 
their own regionalization programme (see above Chapter Four). 
The Corsican demands, limited at this point to economic aid, 
could easily be fitted into this programme. Second, the 
Corsican prefect at this time was Marcel Savreux, who proved 
to be a dynamic advocate of the islanders' cause (33). The 
result was the adoption of the PAR which was examined in 
detail in Chapter Four.
To have such a programme adopted was a considerable coup 
for the traditional local politicians, and they tried to use 
it to reestablish their legitimacy as the islanders's 
representatives. This was an important "good" which they were 
bringing to the island. Their influence with the central state 
could be seen to have paid off. As in other clientelistic type 
societies, being seen to have influence was more important 
than the influence itself. This process of claiming credit for 
something that was only partly a result of their efforts began 
as early as 1953. Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra, then President of
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the Conseil Général and new leader of the Pietri clan, made a 
speech to the Council in which he referred to the creation of 
a Commission de Modernisation. d'Eguioment et d7Aménagement de 
la Corse (a forerunner of the PAR). He stated: "Ce sera 
1'honneur de cette Assemblée d'avoir pris l'initiative de 
solliciter et d'avoir obtenu, grâce à l'action conjuguée des 
conseillers généraux et des parlementaires avec l'aide des 
autorités administratives, la création de cette commission [my 
emph]" (34). Furthermore, it was a Corsican Senator, Jean 
Filippi, who, as Rapporteur-Général de la Commission du Plan, 
was responsible for drawing up the details of the Corsican 
PAR.
But not only did the local politicians need to be seen to 
be behind the adoption of the PAR, they also needed to be seen 
as controlling the new institutions which were set up to 
implement it - the SOMIVAC and the SETCO. In fact, these were 
two sections of a single société d'économie mixte which had 
one board and different sections to deal with tourism and 
agriculture. In the section responsible for tourism we find 
the two Corsican Deputies Jacques Gavini and François Giacobbi 
(son of Paul who had since died) and in the section 
responsible for agriculture we find the Senators Jean Filippi 
and Dr Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra. It is worth noting that these 
four politicians were the leaders of the two main clans: 
Gavini/de Rocca-Serra represented the gavinisti;
Filippi/Giacobbi the landrvsti. It is possible, though
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impossible to prove, that the two clans perceived the new 
institutions as another piece of "territory" to be divided 
between them.
It seemed, then, as though the traditional system of 
inter-Corsican and Corsican-French relations had reasserted 
themselves. The traditional clan leaders were back in the 
driving seat and seemed to be carrying out their traditional 
role of channelling resources from the centre to the 
periphery. Furthermore, they had beaten back any threat to 
their hegemony either from the left or from the old-style 
regionalists. But this tranquillity existed only on the 
surface. Underneath, social forces hostile to the clans were 
preparing to attack again.
THE EMERGENCE OF MODERATE REGIONALISM
Several factors contributed to continue the undermining 
of the clan leaders' legitimacy. First, the political hegemony 
of the clans over the island society was no longer complete. 
Although groups such as the Communists seemed to be driven 
underground, they still retained an important support base 
and, as noted above, held several important bastions such as 
Bastia and Sartene. Other groups were also outside the 
traditional network of politics. There were still the old- 
style regionalists who, like their counterparts in Brittany 
and Alsace, were still under a cloud of discredit because of
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the collaborationist activities of some of their number. At 
first, they limited their activities to cultural matters. 
These grouped around a journal published in Corsican called U 
Muntese. An important figure was Jean Makis (the nom de plume 
of M. De Susini), an old-style regionalist who had been 
imprisoned for collaboration. Makis founded a newspaper 
(written in French) called L'Insulaire which provided a forum 
for those sympathetic to right-wing and regionalist ideas.
When Makis died, the newspaper was taken over by his son 
Achille De Susini. Another excluded group, this time by 
geography rather than political decisions, were the many young 
Corsicans who had left Corsica to study in the universities of 
the mainland such as Paris, Marseilles, Nice and Lyons. 
Finally, some of the powerful Corsican Federations which 
grouped together the Corsicans living in France were not 
sympathetic to the clan system. The most important of these 
was the Fédération Corse De Marseille et des Bouches-du-Rhône, 
led by Bastien Leccia who was a close associate of the 
Socialist Mayor of Marseilles, Gaston Defferre.
Second, as has already been discussed above (Chapter 
Four) the necessity of a société d'économie mixte to implement 
the development programme seemed to cast doubt on the efficacy 
of the traditional institutions. This was reinforced by the 
fact that, despite the visible presence of the clan leaders on 
the board, real control lay with non-Corsicans, mainly 
reclassified civil servants from Morocco and Tunisia (35). At
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least one interpretation of this could be: the central 
Government did not have the confidence in the local 
politicians that the latter had in themselves.
Thirdly, the PAR itself proved to be less ambitious and 
extensive than the Corsicans had at first believed. It was 
limited in the number of geographical areas ear-marked for 
development. It was also limited in the funding made available 
for it. This has been treated in greater detail in Chapter 
Four.
Finally, at this time, there appeared, perhaps for the 
first time, a Corsican public opinion. Before the early 
1950's, there had been no single newspaper covering the entire 
island (36). Newspapers in Corsica were traditionally limited 
to single towns or regions and tied to a particular clan. This 
changed in the early 1950's when the Nice newspaper Nice-Matin 
began to publish a Corsican page and was sold all over the 
island. Then the Marseilles daily Le Provencal began to 
publish a special Corsican edition - La Corse-Le Provencal - 
which was also sold all over the island. With the improvement 
of communications between the island and the mainland, 
especially the advent of a daily air service, by the end of 
the 1950's Corsicans, even in the remotest villages, could 
have a daily newspaper on their breakfast tables. Furthermore, 
the Nice paper was politically sympathetic to the right, the 
Marseilles paper to the left. Corsicans therefore had access
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to a wider range of political ideas and information than ever 
before. The existence of these means of communication also 
made it easier to mobilize the population. It meant, too, the 
creation of a new class of journalists most of whom were 
outside the clan system.
All of these factors combined at the end of the 1950's to 
produce the Mouvement du 29 Novembre to which we now turn.
LE MOUVEMENT DU 29 NOVEMBRE
The Mouvement du 29 Novembre (Mdu29N) is a movement the 
importance of which has frequently been underestimated, 
especially by radical regionalists who wished to illustrate 
the inefficacy of moderate regionalism (37). This has been 
repeated by certain subsequent authors who do not seem to have 
researched sufficiently this period (38). In fact, the rise 
and decline of the Mdu29N has an important place in the 
development of subsequent movements which cannot be understood 
except in reference to it. What is presented here, therefore, 
is a new interpretation of the significance of this movement.
The Mdu29N was a coalition of those groups, listed above, 
which had been excluded from the traditional system of 
politics on the island. But even before the coalition was 
formed some of the groups were already organised and sniping 
at the local politicians. The Communist Party has already been
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treated above. In L'Insulaire. De Susini was attacking the 
recent developments. The PAR was criticised for its lack of 
funding (39) and because it was "...une sinécure pour caser 
quelques fonctionnaires à reclasser.." (40). The tone of De 
Susini's articles mounted after the arrival of De Gaulle to 
power in 1958 and the realisation that even the limited 
funding promised during the Fourth Republic would not 
materialize. The PAR was then described as an instrument of 
colonialism: "...une méthode [qui n'a pas] très bien réussi, 
tant en Indochine qu'en Afrique du Nord et en Afrique noire"
(41). According to De Susini, "...l'on perçoit que la Corse 
devient la dernière terre coloniale française... Nous 
subissons déjà l'emprise De la SOMIVAC dont le but réel est 
d'EXPLOITER LA CORSE SANS LES CORSES - la mise en valeur De 
l'île n'en était que le fallacieux prétexte [emph in text]"
(42)
In 1959, the Gaullist Government threatened to close down 
the island's only railway. This was the spark that led to the 
formation of the first mass movement in modern Corsican 
history. Although it is still unclear, it to seems to have 
been the Communists who took the initiative to establish a 
more structured opposition to the Government. The Party, 
however, was aware of the intensity of partisan competition on 
the island and did not wish to appear publicly -as the leaders 
of the opposition. (43). They therefore contacted several of 
the island's journalists known to be sympathetic to the need
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for reform. These included M. Mariaux (A.F.P.), Achille De 
Susini (L'Insulaire), Francis Maure (Provencal-Bastiaï, Paul 
Silvani and Pascal Bontempi (Le Provencal), Louis Rioni 
(L'Informateur), and Joseph Santi (Courrier De la Corse).
These journalists formed a Comité De Presse which agreed to 
organise the public meeting from which emerged the Mouvement 
du 29 Novembre.
The Congrès du 29 Novembre met, in fact, on 27 November 
1959 at Ajaccio. The title of the congress was chosen because 
it was on the 30 November 1789 that the Constituent Assembly 
formally declared Corsica to be fully integrated into the 
French Empire (i.e. nation). The title chosen implied that 
Corsica was, in reality, still only on the eve of integration 
and that it wished to be fully integrated. In other words, the 
movement remained within the framework of a Jacobin 
understanding of relations between Corsica and France. For 
this reason it may be called moderate regionalism. The 
influence of the PCF can be clearly discerned here. This 
loyalty to France was clear when, after the inaugural meeting, 
the delegates proceeded to the Monument des Morts, laid a 
wreath to those who had given their lives for France and ended 
by singing the Marseillaise (44). Other elements of the 
coalition, such as the tendency represented by De Susini, were 
less Jacobin but at this phase it was the Jacobins who were in 
control. For the moment, the unity of the movement was most 
important.
- 225 -
The sinking of ideological differences may be seen in 
those chosen to be the movement's first officers. Achille De 
Susini was elected President; one of the Vice-presidents was 
Philippe Semedei (who was, however, close to François 
Giacobbi) of the Comité De Presse; and the General Secretary 
was Albert Feracci, a leading member of the Communist Party. 
The desire for unity was stressed by De Susini in his 
presidential address: "Nous sommes venus sans parti, ni parti- 
pris pour engager toutes nos forces pour qu'enfin vive la 
Corse" (45). It should be noted that the French word "parti" 
translated the Corsican partitu meaning clan.
One of the first acts of the movement was to draw up a 
list of demands to be made of the central Government. The 
Jacobin orientation of the group is clear from these demands:
L'application intégrale des Arrêtés Miot;
Le maintien du Réseau Ferré;
L'alignement de la Corse sur les autres départements en
regard des frais d'approche (46).
It is significant that these demands related both to the 
problem of the railway closure and to that of insularity. The 
second referred to attempts to reduce the effects of 
insularity by a system of "territorial continuity" (although 
the term was not yet used). It is clear that such a demand was
- 226 -
based on the idea that Corsica is fully French and should be 
roo£§—fully—integrated into the nation. Furthermore, there is 
also the implicit idea that France has a duty to assist this 
integration.
In order to achieve this fuller integration the movement 
felt it was necessary to mobilize the local population around 
these purely economic demands. The adoption of these tactics 
was clearly influenced by the activities of the Breton CELIB 
(see Chapter One above). At first, mobilization seemed to be 
successful. The inaugural meeting itself was attended by 1200 
delegates from all parts of the island; there were 1000 
telegrammes of support and 30,000 signatures to a petition 
supporting the movement's aims (47). Several important 
interest groups were present. L'Association des Maires De 
Corse and the Fédération des Commerçants were both 
represented. The Fédération des Groupements Corses de 
Marseille, presided by Bastien Leccia was present. However, 
the traditional clan leaders were absent. Indeed, with the 
possible exception of François Giacobbi, they viewed the new 
movement with caution and, at times, with hostility.
The wider population, too, seemed to respond to the call 
to mobilize. A series of strikes, lasting from a few hours to 
a full day fisula morta), were well observed as can be seen 
from the columns of the local press at the time. Violence was 
strictly excluded, although some members of the movement,
- 227 -
including De Susini, threatened to use it. Nevertheless, apart 
from the occasional scuffle between demonstrators and police, 
there was no violence at this stage.
Although the demands were being made by the movement 
directly to the state, their real targets were, in fact, the 
traditional politicians. In reality, the movement did not 
seriously question the existing system of mediation and the 
existing institutions in which this took place. Rather their 
intention was to influence this system and, in a sense to 
cleanse it of its traditional corruption. This is why the 
traditional clan leaders regarded the movement with such 
suspicion: it directly attacked their own legitimacy by 
calling into question their ability to deliver the goods. 
Furthermore, the leaders of the Mdu29N pointed to the 
representativeness of their own inaugural meeting and 
contrasted this with the unrepresentativeness of the 
traditional politicians who were, they claimed, elected by 
fraud (48).
The Mdu29N did ensure that the railway was saved, but 
failed to obtain other demands. It was, however, successful in 
forcing the local politicians to react. As the Mémorial des 
Corses expresses it: "Face à l'explosion du phénomène, ils 
[ont été] tout d'abord surpris, voire agacés, par le 
débordement d'une action que jusque-là ils canalisaient" (49). 
The attitude of the local politicians is summed up in an
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editorial which appeared in the Journal De la Corse, a 
Gaullist newspaper which had not supported the Comité De 
Presse» Following the success of an isula morta at the end of 
1959, it appealed to the local population:
Revenons ... au calme, après la têmpete, mettons un peu 
d'eau dans notre vin. Si cela n'ira pas beaucoup mieux, 
cela ira moins mal, car nos pleurs, loin d'attendrir les 
maîtres de nos destins, les incitaient à ne rien donner à 
ceux gui demandaient tout, risquant à tout perdre en 
voulant tout gagner (50).
In other words, don't bite the hand that feeds you!
But it was precisely this supine attitude on the part of 
the local politicians that the new regionalists refused to 
accept and which they wished to change. Their actions became 
serious enough to force the prefect, M. Bernard, to receive a 
delegation (51). Then François Giacobbi, President of the 
Conseil Général and leader of the "left" clan, assured the 
movement of the support of the conseillers généraux (52). 
Corsican politicians at the national level showed more reserve 
as was evident in the their answers to a letter which the 
Mdu29N had addressed to them (53). All the politicians, in 
their answers, were concerned to show how much they had done, 
as individuals, about Corsican economic problems. But they 
pointed out that their influence had been severely limited by 
the arrival of the Gaullist régime and the diminution of the 
powers of Parliament.
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The same letter had been addressed to all the national 
political party leaders in the National Assembly, but only M. 
Waldeck-Rochet, the PCF leader, answered it. His comments are 
interesting, as they give another impression of the attitude 
of the Corsican Deputies and modify the image they present of 
themselves. He pointed out that the PCF Deputies had fought 
against the suppression of the Corsican railway and added:
[Les députés PCF] ...n'ont pas eu gain de cause en raison 
De l'opposition conjointe du Gouvernement et de la 
majorité de l'Assemblée Nationale (y compris les députés 
de la Corse) (54).
By the end of 1960, the failure of the PAR to make a dent 
in the island's economic problems, the insensitivity and 
intransigence of the Gaullist Government, and the impotence of 
the local politicians all combined to ensure the success of 
the mobilization by the Mdu29N. When the movement held its 
second Congress in November 1960 all the island's politicians, 
including those at national level were present. Nevertheless, 
the movement largely failed to have its most important demands 
met. In the Corsican context a movement will succeed only if 
it manages to deliver the goods. The clans had failed but so 
did their principal opponents. This, combined with the entry 
into the movement of the traditional politicians or their 
representatives, ensured that the movement would inevitably 
decline.
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THE DECLINE AND DEMISE OF THE MODERATE REGTONALISTS
On 27 October 1963, the Mdu29N changed its name to the 
Comité d'Action et Promotion De la Corse (CAPCO). The 
President of the new group was Bastien Leccia from Marseilles; 
there were two Vice-Presidents, Achille De Susini (Ajaccio) 
and Philippe Semedei (Bastia); and two General Secretaries, 
the Communist Albert Feracci (Ajaccio) and Jean Pieraggi 
(Bastia). Almost all of the political, social and economic 
forces of the island were represented in the Comité Directeur 
(55). The local politicians did not participate directly for, 
according to them, tactical reasons. At its inaugural meeting 
the CAPCO adopted the following programme:
1) The realisation of a genuine continuité territoriale;
2) the establishment of a new fiscal statute which would 
respect the spirit of the Arrêtés Miot;
3) the granting of an indemnité provisoire d'insularité 
compensatrice de la vie chère for civil servants who 
lived on the island;
4) the passing of a law establishing the amount of 
funding and a timetable for the implementation of the 
PAR. (56)
Despite the seeming continuity in personnel and with the 
programme of the Mdu29N, the founding of the CAPCO was the 
beginning of the end of moderate regionalism. The movement was 
already running out of steam and the serious ideological 
differences within the coalition were now breaking out into
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the open. In December 1963, De Susini resigned as Vice- 
President (57). The former President of the Mdu29N gave two 
reasons for his resignation. First, he claimed the CAPCO was 
the creation of the local politicians with the purpose of 
channelling the "mouvement revendicatif". He claimed that Jean 
Filippi and François Giacobbi had both tried to exclude him 
from the leadership position because of his outspoken 
criticism of the clan leaders. Second, he claimed that his 
demotion was the result of the political ambitions of Bastien 
Leccia who wished to use the Corsican movement to further his 
ambition of becoming Deputy for Marseilles in the event of 
Gaston Defferre winning the Presidential election of 1965 
(58).
It is, of course, possible that De Susini was piqued at 
having lost the leadership of the movement and his attacks 
against the CAPCO were the result of sour grapes.
Nevertheless, his claim that the movement had been 
"recuperated" by the local politicians seems to be accurate. 
The Mémorial des Corses, commenting on the setting up of the 
CAPCO, states that "... il est clair qu'un effort a été fait 
pour mettre dans le coup le plus d'élus possibles, maires ou 
conseillers généraux" (59). Although the leading clan 
politicians stayed away, their colleagues from a lower level 
managed to infiltrate the organisation.
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De Susini took with him the old-style regionalists who 
now resented the new organisation and the presence of the 
clans. It might be remarked that the split was also one 
between left and right within the movement. The movement was 
now taken over completely by the traditional Jacobin left - 
the Communists and Socialists. It seems that this left were 
now willing to accept the "left" clan of Giacobbi as part of 
the left. Henceforth, the attacks against the "clans" were to 
be directed principally against the "right" or Gaullist clan 
of De Rocca-Serra.
But the change and the departure of important sections 
left the movement weakened, while the presence of the local 
politicians meant a dilution of the demands and forms of 
action. The CAPCO limped on until May 1967, when it changed 
its name to the Mouvement Revendicatif Insulaire (MRI). But 
this was only a pale shadow of the Mouvement du 29 Novembre. 
As the Mémorial expressed it: "[Le MRI] fait figure de vain
replâtrage et la promulgation d'une charte revendicative qui 
reprend les thèmes sur lesquels la bataille a été menée en 
vain depuis plusieurs années ne suffit pas à donner un élan 
nouveau" (60).
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CONCLUSION
The phases of proto- and moderate regionalism are 
revealing in several respects. First of all, they show very 
clearly the nature of the system of mediation on the island. 
Twice in just over a decade the system was under serious 
threat from forces which lay outside it. However, the clans 
joined forces to neutralize the threat either by taking up the 
demands themselves or by taking over the movements which 
articulated the demands. The period also reveals the ambiguity 
of Corsican-French relations. If Corsicans are French then 
they expect the benefits of being French.
Moderate regionalism was distinguished by two principal 
features: its attachment to a Jacobin understanding of 
Corsican-French relations; and the presence in its ranks of 
local notables (with the exception of the Gaullists). With 
regard to the first point, the vast majority of the leaders of 
the movement, especially the traditional left, such as the 
Communist Party, identified strongly with France, even if they 
opposed particular Governments such as those of De Gaulle. 
Secondly, the movement was dominated by socio-economic groups
- journalists, local politicians, business-men - close to the 
system of mediation. Such groups, while they wished to reform 
the way in which the traditional system based <?n the prefect 
and the commune operated, did not wish to radically change it.
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Because of their strong Jacobinism the moderate 
regionalists did not question the attachment of Corsica to 
France, but the mobilization which occurred under their 
leadership allowed anti-Jacobin groups to become reintegrated 
into the legitimacy of political life. Moderate regionalism 
therefore laid the ground for the emergence of radical 
regionalism. To this we turn in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHTt THE RADICAL REGIONALISTS OCCUPY THE CENTRE OF
THE STAGE
Moderate regionalism broke up when it failed to "deliver 
the goods". Its component parts split into different 
directions. The Jacobin element - the parties of the French 
left - eventually joined forces with the "left" clan which was 
also in opposition to the Gaullist regime. The anti-Jacobin 
elements, the old-style regionalists and the young 
intellectuals in the French universities - now began to occupy 
the centre of the stage of the protest movement. We thus find 
a radicalization of the regionalist movement. This 
radicalization occurred both at the level of ideology and of 
tactics, although this latter took place at a later date than 
the former. This Chapter will analyse the regionalist 
movements both as distinct entities and in their relationship 
to one another. lit will also attempt to place them in 
relation to the system of mediation.
There were three distinct phases in the growth of radical 
regionalism. The first is the period around the late 1950's 
and early 1960's when young Corsicans began to rethink the 
situation of their island. The second, from about 1960 to 
1967, is the attempt to give organizational form to the 
different tendencies. The third, which occurred around 1973 is 
a further radicalization, when the movements move from 
regionalism to an explicit autonomism and nationalism (1).
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However, the last phase may be seen more as the making 
explicit what had been implicit or hidden in the earlier 
phases.
THE FIRST STIRRINGS OF RADICAL REGIONALTSM
The most important first step toward creating an 
organisation which represented the specific interests of young 
Corsicans of the diaspora was taken on 25 November 1960 when 
Charles Santoni founded the group Union Corse. This was 
composed of young Corsicans, either students or recent 
graduates, living in Paris (2). Pomponi describes it as a 
"groupement de compatriotes qui se présente comme un nouvel 
organe de liaison pour les Corses de la région parisienne"
(3). The association produced a newspaper Union Corse which 
appeared until 1968. Its first President was Dominique 
Leandri.
The new group seemed at first to be little different from 
the other Corsican Amicales which existed on the French 
mainland. Like them,it sought to promote mutual aid among the 
islanders and to preserve and develop Corsican culture. This 
is clear from a presentation of the objectives of the 
association made by Leandri in Union Corse in July 1961. He 
states that "L'Union Corse n'a pas la prétention d'oeuvrer au 
relèvement économique de l'île... Ses objectifs sont bien plus 
modestes. Ce qu'elle veut c'est reserrer les liens de la
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communauté corse de Paris [en commençant] dans le domaine 
social, culturel et sportif" (4). To achieve these three 
objectives, it proposed to set up:
" - sur le plan social, un entr'aide désinteréssé entre
insulaires..;.
- du point de vue culturel, ... de créer à Paris, la 
"Maison Corse"...;
- du point de vue sportif, ... une équipe de football est 
constitutée."
Even at this early stage, however, the group wished to 
break with some of the features of the traditional Amicales. 
First, it has "... tourné résolument le dos à ces formes de 
groupements qui comprennent deux catégories bien distinctes: 
"les personnalités" et ... "les autres". Ici, tous les 
adhérents sont sur le même plan". Secondly, "l'Union Corse 
groupe les jeunes Corses de Paris. La grande majorité des 
adhérents a moins de trente ans". But this implicit critique 
of the association's elders was not yet a political one: "Les 
membres ... s'abstiennent de se livrer à une activité 
politique partisane ... Ils n'ont pas le goût des grandes 
discussions... Ils attachent plus d'importance à la qualité 
des réalisations pratiques".
Nevertheless, reading the early issues of Union Corse it 
is possible to note a tension. In Leandri's statement of 
objectives, it was stated that the group "... ne veut pas dire 
qu'elle se désintéresse de cette importante question [le
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relèvement économique de l'île]". This concern for economic 
and then political questions grew as young intellectuals such 
as Charles Santoni and Gisèle Poli began to develop more 
explicitly regionalist themes in the paper. Thus, in an 
editorial, written in early 1962, Santoni exclaimed: "La Corse 
est dans une situation grave. Que pouvons nous faire, nous 
ceux de la nouvelle génération, la génération déracinée? [my 
emph]" (5). He linked this situation in which young Corsicans 
found themselves to the recent economic development projects. 
He was not at this stage against the SOMIVAC and SETCO, but 
stated that "Nous ne comprendrons pas qu'on laisse se 
dévélopper davantage 1'émigration catastrophique des habitants 
de l'île, pendant qu'on encouragea parallèlement 
l'implantation massive ... d'éléments étrangers au département 
[i.e. les pieds noirs]". Furthermore, Santoni insisted that 
there must be a cultural renewal linked to the economic one: 
"Si la Corse perd son âme, abandonne sa personnalité, elle 
n'aura plus aucune envie de survivre. La Corse sera morte. Une 
île prospère, peuplée d'habitants nouveaux existera peut-être 
à sa place".
But Santoni was already proposing a political analysis 
and solution which went further than moderate regionalism. He 
advocated at this point a federal solution and criticised the 
excessive centralization of the French state. This critique 
was justified by the special situation of Corsica: "La 
géographie donne à la Corse un caractère spécial qui ne
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s'accorde guère de la rigidité centralisatrice de l'Etat". 
Instead, there should be a political decentralization along 
federalist lines: "confier à la commune, les affaires de la 
commune, à la région, les affaires de la région, l'Etat se 
réservant les affaires de l'Etat". However, he did not propose 
that the young Corsicans should challenge the leadership of 
the Mdu29 but should rather support them.
In the following issue, Gisèle Poli pointed to the 
decadence of the island and insisted that it is the duty of 
the young to speak up (6). Poli advocated a change in the 
island's economic relationships: from being primarily related 
to France, it should shift to a Mediterranean and European 
context. In an interesting analysis of the Corsican problem, 
Poli pointed to penetration by the mass media as an important 
factor in raising the consciousness of deprived groups: these 
have penetrated into "les endroits les plus reculés". The 
populations of these places became aware "qu'il existait une 
vie nationale florissante, que les réalisations étaient 
nombreuses, et que la France marchait allègrement vers un 
brillant devenir". It was then that "[c]es populations 
déshéritées, en découvrant un monde qu'elles ignoraient, 
prirent soudamment conscience de leur propre misère". The 
clearest example of this phenomenon, according to Poli, was 
the Bretons who led the way and "ont fait naître un immense 
espoir" (7).
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By 1963, the tone had hardened. Santoni, in a speech to 
the Association on January 1963, advocated "(1) la nécéssité 
d'une action de la jeunesse distincte de celle des générations 
précédentes" and "(2) l'importance d'une réforme 
intellectuelle et morale en profondeur..." (8). The first 
point was based on the idea that the revendications of the 
elders did not take into account the specific demands of 
youth. For example, they were not asking for a Corsican 
university. In the second point he developed themes which show 
the influence of federalist philosophers such as Alexandre 
Marc (9), but adapted to a Corsican context: "Il s'agit ... de 
sauvegarder ce mode de vie corse si étroitement lié à 
l'humanisme méditerranéenne... Le respect de la personne, le 
sens de la mesure, le souci de la justice, la pratique de la 
solidarité, l'attachement de la liberté, telles sont les 
caractéristiques de cette civilisation méditerranéenne à 
laquelle nous appartenons". One of the purposes of their group 
was "recréer ... un milieu dans lequel ces valeurs aient 
cours" against a civilisation which reduces man to an object, 
against "l'hypertrophie et la demesure [de] l'Etat 
tentaculaire". For these reasons he declared that "nous sommes 
résolument régionalistes". Thus Santoni proposed three 
directions for the Association:
a) la promotion d'un régionalisme authentique qui 
conditionne la pratique correcte de la démocratie...;
b) la restauration de l'idée communautaire...;
c) l'ouverture méditerranéenne ... [this was linked to 
the rocess of European integration].
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Union Corse thus provided an important forum of 
organisation and political expression for the young 
intelligentsia of the diaspora.
Union Corse grouped together students and ex-students. On 
18 July 1962, a group composed exclusively of students was 
founded at Vivario, a mountain village in Corsica near Corte: 
the Union nationale des Etudiants Corses (UNEC) (10). The UNEC 
was an amalgamation of seven previously existing Associations 
d'Etudiants Corses (AEC) from Paris, Aix, Nice, Marseilles, 
Montpellier, Caen and Lyons.The term "national" here referred 
to the French national context. The first officers of the 
group were drawn from the principal universities which were 
attended by Corsican students. The founder and first President 
was Dominique Alfonsi (Paris); the Secretary-General was 
Jacques Luciani (Paris); the Treasurer was Henri Groult 
(Lyons). The committee members were Noël Pantalucci 
(Marseilles), Romain Colombani (Aix), and Dominique Rostini 
and Maurice Polovia (both at Montpellier) and Lucien Felli.
The principal objective of UNEC was the creation of a 
Corsican University but it remained close to the Union Corse 
and supported the wider objectives of the radical 
regionalists. In a statement issued prior to the formation of 
the UNEC, the AEC declared that "Nos deux associations 
représentent la totalité de la jeunesse corse à Paris" (11).
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In the early phase, UNEC, like Union Corse, supported the 
moderate regionalists of CAPCO: "... les étudiants, tout comme 
l'Union Corse, se déclarent solidaires du CAPCO". At the end 
of 1964, these two groups, with another called "La Corse", 
merged to form a new organisation called "Union Corse 
L'Avenir". The newspaper Union Corse also took the new name.
The CEDIC
The above tendency may be described as leaning toward 
"progressive" political ideologies such as one branch of 
radical federalism and socialism (12). There existed at the 
same time another tendency which was closer to old-style 
regionalism, although in this early period of the first 
stirrings of radical regionalism these differences were not 
always clearly discerned. This tendency may be called right- 
wing radical regionalism. The continuity with old-style 
regionalism was provided, at least in part, by the personal 
and family contacts between the older generation and the 
younger. The link was maintained in journals such as 
L'Insulaire, founded, as seen, by Jean Makis, who had 
collaborated with the Italians and served a spell in prison 
for these activities, and taken over by his son, Achille de 
Susini. De Susini opened up the paper to writers sympathetic 
to right-wing ideas and to such discredited figures as 
François Pietri.
- 243 -
The young right-wing radical regionalists formed their 
own organisation later than their left-wing counterparts. It 
was not until April 1964 that the Comité d'Etudes et de 
Défense des Intérêts de la Corse (CEDIC) was founded by Paul- 
Marc Seta, a graduate of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, who 
also became its first president and leading ideologist. Max 
Simeoni was also a leading member of the group. At first, the 
CEDIC had no newspaper of its own, but Louis Rioni, editor of 
L'Informateur, allowed the group to express its ideas in this 
newspaper.
In fact. Seta had already been using the columns of 
L'Informateur to elaborate what later became the ideology of 
the CEDIC. It is instructive to look at some of the themes 
which he puts forward at this time. He, too, favoured a 
federal Europe (13) but was closer to the position of the 
right-wing federalist Guy Héraud whose book, L'Europe des 
Ethnies he described as "un remarquable ouvrage" (14) than to 
the more left-wing federalism of the Parisian students. He 
concluded that "... seule la création de l'Europe des régions 
mettra fin aux dominations de l'Etat unitaire" (15). Seta 
defined the problem of Corsica in this framework and his 
solution to the problem was couched in the same terms. He 
demanded "une autonomie contractuelle"; "la revendication 
globale d'une autonomie contractuelle et proportionnelle"
(16). He criticised the existing institutional structures of
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the département and Conseil Généralf and proposed instead a 
Regional Assembly (17).
After the creation of the CEDIC these ideas were 
presented in L'Informateur in a more explicit and coherent 
manner. The aim of the association was the "sauvegarde de 
l'ETHNIE CORSE": "... il ne s'agit pas seulement d'accroître 
la production agricole de l'île ou de développer le tourisme 
en Corse, mais d'orienter l'action entreprise de façon à ce 
gue ces éléments du progrès économique servent EN PRIORITE LES 
INSULAIRES, et permettent le maintien et l'enracinement en 
Corse de 1'ACTIVITE ET DE L'UNITE ETHNIQUE [emph in text]"
(18) . It was this existence of a distinct ethnic group that 
justified the demand for separate administrative structures: 
"La collectivité insulaire doit être associée à la gestion de 
la Région, et aux responsabilités qui en découlent". The 
notion of the Corsicans constituting a separate ethnie was an 
idea quite contrary to the notion of France as "one and 
indivisible" and was a new way of expressing the nineteenth 
century regionalist critique of the Republic, as found, for 
example, in authors such as Le Play. This insisted that the 
departmental structures set up at the Revolution destroyed 
natural human communities. In 1964, Seta and Yves Le Bomin 
gave a more clear form to these ideas in the Manifeste du 
C.E.D.I.C. pour L'ETHNIE CORSE (19).
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Although the young intellectuals in Paris were 
developing similar themes there were important differences 
between the two tendencies. First, the CEDIC was based 
primarily in Corsica itself, mainly in the region around 
Bastia. Second, it was less favourable toward the use of 
Marxist concepts to analyse the problem of Corsica. Instead, 
it limited itself to the framework proposed by right-wing 
federalists such as Guy Héraud. Third, it viewed the moderate 
regionalists in the CAPCO in a more critical manner than did 
Union Corse. This may have been for two reasons. First, the 
CEDIC were close to Achille de Susini and the old-style 
regionalists who had quit CAPCO after a violent disagreement. 
Second, CAPCO was now completely dominated by the parties of 
the French left which had begun to cooperate with the "left" 
clan of Giacobbi. The Parisians, given their overall socialist 
orientation, were (like the Breton UDB) more favourable to 
some form of cooperation with such parties. Finally, while the 
left-wingers sought an ouverture méditerranéenne, some of the 
CEDIC sympathizers such as Jacques Luciani (also a member of 
UNEC), expressed overtly racist judgements in L'Informateur: 
"Le sol de France: un paillasson pour les métèques" (20). 
Another article in the paper attacked the North Africans who 
were arriving in Corsica: "... les Services de la main- 
d'oeuvre devraient éliminer le plus possible cette main- 
d'oeuvre [les musulmans nordafricains] très peu productive, 
dans nos villes" (21).
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Despite these differences the two tendencies seemed to 
have some common features: their youthfulness, their desire 
for a radical change in the administrative structures between 
Corsica and France, their federalist philosophy, their 
critique of the economic development programme (although for 
different reasons). These elements of a possible common 
programme were enough for the two groups to attempt to create 
a single organisation. This took place on 31 July 1966 during 
the Assises Régjonalistes de la Jeunesse Corse which took 
place on the island. The new group was called the Front 
Régionaliste Corse (FRC).
The Front Régionaliste Corse
A tract distributed immediately prior to the Assises (22) 
outlined the topics to be discussed:
- des lois exceptionnelles pour la Corse...;
- la reconnaissance de la personnalité de notre
région...;
- son érection immédiate en région de programme;
- la réalisation rapide d'un plan d'ensemble;
-le droit et les moyens pour la jeunesse corse de rester
et de travailler dans son pays;
- 1'égalité totale des conditions de vie avec les autres
régions de l'ensemble français.
During the Assises. Dominique Alfonsi criticised the 
moderate regionalists. Santoni presented an analysis of the
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Corsican problem in the framework of the internal colonialist 
thesis developed by Robert Lafont. Seta spoke on the system of 
"autonomie administrative interne". Finally, Max Simeoni 
presented a synthesis of the speeches (23). Thus the 
proceedings were dominated by the leaders of the two 
tendencies. The outcome was the fusion of the CEDIC and 
L'Union Corse-L'Avenir to form the Front Régionaliste Corse 
(FRC).
The marriage between left-wing and right-wing radical 
regionalism was, however, short-lived. The ideological 
differences between the two tendencies were too great and, 
after a few months, the CEDIC left the new organisation. 
Already, in August 1966, the speeches of Alfonsi and Santoni 
had been criticised in the columns of the L'Informateur by a 
columnist called Fléchettes. Alfonsi was criticised for the 
violence of his attack on the moderate regionalists while 
Santoni came under attack for quoting Lenin. The two CEDIC 
militants who were members of the Comité Directeur of the FRC, 
P. Beretti and M. Simeoni, resigned explaining that the CEDIC 
was the group which best expressed their views. In November
1966, L'Informateur became the official journal of the CEDIC 
and, on 1 November 1966, the group founded its own paper: 
Arritti (a Corsican word meaning "Arise!).
Another consequence of the withdrawal of the CEDIC was 
the departure from the FRC of Dominique Alfonsi who resigned
- 248 -
in August 1967 because he disagreed with the departure of the 
CEDIC. Already, in December 1966, Alfonsi had returned to 
Ajaccio and founded his own newspaper which bore the title La 
Corse hebdomadaire. He created at the same time a "comité à 
aspirations régionalistes tendu vers une moralisation de la 
vie politique et à la prise en main de l'économie insulaire 
par une nouvelle génération élitaire" (24). The tendency 
represented by Alfonsi may be described as lying, in 
ideological terms, somewhere between the right and left-wing 
tendencies.
The FRC remained in existence but was now composed almost 
exclusively of the left-wingers. The Mémorial des Corses gives 
a good summary of the reasons for the split:
La controverse a porté et porte encore sur des options de 
fond. Il s'agissait de savoir si le régionalisme devait 
s'armer politiquement, s'il devait affirmer des options 
socialistes plutôt que de déboucher immédiatement sur une 
technique électoraliste en négligeant l'approfondissement 
doctrinal sur un régionalisme démocratique gui 
dépasserait en impact une simple revendication 
institutionnelle - sur ce débat, le mouvement 
régionaliste s'est divisé en plusieurs tendances (25).
By the middle 1960's, then, the tendencies within the 
younger generation of radical regionalists had been clarified, 
and each tendency had its own ideology, tactics and 
organisation. It is not the purpose of this Chapter to give a 
history of the subsequent development of the movements. This 
has been done competently elsewhere (26). Rather it will try 
to place them within the context of the general plan of the
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thesis: their relationship to Corsican society, the system of 
mediation between the island and the state, and the changes 
that have occurred in the relationships between these. This 
means analysing the two principal tendencies in terms of 
their: a) ideology; b) programme and tactics; c) socio­
economic support base and d) success or failure. These 
features of the movements will then be related to the above 
three factors.
THE LEFT-WING RADICAL REGIONALISTS
These were represented principally by the FRC following 
the departure of the right-wingers but also by other groups 
such as those founded by Dominique Alfonsi on his return to 
Ajaccio. The exit of the right-wingers left the group free to 
develop more fully its own distinctive brand of regionalism, 
some elements of which had been germinating since around 1960.
Ideology
In February 1967, L'Union Corse 1'Avenir published the 
Propositions du Front Régionaliste Corse (27). In these may be 
found a clear expression of the group's ideology. The 
proposals were divided into two sections. The first section 
developed an analysis of the Corsican problem, and the second 
proposed a programme to solve this problem. It is the first 
section which is of most interest.
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First, there was the affirmation that La Région Corse 
constituted "une unité organique naturelle, parfaitement 
définie dans ses trois dimensions". These are:
a) Une dimension socio-culturelle: autrement dit, 
l'existence d'un peuple ...;
b) Une dimension géographique: la Corse est une île de la 
Méditerranée ... ;
c) Une dimension économique: l'économie corse est une 
économie sous-développée ...
Second, the FRC provided an explanation for this 
underdevelopment: le colonialisme intérieur: "La situation de 
la Corse est une situation de type colonial". This framework 
is explicitly adopted from the Occitan regionalist movement 
presided over by Robert Lafont , the C.O.E.A. (Comité Occitan 
d'Etudes et d'Action), and hommage is paid to the notion of 
révolution régionale, although mention is not made of the 
author of these ideas, Robert Lafont. Corsica is an example of 
internal colonialism because it has, according to the FRC, the 
following characteristics:
(1) La fuite des ressources naturelles.
(2) L'exploitation des ressources par un grand capital 
agraire ou financier...
(3) La réduction constante du marché du travail.
(4) La prolétarisation des Corses hors de Corse et 
l'implantation dans l'île d'un sous-prolétariat importé.
(5) La dépossession de la terre [aidée] par la SOMIVAC et
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les organismes de crédit.
(6) L'écrasement du petit commerce et de l'entreprise 
étroitement liés à la vie locale.
(7) Le monopole du pavillon ...
(8) Soumission absolue par le moyen du pouvoir central, 
aux impératifs d'une politique économique nationale puis 
européenne ...
(9) La soumission aux impératifs d'une politique 
militaire qui transforme les régions sous-peuplées en 
bases opérationnelles ...
(10) L'ignorance par la majorité des Corses de leur 
culture ...
(11) Le portrait du colonisé corse sous les traits d'un 
paresseux, d'un incapable, voire d'un criminel ...
The theory of internal colonialism as applied to Corsica 
which is the FRC's distinctive contribution to Corsican 
regionalism was given further expression in a rapport 
d'orientation presented to the group's Third Congress in 1970. 
It is worth quoting this in full given the importance of this 
ideology in subsequent developments:
Tout l'édifice colonialiste repose sur une même souche: 
la propriété privée des moyens de production et 
d'échange, avec son expression politique, l'Etat 
centraliste bourgeois et son expression idéologique, la 
culture bourgeoise. Il faut détruire ces structures 
jusque dans leurs fondements, autrement dit, il faut 
décoloniser d'abord. Si l'on est d'accord sur cette 
nécéssité, il suffit de fixer les objectifs généraux: 
propriété collective des terres, des rivages, des mines, 
des industries à créer, des transports, du tourisme ... 
organisation de l'instruction à tous les niveaux (y 
compris l'Université au bénéfice du peuple et non plus 
des priviligiés), promotion de la langue corse et du 
patrimoine culturel. Cela se nomme socialisme (28).
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In the same report can be found a definition of the 
meaning of colonialism:
Quel est ce sens? Ni plus ni moins que celui d'une 
surexploitation. Les travailleurs de Nancy, par exemple, 
sont certainement exploités. Il s'agit toutefois d'une 
exploitation de type capitaliste bien définie. Lorsque 
cette exploitation est aggravée et généralisée au point 
de dévaster un pays, de lui interdire toute progression 
et tout progrès, au point de paupériser et de 
clochardiser la grande masse de la population; lorsqu'à 
cela s'ajoutent des mesures de l'Etat qui tendent à 
détruire l'identité de cette population en réprimant sa 
culture, alors seulement il est permis de donner à 
pareilles conditions de vie pour les larges masses du 
peuple, le nom de colonialisme; c'est le cas de la Corse.
Thirdly, this system of internal colonialism is set up 
with the complicity of the Corsicans themselves: une 
autocolonisation. At the centre of this complicity is "le 
féodalisme du système des clans". Interestingly, the FRC, 
perhaps because of the presence in its ranks of former PC 
fellow-travellers such as Jean Leandri and also because of the 
Marxist analysis of its Trotskyist members, here develops an 
analysis of the clan system strikingly similar to that of the 
PCF in the immediate post-war period which has been mentioned 
in the previous Chapter: "[c]ette société sclérosée corse 
favorise la domination anachronique d'une classe dirigeante 
rétrograde qui tend tous ses efforts vers le maintien de la 
sclérose et de la désintégration sociales qu'elle juge 
nécessaires au maintien de son pouvoir". This is convenient 
for the central power: "on constate aisément quel avantage 
procure ce système à l'administration centraliste et aux 
groupes économiques colonisateurs". The use of different party
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labels by the clans does not alter the fact that they have all 
had the same basic approach to the central power: a 
capitulation and abdication of Corsica's interests.
The arguments of left-wing radical regionalism may be 
found in their clearest form in Main basse sur une île (29). 
This book, which appeared in 1971 as a collective work of the 
FRC was, in fact, written mainly by Charles Santoni and Pascal 
Marchetti. The book, in effect, is a brilliant attempt to 
rewrite Corsican history from the viewpoint of the internal 
colonialism thesis. All Corsican history, and not least the 
period of French rule, is interpreted as one long story of 
colonization (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 attempts to illustrate 
that Corsica is "une colonie à part entière". Most 
importantly, the present efforts at mise en valeur by the 
SOMIVAC and SETCO are seen as a continuation of the old 
pattern. Chapter 3 applies the analysis to the cultural 
situation of Corsicans: the déculturation and taking away of 
Corsica's history and the substitution of a degraded 
"folklorisme": "rien n'échappera plus aux fabricants 
d'histoire, aux modeleurs d'une Corse de convention, aux 
marchands de folklore" (30). The authors term this "le grand 
dérangement culturel". Using the analysis of Albert Memmi in 
Portrait du colonisé, the authors explain how Corsicans are 
the instruments of their own colonization and déculturation. 
Finally, they reject both the poujadism of the petit bourgeois 
regionalist movements and any tendency towards independence.
- 254 -
Instead they propose a Corsican socialism as the way forward 
(Chapter 5). This work, probably the most influential piece of 
writing to come from the Corsican regionalists, had a wide­
spread success and was translated into several languages. It 
provided young Corsicans with a version of regionalism that 
was in tune with modern ideas. Furthermore, it possessed a 
coherence and power of argumentation that seemed difficult to 
refute. For these reasons Main basse sur une île helped to 
transform the terms in which the Corsican problem was debated.
The ideology of left-wing radical regionalism, then, may 
be summed up as a reworking of old regionalist themes such as 
the specific identity and organic unity of the Corsican people 
in new terms. These are borrowed from the language of both 
integral federalism and neo-Marxism.
Programme
The FRC developed two key ideas as their principal aims
(31) : "la possession de la région par les autochtones et 
l'administration de la région par elle-même". The first aim 
was based on the notion of "propriété régionale", i.e. it is a 
fundamental right of the inhabitants of a region to possess 
collectively and enjoy the usufruct of the natural wealth of 
the region. A specific strategy and set of tactics were put 
forward to obtain this aim: it is necessary to struggle:
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- Pour exiger la formation sur place de cadres 
autochtones.
- Pour l'étude régionale des problèmes de rentabilité.
- Pour le réemploi à des fins régionales des sommes 
déposées aux guichets bancaires.
The second aim was to put the administrative powers of 
the region in the hands of an assemblée régionale corse. Such 
an assembly would administer the economic, intellectual and 
social affairs of the region, to do so it must have a regional 
executive, emanating from it and with authority over the 
region's services. The prefect would be replaced by a delegate 
of the central power responsible for those field services 
provided directly by the central state and for harmonizing the 
regional and national plans.
Other proposals made by the FRC included the erection of 
Corsica into a distinct economic region with its own programme 
and regional investment bank along the lines of the Cassa per 
il Mezzogiorno in Italy. Regional development planning should 
be by Corsicans for Corsicans: "Le plan régional de 
développement de la Corse sera financé par le budget régional 
et par la Caisse régionale d'investissement corse". It should 
include: infrastructural investment (ports, roads, dams, etc); 
industrial investment (with priority given to the creation of 
jobs in industry); an agricultural policy based on support for 
the island's pastoral sector (i.e. the opposite of of most 
economic proposals from the centre which envisaged the 
disappearance of the latter). In order to bring about this
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form of development there would have to be: an educational 
system to serve the economy; a policy of demographic renewal; 
an overall plan of technical aid; the opening up of the region 
to the Mediterranean and to Europe (although not "...
1'Europe actuelle des forces économiques, qui assujettissent 
notre région au sous-développement... nous nous déclarons 
résolument pour une Europe des peuples, c'est à dire pour une 
Europe des régions"); improvement in communications and 
tourism ("le développement d'un tourisme moyen"); and a 
special fiscal statute.
Support base
Left-wing radical regionalism was based principally in 
Paris and, to a lesser extent, in the French provincial 
universities. Dominique Alphonsi tried to bring it back to 
Corsica but with only limited success, although several of the 
leaders of this tendency, such as Charles Santoni, did return 
to the island. In numerical terms, it seems that the FRC was 
never more than a small group of intellectuals - either 
students or recent graduates in the liberal professions, 
especially lawyers and teachers (32). However, the 
intellectual force of the group's arguments diffused through 
its newspaper and its 1971 collective publication Main basse 
sur une île , gave it an influence much wider than the number 
of members might indicate.
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Tactics
The FRC decided not to contest elections itself. This was 
probably the consequence of the group's small number of 
members and the fact that the latter lived mainly outside 
Corsica. Max Simeoni did stand as an FRC candidate in an 
election in Bastia but the group denounced this use of its 
name. Instead, it gave conditional support to the parties of 
the French left such as the SFIO and PCF (33). For example, in
1967, it was more positive toward the programme of the 
Fédération de la Gauche Démocratique et Socialiste (FGDS) than 
to that of the UNR. In the parliamentary elections in 1967 in 
the Corte constituency it recommended its followers to vote 
for Mondolmi (SFIO) and Bungelmi (PCF). Its attitude may be 
illustrated by its comments following the victory of the left- 
wing candidate, Jean Zuccarelli, in a municipal by-election in 
Bastia in 1968:
... la manière dont il a conduit la campagne, dégagé de 
l'emprise des clans, sa référence constante à des options 
idéologiques, son souci de se démasquer du giaccobisme en 
contre-balançant l'influence de celui-ci par la venue de 
leaders continentaux de la Fédération, MM Billières, 
Defferre, et Mitterrand. M Zuccarelli est l'élu des 
ouvriers, employés, agriculteurs, commerçants, autant 
gu'il est l'élu des clans et de leurs troupeaux (34).
When the "events" of May 1968 broke out, it was natural 
that the FRC should participate. Firstly, the radical 
regionalists were part of the forces of the "new left" which 
were an essential component of May 1968. Secondly, most of
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their members were already in Paris where the first outbreak 
occurred. Thirdly, many of them were still students or had 
recently graduated and the "events" were precipitated in the 
Universities. Following May 1968, the radical regionalists 
adopted the tactic of joing forces with the Soixante-huitards 
while many of the latter joined the regionalists. On 19 August 
1970, they organised a Journée unitaire progressive corse, 
with the participation of the CFDT, PSU and MODEF among others 
(35) . In December 1971, they suggested to the leaders of the 
island's left-wing parties (PS,PCF,PSU), trade unions and 
regionalist movements, that a "front politique de lutte contre 
le colonialisme français en Corse" be established (36). Not 
surprisingly, the Jacobin PCF and PS did not respond 
favourably while it was the PSU and CFDT, the party and trade 
union most influenced by May 1968, which did.
Left-wing radical regionalism: success or failure?
As a political movement mobilizing the Corsican "masses" 
and aggregating their interests the radical regionalists of 
the left failed. The "masses" continued to support the 
traditional parties, as may be seen in successive election 
results. As a group the left-wing were a tiny minority of the 
total Corsican population. Furthermore, this already tiny 
movement, like many similar extreme left-wing groups, began to 
break up reducing its numbers even more. In April 1973, the 
movement transformed itself into a political party, the
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Partitu di u Populu Corsu, following the adoption of a more 
explicit autonomist programme in the A Chiama di a Castellare 
(see Appendix). This led to internal disagreements and the 
Trotskyists left (37). In July 1973, the FRC adopted an 
explicitly autonomist programme and changed its name to the 
"Partitu di u Populu Corsu (PPC). Then, some time later, 
Charles Santoni, one of the principal leaders and the chief 
ideologue of the movement left to join the new PS. This was in 
line with similar "transfuges" in other regions such as 
Brittany and the French Basque Country (38). In July 1974, the 
PPC joined with the PCP of Dominique Alfonsi to form the 
Partitu di u Populu Corsu per l'Autonomia (PPCA). However, the 
PPCA disappeared after a short period of time (in December 
1974). In the end, the left-wing radical regionalists were 
represented by the tiny party of Dominique Alphonsi: the 
Partitu Pupulare Corsu (PPC) and by the violent separatists 
who will be treated below. However, they were present in the 
new Socialist Party of François Mitterrand and had an 
influence therein which would bear fruit when the latter came 
to power in 1981 (see Chapter Nine below).
Left-wing radical regionalists, however, were important 
in ideological terms. They raised the level of analysis and 
debate on the Corsican question and imposed a radically new 
framework in which this could be understood. What is important 
is less the intrinsic merits of this framework than the fact 
that it helped to rehabilitate regionalism, discredited after
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the Second World War, by giving it a "progressive" veneer. The 
old regionalist themes were now couched in neo-Marxist terms 
and concepts: the theory of internal colonialism - as well as 
the theory of integral federalism. Although most of the French 
left remained Jacobin and would not accept the "colonialist" 
thesis, nevertheless, other elements of the analysis, 
especially the economic, made it more acceptable to them. This 
provided a bridge across which regionalists and socialists 
could travel to meet and influence each other. The 
consequences of this meeting would become clear when the left, 
after its long sojourn in the political wilderness, finally 
came to power in May 1981.
RIGHT-WING RADICAL REGIONALISM
The first stirrings of this tendency have already been 
outlined above. The members of this group, because of their 
personal and family contacts, as well as ideological 
affinities, were closer to the old-style regionalists of an 
earlier generation. Their departure from the FRC had two 
important consequences. First, it led to an ideological 
conflict with the FRC which was now completely dominated by 
the left (39). This forced the right-wingers to formulate 
their own position in a clearer manner. Second, it gave them 
the opportunity to form their own distinct organisation. In 
fact, the same personnel formed several organisations with 
different names: CEDIC (April 1964) became ARC (Action
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Régionaliste Corse - September 1967) ARC kept the same 
acronym but changed the words to Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa 
in July 1973. This change was meant to convey the fact that 
ARC had become explicitly autonomist. After the events of 
Aleria in August 1975 (see Introduction), when the ARC was 
banned the group changed its name to the Associu di i Patrioti 
Corsi (APC - February 1976) and then to the Unione di u Populu 
Corsu (UPC), which is its present name.
Ideology
Some of the elements of the right-wingers' ideology have 
already been mentioned above. These became more explicit as 
the controversy with the FRC developed and the CEDIC and later 
ARC were forced to clarify their positions. Immediately prior 
to the attempted merger the latter declared themselves to be 
"apolitical" (40). Seta explained this as meaning a refusal to 
become involved in the political system then existing on the 
island, that is, the corrupt system of the clans:
"1/apolitisme, en effet, repousse par définiton toute 
subordination à un parti ou à un clan et assure la prééminence 
de l'économique sur le politique" (41). It is interesting that 
the claim to be "apolitical" is often made by right-wing 
nationalist groups. The Breton MOB claimed to be "ni rouge, ni 
blanc" (see above Chapter One) while the early Provisional IRA 
claimed to be "neither right nor left" and opposed to both
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socialism and capitalism. In fact, such groups tend to be 
more against the former than the latter.
Another reaction of such groups is to reject "foreign" 
political philosophies such as Marxism or socialism in favour 
of a purely nationalist one. This reaction may be found in a 
speech by one of the first leaders of the right-wing 
regionalists, Lucien Alfonsi, at the founding Congress of ARC, 
in Cateraggio (42). In defense of the "apolitical" 
orientation, he quotes with approval Paul Sérant: "Les 
régionalistes ont le droit d'être pour ou contre la monarchie, 
pour ou contre le socialisme, de croire à l'Europe ou de ne 
pas y croire. Mais ils doivent ensemble défendre la région".
He then develops a quasi-nationalist interpretation of 
Corsican regionalism: the ARC, according to Alfonsi, differs 
from the FRC in that it is the bearer of a "régionalisme 
purement corse". This position is adopted because these non- 
Corsican political philosophies divide Corsicans rather than 
unite them:
En Corse fermer la porte du régionalisme à tous ceux qui 
ne font pas dévotion à telle ou telle chapelle politico- 
philosophique, c'est se condamner à l'inefficacité, donc 
à la mort ... Pour arracher au gouvernement, quel qu'il 
soit, une mesure contre laquelle l'appareil administratif 
centraliste, jaloux de ses prérogatives et soucieux de 
ses intérêts dressera jusqu'à son dernier souffle tous 
les obstacles en son pouvoir, il faut l'adhésion massive 
de la population. Il est ridicule, il est criminel de 
prétendre que le régionalisme l'obtiendra en divisant 
encore ce qui est déjà morcelé.
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These positions are based on the assumption, shared with 
the left-wingers, that there exists a Corsican ethnie or 
peuple which possesses an organic unity. The right-wingers, 
however, claim that "foreign" political philosophies, such as 
Marxism, are based on the theory of class struggle and the 
predominance of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Such a 
philosophy runs counter to the ARC'S desire to unite all 
classes in Corsica on the basis of their "Corsicanness". It is 
for this reason, too, that they reject the parties of the 
French mainland based as these are on class interests. But 
they also reject them because they are French and therefore 
instruments of centralization. Once again, it is Alfonsi who 
explains:
Il n'y a rien à attendre des partis français: [ils] sont 
centralistes, les uns à droite par filiation 
conservatrice, héritiers plus ou moins conscients, plus 
ou moins volontaires, des 40 rois qui, en mille ans, ont 
fait la France, les autres, de gauche, par tradition 
jacobine ... Tout lien du régionalisme avec un parti 
revient automatiquement à le couper des autres, donc à 
diviser les Corses (43).
The idea that the Corsican people must be united and not 
divided, which was central to the ARC's ideology and related 
to the notion that Corsicans constitute an ethnie or peuple 
was later given more explicit expression in the ARC's booklet 
Autonomia (44), written in 1974 as the movement's equivalent 
to Main basse sur une île:
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^  CJ-e peuple corse] est une réalite historique, 
charnelle. Il possède sa langue véhiculaire, son 
atavisme, son instinct, son comportement spécifiques. Il 
est enraciné depuis des millénaires dans la terre rude et 
belle de l'Ile de Corse. Leur union est indissoluble 
(45).
Autonomia. like Main basse sur une île. presented a 
highly idealized picture of this peuple heroically struggling 
throughout history to preserve its existence and identity 
against the incursions of the island's many invaders. More 
importantly, the island's present ills were interpreted in the 
same terms of defense against agression, the aggressors now 
being the French:
Le passé de la Corse française a lentement et 
impitoyablement préparé l'agression du present, à la fois 
générale et multiforme, que trop de Corses ne distinguent 
pas derrière une expansion tapageuse dont ils pensent 
bénéficier alors qu'elle est organisée contre eux. A son 
tour, l'agression d'aujourd'hui prélude minutieusement à 
l'éxécution du grand dessein colonialiste de demain, 
inscrit dans les Plans et Schémas de l'Etat français: 
l'élimination du peuple corse [my emph.] (46).
The ARC shared with the FRC the notion that Corsica was 
colonized by France. In fact, this "colonialist" 
interpretation may be traced back to the writings of Achille 
De Susini in L'lnsulaire in the late 1950's (see previous 
Chapter). This was not as "progressive" as it might seem at 
first sight. The complaint of old-style regionalists such as 
De Susini was not against colonialism as such but against 
Corsicans receiving the same treatment as Africans and Asians. 
However, the ARC does draw to some extent on the "internal
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colonialist" thesis of Lafont as mediated by the FRC but 
denuded of its Marxist content and of the conclusion that 
there should be a socialist solution:
Toutes les agressions économiques, financières, 
démographiques, sociales, écologiques pratiquées de 1957 
à 1973 par la volonté ou l'assentiment de l'Etat français 
contre le peuple corse ont donc tendu à priver ce dernier 
de ses ressources naturelles pour en confier à d'autres 
l'exploitation et les bénéfices. Une telle attitude de la 
part d'un Etat à 1'égard d'un térritoire qu'il contrôle 
ne peut porter qu'un nom: le colonialisme.
Le colonialisme de l'Etat français vis-à-vis de la Corse 
pourrait n'être, cependant, qu'une variante affaiblie du 
colonialisme totale, une sorte de version interne, s'il 
s'était borné aux aspects dénoncés plus hauts, dans ce 
bilan de l'expansion. Pour mériter tout à fait son nom, 
le colonialisme doit revêter aussi des aspects politico- 
administratifs et judiciaires - et trouver des complices, 
conscients ou abusés, dans la population et représentants 
légaux (47).
Programme
The programme proposed by ARC had two principal elements: 
a revitalization of the plan for economic development and a 
change in the administrative structures between the island and 
France. Unlike the FRC the ARC did not blame the economic ills 
of the island on the capitalist system or the existing process 
of European integration which they (like earlier figures such 
as De Susini) supported. Rather they used an argument that 
went back to nineteenth-century regionalism: the island's ills 
were caused by the fact that the French state had abandoned 
them (48) - which was somewhat contradicted by the notion of a
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solution "purement corse". ARC pointed to three principal 
areas for development: tourism, agriculture and industry. What 
was needed was for the state to provide the means to develop 
them (49). The model chosen was the Italian state's policy 
with regard to the Mezzogiorno and Sardinia:
... le plan de développement [de la Sardaigne] a commencé 
par l'implantation d'unités industrielles qui, par leurs 
dimensions, leur haute technicité et leur capacité 
productive, doivent se révéler compétitives au niveau 
national et même européen (50).
This, in fact, was implicit in the PAR of 1957 whose 
general orientation, according to the CEDIC and ARC, was 
correct. What went wrong was the initial lack of means 
provided to achieve these goals, the change of orientation 
with the Fifth Republic and the arrival of the pieds noirs on 
the Plaine Orientale. Finally, the authorities forgot that 
"[l]e développement économique de la Corse doit être fait par 
les Corses et pour les Corses (51). The economic development 
programme of the right-wing radical regionalists was based on 
continuing the orientations of the 1957 PAR but with Corsicans 
in control of the development.
To obtain this, different administrative structures are 
necessary. Paul-Marc Seta, in the pages of L'Informateur. 
developed the theme of obtaining a special statute of internal 
autonomy:
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Sauvegarder l'ethnie ne s'avère possible que si la 
collectivité insulaire devient étroitement et réellement 
associée à l'administration comme à l'économie de la 
région corse, de façon à contrôler les investissements et 
répartition des bénéfices du Plan d'Action Régionale. Un 
tel résultat ne peut être obtenu que par l'octroi a la 
Corse d'un statut spécial qui lui donnerait les moyens 
d'exercer cette action concrète dans la conduite des 
affaires régionales. L'autonomie de gestion dans les 
affaires corses, procurée par l'octroi d'un statut 
spécial, signifierait pour les insulaires une 
collaboration plus étroite et donc plus confiante avec le 
pouvoir central de Paris ainsi que la consultation 
obligatoire de leurs représentants avant toute décision 
d'origine légale ou réglémentaire intéréssant l'île. Sans 
autonomie locale, sans statut spécial, la Région ne peut 
espérer protéger son ethnie (52).
Tactics
Although the ARC proclaimed itself to be "apolitical", it 
decided initially to engage in electoral activity. This tactic 
was based on the strategy of mobilizing the Corsican people on 
the basis of its organic unity. The traditional political 
parties were based on divisions of ideology or class or those 
promoted by the traditional clans while the ARC presented 
itself as the unifying alternative to these. In March 1967,
Max Simeoni stood as a candidate in a legislative election in 
Bastia (under the label of the FRC!). He received only a small 
percentage of the votes cast (see Appendix on electoral 
activity in Corsica). In Autumn 1967, his brother Edmond was 
candidate in the cantonal election in Bastia Terravecchia. In 
the 1968 municipal elections in Bastia, Max headed a 
regionalist list which obtained only a few hundred votes. In 
1971, Max again headed a list in the municipal elections in
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Bastia. Finally, in 1973, the ARC decided that elections in 
Corsica were too rigged for it to have a fair chance. It 
decided therefore not to adopt this tactic again:
Il est certain que les résultats électoraux de l'ARC ne 
sont pas à la mésure de l'audience réelle que connait le 
mouvement ... On peut être sympathisant régionaliste, 
voire même militant sans pour autant suivre la consigne 
de rénoncer à la pulitichella (53).
They did not consider the possibility that the vast 
majority of Corsicans still did not wish to join in their 
"mobilization". They decided, therefore, to try to occupy 
other terrains and were present in almost all the social 
protest movements that occurred in Corsica in the 1960's and 
early 1970's (54).
Finally, the ARC militants were not averse occasionally 
to threaten violence and to sometimes use it, although this 
was not a usual tactic for them. In fact, violence as used by 
this tendency was more a series of symbolic gestures rooted in 
the island's cultural system, as explained above in Chapter 
Six. There was no attempt to organise a systematic campaign 
against the state but rather sporadic incidents such as at 
Aleria in 1975 or Bastelica/Ajaccio in 1980 (55). These 
incidents sparked off mass protests and provoked a sense of 
solidarity among the islanders. However, the ARC and, later, 
the UPC leaders denounced the use of violence.
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Support base
Right-wing radical regionalism, in contrast to the left­
wingers, was, as has been noted above, implanted on Corsica 
itself. Within Corsica, however, its influence was 
concentrated in specific areas (56). These were principally 
Bastia, the area of the Oriental Plain near Bastia and the 
Fiumorbu region to the west of the Plain. It is not difficult 
to find the reasons for this. Right-wing radical regionalism 
found its greatest support among those social groups most 
affected by the upheavals caused by the economic development 
programme of the 1960's: small farmers, hoteliers, shop­
keepers and commerçants. In other words, the traditional 
constituency of pouiadisme (57). As the Mémorial des Corses 
expressed it:
La clientèle initiale du mouvement est faite de membres 
de catégories sociales auxquelles s'adressaient plus 
particulièremént le CEDIC, la Confédération Générale 
Interprofessionnelle (CGIC), les PME ... c'est-à-dire, 
des commerçants, des artisans, des boutiquiers, des 
membres des professions libérales (58).
This orientation was made explicit in an editorial which 
appeared in Arritti:
Notre action a pour elle de prendre son élan, au départ, 
sur une catégorie de Corses particulièrement touchés par 
les injustices dont notre département est accablé: les 
petits commerçants groupés au sein de la CGIC que préside 
notre ami Jean Villanova. Nous nous concentrons sur eux 
parce qu'ils sont les victimes visées par l'illégalité 
fiscale que l'on veut imposer à la Corse. Quelques 
mauvais esprits, radoteurs du clan, essaient bien de 
dresser les consommateurs contre les commerçants.
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Laissons leur cette basse manoeuvre. Notre action a pour 
objet l'intérêt absolu de toutes les catégories de Corse, 
mais à ce titre elle doit la priorité à ceux dont la 
situation commande toutes les autres et personne ne peut 
nier valablement que le commerce soit le facteur 
déterminant de l'économie corse. Ce choix de priorité 
était indispensable, mais nous défendrons toutes les 
causes de toutes nos forces car, en abandonner une, 
serait de trahir toutes ... (59).
Although the ARC/UPC tendency failed to garner much 
support in electoral terms - reaching its height with about 10 
per cent of the vote in the 1982 Regional Assembly elections 
(see below Chapter Nine) - it did attract a significant 
following among young Corsicans. This was especially true 
after the violent incidents mentioned above, and can be seen 
from the level of participation in protest marches. 
Furthermore, an opinion poll taken soon after the events of 
Aleria indicated that a large minority of Corsicans were 
sympathetic to some of the theses of the regionalists and with 
their action at Aleria (60).
Right-wing radical regionalism: success or failure?
This tendency has been successful in relative terms, that 
is, compared with their left-wing rivals (the opposite of what 
occurred in Brittany - see Chapter One above). They have 
managed to establish a stronger presence on the island. 
Furthermore, they have been successful in keeping the Corsican 
question alive and on the agenda. The occasional use of 
violence provoked a repressive response from the Government
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and this in turn produced a wave of sympathy on the part of 
many young Corsicans. Finally, unlike the left-wingers this 
tendency has been successful in maintaining their organisation 
in existence over a period of almost twenty years with very 
few splits occurring (61).
In terms of the movement's attempted mobilization around 
the theme of the peuple corse it must be seen as a failure.
The vast majority of Corsicans have remained faithfully 
attached to France and remain unwilling to call this into 
question. However, the movement could claim some success in 
the sense that it legitimised the term and concept peuple 
corse. This is evident when one compares the responses of 
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing quoted above in Chapter Five and the 
use of the term by President Mitterrand on a visit to the 
island in 1982 (see Chapter Nine below). The problem for 
radical regionalists of both right and left tendencies has 
been that while they have admitted to being both Corsican and 
French they put the emphasis on the first element of their 
dual identity. The majority of Corsicans, however, have been 
proud to place the second element in first place.
THE VIOLENT SEPARATISTS (62)
The Corsican "phobia" has always been that- the island 
would leave the French state and be returned to Italy. During 
the 1930's the autonomist movements did indeed flirt with this
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notion, as some of their members fell under the influence of 
Mussolini's irredentism. The moderate and radical regionalist 
movements were convenient umbrellas under which those who held 
such opinions could resume their activities. As early as 1961 
a group calling itself the Comité Corse pour l'Indépendance 
(CCI) made its existence known by planting bombs in the Bastia 
region. In 1962 the group published a pamphlet entitled Livre 
blanc (63). In late 1967/early 1968, a groupuscule called 
Corse Libre was founded which also carried out several 
bombings in Bastia and Ajaccio (64). The most important 
groups, however, were the Fronte Paisanu Corsu di Liberazione 
(FPCL - October 1973) and Ghjustizia Paolina (GP - march 
1974). In May 1976 these two groups merged to form the best 
known of the Corsican separatist groups - the Front de 
Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC).
Ideology
The ideology of the violent separatists may be described 
as the making explicit and the carrying to their logical 
conclusion of the assumptions of the radical regionalists. The 
most important difference is that the separatists do not feel 
the need to pay lip service to the existence of a dual 
identity. They simply deny they are French. However, there is 
a division here too between right-wingers and left-wingers.
The former may be found in the CCI who rejected an autonomist 
solution within the French state and opted for an independent
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Corsica. However, this group was also linked to those who 
opposed De Gaulle's policy in Algeria and who sympathized with 
the pieds noirs (65). There would seem to have been links 
between them and the pied noir terrorists of the OAS with an 
agreement being signed between them (66). Corse Libre 
advocated complete independence but does not seem to have had 
a very developed theoretical position.
The FPCL did not, at first, demand complete independence 
but demanded instead the statute of "protectorate" (67). GP 
was as vague in its declared options (68). However, in its 
Manifeste de la Pentecote published in 1975 it made a clear 
choice for independence. The FLNC, finally, as its name 
suggests, wished for complete independence. In fact, the name 
was adopted from the Algerian FLN, the assumption being that 
Corsica too was a colony that had to be liberated in a 
national liberation struggle. Here, in effect, can be 
discerned the most radical expression of the internal 
colonialist thesis. The violent separatists accept fully the 
theory as elaborated by groups such as the FRC. They, however, 
wish to take action of a more radical kind (69).
Programme and tactics
The early use of violence in the 1960's does not seem to 
have been based on an elaborate political theory. Rather, it 
seems to have been the work of individuals and small cells
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motivated by the desire for revenge at the spoliation of their 
society and their own bitterness at being left out of the 
development of Corsica (70). Furthermore, it was a Corsican 
tradition to express one's emotions in violent form, although 
the use of explosives was not traditionally Corsican. However, 
as time went on, the groups felt the need to elaborate a more 
theoretical justification of the use of violence. The FLNC 
distinguished between propagande armée and lutte armée. The 
former was the use of violence to draw attention to the 
island's plight and to put pressure on the authorities to 
respond to their demands. The targets of this campaign were 
not people but buildings. Among the latter the favourite 
targets were Government buildings, the SOMIVAC and SETCO and 
hotels and farms set up under the PAR, as well as spectacular 
targets such as aeroplanes and ships. However, the lutte armée 
would arrive only at a later stage. This would be a full scale 
insurrection in which the Corsican people would rise up 
against the French and the spilling of blood would be 
inevitable. It would seem that some of the violent separatists 
feel that this stage has been reached in the 1980's (see below 
Chapter Nine).
Bomb attacks in Corsica began in the early 1960's and 
gradually increased in intensity (71) as the following figures 
indicate:
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Year Number of bomb attacks
1971 - 9
1972 18
1973 43
1974 111
1975 226
1976 298 (incl. destruction of a Boeing aircraft at
Ajaccio)
1977 (first violence appears on mainland France)
1979 329
1980 462
1982 742
1983 608
1984 490
1985 396 (72).
However, it should be pointed out that although the 
number of bombs was increasing, often these bombs consisted of 
only a few ounces of gelignite and caused little damage. By 
contrast, bombs planted in Northern Ireland by the IRA (Irish 
Republican Army) may contain as much as 1000 lbs. of explosive 
in one bomb and cause widespread damage. Most of them are 
aimed at isolated villas and houses in the mountainous 
interior. Furthermore, most of the bomb attacks of the 
Corsican separatists have caused little disruption to the 
everday life on the island. Although there are large numbers 
of security forces on the island, there is little sense of a
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society at war, as is the case in Northern Ireland. It must be 
concluded therefore that Corsican violence, although seemingly 
impressive in terms of statistics is, in fact, quite marginal. 
In 1980's, however, there has been a tendency to radicalize 
the violence and several assassinations have taken place.
Support base (73)
The personnel of the violent separatist movements seems 
to have been largely drawn from the ranks of the legitimate 
radical regionalists. Indeed many were members of the ARC or 
FRC by day and clandestines by night. However, it would seem 
that none of the violent separatist movements ever had a very 
widespread following. The actual numbers involved were quite 
small even if these were very active and could carry out many 
bombings thus giving the impression of a much greater support 
base. The opinion poll quoted above (74) indicated that about 
3 per cent of the population supported the idea of 
independence.
There was, nevertheless, an ambivalence on the part of 
Corsicans toward these clandestine movements. The sentiment of 
solidarity and close family contacts led many Corsicans to 
participate in demonstrations of solidarity with Corsican 
political prisoners and against the police repression 
especially during the Giscardian period. Such demonstrations,
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however, should not be confused with support for the ideas of 
the separatists.
Violent separatists: success or failure?
If we assess the success or failure of the separatists 
from the point of view of obtaining their declared aims, then 
they must be judged to be a complete failure. There is little 
likelihood that Corsica will achieve independence, not least 
because of the desire of the vast majority of the people 
living on the island, including most Corsicans, to remain 
French. However, the separatists have achieved a certain 
amount of success in keeping the Corsican problem on the 
political agenda, and this has contributed to the solution put 
forward by the Socialists in the Statut Particulier.
Attention should also be drawn to the existence of 
barbouzes such as the "Front d'Action Nouvelle contre 
l'Indépendance et 1'Autonomisme" (FRANCIA) founded in 1977 as 
a direct response to autonomist and separatist violence. 
FRANCIA was the group responsible for the events of Bastelica- 
Ajaccio in January 1980 and for many bombings against the 
autonomists (75). Following these events comités nationalistes 
were created everywhere on the island. These later became the 
Consulta di i Cumitati Naziunalisti (CCN). The latter went 
through some internal splits but eventually emerged around
1981 as the mouthpiece of the FLNC. In 1983, after the first
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Corsican Assembly Elections, the FLNC broke a cease-fire it 
had observed since 1981 when the Socialists were elected. The 
Government banned the CCN and this changed its name to the 
Muvimentu Corsu di Autodeterminazione (MCA) (see below Chapter 
Nine).
CONCLUSION
Both kinds of radical regionalism were composed of those 
social groupings which were most excluded from the system of 
mediation between Corsica and France. The right-wing tendency 
may be described as the younger generation of old-style 
regionalists whose ideology had been given a more modern and 
"progressive" veneer: federalism and europeanism, as well as 
socio-economic groups excluded from the economic development 
programme. The second tendency included those excluded by 
geography (domicile outside Corsica) and culture (une 
génération déracinée).
An indication of their distance from the system of 
mediation is the extremeness of their ideologies. Both groups 
radically call into question the traditional administrative 
and political relationships between Corsica and France. Both 
advocate a system of internal autonomy based on a federal 
system of relationships. Both conceive of Corsicans as 
constituting an ethnie, peuple or nation which possesses 
intrinsic rights such as the right to negotiate with the
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French people or state on the kind of relationships that 
should exist between them. Finally, both attacked the clan 
system and wished to abolish it rather than simply changing 
the elites who run it to make it less corrupt.
Radical regionalism exploits the ambiguity that 
constitutes the Corsican identity. Moderate regionalists 
stressed the French element of this identity. The radicals 
stress the Corsican element although, with the exception of 
the violent separatists, they usually do not completely deny 
the French element. However, the majority of Corsicans have 
refused to follow them in this line of thinking. Furthermore, 
the clan system quite successfully resisted this challenge to 
its hegemony and has reestablished itself.
The general pattern of radical regionalist mobilization 
was established by the mid-1970's. The two main tendencies - 
left-wing and right-wing - remained in existence, although the 
former showed more fissiparous tendencies than the latter. 
Several groups formed around these tendencies such as Donne 
Corse, a Corsican women's' group, and A Riscossa, a support 
group for political prisoners. During the Giscardian period 
heavy police repression was used, but this became a 
constituent element of the problem as it drove many young 
Corsicans into the radical organisations. The môvement even 
spread among the school children through the ULNC (the Union 
des Lycéens nationalistes corses). By 1981, Corsica seemed to
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be a tinder-box or, as Delors and Muracciole describe it, a 
poudrière. with violence coming from both the extreme 
nationalists and the right-wing barbouzes. It was for these 
reasons that the new Socialist Government elected in June 1981 
after the Presidential victory of François Mitterrand in May 
of that year, seriously turned its attention to the problème 
corse. To this we now turn.
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EPILOGUE: THE SOCIALIST REFORMA
The foregoing analysis has shown that the Corsican 
problem is a complex one and that the regionalist movements 
were alienated in various ways from the traditional system of 
mediation between the local society and the state. Before 
1981, French Governments had responded to this problem in a 
partial, piece-meal fashion which often exacerbated the 
problem itself. Furthermore, they often excluded Corsicans 
themselves from running their own affairs.
When the Socialists came to power in 1981, they were 
determined to apply a completely different approach. This was 
based on a comprehensive or global understanding of the 
problem and the solution was to be found in allowing Corsicans 
themselves, and other regional populations, to run their 
regions' affairs. The principal limitation placed on these 
reforms was that the Jacobin notion of the "one and 
indivisible Republic" was to be maintained. But this was to be 
a new understanding of Jacobinism: democratic Jacobinism. This 
epilogue analyses these developments in so far as they affect 
Corsica and the regions in general.
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CHAPTER NINE: THE SOCIALIST REFORMS OF 1981
The argument presented so far in this thesis is that 
regionalist movements in the different regions of France 
emerged as a result of the conjuncture of internal and 
external factors: rapid socio-economic changes which tended to 
disrupt the political and social relationships in traditional 
societies. Governmental responses to these movements have 
varied. During the Fourth Republic, the regionalization 
programme of the centre-left Governments coincided with some 
of the demands of the moderate regionalists (see Chapters Four 
and Seven above). This changed with the arrival to power of De 
Gaulle who set out to reduce the power of Parliament and of 
political parties and, hence, the influence of local 
politicians over the centre which had been mediated via the 
party system and Parliament.
These governmental responses became an important factor 
of alienation of certain regionalist groups as two 
fundamentally different ways of conceiving the territory 
bounded by the "Hexagon" entered into conflict. On the one 
hand, there was the traditional Jacobin vision of De Gaulle 
and his successors Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing who 
emphasised the unity and indivisibility of the Republic. For 
them there existed only the French nation spread throughout 
the entire territory bounded by the Hexagon. The radical 
regionalists, on the other hand, questioned this very concept
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of a French nation and conceived the "Hexagon" as a kind of 
prison within which natural "regions", ethnies and nations 
were artificially bound together by conquest.
These two mutually incompatible visions implied two 
equally conflicting logics for the elaboration and 
implementation of regional policy. The first led to a 
technocratic and functional regionalization. This approach 
promoted a regional development designed to ensure national 
unity. From the point of view of the regions themselves, it 
was undemocratic, piece-meal and inadequate. The second 
implied a regionalization congruent with a radical regionalism 
and federalism in which the units of policy-making and 
implementation would be the French state and the sub-state 
regional units. Policies would be drawn up and implemented on 
a contractual basis with the state and the regions operating 
as equals. A minority of the radical regionalists refused 
even this and sought complete separation from the French 
state. The clash of ideologies led to serious agitation within 
the regions and a continuous radicalization of the movements, 
which have been analysed in detail with regard to the Corsican 
case in this thesis.
It was within this context of social and ideological 
conflict that the left, during the 1960's and 1910's, 
developed its own regional theory (1). Finding itself in 
opposition for a long period of time, the left realised that
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the regional question was another stick with which it could 
beat successive right-wing Governments. Furthermore, the left 
at the end of the 1960's had a political programme which was 
either empty of content or purely negative. This vacuum could 
be filled by the ideas of the "new left" and the "new social 
movements" (2). It began therefore to abandon its former 
Jacobinism and to take into account the demands being made by 
the regionalists. This was helped by the fact that the latter, 
also at odds with the Gaullist regime, were undergoing a 
parallel change, abandoning their traditional conservatism and 
adopting elements of socialist ideology. This facilitated a 
meeting of minds with the traditional left, and sections of 
the two traditions began to collaborate. Furthermore, several 
important figures within the regionalist movements, such as 
Michel Phlipponeau and Louis Le Pensec from Brittany, Jean- 
Pierre Destrade from the French Basque Country and Charles 
Santoni from Corsica, actually joined the Socialist Party, 
thus helping to raise the consciousness of the latter with 
regard to the regional problem. Another important entry into 
the party was the PSU leader Michel Rocard, who had been a 
fervent advocate of a "decolonization" of the regions (3). 
Finally, mention should also be made of Gaston Defferre who 
had his own brand of regionalism and who had contacts with 
French federalist movements (4).
It should be noted, however, that just as there were 
several regionalisms within the regionalist movements, so,
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too, there were several positions with regard to the regional 
problem within the left. The PCF, PS and PSU all adopted 
significantly different lines (5). Within the PS there co­
existed the traditional. Jacobinism of groups such as the 
CERES, the moderate regionalism of individuals such as 
Defferre and the more radical regionalism of Le Pensec and 
Santoni. It is important to note these diversities both within 
the left and within the regionalist movements since it helps 
to explain apparent inconsistencies in the regionalist 
positions finally adopted by the left, and in particular by 
the Socialists, and the divisions and incomprehensions among 
the regionalists with regard to these positions.
Despite these divisions within the PS, the party managed 
to agree on a basic policy toward the regional question. This 
may be found in several positions adopted in the period 
preceding the Presidential elections of May 1981. This 
regional policy was part of a wider programme which advocated 
the restructuring of French society according to the 
principles of autogestion and political decentralization.
Thus, one of the theses on autogestion adopted by the PS 
national congress in June 1975 states:
Les régions doivent devenir des collectivités 
démocratiques avec leurs assemblées élues au suffrage 
universel, leurs exécutifs et leurs propres services 
techniques et administratifs. Certaines régions 
constituent des pays de minorité ethnique et leur 
identité sera forte. Les principes qui sous-tendront 
leur organisation sont de portée generale et constituent 
un des aspects du droit à la difference.
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This basic position may also be found in the Socialist 
Manifesto, drawn up at the extraordinary Congress of the PS 
held in Créteil on 24 January 1981 with a view to the 
forthcoming Presidential elections (6). The Manifesto was 
composed of a preamble followed by the 110 Proposals of the 
Socialist candidate. The preamble states that " ce qui 
constitue peut-être le point central de notre action, car il 
conditionne tous les autres, que l'on appellera, selon 
l'objet, décentralisation, responsabilité à la base, 
organisation des contre-pouvoirs, autogestion". This is based 
on a reassessment of the role of centralisation in building 
the French nation: "si le pouvoir central a servi, naguère, 
l'unité nationale, aujourd'hui il lui nuit". It should be 
pointed out, however, that De Gaulle had made the same point 
thirteen years previously when he stated in a famous speech, 
quoted above in Chapter Two, that "1'effort multiséculaire de 
centralisation n'a plus raison d'être". In other words, the 
Socialists remained Jacobins in the sense that they wished to 
preserve the unity and indivisibility of the Republic ("nous 
proclamons notre attachement irréductible à la patrie") but 
they considered that such unity could now be achieved, not by 
denying that diversity exists, as traditional Jacobinism had 
done, but by a democratic respect for this diversity. This 
meant recognizing the rights of cultural and linguistic 
minorities, especially the fundamental "droit à la 
différence".
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From this basic principle would follow several concrete 
measures concerning the regions and their populations. Some 
of these are outlined in the 110 Proposals, especially 
proposals 54-59. 54 promises a general programme of 
decentralization, a special statute (Statut Particulier) for 
Corsica and a single départment encompassing the French Basgue 
Country. 54 deals, then, with the regionalist demands for a 
restructuring of France's administrative structures. The 
cultural guestion is dealt with in 56: "La promotion des 
identités régionales sera encouragée, les langues et cultures 
minoritaires respectées et enseignées". These promises were 
repeated in speeches made by the Presidential candidate 
Mitterrand. The attitude of the PS was summed up in a speech 
at Lorient, Brittany, when Mitterrand stated: "C'est blesser
un peuple au plus profond de lui-même que de l'atteindre dans 
sa culture et sa langue" (7).
It is, therefore, not surprising that, following the 
Socialist victories of 1981, the new left Government should 
announce a "vast" programme of decentralization under the 
direction of Gaston Defferre who was named Minister of the 
Interior and Decentralization. Decentralization was to be la 
grande affaire du septennat. Several authors have examined 
the nature and functioning of this programme (8)'. Our concern 
here is with that part of the programme that deals with the 
regional problem and the problem of cultural and linguistic
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minorities. Have the Socialists kept the promises outlined 
above? What have been the policies formulated since May 1981? 
How has their implementation affected the condition of the 
regions and the minorities?
First,it should be noted that it is the promise of 
decentralization that the Socialists have most faithfully 
kept, even when other aspects of their project of Government 
have been abandoned or seriously diluted (9). It is, however, 
rare that a political party is completely faithful to its pre­
election promises. This is also the case with the Socialist 
decentralization project and policies toward minorities. These 
two points - the implementation of many of the pre-election 
promises and the modification of some of them - are clear from 
an examination of the Socialists' record since May 1981.
The new Government decided to act with speed in 
initiating the decentralization programme. This tactic was 
aimed at overcoming possible resistance from the right, now in 
opposition and demoralized following their electoral defeats, 
and from the upper ranks of the civil service, still unsure 
about the new Government. In this way, the necessary 
legislation was passed in 1982 and in the same year the 
reforms began to take effect. This tactic of speed had two 
effects: it meant that the policies finally adopted were very
close to the pre-election promises and that an irreversible 
situation was created. But this aspect of irreversibility,
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designed to ensure that the right could not tamper 
fundamentally with the reforms should they be returned to 
power, also meant that the Socialists themselves would be 
forced to respect their own creation. This is particularly 
important, as the Socialists "swung to the right" in April 
and May of 1983, a swing confirmed by the "new realism" 
approach of Laurent Fabius, who became Prime Minister in June 
1984.
Besides pushing through the more general decentralization 
programme, the Socialists have put into effect some of their 
more specific promises. Corsica was given a Statut 
Particulier by legislation based on a previous Socialist bill 
of 1977. The Statut Particulier gives to Corsica a Regional 
Assembly, elected by direct suffrage, to administer the 
political, social, economic and cultural affairs of the region 
(10). The powers of the Corsican Assembly are greater than 
those granted to the conseils régionaux, the new bodies, also 
directly elected, which are to administer the other regions.
It is, however, in the response to proposal 56, 
concerned with the rights of cultural and linguistic 
minorities that the left-wing Governments were most faithful 
to their promises. In August 1981, the Minister of Culture, 
Jack Lang, commissioned Henri Giordan, an academic and Occitan 
activist, to draw up a report on this question. This report, 
completed in February 1982, under the title Démocratie
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culturelle et droit h la difference. (11) was the basis for a 
private member's bill tabled for the Socialist group in the 
National Assembly by their Deputy for the Bayonne 
constituency, Jean-Pierre Destrade .
THE GIORDAN REPORT
The Giordan Report takes up some of the traditional 
theses of radical regionalism and develops them further. The 
solution to the problem of cultural and linguistic minorities 
is conceived as lying in the promotion of cultural democracy, 
based on the "droit a la difference". But the report goes 
further than previous analyses made by the Socialists. First, 
it widens the number of minorities to be included in the 
general category and, therefore, entitled to be considered in 
any policies adopted in their favour. It was part of the 
received wisdom that there existed in France seven linguistic 
minorities, all territorially based (12). Giordan includes 
other linguistic minorities with a territorial base (those who 
speak a dialect of French such as picard and gallo) as well as 
those minorities not defined by territory. The latter are, 
according to Giordan, immigrant workers and political 
refugees, who are not French citizens? Jewish, Gypsy and 
Armenian populations who are; and those communities from the 
territorially based minorities (Corsicans, Bretons, etc) 
living in cities like Paris, Lille, Lyons, etc.
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The second important development is that any policies 
adopted toward these minorities should be based on the 
necessity of a réparation historique because of the repression 
of their cultures and languages in the past. In other words, 
the Government should say that it was sorry. In order to 
translate this act of contrition into concrete acts of 
atonement, it is recommended that several bodies be 
established to preserve and promote the minority cultures and 
languages, for example, a Commission de la recherche sur les 
langues et cultures minoritaires and a Centre national de 
documentation, de recherche et d'échange. There should also 
be administrative structures to ensure that the voices of 
the minorities be heard by Government. The "piece maîtresse" 
of these would be a Commission nationale des cultures 
minoritaires. This would occupy an intermediary position 
between the Ministry of Culture, the Directions régionales des 
affaires culturelles and those bodies dealing with the non­
territorial minorities. Finally, the Giordan Report 
recommended that the minorities within France establish 
contacts with those outside it (a significant departure from 
previous attitudes).
After the publication of the Giordan Report, both the 
Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education engaged in a 
considerable effort to put some of its recommendations into 
effect. The former set up the Direction du développement 
culturel (DDC), in 1982, replacing the Mission du
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développement culturel which had existed since 1979. It is 
the responsibility of the DDC to carry out the policy of 
cultural decentralization. It does so by a "politique 
contractuelle avec les collectivités territoriales" and by 
taking into account the "différences des identités culturelles 
et le dialogue international des cultures" (13) . The DDC 
negotiates "cultural contracts" with all the regions, ten 
départments and sixty-nine medium-sised towns. The purpose of 
these contracts is to make the state and the local Government 
institutions partenaires égaux in the formulation and 
implementation of cultural policies. The difference between 
these contracts and the chartes culturelles drawn up in 1974 
by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing lies in the number of local bodies 
involved - over a hundred - and in the increase in financial 
support - aid for cultural projects in the regions was 
increased by two-thirds. The contracts are marked by a great 
diversity, corresponding to the cultural diversity in the 
regions themselves. All emphasize, however, the preservation 
of the local cultural heritage, the encouragement of artistic 
creation, and the building up of the instruments (outils) of 
cultural development.
The Ministry of Education was also directly concerned 
with the cultural dimension of decentralization which 
obviously affects the educational sector, given the promise to 
teach minority languages and cultures. Alain Savary, Minister 
of Education in 1982, stated during a conference on
- 293 -
bilingualism in Strasbourg: "Aller vers le multilinguisme, 
c'est éviter l'écueil d'une langue hégémonique, l'anglais en 
1'occurence". This would be based on a "prise en compte du 
maintien et du développement des langues régionales" (14). 
Concretely, this means that the educational system must take 
into account linguistic and cultural particularities and 
integrate them into its overall curriculum. As the Minister 
put it at a later date: "De la maternelle à 1'université les 
cultures régionales auront droit de cité avec un "véritable 
statut" " (15). This policy would be applied by the Academy 
Rectors. In June 1982, for example, the Rector of the Academy 
of Strasbourg in Alsace circulated a letter in which he 
stated that regional languages and cultures should be taught 
in the schools of Alsace. It was also recognised that German 
was the written expression of the Alsatian dialects. This 
represents a significant change in policy, since, although 
German was taught in Alsatian schools, there was not a very 
positive encouragement of the Alsatian dialects themselves nor 
of the idea that German might be their written expression.
It would seem, however, that the activity of the Ministry 
of Education was less intense than that of the Ministry of 
Culture. It is, of course, easier and less politically 
dangerous to promote cultural development than to bring about 
radical changes in the administrative and educational spheres. 
The latter two are much closer to the bone of Jacobin 
sensibility than the question of regional languages which
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most political groups are prepared to support even if it only 
at the level of lip-service. We shall see below the limits 
this Jacobin sensibility has imposed on the Socialist plan for 
France's minorities. Nevertheless, it may be remarked that, 
after 10 May 1981, many of the Socialists' promises to the 
regionalists and to cultural minorities were implemented.
The regionalist demands for administrative reform were 
taken into account by the overall programme of political 
decentralization and administrative deconcentration. Corsica 
was given its Statut Particulier. Demands for the protection 
and encouragement of minority languages and cultures were, to 
some extent, met by the policy of cultural decentralization, 
based on the Giordan Report and expressed legislatively in the 
Destrade Bill, even if the latter did not have the same status 
as a Government-sponsored Bill. The Ministries of Culture and 
Education engaged in a considerable effort to put these new 
policies into effect.
THE STATUT PARTICULIER FOR CORSICA
Corsica was perceived by the Socialists as having a 
peculiar set of problems not to be found even in the other 
"ethnic" regions of France. This peculiarity derived from the 
fact of insularity. Nevertheless, the island was also seen as 
being a particular instance of a wider problem - the plight of 
regions and linguistic minorities - and it was therefore
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chosen to be test-case (a banc d'essai) for the 
decentralization reforms as a whole. What was to be tested in 
particular was the functioning of the new decentralised 
institutions.
There was obviously a certain amount of ambiguity here. 
How could Corsica be used as a test-case for a general 
phenomenon if it was a particular case? The answer to this 
problem seems to be that while the degree of the island's 
problems differed from that of the other regions such as 
Brittany and the French Basque Country (reflected in the 
higher level of political violence on the island), the nature 
of the problem is the same: how to transform peripheral 
societies from backward enclaves of economic decline and 
political clientelism to modern democratic societies.
Those who had especial responsibility for drawing up the 
Statut Particulier had an intimate knowledge of the situation. 
Gaston Defferre who, as Minister of the Interior and 
Decentralization had the task of drawing up and implementing 
the decentralization laws, was also mayor of Marseilles, a 
city with the largest Corsican population outside of Corsica. 
His right-hand man in Marseilles was Bastien Leccia, a 
Socialist Deputy of Corsican origin who, as noted in Chapter 
Seven above, was one of the leaders of the Mouvement du 29 
Novembre. Furthermore, as already noted, Charles Santoni was 
one of the important transfuqes from the radical regionalists
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to the new PS. These Corsican Socialists had been responsible, 
in 1977, for presenting the bill to the National Assembly 
which would have given to Corsica a Statut Particulier which 
was very close to the statute of autonomy demanded by the 
radical regionalists (16).
Not surprisingly, the bill did not get far in an Assembly 
dominated by the right. Nevertheless, it provided the 
inspiration for the Socialist project of 1982. The new 
Government was determined to make a radical break with the 
policies of the right-wing Governments of the past and decided 
that, in the case of Corsica, the way to do so was by a Statut 
Particulier. In fact, divisions within the PS itself and 
limitations imposed by the Conseil Constitutionnel led to a 
toning down of the 1982 version compared with that of 1977 
(17). The principal difference between the two is that, 
whereas in the original version, decisions of the Corsican 
Assembly (elected by direct suffrage) would have been binding 
on the national Government, in the updated version, the 
Assembly would have only a consultative role. In other words, 
there was a firm rejection of any drift towards a federalist 
system and a reaffirmation that political sovereignty should 
remain totally with the central Government. Nevertheless, the 
Socialist project did represent a more radical form of 
political decentralization compared with the regionalization 
attempts of their predecessors, if only in that the 
functioning of local administrative institutions, because of
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election by direct suffrage, is now to be controlled by the 
local populations. Furthermore, in the Corsican case, an 
examination of the legislative texts,and the new institutions 
which they establish, reveals a largely coherent and 
comprehensive attempt to deal with most of the elements of the 
Corsican problem.
The Socialists had to strike a balance between two 
opposed ideologies and political groupings. On the one hand, 
there were those who had been alienated from the political 
system - the regionalists of various kinds. On the other, 
there were those, perhaps the majority of Corsicans, who 
feared that any move toward political decentralization would 
lead to the separation of Corsica from France. Many local 
politicians also feared the consequences of a decentralization 
which forced political responsibility on them, accustomed as 
they were to the "irresponsibility” of patron-client 
relationships made possible by massive subsidization from the 
state. The Socialist Party, having adopted regionalist theses 
in the 1960's and 1970's, tended to sympathize with the former 
group. At the same time, they knew they could not afford to 
alienate the latter.
The Statut Particulier for Corsica reflects this desire 
to reconcile these opposing tendencies, but alsd represents a 
wish to change the system of "irresponsibility” of local 
politicians by introducing a greater measure of local
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democracy. For the Jacobins, there was the reassurance that 
the reforms were not intended to encourage any move toward 
federalism. For the regionalists, there was the setting up of 
a Regional Assembly, elected by direct suffrage, which would 
allow the local population greater control over their 
political, social, economic and cultural affairs.
In practice, however, the statute leans more toward the 
regionalists than toward the traditional Jacobins (as opposed 
to the new Jacobins of the PS). First of all, there is the 
recognition that Corsica is a special entity with 
characteristics that mark it off from the rest of France: 
"L'organisation de la région de Corse tient compte des 
spécificités de cette région résultant, notamment, de sa 
géographie et de son histoire". An entire section (Titre 1er) 
of the law of July 1982 dealt with the "identité culturelle de 
la Corse" (18). While the laws did not explicitly recognise 
the existence of an ethnie corse or a peuple corse, the 
recognition long demanded by the radical regionalists as the 
legal basis for policy-making, the emphasis on Corsica's 
specificity was at least a step in the direction of such a 
recognition. On a visit to the island in 1983, President 
Mitterrand himself used the phrase le peuple corse, which 
seems to confirm this (19). This was central to the demands of 
the radical regionalists, who had adopted the federalist idea 
that the legal basis of centre-periphery relations should be 
that of a contract between a legal person (the ethnie or
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peuple) and the state drawn up by the two partners as equals. 
In fact, the Socialists had not abandoned the Jacobin concept 
of the state as the primary and final locus of political 
sovereignty, in opposition to this federalist concept. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the awareness of the 
regionalists' position, there was a notable shift from the 
period when French Governments merely recognised "des Français 
qui habitent en Corse" to a recognition that Corsicans might 
at least have a dual identity and even that they constituted a 
distinct peuple.
The institutions created by the Statut Particulier may 
also be seen as a concession to the radical regionalists, even 
if, as we have seen, the powers granted to them were less than 
the latter hoped for. The most important of these institutions 
was the Corsican Assembly, consisting of sixty-one members 
elected by direct universal suffrage by proportional 
representation (20). The executive of the region is no longer 
the regional prefect, who becomes instead the commissaire de 
la République, but the Chairman of the Assembly and his bureau 
of vice-chairmen. This may be seen as a response to the demand 
by regionalists for greater political control over the 
regional institutions. At the same time, the specificity of 
Corsica is recognised by giving it a Regional Assembly while 
the other regions will simply have Regional Councils.
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The difference lies in more than the name as the Assembly 
will have greater powers than the Councils. Its basic function 
is to administer the economic, cultural and social affairs of 
the regions (21). It will do this principally by deciding the 
priorities of that portion of the national budget allotted to 
Corsica and then entering into a contract with the state on 
the basis of this decision. While Corsicans have, in this way, 
been given a greater control over how their island is 
administered (thanks to the system of direct elections), 
political sovereignty remains with the Government, since the 
latter may veto any proposal that the Assembly puts forward. 
The only binding power the Assembly has on the Government is 
to stop any proposed legislation of the latter which affects 
the region in order that the advice of the region may be 
given. In the end, however, the Government is not obliged to 
accept this advice. This dilution of the Assembly's powers may 
be seen as a result of that continuing Jacobinism of which we 
have spoken above (22).
Other institutions created by the Statut Particulier have 
the function of assisting the Assembly in its task of 
administering the region. These include two consultative 
councils: the conseil économique et social and the conseil de 
la culture, de l'éducation et du cadre de vie, the latter 
being unique to Corsica. The members of these councils are 
appointed in a proportion that should reflect the importance
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of the forces vives of the region (economic, social and 
cultural interest groups).
This desire to include a wide cross-section of the local 
population (and not simply local notables) may be seen as 
following the basic logic of the Socialists' reforms: the 
attempt to promote greater democracy at the local level. An 
important aspect of this is the inclusion of those who had 
been alienated in various ways from the mainstream of Corsican 
political and social life as outlined above (Chapter Eight). 
These include cultural activists who felt the Corsican culture 
had been degraded by official neglect and even hostility, 
political actors who felt they could not participate in the 
existing political system over which they could exercise 
little control, and economic groups such as trade unions and 
peasant groups which were excluded by pre-existing regional 
bodies set up during the period of right-wing Governments. 
According to the regionalist theory developed by the left, 
democracy would be promoted only by the inclusion of these 
forces vives into the political system and the processes of 
decision- making and implementation. Only in this way could 
the structural problem be solved (the corrupt system of 
patron-client relationships and economic dependency). This 
approach is also evident in the creation of bodies known as 
the Offices (economic development agencies). These may be seen 
as a response to the long-standing Corsican complaint that the 
SOMIVAC and the SETCO were controlled by non-Corsicans in the
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interests of groups foreign to the island. The establishment 
of the Offices was meant to rectify this situation by placing 
the development agencies under the control of the Regional 
Assembly and, therefore, of the local population.
These development agencies are the Office d'Equipment 
hydraulique and the Office du Développement agricole et rural, 
which replace the SOMIVAC. Both Offices have a single board 
and Art. 16 (23) stipulates that professional farmers' 
organisations should have the majority of seats on it. Art.15 
states that the Office du Développement agricole et rural must 
submit its budget proposals to the Regional Assembly, which 
may then modify them. In this way, it is hoped to avoid the 
abuses that had marked the SOMIVAC operations. Greater control 
over transport is provided by an Office des Transports, by 
means of which the Region would take over from the state 
("l'Office des Transports est substitué à l'Etat") the 
responsibility for negotiating contracts with the maritime 
companies. These contracts would define "les tarifs, les 
conditions d'exécution, et la qualité de service ainsi que 
leurs modalités de contrôle" (24). The Presidents of the 
three Offices are chosen by a vote of the Regional Assembly.
The Socialists wished in this way to promote a type of 
development which differs from that of the PAR of 1957. It is 
now agriculture which occupies the central place instead of 
tourism. However, the latter is not neglected, and an Agence
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régionale de Tourisme has also been created. In fact, there is 
a concern to promote a harmonious economic development, and 
both the decentralization laws, and the Statut Particulier, 
have created several bodies to ensure this. These include the 
Comité de Coordination pour le développement de la Corse, 
presided by the Prime Minister (art. 8); a group composed of 
mayors to draw up a Schéma d'Aménagement de la Corse (art. 9); 
a Commission mixte sur l'emploi (art. 21), the chairmanship of 
which is "alternativement assurée par un représentant de 
l'Etat et par un représentant de la Région de Corse"; a Comité 
régional de Prêts; and a Comité régional de la Communication 
audiovisuelle (art. 5) (25). Besides these bodies specific to
Corsica, the region will receive others under the general 
programme of decentralization, notably in the fields of 
education, culture and environment, housing and professional 
training (Law of 7 January 1983).
There would also be a transfer of resources and 
personnel, an administrative deconcentration corresponding to 
this political decentralization. All field services of the 
state will be grouped under the direct control of the regional 
prefect, who will then make them available to the executive of 
the Regional Assembly (26).
In summary, then, it may be argued that the Socialist 
Statut Particulier is a comprehensive attempt to deal with 
several elements of the Corsican problem. By recognizing and
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promoting the two dimensions of the Corsican identity, an 
attempt has been made to reconcile and harmonize both. The 
element of unbalanced economic development is met by setting 
up bodies whose function is to promote a more balanced 
economic and social development. By democratizing the regional 
bodies, it is hoped to eradicate the alleged political 
irresponsibility of the local politicians by thrusting 
responsibility upon them. At the same time, it is hoped that 
the input of the forces vives of the region will accelerate 
this process of modernisation. Democratization would, 
hopefully, also have the effect of reducing the degree of 
exclusion and alienation. At least this is the theory? What, 
however, happened in practice?.
The creation and functioning of the new institutions
There were two main sources from which possible 
resistance to the reforms would come: from the local 
politicians and from within the civil service (27). To 
overcome this possible resistance, the Government chose to 
move quickly (28). The main legislative texts had become law 
by mid-1982, and the first elections to the Corsican Assembly 
were held in August of the same year. This had the advantage 
of catching the opposition (the traditional French right), 
still in disarray and demoralized, unprepared, while the 
Government benefited from the prestige of its recent victory. 
On the other hand, it entailed the risk of a hasty, ill-
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prepared implementation of one of the basic planks of the 
Socialist programme.
In practice, the reforms were implemented more smoothly 
than might have been expected . The FLNC called a cease-fire 
before the Presidential elections and prolonged it as it 
waited to see the new Government's response to the Corsican 
problem. Although it finally denounced the Government's plans 
as a "new form of colonialism", and its political counterpart 
the Consulta di Cumitati naziunalisti (CCN) boycotted the 
Assembly elections in August, the cease-fire nevertheless held 
until then. Furthermore, the type of proportional 
representation adopted, with only 1.6 per cent of the vote 
being necessary to obtain at least one seat, enticed the UPC 
(autonomists) and PPC (nationalists) to present lists. Thus, 
the strategy of drawing back into the mainstream of political 
life those excluded or alienated from it, seemed to be working 
(except on the FLNC and CCN). Since the Regional Assembly is 
the key institution of the reform, it was necessary that it 
should be marked from the start as the legitimate expression 
of the political complexion of the Corsican people. For this 
reason, a special Commission was set up, to examine and purge 
the island's electoral registers, which were notorious for 
their inflated character (29). This measure was also designed 
to attract the autonomists and nationalists who had hitherto 
refused to contest elections on the grounds of their corrupt 
character.
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The Corsican regional Assembly election of 1982
Party list 
cast
Seats % of votes
RPR-UDF-Bonapartist
PCF
UPC
MRG (Haute-Corse)
UDF dissidents 
MRG (Corse-du-Sud)
PS
RPR dissidents 
Diverse Right (Gaullist) 
Ex-PS (Santoni)
PPC
Independent 
MRG dissident 
Others
19
7
7
7
6
4
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
28.0
10.8
10.6
10.3
9.6
6.7
5.4
3.1
2.7
2.4
2.1 
2.1
1.7 
2.2
Source: Le Monde 10/8/1982
The elections were marked by a high turn-out (68.84 per 
cent of registered voters cast their votes - 136,795 out of 
201,166) (30). Surprisingly for Corsica, there were no claims
of electoral irregularities. The Government was highly pleased 
with the success of the elections. Gaston Defferre later 
remarked that "les élections se sont déroulées dans le calme 
et la dignité. Pour la première fois depuis longtemps, aucune 
contestation n'a accompagné la proclamation des résultats. 
L'élection de votre Assemblée n'est entachée d'aucun soupçon 
..." (31). This view was later reiterated by President 
Mitterrand himself during a visit to the island: "Vous avez 
battu les records de participation, sans aucun contentieux
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électoral. Voici donc une Assemblée incontestable dans sa 
realité démocratique" (32).
The results of the election, however, brought only mixed 
comfort to the Government. First of all, there were numerous 
lists - 17 lists each containing 61 candidates, or 1037 
candidates for 61 seats in an electorate of roughly 201,000 
registered voters - with each major political formation, 
including the Communist Party, facing a dissident list. The 
Socialists themselves were challenged by a list led by Charles 
Santoni, who had been expelled from the party because of 
disagreement over the implementation of the Statut 
Particulier. Such a multiplicity, reminiscent of the politics 
of the Fourth Republic, held out the prospect of an unstable 
Assembly, since the formation of a majority would be more 
difficult. At first, however, the Government were more 
concerned that their strategy of wooing the autonomists paid 
off. The UPC had indeed won 7 seats and 10.6 per cent of the 
votes cast, and, since the left/right blocs did not each have 
enough seats to form a majority, the UPC found itself in a 
mediating position. It decided to ally itself with the left 
and this enabled a majority to vote for a Chairman, Prosper 
Alfonsi of the MRG, who then formed an executive (33) . The 
internal Commissions were set up, and the Assembly got under 
way (34). The first phase of the reform passed ’off, therefore, 
successfully.
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At this point, however, the hasty and ill-prepared nature 
of the reform began to have its effect and threatened to 
damage the credibility of the new institutions. For instance, 
the building that housed the Assembly was inadequate; there 
was insufficient funding for the Assembly's administrative 
staff; and complaints were heard that the Government did not 
take its own brainchild sufficiently seriously. Furthermore, 
the FLNC, unimpressed by the reforms, relaunched its campaign 
of violence and even stepped it up, causing public unease 
(35). The diminishing credibility of the Assembly and its 
inability to deal with the violence, combined with the growing 
public unease, prompted the Government to act. The Prime 
Minister, Pierre Mauroy, sent a letter reaffirming Government 
support for the reforms (36). In June 1983, President 
Mitterrand himself paid a visit to the island to bolster the 
prestige of the Assembly and to reassure all sections of the 
population. This was followed up by a visit from Gaston 
Defferre with the same purpose.
Despite this shaky beginning, the reforms were, by 1986, 
well under way and there were several indications that the new 
institutions would survive and even have a certain amount of 
success. First of all, the Assembly was in operation, and 
those initially opposed to the Statut Particulier (the local 
politicians) did not sabotage it. On the contrary, realising 
that the nature of the "transmission belt" by which resources 
are channelled from the centre to periphery had irreversibly
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changed, their aim has been to capture the most important 
places in the new system. With the help of an intermediary 
group called the interaroupe de sept (37), they managed to 
secure the posts of Chairmen of the important Offices. 
Furthermore, they voted, almost unanimously with the left, in 
favour of the the budget priorities, at 5.30 a.m. on 25 
February 1984 (38). These would form the basis of a contract 
negotiated between the Assembly and the Government. The later 
reversal of position of the right helped by the interaroupe de 
sept, which blocked the Assembly's functioning and provoked 
its dissolution by the Government, may be interpreted as a 
tactical move rather than an attack on the institution itself. 
The right-wing opposition hoped in this way to strengthen its 
position and even to win a majority in a new election (for an 
analysis of the August 1984 elections see below). But this in 
itself indicated an awareness that local politics must now be 
fought out within the new institutions. In other words, the 
Socialists had created an irreversible process to which all 
Corsican politics had to adapt.
Secondly, despite the refusal of the FLNC to accept the 
new institutions, most of those alienated from the system have 
been drawn back into it. It is significant that Edmond 
Simeoni, one of the original founders of the ARC/UPC tendency, 
and three of the founders of the FRC, Charles Santoni, 
Dominique Alfonsi and Lucien Felli, all sat as Assembly 
members in the first Assembly. The withdrawal of the UPC from
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the Assembly on 12 January 1984 was explained by the party as 
a protest against the Government's "abandonment" of the 
Assembly (39). This criticism, however, implies an acceptance 
of the new institutions. The real motive behind the withdrawal 
was more probably the fear that the UPC would lose influence 
among Corsican youth, who suspected them of having gone soft 
on the Government and the pouvoir (40). It is more likely that 
they, too, wished to use the new elections to increase their 
representation in the Assembly. Furthermore, the FLNC has 
become increasingly marginal and is now perceived by most 
Corsicans either as a threat to their fundamental conviction 
that Corsica should remain French or as being undemocratic. 
Many Corsicans who had hitherto sympathized with the group 
became ill at ease with their xenophobic campaign against the 
continentaux (Frenchmen from the mainland). This has been 
aimed mainly at schoolteachers and modest workers such as 
postmen whose "crime", in the eyes of the FLNC, was that they 
bore French names. The tiny minority support of the FLNC was 
sarcastically emphasised by Mitterrand when he remarked:
"...je ne connais pas de démocratie ou 1,6 per cent, ou plutôt 
moins, a pu faire la loi à 98,4 per cent" (41).
Thirdly, the transfer of resources and personnel took 
place more or less as planned. There was practically no 
resistance from within the civil service. The Government was 
astute enough to choose Corsican civil servants who desired to 
return to their home island to take charge of the different
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field services. Prefects who enthusiastically supported the 
decentralization reforms were appointed. Thus, an irreversible 
dynamic was created which must ensure at least the survival 
and probably the success of the new institutions.
Finally, the Assembly began to act as a forum in which 
divisions and grievances on the part of the Corsican 
population could be expressed and fought out (42). If politics 
is war by another name, then it is possible that the endemic 
violence which has plagued Corsican society may be acted out 
in a symbolic manner within the Assembly.
The August 1984 Regional Assembly Elections (43)
These tendencies were confirmed by the elections, held in 
August 1984, which followed the dissolution of the first 
Assembly. As has been noted above, this dissolution was 
provoked by the right in the hope of strengthening their 
position in the new Assembly rather than an attack on the 
institutions as such. Indeed, it was the confirmation of their 
acceptance of these institutions. The Government wished to 
prevent a recurrence of the situation in the first Assembly 
when small groups were able to impose their will and create a 
situation of instability. Accordingly, following a 
recommendation from the Senate, they increased' the threshold 
necessary for a list to obtain a seat from 1.6 per cent to 5 
per cent. This higher barrier had the effect of forcing groups
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to coalesce before the elections and not after them. Whereas 
in the 1982 elections there were seventeen lists, in these 
elections there were only ten.
Regional Assembly Elections of August 1984
Registered 203,366
Voting 139,439
Abstentions 31.43%
Total votes 136,944
seats
Union of the 
Opposition (1) 19
MRG (2) 9
MRG-PS (3) 9
PCF (4) 7
FN (5) 6
CNIP (6) 5
MCA (7) 3
UPC (8) 3
Several parties (9) 
MCS-PPS (10)
votes % of votes cast
39,953 29.17
19,405 14.17
18,899 13.80
16,.77 11.73
12,631 9.22
10,781 7.87
7,161 5.22
7,146 5.21
3,568 2.60
1,323 0.96
(1) Union of the Opposition, RPR,UDF, Bonapartists, 
Independents: Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra, Deputy RPR.
(2) MRG of Upper Corsica: François Giacobbi, Senator.
(3) MRG of S. Corsica and PS: Nicolas Alfonsi, Deputy.
(4) PCF: D. Bucchini, mayor of Sartène.
(5) FN: P. Arrighi.
(6) CNIP and RPR dissidents: J. Chiarelli.
(7) MCA, Corsican Movement for Self-determination: P. 
Poggioli.
(8) UPC, Union of the Corsican People: Max Simeoni.
(9) Several Parties: Denis de Rocca-Serra.
(10) MCS-PPC, Corsican Movement for Socialism-Corsican 
People's Party: Charles Santoni.
Source: Le Monde. 14/8/1984
What is perhaps most significant about these elections 
from the point of view of this thesis is that the new 
institutions were an attempt to draw back into the political
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process those who had been alienated from it. Of significance 
here was the fact that the extreme nationalists of the 
FLNC/MCA tendency presented a list (after the FLNC resumed its 
bombing campaign, the CCN was banned but changed its name to 
the Muvimentu Corsu di Autodeterminazione - MCA) . Now, not 
only the traditional right-wing opposition accepted and 
participated in the new institutions, but the extreme 
nationalists too. The latter still did not accept the 
institutions as the embodiment of their political aspirations. 
On the contrary, they advocated a completely independent 
Corsica. Nevertheless, the institutions had become a central 
focus of the island's political life and the nationalists were 
forced to recognise this and try to influence their 
functioning. In fact, the nationalists' list obtained 3 seats 
with 5.22 per cent of the votes cast by biting into the 
support, of the UPC which dropped to 5.21 per cent. The latter 
suffered from the illness of their charismatic leader Edmond 
Simeoni but the principal reason for its loss of votes was 
indeed what they had feared: a significant portion of the 
nationalist supporters, especially the younger ones, who had 
given them their support withdrew it because of their alleged 
compromise with the Socialists. Nevertheless, the nationalists 
took their seats in the new Assembly and, furthermore, 
participated in its functioning.
The other notable feature of the 1984 elections was the 
success of the neo-Fascist National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen
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in winning six seats on a list led by Pascal Arrighi (who had 
been a Gaullist politician and had led the attempted coup of 
Ajaccio in 1958). This frustrated the designs of the 
traditional right (RPR and UDF) of winning a clear majority in 
the new Assembly, and they were forced to form a coalition 
with the extreme right in order to capture the Chairmanship 
and, therefore, the executive of the Assembly. What is 
interesting in this situation is that for the first time in 
Corsican history, all the political tendencies on the island 
from the extreme nationalists to the extreme right were now 
represented in one Assembly. While the right used their 
position to try to frustrate the nationalists (for example in 
refusing to vote the funding to the local university which was 
accused of being a nationalist hotbed) at least there wafe now 
the possibility that if the left win power again, perhaps with 
the help of the autonomists or nationalists these positions 
could be reversed. In other words, the political conflicts of 
the island are now being fought out within the new 
institutions.
Prospects for the future
So far in this Chapter we have tended to take the most 
optimistic view of the Statut Particulier and its potential 
for resolving the Corsican problem. This is because there are 
real grounds for such optimism and, by 1986, the signs so far 
pointed to the continuing survival of the institutions and the
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possibility that in the long term they would contribute to 
changing and modernizing political behaviour on the island.
The Regional Assembly could be seen as having a pedagogic 
function, teaching the local politicians how to behave in a 
more principled manner than had hitherto been their custom. 
This may be achieved by the accountability forced on them by 
the fact that their performance is now subject to the sanction 
of the local population because of direct elections. 
Furthermore, the old clan system is in the process of breaking 
down as new political forces (such as the left, the 
autonomists and nationalists, and some modernizing sections of 
the traditional right) are given the possibility of exercising 
power within the Region. At least, these are the possibilities 
that the new institutions open for the future.
Nevertheless, other commentators, such as Professor Yves 
Mény, have taken a less optimistic and even a sceptical view 
with regard to the entire decentralization reforms seeing in 
them another example of "plus ça change, plus c'est la même 
chose". While such authors are right to emphasize the 
continuity with previous decentralization programmes, they 
seem to underestimate the very real changes that have taken 
place, in particular the change which allows regional bodies 
to be elected by universal suffrage. The disappointment of 
authors such as Michel Crozier (44) may result' from too short­
sighted a view of the political process and while Crozier is 
right that "on ne change pas la société par décret", the
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"content'1 (that is local politics) must change as the 
"context" (the new institutions) changes. This change, 
however, will take place only in the long term.
Despite this, the critics are correct to point out 
certain failings of the reforms. For example, in the case of 
Corsica there are now too many institutions (45). Besides the 
Regional Assembly and its accompanying institutions, there 
remain the institutions of the island's two départements. This 
has led to a certain amount of confusion and overlapping with 
regard to their functions and powers. In fact, this is an 
instance of what is perhaps the most serious ambiguity of the 
entire decentralization reforms: the failure to make a clear 
choice between a decentralization based on the département or 
one based on the region, it being generally recognised that 
the two levels of local Government are compatible only with 
difficulty.
This does not detract from the fact that the Statut 
Particulier does represent a courageous and far-sighted 
attempt (perhaps the first such attempt in Corsican history) 
to tackle the Corsican problem in a democratic manner. 
Paradoxically, the Government has had to force the majority of 
the local population to accept the responsibility of running 
their own affairs. This is an interesting example of the 
Rousseauesque problem of whether one can force people to be 
free. The success or failure of the reform depends, then, on
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two groups of actors: on the islanders themselves and on the 
Government. The former must learn a new set of political 
habits. The latter have already gone a long way by providing 
the institutional context within which this take place. 
However, they must continue to provide financial, technical 
and political support until the island has developed 
sufficiently to provide largely for itself. This will never be 
totally possible but at least Corsicans might live in a more 
dignified manner than ever before.
THE LIMITS AND LIMITATIONS OF SOCIALIST DECENTRALIZATION
Despite these measures, however, there was not been a 
complete implementation of the Socialists7 pre-election 
promises. This failure concerns particularly those parts of 
the reforms under the control of the Ministers of the Interior 
and Decentralization (Defferre) and Education (Savary), that 
is the administrative and educational aspects. First, while 
Corsica received a Statut Particulier. this is a considerably 
diluted version of the original 1977 Bill. To give the 
Corsican Assembly the powers originally envisaged would have 
required a change in the Constitution and would have meant, 
basically, that France would become a federal state. Here, we 
have the clue to the Socialists' apparent inconsistencies and 
refusal to implement parts of its pre-election programme. It 
is the continuing allegiance to the Jacobin concept of the one 
and indivisible Republic and the refusal of federalism,
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repeated by Gaston Defferre both inside Parliament and outside 
it, that has imposed limitations on the policies they are 
prepared to accept. Further limitations were imposed by the 
Constitutional Council and by the Senate (46). In fact, the 
Defferre Bill was given an easy ride through the Senate 
because its provisions were based on a previous Bill (drawn up 
by the same expert under Giscard d'Estaing) which had already 
been examined and approved by the Senate. Such a Bill would 
not have infringed the sacred canons of Jacobin ideology.
The dilution of the powers of the Corsican Assembly, 
reduced to a consultative status, is one example of this.
But to give to Corsica a special statute in the first place 
was based on the fear that alienation in Corsica (expressed by 
the FLNC bombing campaign) had reached such a point that the 
attachment of the island to France was seriously threatened 
(even if such a fear seems to have been highly exaggerated).
In other regions, this fear was less because there were less 
serious attempts to call into question the attachment of the 
region to the Republic. The refusal of Gaston Defferre to 
create a single Basque department was based on the fear that 
this would encourage separatism, given the violent situation 
on the Spanish side of the border and the presence of large 
numbers of ETA refugees on the French side (47). Defferre also 
had to take into account the opposition of local right-wing 
politicians.
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One interpretation of the Jacobin notion of nationhood is 
that the individual's personality can develop only within the 
wider context of French culture. In other words, the minority 
languages and cultures', by themselves, are insufficient to 
bring about this development. It is this underlying idea 
that may explain the apparently inconsistent behaviour of the 
Minister of Education, Alain Savary, and the limits he imposed 
on the teaching of minority languages. Despite his promise 
that they would have a "droit de cité" from the "maternelle à 
l'université" he showed himself very reluctant to allow this 
to happen. Thus, the right to grant a licence d'études 
bretonnes was given to the University of Rennes only after 
being first refused and then conceded under pressure from 
Breton cultural groups and the university itself. There is 
still no maîtrise de langue bretonne, nor will there be a 
licence d'études basques. The University of Corte in Corsica, 
however, is empowered to grant both the licence and maîtrise 
of Corsican studies. At the level of secondary education no 
new teachers would be trained to teach the minority languages. 
Finally, the state would not take into its charge the nursery 
schools which had been set up and run by the cultural 
associations on a voluntary basis: the Basque ikastolak and 
the Breton diwan.for example. The Minister's response to 
those who protested against these limitations was: "Oui au 
respect des particularismes régionaux. Non au ghetto" (48). In 
other words, there remained the fear that too much 
encouragement might threaten the Jacobin concept of education.
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Nevertheless, the Minister later relented on some points, such 
as on the question of the nursery schools, but not on others. 
These tensions that are evident in the Education Minister's 
positions reveal, perhaps, a deeper tension between the 
regionalists' appeal to ethnic roots and the universalistic 
tendencies of the left.
These, then, are the principal reforms with regard to the 
regions and the problem of cultural and linguistic minorities. 
They may be described as a democratic Jacobinism. The right, 
predictably, condemned the reforms as posing a threat to the 
French language and even to the unity of the French nation.
Le Fiaaro. in its response to the Giordan Report, cried: 
"Alarmant. C'est la langue française qui est aujourd'hui en 
danger, attaquée de l'intérieur même du pays" (49). The 
Quotidien de Paris, made the same charge: "...c'est surtout la 
langue française ... qui est en question" (50). A former
Senator, J. Debu-Bridel, went so far as to claim that "... le
régionalisme est le père de 1'autonomisme qui risque 
finalement d'engendrer le séparatisme" (51). Such positions 
have, honestly or dishonestly, refused to recognise the 
Jacobin dimension of the Socialist project which has been 
described above. The right, however, later became a "convert" 
to the reforms, realising that an irreversible process was 
taking place, and it was concerned to capture the most 
important positions within the new system (52). It was the
local politicians of the opposition who were the most
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vociferous in calling for elections to the yet to be 
established Regional Councils. They realised that these might 
provide them with another "front" from which to attack the 
Socialist Government. The latter, not surprisingly, was 
reluctant to h.Id these elections, and these took place only 
in 1986 (the results have not been included in this thesis).
The Socialists, however, might have expected the right to 
behave in this manner. They were more concerned that their 
project be accepted by the forces vives of the regions, that 
is by those popular forces which had been alienated from the 
mainstream of political and economic life and whom they 
considered to have the greatest potential for democratically 
reforming regional life. According to the Socialists, the 
regionalists represented one of the most important elements of 
these forces vives and their aim was to reintegrate them into 
the French polity. The regionalists themselves, however, have 
not always understood the dialectic of unity through diversity 
which lay at the heart of the Socialist project. Some 
Bretons, Basques, Savoyards and others asked why it was 
Corsica and not their regions which received a Statut 
Particulier. I’here was resentment that the Basques were not 
given a single department, and the Bretons were perplexed as 
to why the Socialists did not grant them their long-standing 
request for a unified Breton region. The refusal to give more 
educational support infuriated the cultural activists.
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The most important consequence of the Socialist approach, 
which granted a great deal but imposed limitations, has been 
to divide the regionalist movements into those willing to 
cooperate and those who remain purs et durs. The UPC, for 
example, belongs to the first category and presented lists in 
the two elections to the Corsican Assembly in 1982 and 1984. 
The Breton UDB maintained its basic position of cooperation 
with the parties of the French left. Since groups such as the 
UPC and UDB represent the majority tendencies within the 
regionalist movements it would seem that the Socialist 
strategy of drawing back into the fold those who had become 
alienated from it was largely successful.
Nevertheless, there has been a further process of 
radicalization, as the purs et durs elements of the 
nationalist movements have rejected the Socialist reforms.
This has had important consequences within the movements 
themselves. First, several new nationalist movements have 
appeared, putting pressure on the longer established ones. In 
Corsica, for example, the ALNC (Armée de libération nationale 
de la Corse) inspired by the Irish INLA, and the BRC 
(Brigandes Révolutionnaires Corses), inspired by the Italian 
Red Brigades, appeared alongside the FLNC. The two new groups 
put pressure on the latter forcing it to adopt a hard-line 
position towards the Socialist Government. It did so by 
carrying out several bombings thus entering into direct 
competition with the more established FLNC. As a result, the
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latter stepped up its activities both in their number and 
their nature. In 1983 and 1984, several assassinations were 
carried out by the organisation as well as a xenophobic 
campaign of violence against continentaux. Similar trends 
could be observed in Brittany and the French Basque Country.
A split occurr -d in the UDB with the expulsion of hard-liners 
who wished to end the policy of cooperation with the 
Socialists. New nationalist movements have appeared and there 
has been a resurgence, albeit on a small scale, of F LB (Front 
de Libération de la Bretagne) violent activity. In the Basque 
Country, too, new nationalist movements have appeared and 
violence has increased with the activities of Ipparetarak 
("those of ETA of the North"). The latter group has killed two 
policemen and carried out several attacks on tourists.
Despite this hardening of attitudes and actions and the
increase of police repression against these groups, it is
unlikely that the Socialist plan will be seriously
threatened by them. It could be argued that the radicalization
is this time related to the weakness of the movements. First,
the movements have lost their more moderate and, perhaps, more
intelligent, members many of whom have been appalled by the
xenophobia and excesses of the hard-liners. There is a
feeling on the part of left-wing sympathizers that the
0radicals have swung too far to the right in their political 
positions and forms of activity. There has also been a loss of 
support from sections of the traditional left such as the
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Socialists and Communists and trade-union and humanitarian 
organisations who supported the reforms and rejected the use 
of violence. Prior to May 1981, these groups had also 
condemned violence but were more "understanding" towards its 
practitioners, blaming the policies of Giscard and his 
predecessors as being its root cause. They also gave support 
to the political prisoners from the regionalist movements. Now 
this has stopped. In Corsica, for example, the left has 
formed the MCD (Mouvement Corse Démocratique) to mobilize the 
population against political violence. In fact, the population 
had already been mobilized by the right under the umbrella of 
the CFR (Corse Française et Républicaine). The success of 
these mobilizations illustrates a ras-le-bol reaction on the 
part of the local population toward the activities of the 
FLNC. The lack of support for the FLNC is shown by the low 
score of the MCA (Muvimentu Corsu de l'Autodeterminazione), a 
legal movement close to the former, who gained just above 5 
per cent in the Regional Assembly elections of August 1984
(53).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it may be said that the Socialist 
decentralization reforms represent a significant change in the 
way in which French Governments have dealt with the regional 
problem and the problem of cultural and linguistic minorities. 
It could be argued that the reforms meet the demands of
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administrative decentralization more than those of the ethnic 
minorities. This is true, but it should be kept in mind that 
in Socialist ideology these form a single problematic the 
parts of which cannot be separated. It is, therefore, thought 
that by tackling problems of administrative reform, the 
framework would be created in which a solution might be found 
to the other problems raised by the forces represented in the 
new social movements. Such a framework would facilitate a 
process of change based on democratic participation by the 
forces vives of the country, impossible because of previous 
exploitation by the right-wing Governments of the past. The 
reform is based on the dialectic of unity through diversity 
and seeks to bring about a form of cultural democracy. It was 
implemented with a great deal of fidelity to the original 
promises although these were modified when it was felt that 
the unity of the French nation might suffer. In other words, 
to answer the question posed by Mark Kesselman (54), what we 
have is not the end of Jacobinism, but a new kind of 
Jacobinism based on respect for cultural and linguistic 
diversity. Finally, the reforms have introduced a real change 
in the nature of local politics, including the nature of the 
regionalist movements themselves. The latter have been 
radicalized, violence has increased, but now there exists a 
real possibility for the re-insertion of the more moderate 
elements, who represent the majority, into the mainstream of 
political life.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to analyse the roots of 
contemporary regionalism and ethnic nationalism in France, 
using Corsica as a case-study. To do so, it has first 
attempted to build a conceptual framework applicable to the 
French case. Second, it has used this framework to analyse the 
phenomenon as it is found in Corsica. Section One (Chapters 
One and Two) contains the theoretical work. Sections Two 
(Chapters Three, Four and Five) and Three (Six, Seven and 
Eight) forms the case-study. An epilogue dealing with the 
Socialist regional reforms has been included.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Section One was an attempt to find the correct conceptual 
framework for studying the French cases of regionalism and 
ethnic nationalism. In Chapter One it was found that, since 
the thesis is concerned with the political analysis of these 
phenomena, the correct empirical framework should be the 
French nation-state. Other possibilities, such as the problem 
of "islands" or a "Mediterranean" framework, or "new social 
movements", appropriate to other disciplines such as 
geography, anthropology and sociology, were rejected. An 
important question was whether the Corsican case is unique - 
an aberration within the French system - or whether it is an 
instance of wider phenomenon within the system. To help answer
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this question, a brief comparative analysis of regionalist and 
ethnic nationalist movements in France was undertaken.
The analysis indicated that the regionalist phenomenon 
had, indeed, appeared in several parts of France. But it also 
became clear that the phenomenon was characterised by great 
diversity: in the kinds of movements, and in the degree of 
strength they have obtained within the regions. Interestingly, 
some regions, such as Alsace and Flanders, which had known 
strong autonomist movements in the inter-war period, and where 
one might have expected similar movements at the present day, 
have been relatively quiescent. In other regions, such as 
Brittany, Corsica and the French Basque Country, there has 
been a wide range of movements using different kinds of 
tactics to achieve a variety of demands. In their different 
ways, all of these movements succeeded in putting the problems 
of their regions high on governmental agendas.
The analysis allowed us to make an important distinction 
between (i) moderate regionalism and (ii) radical regionalism. 
The former is characterised by its Jacobin orientation: it 
bases its demands precisely on the fact that the region forms 
part of the French Republic and should be treated on a basis 
of equality with the rest of France. The latter, on the 
contrary, is anti-Jacobin in orientation: it calls the 
traditional administrative and political relationships between 
the French state and the region into question. Both moderate
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and radical regionalism have right- and left-wing tendencies. 
Radical regionalism, in turn, can be further divided into 
autonomists who seek a simple modification of the existing 
relationships between their region and France and separatists 
who seek to leave the French polity. A further distinction 
concerns the tactics employed: moderate regionalists in 
general have eschewed the use of violence and have usually 
combined parliamentary lobbying with mass mobilization. Some 
left-wing radicals, such as the FRC in Corsica and the UDB in 
Brittany, have been willing to co-operate with left-wing 
national parties such as the PCF, PS and especially the PSU. 
The right-wing radicals, on the other hand, have adopted more 
nationalist positions and seek to go it alone, often refusing 
to cooperate with French national parties because they are 
French and, therefore, instruments of French centralization. 
Finally, both right and left-wing radicals divide into those 
who use violence and those who adopt non-violent tactics.
Several questions which are important for political 
science were raised as a result of this comparative analysis. 
The first is why an allegedly unitary state such as France, 
the "one and indivisible Republic", has witnessed the 
emergence of certain centrifugal tendencies. Other questions 
were why these tendencies arose in some areas and not in 
others and, related to this, why they were stronger in some 
than they were in others. A further question concerned the 
actual nature of the movements: what were their ideological
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orientations, their socio-economic bases, their successes or 
failures in influencing Government policy. A final question 
was how French Governments have responded to these movements 
some of which often challenged the very legitimacy of the 
state itself.
Theoretical models
In order to answer these questions, a theoretical model 
was found to be necessary. This was constructed in Chapter 
Two, after a critical and eclectic adoption of elements of 
several existing models. These models were placed in one of 
two general categories: (i) the "academic"; and (ii) what may 
be called the "militant". Those in the first type are so- 
called because they are developed by scholars who are not 
politically involved in the movements they study. Those in the 
second are developed by those who are so involved. Of course, 
university professors may also be militants and, therefore, 
there may be some over-lapping between them.
One of the most important of the academic models is that 
developed by Rokkan and Urwin. These authors attempted to 
chart the macro-historical dimension of the problem by 
relating to long-term developments in nation- and state- 
building. Any particular instance of regional or ethnic 
diversity may be positioned on a "conceptual map". This 
approach is valuable in as much as it accustoms us to seeing
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the problem in its historical context. It is also useful in 
drawing attention to different kinds of centre and different 
kinds of periphery and to the differing roles played by elites 
in each. Its disadvantage is that it is inadequate for 
examining particular cases such as those of Corsica or other 
French regions and for the examination of particular 
historical periods such as the post-war period in Western 
Europe. This is principally because of the "macro'1 scale 
adopted which is incapable of grasping the complexity and 
nuances of particular cases.
Similar remarks might be made about another "macro" 
approach: the uneven development thesis of Ernest Gellner.
This adopts the same long-term perspective as the above but 
whereas Rokkan and Urwin emphasize super-structures (nations, 
states, institutions) it stresses infra-structural economic 
developments. Once again, such a macro-historical approach is 
valuable: it reminds us of the fact that capitalism did not 
develop evenly in a diffusionist manner.On the contrary, it 
developed unevenly, affecting different regions in different 
ways. This uneven development led to serious under-development 
of regions within nation-states that may themselves be highly 
developed. Several factors, such as the improvement of the 
means of communication, made the under-developed regions more 
aware of their disadvantaged position in relation to the 
developed centres and they began to demand equality with them. 
However, a study of the political significance of the
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movements seeking to represent the interests of these regions 
demands closer attention to more specific factors. These 
include the system of public administration at the local level 
and the policies of particular Governments toward the regions. 
The uneven development approach, however, provides the 
indispensable background to this more detailed analysis.
Another approach, adopted by L.J. Sharpe, attempts to 
make the analysis more concrete by looking at "decentralizing 
trends'* in Western Europe. This postulates the idea that the 
political salience of "ethnicity" in recent times is part of a 
wider trend toward decentralization, which is characteristic 
of the modern state in the contemporary period. This is seen 
as contradicting the assumptions of both Marxism and 
Liberalism that a homogeneous nation-state would eliminate 
societal particularities. It also contradicts the assumption 
of European "integrationists" such as Karl Deutsch that 
various kinds of transactions would bring about a united 
Europe itself characterised by homogeneity. Some of Sharpe's 
insights relating to ethnic nationalism such as the idea that 
"ethnicity" may be a form of "psychic income" for the members 
of an oppressed ethnic group, are valuable. What is more 
dubious is the idea that regionalism and ethnic nationalism 
may be seen simply as instances of a phenomenon called 
"decentralizing trends". Rather, it would be truer to say that 
they are political phenomena in a distinct category which may 
link up to the wider tendencies and adapt these to their own
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needs. One important reason for this is that such regionalism 
and ethnic nationalism existed prior to the appearance of 
these decentralizing trends and, therefore, cannot simply be 
identified with them.
The same remark might be made about the approach, 
advocated by Alain Touraine, which places regionalist and 
ethnic nationalist movements within a general category called 
"new social movements". This is connected with the idea that 
capitalism itself is in rapid transformation and, therefore, 
that the old movements are less relevant. The "new social 
movements" (ecologists, feminists, New Left, regionalists) are 
expressions of these changes. But, in fact, some of these 
movements, such as the regionalists, are often "old social 
movements" which, after a period of being discredited because 
of the collaboration activities of some of their members, 
became politically creditable again. They recovered their 
credibility by being part of larger coalitions led by more 
"legitimate" notables and by adopting "progressive" political 
philosophies such as federalism and europeanism. In other 
words, the "new" social movements are often, in reality, old 
movements with a new political veneer. However, Touraine's 
thesis is valuable in so far as it points to the wider socio­
economic transformations in the contemporary period which are 
the context in which these movements have been given a new 
lease of life.
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Another important theory, proposed by A.D. Smith, is that 
ethnic nationalism is simply a sub-category of a wider 
phenomenon called "nationalism". This may be placed somewhere 
between the academic and militant approaches. It is based on 
the idea that there exists a typology of nations and 
nationalisms. A key assumption in this approach seems to be 
that there exist nations with states and nations without 
states. "Ethnic nationalism" falls into the latter category. 
The militant version of this theory postulates the 
prescriptive notion that such nations should have states. The 
merit of this approach is that it reminds us that the idea of 
"nation" itself is a complex one. But an important criticism 
that may be made against it is that it sometimes begs the 
question it ought to answer: it assumes the existence of 
"nations" in the modern sense of the word when this may be no 
more than a mobilizing project in the minds of nationalist 
militants. In the French case it is doubtful whether there 
exist several micro-nations crushed by an imperialistic 
Jacobin nation-state. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the 
existence of groups differentiated by ethnic characteristics 
such as language or customs is itself a sufficient 
justification for them having their own state.
A similar approach to the theory of ethnic nationalism is 
the theory of "ethnicity" of Guy Héraud, a leading exponent of 
the branch of federalism known as fédéralisme intégral. The 
basic idea in this approach is that the modern nation-state,
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based on an individualistic concept of liberal democracy, has, 
by a process of excessive centralization, crushed more 
"natural” human communities called ethnic groups. These groups 
are characterised by having their own language, culture and 
history. Federalists such as Heraud advocate the superseding 
of the nation-state by a dialectical movement: by promoting 
European integration along federalist lines through a "return 
to the sources", that is, by a radical regionalism. Heraud 
advocates the creation of what he calls a "Europe des 
ethnies".
Another model falling between the academic and militant 
stools is the theory of "internal colonialism", which is 
partly an application of the theory of uneven development 
thesis. The principal exponents of this are Robert Lafont, who 
applies it to France, and Michael Hechter, who applies it to 
the Celtic fringe of the British Isles. Eleonor Koffman has 
tried to apply it to the Corsican case. This theory draws on 
the Marxist theories of uneven development and unequal 
exchange and seems to make the same assumptions as the theory 
of ethnic nationalism: that there exist groups of "nations" 
submerged by the modern nation-state. In turn, the theory has 
been used as a mobilizing tool by contemporary militants who 
wished to give a more "progressive" or "socialist" veneer to a 
regionalism which had been identified with the political 
philosophy of the right. This approach is valuable in so far 
as it has drawn attention to and analysed structural
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relationships of economic dependency between centre and 
periphery and related cultural and political developments to 
these. It is this concern with the structural and economic 
dimensions of the problem that should be retained.
In general, these different models have made a valuable 
contribution to the study of regionalism, centre-periphery 
relations and wider questions such as state- and nation- 
building. They have drawn attention to an important feature of 
nation-states which tends to be forgotten by the official 
ideologies of these states: the existence of distinct peoples, 
characterised by cultures, histories, social habits and 
sometimes languages different from those of the dominant 
culture. They also point to the mythological character of the 
"nation” and the sometimes artificial juxtaposition of 
"nation" with "state". The "nation" is often not "one and 
indivisible" but many and divided.
Where they might be criticised is in their assumption 
that such potential nations are actually nations. It is true 
that a distinction may be made between nation understood 
simply as the group into which one is born (the mediaeval 
notion) and nation in its modern sense (dating from the French 
Revolution) of a voluntary association of free citizens, 
assuming that the latter is also ”one and indivisible" and 
should have its own state. This justifies, to some extent, 
the distinct terminology used by regionalists such as the
- 336 -
distinctions between primary nations and secondary nations, or 
nation and nationality, or ethnic nationalism, national 
minority. But, the militants and academics sympathetic to 
their cause often confuse the two: they take the second, 
Jacobin notion, which they criticise, and simply apply it to 
their own group. A consequence of this, which sometimes 
distorts their analysis, is that their own "nation" is already 
"one and indivisible" and, indeed, that this is one of the 
marks of nation-hood. The analysis contained in this thesis 
illustrates, on the contrary, that such sub-national groups 
are as divided internally as the dominant nation which is 
criticised. Furthermore, if the second meaning of nation is 
accepted, then it must be recognised that,at least in the 
French case, the majority of the populations in the regions 
voluntarily identify with the dominant French nation and do 
not think of themselves as constituting distinct nations. 
Finally, another criticism that may be levelled at the 
regionalists and their sympathizers is that they assume that 
the regions and the state are unitary actors. The problem is 
often presented as struggles between the "Corsicans",
"Bretons", "Irish" against the "French" or the "French state" 
or against the "British" or "British imperialism". This thesis 
has attempted to show that, on the contrary, there exists a 
great internal diversity which has given rise to distinct 
forms of regionalism and regionalist movements which have 
different ideologies, tactics, degrees of popular support and 
varying influence over Government policy. Furthermore, there
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is an almost equally great diversity on the part of 
governmental responses to the regional question.
A two-dimensional model
In this thesis an attempt has been made to develop an 
alternative model which retains some of the elements in the 
existing models but combines other approaches not hitherto 
used much in studies of regional conflict. These approaches 
are the theory of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and 
Marxist geography.
A macro-historical approach is used but confined to the 
French case. First the long-term process of nation-building by 
a centralizing French state was examined. It was found that, 
while the building of the French nation was largely completed, 
the ancient sub-stratum of peoples remained to some extent. 
These survived as traditional societies with cultural 
characteristics different from the dominant society. It was 
the survival of these societies which created ambiguous 
situations leading to the existence of dual identities: French 
and the identity of the specific region. This created an 
"ideological space" which those opposed to central government 
policy could attempt to fill.
The second factor relevant to France was the break-up of 
these traditional societies by more or less rapid economic and
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social changes. This was the catalyst which often sparked off 
the regionalist movements. Such movements occurred in periods 
of social and economic stress as at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the inter-war period, and the period following World 
War II. However, it is in this last period that the movements 
have managed to garner more widespread support than ever 
before. To explain this it is necessary to analyse several 
factors specific to this period: the important economic 
changes in France since the Second World War? Government 
regional policies? the growth in trends such as "new social 
movements", and decentralization.
The model constructed here attempts to provide a 
framework useful for describing and explaining these 
movements. The vertical dimension of the model, with concepts 
drawn from the IGR approach, allows us to explain the way in 
which such societies have survived. Central to this 
understanding is the notion of mediation between the local 
society and the state. In this process of mediation local 
notables. elected politicians and administrators establish a 
network of relationships, based on mutual self-interest, 
cemented by the phenomenon of complicity. This served to 
integrate the local society into the dominant one. But it also 
protected it from complete assimilation by the centre: that 
is, it also maintained differentiation. The regionalist 
movements may then be analysed in relation to this system of 
mediation.
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The horizontal dimension of the model draws on concepts 
from Marxist geography such as economic territorialization.
It may also be seen as a variation of the uneven development 
thesis. It helps us to situate the regionalist movements in 
their socio-economic context, both internally and in the 
relation between the region and the rest of the society. It 
also provides an important element in an analysis which 
stresses the importance of socio-economic changes as factors 
of differentiation-cum-assimilation. Such changes have often 
been the catalysts sparking off regionalist protests. Finally, 
traditional societies have broken up principally as a result 
of such changes taking place in a rapid manner.
This two-dimensional model is useful for several reasons. 
Its vertical dimension allows us to analyse the factors of 
assimilation-cum-differentiation in a state with a Jacobin 
tradition. It does so by drawing attention to various factors
- institutional, economic, political - which contributed to 
the ambiguity of centre-periphery relations. However, this in 
itself is not sufficient to account for the complexity of the 
phenomenon: the diversity of the movements and their 
relationship with the local society. The horizontal dimension 
allows us to do this by analysing the movements in relation to 
the socio-economic background. Although this model has been 
developed to analyse the phenomenon of regional conflict in 
France it may be sufficiently wide to be of use in examining
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federal systems such as Canada or quasi-federal systems such 
as the United Kingdom. In fact, the IGR approach has been 
applied to both kinds of system. At the same time, it is 
sufficiently narrow to allow for both a middle-level analysis
- the system of public administration at the local level - and 
a micro-analysis of individual movements.
THE APPLICATION OF THE MODEL: A CASE-STUDY OF CORSICA
The results of the case-study of Corsica may be found in 
Sections Two and Three. Section Three (Chapters Three, Four 
and Five) explored the phenomenon of ambiguity in the 
Corsican-French relations. Chapter Three showed how 
institutions, which had been developed to promote assimilation 
both encouraged a voluntary identification with France and 
served to protect certain characteristics of the local 
culture. In particular, it was seen how a peculiarly Corsican 
expression of the French political system came about. Chapter 
Four showed how economic developments on the mainland, which 
produced situations either of benign neglect or of 
encouragement of local development on the part of the central 
Government, had the effect of encouraging a sense of 
specificity. The most important development here was the 
adoption of the Plan d'Action Régionale in the 1950's by the 
Governments of the Fourth Republic. This raised the 
expectations of Corsicans and made them feel that they were at 
least being treated as fully Frenchmen. However, these
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expectations were dashed with the arrival of De Gaulle and the 
Fifth Republic. Chapter Five illustrates the phenomenon of 
"assimilation-cum-differentiation" with regard to political 
statements about the island made from the centre. Corsicans 
felt themselves to be, and were encouraged to feel, super- 
francais. Paradoxically, it was this intensity of feeling 
which differentiated Corsicans from other Frenchmen. However, 
many statements from the centre emphasised ways in which 
Corsicans were not French. The conclusion arrived at in 
Section Two is that Corsica-French relations were ambiguous: a 
strong voluntary identification combined with a sense of 
economic, cultural, political and social differentiation to 
produce a dual identity; Corsicans are both French and 
Corsican.
Section Four (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) looked at 
the problem from the point of view of the islanders. Chapter 
Six analysed the horizontal dimension of the model: the 
historical and socio-economic context within which the 
movements took place. From the political view-point, the most 
important feature of this society is the system of mediation 
between the local society and the state known as the clan 
system, the socio-economic roots of which are analysed in this 
Chapter. Chapters Seven and Eight analyse the different forms 
of regionalist movements in relation to this system of 
mediation and socio-economic context.
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Chapter Seven examined the phenomenon of moderate 
regionalism. This form of regionalism emphasised the French 
dimension of the Corsican identity. It based its demands on 
the idea that Corsica is French and is, therefore, entitled to 
the same treatment as the rest of France. The principal 
demands of this form of regionalism were concerned to promote 
closer relations between Corsica and France. They may be 
summed up in the notion of territorial continuity. Moderate 
regionalism also demanded that the French state assist the 
region to overcome its natural or artificial handicaps. It did 
not call into question the traditional administrative 
structures between the local society and the state such as the 
departmental system. Some of its exponents, however, favoured 
the creation of regional assemblies, although they would have 
opposed powers which would have made France a federal state.
However, the analysis of moderate regionalism showed it 
to be a wide coalition of forces which included radical 
regionalists who did call into question these traditional 
structures. These are analysed in Chapter Eight. But radical 
regionalism itself consisted of a variety of movements 
characterised by distinct ideologies and tactics. These were: 
the right-wing and left-wing tendencies; autonomists and 
separatists; those who used occasional violence, those who 
used continual violence, and those who were non-violent.
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Section Four analysed the movements in relation both to 
the socio-economic context and to the system of mediation. It 
found that the more moderate the movement in both ideology and 
tactics, the closer it was to the system of mediation, and 
vice versa. The moderates were found to be the local notables
- local politicians, especially those belonging to mainland 
parties, local businessmen, and members of the liberal 
professions. The radicals, on the other hand, were those who 
were most alienated: old-style regionalists; young 
intellectuals of the Corsican Diaspora: small farmers and 
shop-keepers endangered by, and excluded from, the new 
economic developments of the 1960's. But the group most 
difficult to analyse was the violent separatists precisely 
because of the clandestine nature of their activities.
It was seen from this analysis that Corsica was different 
in several important respects from other French regions. The 
fact of insularity meant that its cultural system had survived 
much longer than in other regions. Its economic system, too, 
was more backward. This meant that, when the socio-economic 
changes did come in the 1950's and 19607s, they were felt all 
the more keenly. Another difference is that on Corsica there 
existed already a tradition of violence which meant that 
Corsicans were more willing to use this.
However, there are also important similarities between 
Corsican regionalist movements and the other French movements.
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First, there was the important role of the local notables and 
the development of moderate regionalism. Of course, there may 
simply be a contagion effect: the Breton CELIB had shown the 
way. However, it may be also be a consequence of the fact that 
all the regions were suffering the same kind of crisis in the 
system of public administration at the local level: the 
traditional relations between the centre and the periphery 
were in the process of breaking down. What is remarkable is 
that in Corsica, Brittany and the French Basque Country, the 
pattern of development from moderate regionalism to radical 
regionalism was broadly similar. The movements adopted similar 
kinds of ideologies and tactics. This was the case even when 
there was little contact between them. The conclusion that 
might be drawn from this is that the regionalist phenomenon in 
France is fundamentally a problem of centre-periphery 
relations within the French state at a particular period of 
its history.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS
The analysis of the Corsican problem in the framework 
developed in this thesis is useful in so far as it makes a 
modest contribution to the literature on regionalism and 
ethnic nationalism. First of all, it is a political analysis 
of one important case: Corsica. Second, it provides a model 
that permits us to analyse certain features of the phenomenon
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of ethnic nationalism which tended to be ignored in other 
approaches.
It rejects the idea, often found in the literature, that 
there exist homogeneous entities called submerged "ethnies" or 
"micro-nations". On the contrary, it was found that these were 
often highly differentiated societies which considered 
themselves to belong to the French nation. The framework 
adopted allowed us to place regionalist movements in their 
socio-economic context and, in this way, to analyse their 
diversity. What were sometimes presented as theories such as 
ethnicity, ethnic nationalism or internal colonialism, were 
seen often to be ideological weapons used by regionalist 
movements and these, in their turn, can be placed within a 
wider context and become thereby more comprehensible.
The analysis presented in the thesis is also of value for 
two other reasons. First, it helps us to understand the nature 
of centre-periphery relations within the French state. Second, 
it helps us to appreciate developments in the regional policy 
of French Governments since the Second World War.
With regard to the question of centre-periphery relations 
within France, it is clear that the notions of a homogenized 
nation-state and of a "one and indivisible Republic" are 
inadequate for understanding the complexity that actually 
exists. Anti-Jacobins are right to point to this plurality. On
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the other hand, the very existence of the plurality of France 
is an indication that the contention of the anti-Jacobins that 
a centralized Jacobin state ruthlessly crushed submerged 
nations or ethnies may itself be mythical. In other words, the 
existence of diversity two hundred years after the French 
Revolution may indicate a greater toleration of diversity than 
the anti-Jacobins admit. Furthermore, many inhabitants of the 
regions, including the local politicians, seem to have been 
content with this situation most of the time. This ambiguous 
consensus is an important dimension of centre-periphery 
relations in France.
With regard to specific regional policies, not only has 
there been a diversity of regionalist responses but also a 
variety of governmental responses. During the period of the 
Fourth Republic there was a coincidence between a governmental 
regional policy concerned to bring into productivity under­
developed economic areas in the regions and the demands of the 
moderate regionalists. In fact, the Fourth Republic was 
characterised by the important influence of rural notables in 
the central organs of power such as Parliament. Furthermore, 
administrators sympathetic to regionalism and even federalism, 
such as Jean Monnet and Jean-Fran<?ois Gravier, were 
influential at this period. There was, furthermore, a strong 
link between the process of European integration, in which 
France at this period played an important role, and
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regionalism. This meant that many of the demands of moderate 
regionalism were met by the central Government.
A significantly different approach to regional policy was 
reached with the accession to power of De Gaulle and setting 
up of the Fifth Republic. This led to a new orientation of 
governmental priorities with regard to the regions, expressed 
in the policies adopted by the first Prime Minister, Michel 
Debré. Then the emphasis was placed on national development to 
promote French grandeur. Only those regions already strong, 
such as Paris or Rhône-Alpes, were to be developed to assist 
this process of aggrandisement. Weaker regions were to be 
ignored. This particularly affected Corsica which was one of 
the weakest regions and one of the most Gaullist.
The change of régime and regional policies had important 
effects on the regionalist movements themselves. The apparent 
lack of concern for the underdeveloped regions on the part of 
the Gaullists deeply offended the sensibilities of the local 
inhabitants. This led to two principal reactions: (i) a 
radicalization of the movements; (ii) a swing to the Gaullists 
on the part of many notables. In the Corsican case, only one 
of the clans at first rallied to De Gaulle - the de Rocca 
Serra clan - while the other - the Giacobbists - continued to 
support the moderate regionalists. However,*the intransigence 
of the Gaullist Government and subsequent Governments under 
Pompidou led to the demise of their movement. This left the
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field open to the radicals who, from the middle 1960's, began 
to occupy the centre of the stage. During this period 
Government policy toward the regions was a mixture of the 
carrot and the stick. The regions continued to be subsidised 
in a clientelistic manner while increasingly repression became 
more frequent. The latter was particularly true under 
President Giscard d'Estaing. In the regions most affected by 
these changes this led to a cycle of violence, police 
repression and further violence. This, in turn, led to 
increasing alienation of social groups, such as small farmers, 
shop-keepers and intellectuals, already disillusioned by 
Government policy, and the alienation of new groups such as 
the youth of the regions. When the central Governments did 
adopt regional policies in the 1960's and 1970's these tended 
to ignore the political, administrative and cultural reforms 
and to concentrate on economic issues. The strategy was to 
incorporate key functional elites into the policy-making 
system. However, these incorporated elites usually had a 
purely consultative role and were given little political 
power. The local populations were as powerless over the 
affairs of the region as they had been before. In Corsica, 
this led to increasing radicalization within the movements and 
a greater willingness by the more extreme elements to resort 
to violence. By the time of the 1981 Presidential elections 
parts of the island could be fairly described as a tinder-box.
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The analysis found in this thesis may also be of a more 
general interest to the field of studies of regionalism and 
ethnic nationalism outside France, as well as to the general 
study of centre-local relations in modern nation-states.
First, it warns against treating the social actors - 
regionalists, notables, the "state" - as if they were unitary 
actors. The analysis presented in this thesis brings out 
clearly that these minority groups, while they do retain a 
certain common identity of culture, social habits and perhaps 
language, are nevertheless internally quite diversified. This 
diversity is itself of political significance because it 
affects the degree to which movements may mobilize the local 
populations and affect Government policies.
The "state", too, is not simply a unitary actor but a 
complex of different organisations, levels of Government, and 
individual actors. This means that often there is no "state" 
policy which is a unified and coherent whole. It is true that 
different countries have overall traditions of politics and 
administration: it is contended that Britain is characterised 
by incrementalism and a toleration of minorities; Germany has 
a strong legal tradition in its administrative system; Italy 
has a tradition of a sprawling and incoherent state 
bureaucracy with clientelistic modes of mediation. France, it 
is alleged, has inherited tendencies toward centralization and 
is characterised by the existence of a technocratic 
administrative elite. Nevertheless, within these overall
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traditions, there exists a great diversity of practices and 
traditions. It is this which should put us on guard against 
assuming that the state is simply a unitary actor.
Another way of stating this is that all the actors 
involved - state agencies and representatives, local 
politicians, regionalist movements, the local populations - 
are all acting under various constraints. In terms of the 
distribution of power relationships, all have some kind of 
power but this is unequally distributed because of these 
constraints. The most important actors are those representing 
the state itself: they possess the various resources with 
which to respond or not to respond to the demands of the 
regionalists. But this power is constrained by wider economic 
and political factors: whether they can afford generous 
regional policies; whether to concede too much will lead to 
other groups making demands; the very diversity of demands 
within the regions. This is evident in the Corsican case 
studied in this thesis. Government policy toward Corsica has 
been marked by continual shifts in orientation, by 
incoherence, by leaps forward to be followed by steps 
backward, by good-will mingled with supercilious indifference 
depending on the individual politicians or administrators 
involved. A good example of this is the decision to send the 
returning pieds noirs to Corsica. In all probability this was 
simply an ad hoc decision made hurriedly in a situation of 
crisis. It was not, as radical regionalists claimed, part of a
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state conspiracy to wipe out the Corsican "ethnie" and replace 
it with another.
Perhaps the most Stringent criticism that may be made of 
the policies of French Governments toward the regions is that 
they have been usually piece-meal, short-term and often 
conceded too little too late to the regionalists. Often, they 
have been policies imposed on the regions without the proper 
participation of the local populations, except for a few 
notables sympathetic to the Government. During the Fifth 
Republic, even these local elites themselves were often not 
consulted and, if they were, their advice was sometimes 
ignored. Another limitation and cause of grievance was that 
Governments often thought that economic or administrative 
solutions were sufficient and that questions such as respect 
for local cultures and democratic participation by the 
inhabitants of the regions in the running of their own affairs 
could be safely ignored.
But the movements themselves were also operating under 
constraints. The most important constraint was that the 
Government held the budget strings and it was it which made 
the final decision concerning the distribution of resources. 
Moderate regionalists, during the Fourth Republic, exercised a 
certain amount of power in the sense that they had established 
a lobby system based on networks of contacts in the political 
and administrative systems. The radical regionalists, on the
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other hand, could only exercise the negative power of street 
agitation and violence or the threat of it. In fact, this 
produced relatively meagre results except for the keeping the 
issue on the political agenda. Paradoxically (given their 
rejection of the French system) it was the presence of 
sympathizers with their cause in the national French Socialist 
Party that gave them an opportunity to achieve some of their 
demands. This took place with the decentralization reforms of 
the Socialists initiated in 1982.
THE SOCIALIST REFORMS
The Socialists, elected in May and June 1981, tried to 
adopt a radically different approach to the regions and 
cultural and linguistic minorities, based on the notion of 
"democratic Jacobinism". This means that the unity and 
indivisibility of the French nation is still to be maintained. 
The Socialist, however, thought that the centralization of 
previous periods, once necessary, now hindered the creation of 
a nation that was one and indivisible. Now, this could be 
achieved by a new respect for the rights of minorities and the 
setting up of institutions designed to allow them to exercise 
some control over their own affairs.
The most important political aspect of these reforms is 
the fact that Regional Councils and, in Corsica, a Regional 
Assembly, were to be elected by universal suffrage using
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proportional representation. It is still too soon to assess 
the success or failure of these new developments. The Regional 
Councils were elected only in the 1986 Legislative Elections. 
The Corsican Regional Assembly has, however, been in operation 
since August 1982 and there have been three elections to it. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the report contained in the 
Epilogue to this thesis, on the Statut Particulier and the 
reforms with regard to linguistic and cultural minorities, is 
that so far the reforms have been quite successful. In effect, 
these reforms were based on a more comprehensive understanding 
of the Corsican problem than any previous Government had 
possessed. Furthermore, they are perhaps the first attempt by 
any French Government to allow the local population to have a 
say over the running of their own affairs. Significantly, for 
the first time, all the island's political tendencies are 
represented in a single assembly to administer the region's 
affairs. Violence is continuing but the signs are that the 
radical regionalists are considerably divided and weakened, 
while the more moderate tendencies are willing to re-enter the 
political system.
In conclusion, then, the thesis has demonstrated that the 
roots of the phenomenon of regionalism and ethnic nationalism 
in France are both long-term: the historical factor of nation- 
building, the socio-economic background, the relations between 
the centre and the periphery and short-term: the particular 
sets of circumstances of political and economic conjuncture at
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any particular time. The phenomenon is complex and the model 
presented here may be of use in analysing it. However, it is 
hoped that the model will also be use in analysing similar 
phenomena in countries other than France. Finally, even in the 
case of Corsica, much research needs to be carried out. In 
particular, a full sociological analysis of the regionalist 
movements, and in particular the clandestine separatists 
remains to be made.
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edition of La société bloquée, that nothing had changed 
since the arrival of the Socialists to power.
(45) See Yves Mény and John Loughlin, "La Corsica tra rivolta
e riforma: il problema corso e la politica del governo di
F. Mitterrand", in Le regioni. a. XII, no. 3, maggio-
giugno 1984, pp. 483-504.
(46) Interview with Professor Yves Mény.
(47) On the refusal by Defferre see Le Monde. 10-11/1/1982,
and Le Figaro. 24/2/1982.
(48) Le Monde. 20-21/6/1982.
(49) 16th March 1982.
(50) 18th March 1982.
(51) Le Monde. 20/4/1982.
(52) For example, Michel Giraud (RPR), President of the 
Conseil général of Ile-de-France has stated: "Il y a dans 
la réforme une part d'irréversible. La décentralisation 
doit dépasser les clivages politiques puisque c'est la 
France qui est en jeu", "La Décentralisaton", Le Monde. 
(Dossiers et documents), no 107, January 1984.
- 390 -
(53) See John Loughlin, Government and Oppositionr op. cit.
(54) See article quoted in note (8) above.
- 391 -
«V * - > S * r «•*,* »Wf i * ~£ --V  ^^  ,
40MI $£ \Ssí ^ t?Stát*A*9& ,
<*&*• I & * S W h ^ >
^ i» ipr«&# qawjianf «&** ÿfjwft*3/^^  ^  __ _ * W' «a*** „\2l. i i 4>*uir ■«h**«*«' i &» ¿5-* 'Sr-Vt* »
&?&&£& 1 Ä  í> H í^- ’Msc&ss£*> $®i <?
««$* **sd&#& **£* ’W i ^ l , a^wwiuy w á » x % ,  «•
*í Í*í JïflfciŸ^ #**• p S ^ i i R /  *|feç g# frfftW
G<>frff Vti8¡$¡,If 4»$S SSS»ä ÄBftWfcfc* •'&&&&£ *ftM* *
mmk*máJuX¿si*sm- **. a. j s m í ^  < w ,
-2S©, „ *‘ ’ .
*" ^ i. * jt •*. '*'%«"*/'’ Tw *? i * p i*
d»í«r C*^i**’,*V JNÄ*s*Ä i-A Ää*t pt«tot-*ti® ft? vi1
r j&*f &  „ **«* 5 * ^ 2  *** ^ m m 4 î"
^ ÎÂ 'IU i« «  *<«>'li'"****!#** « IS wUfU*$& a*M.
J"is* * « >v^ tX, "tä* %?
ä ,:<&v . c-.' “** ^
iT i ' i f ' ’*1' i - *■ %^ ‘",iiï'£r "’ " t* j1 -w-,^  , '■‘'rï^l^
***£*»*$' vwter'.i««#'^/  j> - - f ”**  .V i -J* -V >• *•’ -,*, */r>V „ " ^ ‘Ü* * , É*»1?y n«,' HK 1 r _ * <•' t -> r a,“ *» „ a « >ï <s »i
^;/>j fv
„i ,-i Ä  r(5.tl- ^  V.'-'iP» ~*r Í « 4al. t(> - 5- S
W K .  »M*i»t ö f a ^ ' « Ä  > wf J»*'_. K
*jt* '■’i á¿^.itM..K«,«''%>^s--A.?:.r» f=T£# ®X-St M
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED
- 392 -
vn-fr-v 'v * ^  o. wArfit  ^ * m, «*
- 1 >  V „ ^ A J .  1 it~ »  ^  *  *“lì  ^ f- *§ *■ ■* «* » & i t> ^ *v’
' ^ C ^ - r ^ V  ^  '"* ^ ’; r ^  **ì* , ^   ^V
?4
* * * v w0jr J f /• * ? fr
ai;
•.i'-^S.'Säi•. ■■•¿, *i'''va*'^':;Ti:;:’ '*VN ' . -VvWy;?-r.•, '* > f i i i> 'Ä '.“ ’'iOi> > .v  ;r- î -'
», n i .  «  j ,  3» .  ^  ’ ’ ^ n  ^  <? 1 ~ ÿ
- v ^  ;  # * £ * * « ,  ^  ' • '  ’ * ’> '  „ »  ,  „  
r<< - »> ‘ f it - » V   ^ r
C ^ %t v * ¥ s -5«,-■$-;*>* K ^
', ì *L^ ~ ^  .» A *• ' « . *' - -
* K > ■# * *  ^
V  *  ' * i V *  fcrt äV P V i  ^  - t j .  ^  4 *&flbf *■" % "* #  ^«► ¿ rfv ■rV * * '& J
4^v%^ us«»- <  -  * y f^  y
*« *? r ,*« «'V* " “1 4 _  ~*A * " + »
fc^^:r>.í'^V-twA;tf<-;-};í*/’-i-'‘W.’>!,-*'->í,.>M '■'C.wï:'^,”.^ 1^’'*’' «■ î-'?,j.3¿-fV-‘-'*' ".‘¿i i*visj, .;'• i • - v^ :^--^'^/^'^*».-<,*-V^.:.;-. • - ^,':j.'4 -ÍMtt -  ^  * s .  “ V-
^  1 >  '  , fe ,
ib
jjs r .- - - .w ~ — .»-- - ..->*« . V . . . - .  . . - -  .-.- - . .., „- ... r . . .............. . . . .  •.....V ^ * rf * -4r *-"■• ^s- *<'TH^-i-y;'-'^ •-^V?^-'V::'-i^';^\-'\,; '^ í'^ S^^*-,'^¡r<f
^  «i ~^V ^
«*»'''■ ’ *1 (■“ * k , ''’'•* rt
.• W íi' - . í  -•• --í-í v .  ^  ■’• -•*••-^-;> - í  •'. • ?-.• 'V'. ‘i- r  ^'.^n ■- , >-v^4>0'- ,' -.-rvi'v'V •. ; • í , - v ,  - .^  -V  ..,••V■vï-v.i,-^ '-.v.-*;-::t ^»’'.^i'-'-v >^’4T,1-t :"HV^%'-- -¿‘-i'’1 - • • *• »-•
3 í ^  ^  ~k k  V - t ,  s *  ¿  \  *  *í~
■h —• V f  í'-,;.jí
« • » j *  <- ^ 4  ^  í ¥ |
•'•■•' *• «.'.•Í'IHÍ • * : ' )síí4 £ '  
^  " í
i¿.: ■ • » - . 'W .  V.-.'^
• *',v';'.i:Vv;:..vf-5 '■■$$'£’''‘V./S.‘; '-.V'':'^\ -^: ;- ' '  ¿'^;>;'-íi:
^  f  ^
»
‘ '.\ ‘■-t-'W.i- - J '■>. 1.".
t  c.
:-: : -V f  . ; ^
f H  ^*3 '-.'■ ■-'\ ■:<•?{,&.% t ,' ' '•v-.^<*aí'í-."' í :  ^,;;ví-i '?i '^: -- •?• yv- ; Kí* ‘ *
' 's í * í í  ' •î.s'-ïl'^i^«-'-:-":: K
Ä i* *> <* c- iT' ^  â  i ^  i a
'^-■irjirv.-: -ììi-v.».-« í.Uí .. ,.._■- u* .'.•'>j--’-.>'V^  "s íxt-; ».»w'»-: !•. '-.<>;,• ->• ».•?<'—•.¿*?s»: .r . >¡“f-j. .iv»* <>»«.: .••,-txk^ Lf» '.. J-. -k-»u «<•,»*«.;. í *>-Oí*»-
>
S«'>.-:<,-'Átr»S'
*»K V i  x  »*
' Í Í ' - V ^ '  W ;  . \ , - ^ r ‘; .v  *v>t--S^.V‘ ( i i *>-i /  >■<t * H V^ J &*■ Wfc  ^ ^ V
i L
■2\ . ......... . ................... . . .  ___ _____
éí 1 K *- * > t
. Jf 1 * H. V *■ 1 Jb ^  í- * ^
^  ^  sj -s ->  *x * *  ï  - i  ^J»^'¡" •» “í * " t 
Í  j t  V í«  J <• I«■& *. r ì 1
* >  -  ^  t  t - ' " » -  ’  -  v .  *  "  '  n
 ^ V* i ííi*»'ir<>n«í A,4 ^ ^ *
^■*^. J*. -rt- . r t  V ^
^  ~  í‘ S ^  '  / *  " * ^  £  \  r«i * rí>*í*f?'í^a í>.-v j.
k , ' to $ K -  ^ ■*■,’*<,' *  ^ -i 
^\3  ^* T.V / t
S ¿ r  * -  '
j ■" ' 'tl*^  ^  ' < *'*  ^* y ï
i, vf.V V  2V i  , ■* -  t - í  í  X - -*
V i : , r * ç* ^  - ' * ' & : 4t -  
?f,?^  -r. vMî‘ ¡S'i  ^^  avj  ^ <*  ^ ^ H * ■* *■^ » - - «,
î H *^^«>9» {UT -t ji^-> 4^ *> *. £f t^árr ^  * *v - h f  ^ - * 9 í 1** ^
* ^ R i *  1 f . i l :  «15^  ì tò . N í* E ^  k .
»V H 'î
;r;;|;Sÿip
*¥*<
m $ ß .
■*- A«1 * r  4>
%. -«
li íi^ ifeih >iuii
'ñ s *t ríí jV rt» i  i -i #J >  ^  5V 4  ^  ¿ ^ „-A. .f  ; nit* »%?& ,% í ;
^ tí  ^ * ■">'íá «-^ - I * - ¿J. t s  *»»sí ï âÇ<i
WORKS ON CORSICA
Official Publications
Arrêté du 13 juillet 1956 portant application du décret No. 
55-873 du 30 juin 1955, Journal Officiel, du 14 juillet 1955.
Arrêté du 28 novembre 1956 définissant le cadre des programmes 
d'action régionale, Journal Officiel du 6 décembre 1956.
COMMISSION EXTRAPARLEMENTAIRE ET INTERMINISTERIELLE CHARGEE 
D'ETUDIER LA SITUATION ACTUELLE DE LA CORSE, (RAPPORT 
DELANNEY), Journal Officiel du 4 juillet 1909, 12 septembre 
1909, 10 novembre 1909, pp. 715-1370
CONSEIL GENERAL, Plan de mise en valeur de la Corse. , 2e 
session ordinaire de 1965.
Corse 1972. Résultats et commentaires. Direction départmentale 
de l'équipment
DATAR, Schéma d'Aménagement de la Corse. (Paris: Documentation 
Française, 1972).
Décrets du 30 juin 1955 tendant à stimuler la mise en valeur 
des régions souffrant du sous-emploi ou d'un développement 
économique insuffisant, Journal Officiel du 2 juillet 1955, 
pp. 6638-6643.
ETABLISSEMENT PUBLIC REGIONAL CORSE, Charte du développement 
économigue de la Corse. (Ajaccio, E.P.R., July 1975).
Loi no. 82-214 du 2 mars 1982 portant statut particulier de la 
région de Corse (organisation administrative), Journal 
Officiel du 3 mars 1982, pp. 1-16
Loi no. 82-659 du 30 juillet 1982 portant statut particulier 
de Corse (compétences), JO du 31 juillet 1982, pp. 2459- 2463
MINISTERE DE L'AGRICULTURE, "La Corse", Monographies Agricoles 
Départementales, La Documentation Française. (Paris, 1958).
MINISTERE DE LA CULTURE, 2 Ans de Politioue culturelle.('81- 
'83), (Paris, 1984).
Plan de mise en valeur de la Corse, Comité Technique de 
Coordination et d'Etudes du Plan, Inventaire, (1949).
PREFECTURE DE LA CORSE, La Corse en quelques chiffres.
(Ajaccio, 1968).
- 393 -
PREFECTURE DE LA REGION CORSE, Une Région Française; La Corse. 
(Ajaccio, 1975) 2ème edn. 1976.
Programme d #Action Régionale établi en application du décret 
No. 55-873 du 30 juin 1955 pour la Corse, Journal Officiel, 
no. 1094, 1957.
Proposition de loi, no. 1991, portant statut particulier pour 
la Corse, seconde session ordinaire de 1976-1977.
RAPPORT DELANNEY. Commission extraparlementaire et 
interministérielle chargée d'étudier la situation actuelle de 
la Corse, Journal Officiel. 4 July 1909, 12 Sept. 1909, 10 
Nov. 1909, pp. 715-1370
RAPPORT NEUWIRTH: rapport 1322 (1962) de la Commission de la 
production et des échanges, dit Rapport Neuwirth, Assemblée 
Nationale.
SOCIALIST PARTY, Proposition de loi portant statut particulier 
pour la Corse. (Assemblée Nationale, 2ème session ordinaire 
1976-1977).
Corsican Newspapers and Reviews
ARRITTI.(Hebdomadaire d'action régionaliste corse" 1966 - 
Weekly journal of ARC/UPC tendency
L'AVENIR DE LA CORSE (Hebdomadaire départemental) (Gaullist 
RPF), Directeur Politique; Antoine Serafini, député, 
Administrateur; J-P Ferraci.First issue: 24/11/1951
L'AVENIR CORSE (Organe d'information et d'action Corses), 
Paris, Collection in Archives Départementales d'Ajaccio, 
begins in 3e année, no. 19, décembre 1953.
BULLETIN D'INFORMATION DE LA SOMIVAC
CORSE - ACTION. (Organe mensuel de Défense des Intérêts 
généraux de la Corse), Director: Bastien Leccia, Oct. 1963 
1974.
U CULOMBU. (Mensuel d'expression et de liaison des 
Travailleurs de Corse), CFDT, 1974-1975.
ETUDES CORSES
L'INFORMATEUR. Bastia, Directeur: Louis Rioni, 1951 -.
- 394 -
L'INSULAIRE. (Le journal d'Ajaccio: Organe hebdomadaire 
d'information politique, économique et sociale). Founded 1952 
by its Directeur: Nicolas de Susini (alias Jean Makis). From 
1953, Directeur: Achille de Susini (son of Nicolas).
POPULU CORSU. (Organe mensuel du FRC), 1970-1974).
U RIBOMBU. (Ghjurnale naziunalistu corsu), 1974 -
TERRA CORSA. Dir. Gisèle Poli, 1972-1975.
TERRE CORSE. (Forti saremu, se saremu uniti), Organe régionale
du Parti Communiste Français. Ajaccio. 1943-.
UNION CORSE. (Organe de Liaison des Corses du Continent),
1961-1963, then L'UNION CORSE - L'AVENIR
- 395 -
Books and Articles
ALBITRECCIA A., La Corse, son évolution au XIXe siècle et au 
début du XXé siècle (Etude de Géographie humaine et 
économique), (Paris: PUF, 1942)
ALBITRECCIA A. , Le Plan Terrier de la Corse au XVIIIe siècle. 
(Paris: PUF, 1942).
ALBITRECCIA, A., Histoire de la Corse. Ed. Que Sais-je?, 
(Paris: PUF, 1947).
AMBROSI C. , "La sécession de la Corse en 1794", in Mélanges 
d'études corses offerts à P. Arrighi. (Centre d'Etudes 
Corses d'Aix en Provence,1971), pp. 11-39
AMBROSI C., "Les deux annexions de la Corse (1768 et 1789)", 
in Ouvrage collectif, Problèmes d'histoire de la Corse 
(de l'Ancien Régime à 1815), Actes du Colloque d'Ajaccio, 
(Paris: Société des Etudes Robespierristes, Socété 
¿'Histoire Moderne, 1971), pp. 7-22.
ANTONETTI P. , Histoire de la Corse. (Paris: Robert Laffont, 
1973).
ARC, Autonomia. (Bastia: Ed. ARC, 1974).
ARRIGHI P., (éd.), Histoire de la Corse. (Toulouse: Ed.
Privât, 1971).
ARRIGHI P (éd.), Histoire de la Corse. Univers de la France, 
Collection d'histoire régionale, (Toulouse: Privât,
1971).
BARTOLI M. , Pasguale Paoli (Père de la Patrie Corse), (Paris: 
Ed. Albatross, 1974) .
BLANQUI F., Rapport sur l'état économioue et moral de la Corse 
en 1839. (Paris: Didot, 1840).
BORDES M., "L'Edit de mai 1771: 1?Administration municipale 
des villes et communautés de l'île de Corse", in 
Problèmes d'histoire de la Corse. (1971), pp. 69-88.
BOURDE P., En Corse (L'esprit de clan. Les moeurs politiques. 
Les vendettas. Le banditisme.), 2ème edn., (Paris:
Calmann Lévy, 1887).
BROCHE F., "Cagoules à tête de Maure", Le spectacle du Monde. 
(251), fév 1983, 57-65
- 396 -
CASANOVA A., "Les observations des administrateurs français 
(fin XVIIIe - début XIXe siècle) et l'évolution des 
techniques rurales en Corse: le cas des formes archaïques 
du moulin à eau", in Problèmes d'histoire de la Corse. 
(1971), pp. 45-68.
CASANOVA A. , "Caporaux et Communautés rurales en Corse",
Corse Historíeme, no 11, 3e trimestre, 1963.
CASANOVA A., "Evolution historique des sociétées et voies de 
la Corse. Essai d'approche", Cahiers d'histoire de 
l'Institut de Recherches Marxistes, no. 12 (1983), pp. 
36-65.
CASANOVA A. , "Note sur les pressoirs pré-industriels de 
Corse", Corse Historíeme, numéros 31-32, 1968.
CASANOVA A. and ROVERE A., Peuple corse. Révolutions, et
Nation française. (Paris: Ed. Sociales, 1979), pp. 15-
106.
CASTA, Abbé F., "Le difficile retour de la Corse à la France 
sous le Directoire (1796 - 1798)", in Problèmes 
d'histoire de la Corse. (1971), pp. 191-234.
C.C.I, Le livre blanc: le problème corse. (CCI, 1962).
C.E.D.I.C., Manifeste du CEDIC pour l'Ethnie corse. (Bastia, 
1964).
CHAILLEY-POMPEI, F., "Les troubles de Pâques 1792 d'après le 
manifeste de la municipalité d'Ajaccio", in ibid. pp. 
179-189.
CHOURY M., Tous bandits d'honneur (Résistance et Libération de 
la Corse. Juin 1940 - Octobre 1943), Préface d'Arthur 
Giovini, 2ème edn., (Paris: Ed. Sociales, 1958).
DEFRANCESCHI J., "De la légende à l'histoire: Paoli et les
frères Bonaparte", in Problèmes d'histoire de la Corse. 
(1971), pp. 132-145.
DELORS J-P and MURACCIOLE S., Corse la Poudrière. (Paris: Ed. 
Moreau, 1978).
DESJARDINS T., La Corse à la dérive. (Paris: Pion, 1977).
DOTTELONDE P., "Pour une nouvelle approche du nationalisme
corse: Etude dur la diffusion du phénomène dans l'éspace 
insulaire", in Etudes Corses, no. 23, 1984, pp. 73-112.
- 397 -
DOTTELONDE P., Histoire de la Revendication Corse 1959-1974 
(Du "Département français à la "Nation corse"), 
(unpublished) thèse de 3e cycle, (Paris: Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Institut d'Etudes 
Politiques de Paris, 1983-1984).
DOTTELONDE P., "Eléments pour une histoire de la revendication 
corse: 1959-1973", (unpublished) Mémoire. (Paris: 
I.E.P.-Paris, 1981).
EMMANUELLI R., "L'intégration à la France", in Arrighi, (ed.)/ 
(1971), pp. 369-397.
ETTORI F., "Langue et littérature" in POMPONI F. et al.,
Corse. (Paris: Bonneton, 1981), pp. 171-211.
FRC, Main basse sur une ile. (Paris: Ed. Martineau, 1971).
GIL J., "La puissance d'un peuple", Les Temps Modernes, no. 
357, April 1976.
GIL J., "La Corse et les impasses du pouvoir", Les Temps 
Modernes. no. 366, January 1977.
GIL J. , "Le clan se sent menacé", Kvrn. October 1981.
GROSJEAN R. , "La préhistoire et la protohistoire", in P. 
Arrighi, (éd.), Histoire de la Corse. (Toulouse: Ed. 
Privât, 1971).
GUIGUE A.M. , Le programme d'action régionale et le problème 
corse. (Nancy: 1965).
GREGORI J., Nouvelle histoire de la Corse. (Paris: Ed. 
Martineau, 1967)
HAINSWORTH P. and LOUGHLIN J., "Le problème corse",
Contemporarv French Civilization. Vol.VIII, no. 3, Spring 
1984.
HERMANT D. and BIGO D., "La violence politique en Corse",
Etudes polémologioues. (37), 1er trim., 1986, pp. 71-114.
JEHASSE J. , "La Corse antique - La Corse Romaine", in P. 
Arrighi, (1971).
JEHASSE J. and L., La nécropole préromaine d'Aléria. (Paris: 
Ed. CNRS, 1973).
KOFMAN E., "Differential modernisation, social conflict and
ethno-regionalism", in Ethnie and Racial Studies. no. 5,
(3), July 1982, pp. 334-385.
LABRO M. , La question Corse (Paris: Ed. Entente, 1977).
- 398 -
LOUGHLIN J. , "The Elections to the Corsican Regional
Assembly, August 1984", Government and Opposition, vol. 
20, no. 2, Spring 1985, pp. 240-250.
LOUGHLIN J., "Corsican-French Relations", in A Macartney (ed), 
The Islands of Europe. (Edinburgh: University of 
Edinburgh Press/Unit for the Study of Government in 
Scotland, 1984);
LOUGHLIN J., "The Corsican Statut Particulier as a response to 
the Problème corse", European University Institute 
Working Paper. April 1985?
MARCHETTI P., Une mémoire pour la Corse. (Paris: Flammarion, 
1980).
MARTINI M., Les Corses dans l'expansion française. (Ajaccio: 
Ed. Les Myrtes, 1953).
Le Mémorial des Corses. 5 Volumes, edited by F. Pomponi, 
(Ajaccio: 1984).
LUCIANI J-M. , La Corse sous Napoléon III. Chapter Three: "Les 
voies et les moyens de communication", B.S.S.H.N.C.
MENY Y. and LOUGHLIN J. , "La Corsica tra rivolta e riforma: 
il problema corso e la politica del governo di F. 
Mitterrand", in Le regioni. a. XII, no. 3, maggio-giugno 
1984, pp. 483-504.
PANASSIE L. and VERDEAUX L., L'Ame Corse. (Paris: Presses de 
la Cité, 1979).
MERIMEE, Columba et 10 autres nouvelles. (Paris: Gallimard, 
1964).
PERNET F. and LENCLUD G. , Berger en Corse, (essai sur la
question pastorale), (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de 
Grenoble, 1977).
PERRIER F., Les raisons de la colère. (Paris: Ed. sociales,
1976).
POMPONI F. , "Le régionalisme en Corse dans 1'entre-deux
guerres", in Gras and Livet, Régions et régionalisme en 
France du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours. (Paris: PUF, 1977).
POMPONI F. , Essai sur les notables ruraux en Corse au XVIIe 
siècle. (Aix-en-Provence, 1962).
POMPONI F., "Crise de structure économique et crise de
conscience en Corse (Fin XIXe siècle - début XXe)",
- 399 -
POMPONI F. , "Emeutes populaires en Corse: aux origines de 
l'insurrection contre la domination génoise (décembre 
1729-juillet 1731)", Annales du Midi, no 170, avril-juin,
1972.
POMPONI F., Histoire de la Corse. (Paris: Hachette,1979).
RAMSAY R., The Corsican Time-bomb. (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984) .
RATZEL F. , La Corse, étude anthropo-aéoqraphicrue. (Annales de 
Géographie), 1899.
RAVIS-GIORDANI G., "L'alta pulitica' et la 'bassa pulitica': 
valeurs et comportements politiques dans les communautés 
villageoises corses (XIXième - XXième siècle)", Etudes 
Rurales. (65), 1977, pp. 171-189.
RAVIS-GIORDANI G., "L'alta pulitica et la bassa pulitica; 
valeurs et comportements dans les communautés 
villageoises corses (XIXe-XXe siècles), Etudes rurales. 
1976.
RENUCCI J., Corse traditionnelle et Corse nouvelle. (Lyon: Ed. 
Audin, 1974).
RENUCCI J., La Corse. (Paris: PUF,1982).
ROVERE A., "Pour une Corse nouvelle: la stratégie du PCF à la 
Libération (1943-1945)", in Cahiers d'histoire de 
l'Institut de recherches marxistes. Sommaire no 12, 1983 
pp. 66-88.
SANGUINETTI A., Lettre ouverte à mes compatriotes corses. 
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1980).
SANTONI C., "Résistance et repression en Corse, 1769-1819, Les 
Temps Modernes, nos. 324, 325, 326, August-September
1973.
SANTONI C., "Résistance et repression en Corse, 1769-1819, Les 
Temps Modernes, nos. 324, 325, 326, August-September 
1973.
SAVIGEAR P., "Corsica, 1975: politics and violence", The World 
Today. November 1975.
SAVREUX M. , L'homme à tout faire de la République (Nice: Ed. 
Lefevre, 1977).
SEDILLOT R. , La grande aventure des Corses. (Paris: Fayard,
1969).
- 400 -
SILVANI P. , La Corse des années ardentes 1939-1976. (Paris: 
Ed. Albatross, 1976).
SIMEONI E. and L., Le pièae d'Aleria. (Paris: Ed. Lattes, 
1975).
SIMI P., Le climat de la Corse. (Bulletin de la Section de 
Géographie, 1963).
TEMPS MODERNES (Les), "Identité culturelle de la Corse", 385
(6), August-September 1978, pp 125-239.
TEMPS MODERNES (Les), "La Corse après le dix mai", 38 (423), 
October 1981.
TOMI P. , "Le royaume anglo-corse", Etudes Corses, no. 19, 
1956-1957.
TUFFELLI C., Une Corse au XXIe siècle. (Ajaccio: La Marge,
1982) .
401 -
GENERAL WORKS
ALLEN K. and MACLENNAN M.C. , Regional problems and policies 
in Italy and France. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970).
ANDERSON M. , "Regional identity and political change: the 
case of Alsace from the Third to the Fifth Republic", 
Political Studies. (Oxford), vol. XX (March 1972), pp. 
1730.
"Attentats commis en Pays Basque nord et quelques prises de
position d'avril 1975 à janvier 1979", Eglise Aujourd'hui 
en Monde Rural, no. 413, (Décembre 1979), pp. 608-10.
AUBY Jean-François , Les commissaires de la République. Ed.
Que Sais-je?, (Paris: PUF, 1984).
BARELLI Y. et al., L'Espérance occitane. (Paris: Ed. Entente, 
1980).
BEER W. , "Internal colonialism and rising expectations: 
ethnie activism in contemporary France", in R. Hall 
(éd.), Ethnie Autonomy - Comparative dynamics. (Oxford: 
Pergamon, 1979).
BEER W., The Unexpected Rebellion: ethnie activism in 
contemporary France. (New York: NUY Press, 1980).
BERGER S., Peasants against Politics (Rural Organization in
Brittany 1911-1967) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1972).
BERNARD P., L'Etat et la décentralisation (Du préfet au
commissaire de la République), (Paris: La Documentation 
Française, 31 March 1983).
BIMODIERE C. and COHEN-SOCAL L., Les nouveaux socialistes. 
(Paris: 1977).
BOULOISEAU M. , La républigue jacobine. (Nouvelle histoire de 
la France contemporaine), (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1972).
BOURJOL M., Les Institutions régionales de 1789 à nos jours. 
(Paris: Ed. Berger-Lavrault, 1969).
BOWYER-BELL J. , The Secret Army. (London: Sphere, 1972).
BRAUDEL F. , L'identité de la France. Vol. 1, Espace et 
Histoire, (Paris: Ed. Arthaud-Flammarion, 1986).
- 402 -
CACIAGLIA M. and BELLONI F. , "The "New" Clientelism in 
Southern Italy: The Christian Democratic Party in 
Catania", in EISENSTADT and LEMARCHAND, pp. 35-56.
CHARLOT J. , Le Gaullisme. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1970).
CHATELAIN D. and TAFANI P., Ou'est-ce oui fait courir les 
autonomistes?. (Paris: Stock, 1976).
CHUBB J. , "Naples under the Left: The Limits of Social 
Change", in EISENSTADT and LEMARCHAND, pp. 91-124
COORNAERT E. , La Flandre française de langue flamande (Paris: 
Ed. Ouvrières, 1970)
CROZIER M., Le Phénomène bureaucratique. (Paris: Le Seuil, 
1963).
DAVANT J. , Histoire du Pavs Basque. (Bayonne: Ed. Elkar,
1970).
DAWSON G. , L'Evolution des Structures de l'Administration 
locale déconcentrée en France. (Paris, 1969).
DE GAULLE C., Discours et messages. Vol. 1, (Pendant la 
Guerre, Juin 1940 - Janvier 1946), (Paris: Berger- 
Lavrault, 1946).
DEFFONTAINES P., La Méditerranée catalane. (Paris: PUF, 1975).
DENIS M., "Mouvement breton et fascisme. Signification de
l'échec du second Emsav", both in Gras and Livet (eds.), 
(1977), pp. 481-506
DULONG R., La question bretonne (Paris: Armand Colin, 1975).
DULONG R., Les régions. l'Etat et la Société locale. (Paris: 
PUF, 1978).
EISENSTADT S.N. , Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol.
EISENSTADT S.N. and LEMARCHAND R. (eds), Political
clientelism. Patronage and Development. (London, Beverly 
Hills: Sage, 1981).
ESMAN M., Ethnie conflict in the Western World. (Ithaca:
1975).
ESPIEUX H. , Histoire de 1'Occitanie (Agen: Centre Culturel 
Occitan, 1970).
FANCHEUX J. , La decentralisation Industrielle. (Paris: Ed. 
Berger Levrault, 1959).
- 403 -
FLORY T. , Le mouvement réaionaliste français. (Paris: PUF,
1966).
FOHLEN C., "France 1920-1970", in Carlo Cipolla (éd.), The 
Fontana Economic History of Europe. (Contemporary 
Economics), Part One, (London: Collins, 1976), pp. 72- 
127.
FOSTER C., (ed.), Nations without a State: ethnic minorities 
in Western Europe. (New York: Preager, 1980).
FOUERE Y. , "Le régionalisme breton sous le gouvernement de 
Vichy et le Comité consultatif de Bretagne", Gras and 
Livet, (1977).
FRANK André Gundar , Development and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).
FREARS J., France in the Giscard Presidency. (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1981).
GELLNER E., Nations and nationalism. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1983).
GELLNER E., Thought and Change. (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1964).
GIORDAN H., Démocratie culturelle et droit à la difference 
(rapport au Ministre de la Culture), (Paris: La 
Documentation Française, 1982).
GRAS S. , "La presse française et 1'autonomisme alsacien en
1926", and REIMERINGEN B. , "Un communisme régionaliste? 
Le communisme alsacien", both in GRAS C. and LIVET G.
(eds), Régions et régionalisme en France (du XVIIIe 
siècle à nos jours), (Paris: PUF, 1977).
GRAS C. and LIVET G. (eds), Régions et régionalisme en France 
(du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours), (Paris: PUF, 1977).
GRAVIER J.F. , Paris et le désert français. (Paris:
Flammarion, 1947).
GRAZIANO L. , "A Conceptual Framework for the study of
Clientelistic Behaviour", European Journal of Political 
Research:
GREILSAMMER A. , Les Mouvements fédéralistes en France de 1945 
à 1974. (Presses d'Europe, 1975).
GUILLOREL H ., "France: religion, periphery state and nation- 
building", in Torvik, (1981), pp. 390-428.
- 404 -
GUILOREL H. , "Problème breton et mouvement breton", in 
Pouvoirs, no. 19, (1981), pp. 83-102.
GURR T. , Why men rebel. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1970).
HAYWARD J.E.S. , "From functional regionalism to functional 
representation in France", Political Studies, vol XVII, 
(March 1969), pp. 48- 75.
HAYWARD, J.E.S., The One and Indivisible French Republic. 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).
HECHTER M. , Internal Colonialism (The Celtic Periphery in 
British national development, 1536-1966) (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
HERAUD G., "Observations critiques sur la notion de
colonialisme intérieur", Europe en formation, no. 193, 
(Avril, 1976), pp. 16-20.
HERAUD G., L7Europe des Ethnies. 2nd éd., (Paris, Nice:
Presses d'Europe, 1974).
HEROD C., The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought (The 
concept of Nations with History and Nations without 
History), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).
HUNTINGDON S. P. , Political Order in Changing Societies. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
KEATING Michael , "Decentralization in Mitterrand's France",
Public Administration. Vol 61, no 3, Autumn 1983 pp. 237- 
51.
KESSELMAN M., The Ambiguous Consensus. (A study of local 
government in France), (New York: 1967).
KESSELMAN M., "The end of Jacobinism? The Socialist regime and 
decentralization", Contemporary French Civilization 
Fall/Winter 1983/4, Vol VIII, nos 1&2, pp. 84-103.
"La Décentralisaton", Le Monde. (Dossiers et documents), no
107, January 1984.
LAFONT R., La Révolution régionaliste. (Paris: Gallimard,
1967).
LAFONT R., La Revendication occitane. (Paris: Flammarion,
1973) .
LAFONT R., Décoloniser en France. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).
- 405 -
LAFONT R., Autonomie: de la région à l'autogestion. (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1976).
LE LANNOU M., La Bretagne et les Bretons. (Paris: PUF, 1978).
LOUGHLIN J., "Regionalism and ethnie nationalism in France",
in Yves Mény and Vincènt Wright, (eds), Centre-peripherv
relations in Western Europe. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985);
LOUGHLIN J., "A new deal for France's regions and linguistic
minorities", West European Politics. Vol 8, no 3, July 1985;
I/DUGHLIN J., "Federalist and regionalist movements in France", 
in M. Burgess (ed.), Federalism and Federation in Western 
Europe. (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 76-98.
MACARTNEY A., (ed.), The Islands of Europe. (Edinburgh: Unit
for the study of Government in Scotland, 1984).
MACHIN H. , The Prefect in French Public Administration. 
(London: Croom Helm, 1977).
MALHERBE J. , "Le nationalisme basque et les transformations 
socio-politiques en Pays Basque nord", in BIDART P.,
(éd.), La nouvelle société Basgue. (Paris: Harmattan,
1980).
MARCZEWSKI J. , "Y a-t-il eu un 'take-off' in France?",
Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A.. mars 1961, pp. 76 seq.
MEDARD J-F , "Political clientelism in France: the centre- 
periphery nexus reexamined", in S.N. Eisenstadt and R. 
Lemarchand (eds.), Political clientelism. Patronage and 
Development, pp. 125-169.
MENY Y., "Decentralization in Socialist France", West European 
Politics. Vol 7, no 1, 1984, pp. 65-79.
MENY Y., "La décentralisation", in Administration 82 (Institut 
International d 'Administration Publique), Paris, 1983, 
pp. 13-57.
MENY Y ., Centralisation et décentralisation dans le débat 
politique français (1945-1969). (Paris: Librairie 
Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1974).
MENY Y., "Crises, régions et modernisation de l'état", in 
Pouvoirs. no. 19, (1981), pp. 6-8.
NICOLAS M. , Histoire du mouvement breton (Emsav) (Paris:
Syros, 1982).
PCF on regional question, L'Humanité. 12/6/1976.
- 406 -
PERSON Y., "Présentation", Les Temps Modernes, vol. 29,
(1973).
PETRELLA R. , La renaissance des cultures régionales en 
Europe. (Paris, Ed. Entente, 1978).
PHILIPPS E. , La crise d'identité. (l'Alsace face à son 
destin), (Strasbourg: 1978).
PHLIPPONEAU M. , "La gauche et le régionalisme (1945-1974)", 
in GRAS et LIVET (eds.), Régions et régionalisme en 
France (du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours), (Paris: PUF,
1977), pp. 529-43.
RHODES R., "Intergovernmental Relations in the United
Kingdom", in Y. MENY and V. WRIGHT (eds.), Centre- 
Peripherv Relations in Western Europe. (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1986), pp. 33-78.
ROCARD M. , "La région, une idée neuve pour la Gauche", and 
SADRAN P. , "Les socialistes et la région", both in 
Pouvoirs. no. 19 (1981), pp. 131-47.
ROKKAN S. , "Entries, voices, exits: towards a possible
generalization of the Hirschman model", Social Science 
Information, vol. XIII (1974), pp. 39-53.
ROKKAN S. and URWIN D., Economy. Territory. Identity (Politics 
of West European Peripheries), (London: Sage, 1983).
ROSSINYOL J. , Le problème national catalan. (Paris: La Haye,
1974) .
RUYS M. , Les Flamands, (un peuple en mouvement, une nation en 
devenir), (Brussels and Paris: Vander, 1973).
SERANT P., Le Réveil ethnigue des provinces de France. (Paris:
1968).
SHARPE L.J. , "Decentralist Treands in Western Europe: a First 
Appraisal", in L. J. SHARPE (éd.), Decentralist trends in 
Western Democracies. (London: Sage, 1979), pp. 9-79.
SHARPE L. J., (ed.), Decentralist trends in Western 
Democracies. (London: Sage, 1979) .
SMITH A.D., The Ethnic revival in the modern world.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
STREICHER J-C., Impossible Alsace (Histoire des idées 
autonomistes), (Paris: Ed. Entente, 1982).
- 407 -
TAGIL S., (ed.)» Regions in Upheaval (Ethnic Conflict and
Political Mobilization), (Kristianstad: Esselte Studium,
1984) .
TARROW S. , Between Centre and Periphery; grssroots
politicians in Italy and France. (Yale; Yale University 
Press, 1977) .
TEMPS MODERNES (Les), "Minorités nationales en France", nos. 
324-326, August-September 1973.
THOENIG J-C., "La rélation entre le centre et la périphérie en 
France", Bulletin de l'Institut Internationale de 
1'Administrât ion. Dec 1975.
THOMSON D. Europe since Napoleon. 2nd revised edn., (London: 
Penguin, 1978).
TOCQUEVILLE A., The Old Régime and the French Revolution. (New 
York; Doubleday, 1955).
TORSVIK P. (ed.), Mobilization. Centre-Peripherv Structures
and Nation-building. (A volume in Commemmoration of Stein 
Rokkan) (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981).
UNION DEMOCRATIQUE BRETONNE, Bretagne=Colonie. 2nd edn., 
(Rennes: UDB, 1974).
VERDAGUER P. , "Sur le Roussillon", Europe (January-February
1981).
VOLTAIRE, Le Siècle de Louis XV.
WALLERSTEIN I. , The World System. (New York & London: 1974).
WASQUET H. and DE SAINT-JOUAN R. , Histoire de la Bretagne.
7th edn., (Paris: PUF, 1980).
WEBER E., Peasants into Frenchmen. (The modernization of rural 
France 1870-1914), (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1977).
WORMS J.-P. , "Le Préfet et ses notables", Sociologie du 
Travail. 3 (July - Sept), 1966.
WRIGHT V. , "Questions d'un jacobin anglais aux régionalistes 
français", in Pouvoirs, no. 19, (1981), pp. 119-30.
WRIGHT V. , "Regionalization under the French Fifth Republic: 
the triumph of the functional approach", in Sharpe (ed.), 
(1979). pp. 193-234.
WRIGHT V. , "The Change in France", Government and Opposition. 
Autumn 1981.
- 408 -
WRIGHT V. , The Government and Politics of France. 2nd edn., 
(London: Hutchinson, 1984).
Newspapers and reviews
La Croix
La Corse-Le Provençal 
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CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN CORSICAN HISTORY
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B.C.
564
260-162
A. D.
458
534
754-774
1014
1077-1133
1133-1195
1195
1284
1453
1729-1769
1755-1768
1768
1769
1789
1794-96
1914-1918
1920
1922
Foundation of Alalia by Phocean Greeks. 
Roman Conquest.
Vandal invasions.
Saracen Invasions.
Corsica ruled by papacy.
Saracens expelled by Pisans and Genoese.
Pisan rule.
Joint rule by Pisa and Genoa.
Genoese control of Bonifacio.
Beginning of Genoese rule.
Genoa hands over the running of the island to 
the Office of St. George.
The revolt against Genoa (the Forty Years 
War)
Paolian period - attempt to set up a 
Republic.
Treaty of Versailles between Genoa and 
France.
Paoli's forces defeated by French at Ponte 
Novo.
Corsica accepted as fully French.
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom.
Thousands of Corsicans die during the 
First World War.
A Muvra founded in Paris by Petru and 
Matteu Rocca.
Partitu Corsu d'Azzione (PCA) founded by 
Petru Rocca.
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1938
1942-1943 
Sept 1943 
1949 
1954
30 June 1955
1957
1957
May 1959
Nov 1959 
June 1960
Nov 1960
Feb 1962
Oct 1963 
April 1964 
June 1964
July 1966
May 1967 
Sep 1967
The oath of Bastia sworn.
Occupation by Italy.
Liberation.
Completion of an Inventaire Départemental
Creation of a Groupement de Défense de la 
Corse at Bastia.
Decree permitting formulation of Corsican 
PAR
Creation of SOMIVAC (Jan) and SETCO (Feb).
Creation of a Centre d'Etudes et de 
Recherches Corses (CERC) by Jean 
Albertini.
Groupement de Défense de la Corse becomes 
Groupement de Défense des Intérêts 
économiques de la Corse better known as 
DIECO.
Creation of the Mouvement du 29 Novembre.
Decree published integrating Corsica into 
the Circonscription d'Action Régionale, 
Provence-Côte d'Azur
Corsican students found Union Corse in 
Paris.
Creation of Association des Etudiants 
Corses in Paris.
Creation of CAPCO at Ajaccio.
Creation of CEDIC.
Four organisations of young Corsicans in 
Paris form the Union Corse-1'Avenir.
Assises Régionalistes de la Jeunesse Corse 
during which the FRC is founded.
The CAPCO becomes the MRI. *
Creation of ARC.
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Aug 1970
Aug 1972
Jan 1973 
1973
1973
Oct 1973 
Jan 1974
Jan 1974 
Feb 1974 
July 1974 
Nov 1974 
Dec 1974 
20 May 1975
17 Aug 1975
22 Aug 1975 
27 Aug 1975 
27 Aug 1975
1 Feb 1976
Dec 1969 Corsica is detached from the Region 
Provence-Côte d'Azur and given its own 
CODER, called the CODEC.
Foundation of the PCP at Ajaccio by 
Dominique Alfonsi.
Adoption of Schéma d'Aménagement 1972 by 
the Cabinet.
The chi ama (call) of Castellare.
Regionalist movements become explicitly 
autonomist.
First université d'été in Corsica.
Formation of FPCL.
The FPCL claims recent bomb attacks on the
island and is
banned by Government.
Loi Deixonne finally applied to the 
Corsican language.
Partitu Corsu pe' u Sucialisimu (PCS) 
founded.
Ghjustizia Paolina makes its first 
appearance, claiming recent bomb attacks.
Cunsulta di i Studienti corsi (CSC) 
founded.
Libert Bou appointed chairman of the 
interministerial mission to Corsica.
Ghjustizia Paolina publishes the Manifeste de 
la Pentecôte which, for the first time demands 
the independence of Corsica.
ARC activists led by Edmond Simeoni occupy 
vineyard at Aleria.
Two gendarmes killed at Aleria.
ARC is banned
Riots in Bastia - a member of the CRS is 
killed.
ARC becomes the APC.
- 413 -
1 Apr 1976 
4-5 May 1976
Apr 1977 
Aug 1977 
Jan 1980
10 May 1981 
Dec 1981
Mar 1982 
Aug 1982
Aug 1984
Compiled from ] 
Dottelonde, op.
Territorial continuity between Corsican and 
mainland comes into force.
FPCL and GP amalgamate to form the FLNC makes 
its first public appearance by claiming 
responsibility for 18 recent bombings.
Anti-autonomist group FRANCIA formed.
APC becomes the Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC).
The events of Bastelica-Ajaccio - UPC 
autonomists capture "barbouzes". Serious 
rioting in Ajaccio. This leads to the formation 
of nationalist committees all over the island. 
These become the Cunsulta di i Cumitati 
Naziunalisti (CCN).
Mitterrand elected President.
Government accepts the programme to give 
Corsica a Statut Particulier.
Statute becomes law.
First elections to the Corsican Regional 
Assembly. UPC have seven candidates elected 
(out of sixty-two).
Second elections to the Regional Assembly.
. Labro, La Question Corse, o p . cit. and P. 
cit. (1983-4), and various other sources.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF CORSICAN GROUPS AND ORGANISATIONS
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ARC Action Régionaliste Corse (1967-1973)
ARC Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa (1973-1974)
CAPCO Comité d'Action et de Promotion de la Corse
CCI Comité Corse pour l'indépendance
CCN Consulta di Cumitati naziunalisti
CEDIC Comité d'Etudes et de Défense des Intérêts de la
Corse
DIECO Groupement de Défense des Intérêts économiques de la
Corse
FLNC Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse
FPCL Fronte Paisanu Corsu di Liberazione (Front Patriote
Corse de Libération)
FRC Front Régionaliste Corse
GP Ghjustizia Paolina
MCA Muvimentu Corsu di Autodeterminazione
MCS Muvimentu Corsu pe' u Socialisimu
Mdu29N Mouvement du 29 Novembre
MRI Mouvement Revendicatif Insulaire
PCP Parti Corse pour le Progrès
PCS Partitu Corsu pe' u Sucialisimu
PPC Partitu di u Populu Corsu
PPCA Partitu di u Populu Corsu pe' l'Autonomia
SETCO Société d'Equipment touristique de la Corse
SOMIVAC Société de la mise en valeur agricole de la Corse
UC-A Union Corse-1'Avenir
UNEC Union Nationale des Etudiants Corses
UPC Unione di u Populu Corsu
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ELECTORAL ACTIVITY IN CORSICA IN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH
REPUBLICS 
(A sample of elections in Corsica)
APPENDIX THREE
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FOURTH REPUBLIC
1945
Municipal Elections (20 April and 13 May)
1st Round 
Ajaccio
Bastia
Porto-
FN won 321 communes out of 366
Socialist - PCF list led by Arthur Giovoni 
2,700
Bonapartists - Eugène Macchini 
Radicals - André Salini 
1,200
Socialists - Moderates - PCF -
Hyacinthe de Montera
2,990
Gaullist-Republican-Radical Socialist -
Jacgues Faggianelli
1900
Sartène, Tramoni (Communist), Calvi, Lucchetti 
(Socialist), Corte, Sandreschi (Socialist),
Vecchio, Pietri (Communist) 
21 = Socialist, 112 Radical Socialists
189 Municipalities = FN 
43 = Gavinists
Cantonal Elections 1945
62 seats 26 = Radical-Socialists (Giacobbists) clan
8 = Republican Independents (Gavinists) co­
operation
16 = Socialists
10 = FN (including 6 PCF)
1 = MRP
1 = Radical Independent
(Clans get an absolute majority - co-operate to block 
Communists. Paul Giacobbi elected President of Conseil 
Général by 35 to 23).
Legislative Elections 21 October 1945
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(Scrutin de liste départemental à la proportionelle = 4 
Deputies)
Radical-Socialists 35,893 votes
2 elected = Giacobbi and Landry
Communists 31,044
1 elected = Arthur Giovoni
Independents 16,014
1 elected = Gavini
Socialists 13,014
None elected
Referendum - 21 October 1945
Corsicans: (1) 96,372 YES to Election of a Constituent
National
370 NO Assembly
(2) 65,521 YES to a Provisional Constitution
28,796 NO
(Corsicans obeyed instructions of De Gaulle).
1946
Referendum - 1946
National Assembly proposed a new Constitution to replace that 
of 1875. De Gaulle opposed this.
(France as a whole accepted it but Corsica follows De Gaulle).
Mav 45, 151, NO
42, 081, YES
October 37, 416, NO
34, 093, YES
60% abstentions
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Legislative Elections - November 1946
PCF - Socialist
Radicals
(Giacobbists)
Independents
(Gavinists)
Left loses ground.
38,702 
2 elected
30,740 
1 elected
17,938 
1 elected
= Giovoni, Bianchini
= Giacobbi
= Gavini
Senatorial (Conseillers de la République) Elections 8 December
1946
1 seat for Corsica. 
Radical Socialists 
PCF-Socialists 
Gavinists
37,492 209 delegates
35,269 236 delegates
13,563 106 delegates
347 votes for Landry 
264 votes for Vittori (PCF) 
6 votes for Romani (not a 
candidate).
But Vittori gets votes from interdepartmental remainder and 
gets a seat.
1947
Radicals adhere to De Gaulle's RPF (Rassemblement du peuple 
français).
PCF excluded from National Government.
Municipal Elections October
Communists and Sympathisers
Socialists
Gavinists
Giacobbists
AJACCIO
73 councils 
46 (+ 25)
86 (+ 43)
161 (+ 49)
Bonapartist - Radical Alliance 
(3587) (1377)
PC (3,950)
Socialists (357)
420 -
BASTIA Gaullists, (4,239)
UNR (2,720) 
socialists (841)
MRP (374)
Independent Democrats (277)
Senatorial Elections
"Clan” candidates Landry elected on 1st round (508) 
Romani elected on 2nd round (490)
PCF 171
Socialists 73 
UDSR 88
(Pleven)
UDSR 241
1st round
2nd round
(Gaullists RPF organise on island: Zuccarelli and Jean-Paul de 
Rocca-Serra represent the party).
Radical-Socialist
Independents
Communists
UDSR
- François Giacobbi
- Gavini
- Giovoni
- Mufraggi
Legislative Elections 17 June 1951
Radicals
Independents
RPF
PC
Socialists
UDSR
1954
25.000 (in comparison with 1946 -6,000) 
1 elected, Faggianelli
15.000
1 elected, Gavini (-4,000)
22.000
1 elected, Serafini 
21,000
1 elected, Giovoni
4.000
3.000
} none elected
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Senatorial Elections
Filippi
Rocca-Serra
Giacobbi
496 votes 
446 votes 
236 votes
elected 1st round 
elected 1st round
1956
Legislative Elections 2 January 
Electorate 90,000 voters.
Apparantés (Radicals, Gavinists, "Serafiniati") 
Left
Radicals
(37,000)
Independents
(19,000)
3 seats
1 seat
Faggianelli 
F. Giaccobbi 
P. Arrighi
J. Gavini
Serafini list no seat 
(11 , 000)
67.000 votes
23.000 votes
PCF
( 2 0 , 00 0 )
Socialist
no seat for first time in 13 years
No seat 
(3,000)
FIFTH REPUBLIC
Referendum - 28 September 1958
To approve the new constitution of the Fifth Republic.
Corsicans 90,154 YES (80% of voters)
13,009 NO
Legislative Elections - 1958
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1st CIRCONSCRIPTION (Ajaccio)
1st round UNR 13,888 Arrighi
November 23 Radical-Socialist 6,917
Gaullist 5,944 Maillot
PC 5,310 Giovoni
Sbcialist 513 Pinelli
2nd round UNR 19,149 Arrighi re­
elected
5th December PC 6,230 Giovini
2nd CIRCONSCRIPTION (Bastia)
1st round Independent 5,721
UNR 5,668
Gauche Dem. 5,184
Radical-Socialist 4,865 
PCF 4,665
Socialist 1,605
Independent 149
2nd round Independent 10,774
UNR 7,249
Radical-Socialist 7,046 
PCF 4,841
Gavini
Maynard
Faggianelli
Zuccarelli
Giudicelli
de Casalta
Maestracci
Gavini re­
elected 
Maynard 
Zuccarelliii 
Guidicelli
3rd CIRCONSCRIPTION (Porto-Vecchio) 
1st round
Radical-Socialist
UNR
PCF
2nd round
11,774
9,717
7,033
2,858
Rad-Soc (Bonifacio) 1,453 
Candidat d'inter\t 896
local à Porto-Vecchio)
UNR
De Rocca-
Serra
Giaccobi
Sammarcelli
Bungelmi
Tramoni 
D. Feracci
18,903
15,971
PCF 2,514
Corsicans on the continent elected under Gaullist banner.
Sammarcelli 
elected 
De Rocca- 
Serra 
Bungelmi
Achille Peretti 
Jean-Baptiste Biaggi 
Pierre Pasquini 
Colonna d'Anfiani
Paris
Paris
Nice
Marseilles
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Pascal Marchetti 
René Tomasini
Marseilles
L'Eure
21 DECEMBER 1958 - Presidential Election
Vote of 'grands électeurs' in departmental
capitals.
582 delegates 
559 vote
497 De Gaulle 
49 Marrane (PCF)
8 Chatelet (Moderate)
5 spoiled
SENATORIAL ELECTIONS 1959
Faggianelli 447 Elected
De Rocca-Serra 425 Elected
Giacobbi 387
Zuccareli 240
Jean Mattei 46
Tranoni 38
8 January 1961 - REFERENDUM
Referendum on self-determination for Algeria. De Gaulle asks 
for a YES.
61,064 YES (76%)
19,199 NO (24%)
YES supported by Sammarcelli, Faggianelli, Serafini, Maillot; 
NO by Arrighi, Gavini, Giacobbi, de Rocca-Serra, last 
represent 70% of the electorate.
REFERENDUM 5 April 1962
To pronounce on Evian Accords giving Algeria independence;
69,301 YES (88%)
9,438 NO
but abstention rate = 50%.
- 424 -
SENATORIALS 24 September 1962
Filippi (Radical Socialist) 439 elected
Giacobbi (Radical Socialist) 438 elected
De Rocca Serra 326
Faggianelli 324
Guidicelli (PCF)‘ 31
Franchini (PCF) 25
REFERENDUM 28 October 1962
On whether the French should elect the President directly
75% of all French vote 
62% YES 
38% NO
Corsica 48% vote
43,763 YES (55%)
35,041 NO (45%)
LEGISLATIVES 18 November 1962
lst Circonscription (Ajaccio-Calvi)
lst round Serafini (CCB)
Franchini (PCF) 
Antona (Gavinist) 
Seta (Radical)
2nd Conscription (Bastia)
1st round
15,772 Elected 
6,883 
4,610 
4,256
Zuccarelli (Rad-Soc) 9,651
Gavini (Independent) 7,177
Sammarcelli (UVR) 4,875
Guidicelli (PCF) 4,667
Maestracci (Independent) 443
2nd round Zuccarelli
Sammarcelli
Gavini
16,541 Elected 
6,147 
7,087
3rd Circonscription (Corte-Sartène)
1st round de Rocca-Serra 17,933
Maynard 14,812
Cantara (UNR) 2,181
Colonna (Independent) 1,980
Bungelmi 2,510
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2nd round de Rocca-Serra 25,427 Elected
Maynard 22,072
Prefect Turon describes the election as a 'Situation choquante 
et dérisoire'.
Spring 1963: Conseil constitionnel annuls elections of
Ajaccio-Calvi, Corte-Sartène. New elections.
Corte-Sartène
de Rocca-Serra 
Alfonsi (Radical) 
Pagini (Gaullist) 
Bungelmi (PCF) 
Mattei (UNR)
21,276 Re-elected 
11,314 
3,124 
2,478 
1,456
Ajaccio-Calvi
1st round Serafini
Arrighi
Franchini
Tomi
Munconi
14,667
7,405
5,218
3,671
2,740
2nd round Serafini
Tomi
19,659 Elected 
17,050
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1965
1st Round (5 December 1965)
Electorate 178,329
Votes cast 100,617
Valid votes 100,038
Results
(0.4%)
(56.48%)
(7.72%)
(0.5%)
(25.66%)
(9.13%)
M. Barbu 456
C. De Gaulle 56,524
J . Lecanuet 7,717
P. Marcilliacy 540
F. Mitterrand 25,661
J-L Tixier-Vignancour 9,140
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2 nd Round (19th December 1965)
Electorate 178,379
Votes cast 109,233
Valid votes 107,931
Results
De Gaulle 64,381 (59.54%)
Mitterrand 43,550 (40.45%)
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 5 and 12 March 1967
1st Constituency (Aiaccio) 
Electorate 61,868
Votes cast 39,974
20,831 elected on 1st round 
12,006 
5,229 
1,908
1st Round
Jean Bozzi Ve Rép.
Fr. Giacobbi, F.G.D.S.
A. Fillippi Codaccioli, P.C. 
D. Bastiani, All.r£p.
2nd Constituency (Bastia) 
Electorate 50,591
Votes cast 36,820
1st round
Faggianelli Ve Rép. 
Zuccarelli F.G.D.S. 
Guidicelli, P.C. 
Giacommi, Rép. ind., 
Hauvesbre-Gallini 
Simeoni, Région-Corse 
Vinciguera, 15 
Ambrosini 
Nucci 
Arrighi
9,726 Elected on 1st round 
8,470 
5,091 
5,058 
1,863
1,160 
15 
12 
4 
3
3rd Constituency fBonifaccio)
Electorate 63,518
Votes cast 4 3,840
23,037 Elected' 
13,299 
3,897 
3,589 
18
J.P. Rocca Sera, Ve Rep. 
P. Mondoioni, F.G.D.S. 
Pierucci, Centr. dém.
P. Bungelni, P.C.
J. Parolo, Défence des
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Intérêts corse
Election annulled by decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
on 12 July 1967.
New election on 27 August 1967.
J.P. Rocca Sera, Ve Rép. 21,834 Elected
P. Mondoloni, F.G.D.S. 14,122
Bungelni, P.C. 3,779
23 and 30 June 1968
1st Constituency (Aiaccio) 
Electorate 62,732
Votes cast 36,771
Jean Bozzi, d.s., U.D.R.
F. Giacobbi, Féd.-Rad., 
prés. Cons, gén., sén.,
G. dem., anc. min.,
A. Ferracci, P.C.,
20,248 Re-elected
11,972
4,551
2nd Constituency (Bastia)
Electorate 51,124
Votes cast 36,834
Paul Giacomi, U.D.R., 19,540 Elected
Jean Zuccarelli, d.s., m., 10,504
Féd.-Rad.,
P. Guidicelli, P.C. 6,294
G. Viale, P.S.U. 481
F. Emmanuelli, Jeun. Révol. 11
marx, corse
21 April 1968 (after annulment) 
Electorate 51,189
votes cast 33,388
Giacomi, Ind., sout. U.D.-Ve, 15,023
Zuccarelli, Féd.-Rad., 11,283
Guidicelli, P.C., 6,158
Simeoni, région 822
Maestracci-Piero 102
28 April 1968
Electorate 36,194
Zuccarelli 19,098 Elected
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3rd Constituency (Corte-Sartène)
Electorate 65,309 
Votes cast 40,077
Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra d.s.
U.D.R., in. de Porto-Vecchio, 
P. Mondolini, Féd.-S.F.I.O., 
P. Bungelmi, P.C.
P. Luciani, P.D.M.,
T. Luca, Progr.,
,23,077
11,947
3,761
1,281
11
re-Elected
4 and 11 March 1973
1st Constituency (Aiaccio-Calvi)
Electorate 63,506 
Votes cast 41,490
1st round (votes cast 40.295)
Bozzi
(Sout.Réf. et C.N.I).,
Alfonsi
P.C.
Parti corse pour le progrés
L.C.
div.,
12,545
11,340
9,998
4,696
1,302
239
22
2nd round
N. Alfonsi, U.G.S.D., 
Bozzi, d.s. U.R.P.,
21,858
19,632
Elected
2nd Constituency (Bastia) 
Electorate 54,238 
Votes cast 35,416
1st round (votes cast 38.219) 
Giacomi,
Zuccarelli,
P.C.,
Réf., 
div. ,
16,950
11,197
8,046
2,004
22
2nd round *
Zuccarelli U.G.S.D., 
Giacomi, d.s., U.R.P.
19,619
15,797
Re-elected
3rd Constituencv (Sartène, Corte)
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Electorate 63,820
Votes cast 39,538
de Rocca-Serra, d.s., U.R.P. 20,733 re-Elected on 1st
Modolini, U.G.S.D. 11,321
Bungelmi, P.C., 4,363
Luciani, S.E., 3,129
1st Round Presidential Elections 1974
Electorate 180,173
Votes cast 122,429
Abstentions 57,744 (32.05%)
Valid votes 121,748
Mitterrand 54,418
Chaban-Delmas 33,766
Giscard d'Estaing 29,725
Le Pen 1,064
Royer 884
Laguiller 658
Dumont 596
Krivine 243
Muller 118
Héraud 102
Renouvin 96
Sebag 78
Aiaccio
Electorate 19,140
Votes cast 14,356
Mitterrand, 5,717
Gistard d'Estaing 4,266
Chaban-Delmas 3,706
Le Pen, 210
Royer 152
Dumont 108
Laguiller 90
Krivine 27
Muller 24
Renouvin 20
Sebag 20
Héraud 16
Bastia
Electorate 19,162
Votes cast 12,949
Mitterrand 7,522
Gistard d'Estaing 2,989
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Chaban-Delmas 2,000
Le Pen 107
Royer 103
Laguiller 80
Krivine 24
Héraud 15
Muller 15
Renouvin 8
Sebag 6
Corte
Electorate 4,131
Votes cast 2,239
Mitterrand 986
Giscard d'Estaing 640
Chaban-Delmas 534
Royer 2 0
Porto-Vecchio 
Electorate 4,270
Votes cast 2,239
Chaban-Delmas 1,440
Mitterrand 624
Giscard d'Estaing 330
Le Pen 26
Royer 26
Sartène
Electorate 2,494
Votes cast 1,887
Mitterrand 1,282
Giscard d'Estaing 340
Chaban-Delmas 209
Le Pen 26
2nd Round Presidential Elections 1974
Electorate 180,185
Votes Cast 139,408
Abstentions 40,777 (22.63%)
180,185
139,408
40,777
Valid Votes 138,365
Giscard d'Estaing 
Mitterrand
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73,547 53.15%
64,818 (46.85%
Aiaccio
Electorate 19,142
Votes cast 15,607
Giscard d'Estaing 8,807
Mitterrand 6,800
Bastia
Electorate 19,278
Votes cast 14,852
Mitterrand 9,041
Giscard d'Estaing 5,811
Corte
Electorate 4,131
Votes cast 2,584
Giscard d'Estaing 1,417
Mitterrand 1,167
Porto-Vecchio 
Electorate 4,208
Votes cast 2,676
Giscard d'Estaing 1,953
Mitterrand 723
Sartène
Electorate 2,494
Votes cast 2,092
Mitterrand 1,449
Giscard d'Estaing 643
LEGISLATIVES 2 and 19 March 1978
Corse-du-Sud (2)
1st Constituency (Aiaccio)
Electorate 59,921
Votes cast 44,546
Abstentions 23.98%
Jean Bozzi, a.s., R.P.R. 22,778 (51.13%) Elected on 2nd
round
M.N. Alfonsi, d.s., cons. 21,768
gén., m. de Piana, M.R.G.
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1st round
Votes cast 41,633
Abstentions 23.98%
J. Bozzi 12,161
N. Alfonsi 11,048
J. Rossi, cons.gén., • 10,317
U.D.F.-P.R.,
A. Ferracci, P.C. 6,160
A. Simongiovanni, C.N.I.P. 663
Mme. Th. Luciani, Choisir 284
2nd Constituency (Sartène)
Electorate 30,117
Votes cast 23,183
Jean-Paul de Rocca Serra, 12,000 Re-elected on 1st round
d.s., prés. cons. gén., 
m. de Porto-Vecchio, R.P.R.
D. Bucchini, m. de Sartène, 3,867
P.C.
T. Luciani, Cons. Gén., 3,366
M.R.G.
P. Ettori, P.S. 2,079
D. de Rocca Serra, R.D.A.C. 1,665
J. Istria, div. maj., 109
D. Panzani, div. maj., 74
F. Rossi, div. maj., 23
Haute-Corse
1st constituency (Bastia)
Electorate 59,901
Votes cast 54,020
Abstentions 24.01%
Pierre-Paul Giacomi, a.d., 23,397 Elected on 2nd round
cons.gén., m. de Pruno, R.P.R.
M.J. Zuccarelli, d.s. cons. 21,623 
gén., m. de Bastia, M.R.G.
1st round
Votes cast 41,190
Abstentions 31.17%
P. Giacomi 12,844
J. Zuccarelli 9,962
P. Guidicelli, cons.gén.,P.C. 8,953
M.J. Vinciguerra, U.D.F.-P.R. 8,099
Mme. L. Molinelli, écol., 1,382
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2nd Constituency (Corte. Calvi) 
Electorate 53,979
Votes cast 38,406
Abstentions 27.53%
Pierre Pasquini, a.d. 
round
m. de l'île Rousse, R.P.R.,
M.F. Giacobbi, sén., prés, 
cons. rég., anc. min. M.R.G.
1st round
Votes cast 37,144
Abstentions 31.10%
F. Giacobbi 
P. Pasquini
F.-G. Geromini C.N.I.P.
V. Carlotti, cons. gén. P.S.
V. Duriani, P.C.
10,828
10,626
7,459
4,236
3,995
20,081 (52.28%) Elected 2nd 
18,325
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Statistiques électorales 1945 - 1981
A - Avant la suppression du vote par correspondance
Comuluttom Inscrit*1
Votant*
V
Taux
v u
Voici par correspondance et procuration
Sou» ce»CorrrifioAj. Proturjl. Total Taux/l Taux /V
Lfjivljtivci 45 
21 octobre 45
Corse
Métropole
158685
24622862
96749
19657603
60,97
79,84
RaouiHtmon 
Elections et 
référendums (k  Monde 
1946)
Législative* 46 
2 juin 1946
Cor«
Métropole
159702
24696949
97840
20215200
61,26
81,85
IrjtUativrs SI 
17 tum 1951
Corse
Métropole
149234
24530523
92601
19670655
62,05
80,18
423
60911
229
9106
652
70017
0,43
0,28
0,70
0,35
M inière de l’intérieur 
et Documentation 
française
Lexical tv« 56 
2 janvier 1956
Corse
Métropole
154692
26772255
90831
22138046
58,71
82,69
251
131017
304
23112
555
154129
0,35
0.57
0,61
0,69
lëftslalivef 58 
23 novembre 1958
Corie
Métropole
160355
27244729
94734
21025824
59,08
'77,18
3816
201467
2368
128981
6184
330448
3.85
U 1 1-57
Léjslatives 62 
1 Î novembre 62
Coru
Métropole
169132
27526358
98393
18918159
58,17
68,72
16101
227106
1100
34607
17201
261713
10,17
0,94
17,4«
1,38
Présidentielle} 65 
1er tour 
5 décembre 65
Cor je 
Métropole
17*329
28233167
100617
24001%!
56,42
85,01
Conseil constitutionnel 
|0  du 30 décembre 1965
freùdrnlielki 65 
2éme tour 
19 décembre 65
Corse
Métropole
178379
28023198
109233
23862653
61,23
85.15
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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Statistiques électorales 1945 - 1981
\près la suppression du vote par correspondance
Consultations Inscrit»1
Votants
V
Taux
V/l
Voles par procuration
SourcesNombre Taux/l Taux/V
Municipal« 77 
13 mars 1977
Corsedu Sud 
Haute-Corse
Corse
Métropole
87494
115583
203077
33080318
, 68503 
83734
152237
26084554
78,29
72,44
74,96
78,80
16021 18,31 23,38 Pour la Corse : bureaux 
des élections des préfec­
tures.
Pour la métropole : le 
Monde (résultats non 
définitifs).
Lcfislatives 78 
12 mars 1978
Corse-du-Sud
Haute-Corse
Corse
Métropole
90422
115654
206076
34394378
65872
79513
145385
28656845
72,84
68,75
70,54
83,31
15710
18458
34168
609202
17,37
15,95
16,58
1,77
2334
23,21
23,50
2,12
Ministère de l’intérieur 
et Documentation 
française |
i
|
Européennes 79 
10 juin 1979
Corsc-duSud
Haute-Corse
Cor«
Metropole
88384
115690
204074
34347872
42382
53254
95636
21026230
47,95
46,03
- 46.86 
61,21
6462
8046
14506
348764
7,31
6.95
7,10
1,01
15,24
15,10
15,17
1,65
Supplement aux Dosiieà^ 
du Monde,Juin 1969 i
Pour les voles par proew- ; 
ration : bureau des élec­
tions des préfectures et 
ministère de l’intérieur i
Consultations Inscrits1
Votants
V
Taux
V/l
Voles par procuration
SourcesNombre Taux/l Tiux/V
Présidentielles 81 
1er tour
26 avril 1981
Corse-du-Sud
Haute-Corse
Corse
Métropole
90193
115729
205922
35458985
60172
73436
13360S
28972114
66,71
63,45
64,88
81,70
12032 10,40 16,38
Conseil constitutionnel 
JO du 16 mai 1981
Pour les voles par 
procuration : bureaux des 
élections des préfectures.
Présidentielles 81 
2è tour
10 mai 1981
Corte-du-Sud
Haute-Corse
Corne
Métropole
90290
115538
205828
35459328
67553
80698
148251
30648932
74,81
69,84
72,02
86,43
15178 13,14 18,81
Législatives 81 
14 juin 981
Corse-du-Sud
HauteCorse
Corse
Métropole
90573
115644
206217
35536041
58477
71719
130196
25182262
64,56
62,01
63,13
70,86
12322
15609
27931
13,60
13,50
13,54
21,07
21,76
21,45
Résultats non encore publiés 
par le ministère de (Inté­
rieur 0 ) Le Monde des 
16 et 17 juin 1981.
Pour tes voles par procura­
tion : bureaux des élections 
des préfectures.
(1) (mir» 1982)
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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RÉSU LTA TS PO LIT IQ U ES 
SU FFR A G ES O BTEN U S, 1945 -1982
CoriuHU-
lions
Résultats d'tniem bk lU su lu n  4*  U fauche
droite |iu c h * dm*n TOTAL MRG PS PC
L45 16300 79957 96257 35969 13015 30973
L46 19095 78310 97405 33974 12182 32154
L S I 37641 54128 91769 28327 4133 21668
L56 28838 60365 . 89203 36864 3110 20391
L58 42770 50299 1045 94114 35386 2119 12794
L62<0 56245 43494 591 100330 31121 - 12373
P65 64381 43550 107931 - - -
L67*2* 59596 52577 9 2 ^ 113097 23289 14122 15166
L68 64117 49276 soé* 113899 22734 11957 14585
L73 64695 52924 443 118062 24506 11321 17097
P74 73547 64818 138365 - - -
L78 78079 64494 490 143063' 35204 6315 22975
P81 77026 70737 147763 - - -
L81 61161 67430 57 128648 33258 14520 19652
CANTONALES DE 1982  (5 )
RPR UDF Modérés ih». |*u. MRG PS PC TOTAL
9944 7797 5569 1562 8791 7586 7092 48341
(1 ) Les d ec in n s des circonscriptions d 'A jaccio  c l de Code ont été annulées. Nous 
avons retenu les résultats des élections partielles du 24 mars 1963 (Aÿaccio) et 
du 12 mai 1963 (C orte)
(2 ) Même observation pour Bastia et Corte — partielles du 27 août 1967 (C orte) et
du 21 avril 1968 (Bastia ).
3 dont 822 tuffrajes autonomistes (M ax Sim eoni).
4 dont 481 suffrages P SU .
S ) 29 cantons sur $2, prem ier tour [ L t  Monde, 16 mars 1982).
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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ÏS
8
\
TAUX DE PROCURATION PAR RAPPORT AUX INSCRITS
L législatives 
P présidentielles 
E européennes
f t  s * 2  sasJW  «i «( <4 J  à J
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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Consultation* Inscrits VotantsV
Twx
V/l
Vom pjf con«ÿond*nce ft procuri lion
SourceCorreipond- ToUl T iiu / l Tan/V
LcfiiUiives 67
5 man 1967
Corse
Métropole
175977 
28300936
116266
22902224
66,06
80.92
25562
362357
2259
57693
27821
420050
15,80
1,48
23,92
M 3
Minnùrc de l'mtériaur al 
Documentation frança«
Lé(»iattvcs 68
23 juin 1968
Cor te 
Métropole
183363
2818ÌB48
114801
22532407
62.60
79,95
21082
338595
2058
66498
23140
405093
12.61
1.43
20,15
1,79
Présidentielles 69 
1er tour 
2 rum 1969
Corse
Métropole
181364
28774041
110947
22492059
61,17
78,16
Comtil constitutionnel 
K> du 20 juin 1969
Président iel les 69 
2è tour 
15 juîn 1969
Corse
Métropole
181270
28761494
108910
19854087
60.08
69,03
Lég»Ut(vei 73 
4 mvs 1973
Cors«
Métropole
182163
»901822
119444
24289285
65,56
8U3
21847
392749
1690
75000
23537
467829
12.92
1,56
19,70
1,92
Mmkim de rmicfiwr et
Dqam tfiuùm  frtnçane
Présidentielles 74 
1er tour 
5 mai 1974
Corse
Métropole
179086
29778550
121472
25285835
67.82
84.91
Conseil comtmitionnel 
JOdu25m »il974
Ptésidemielles 74 
2è tour
19 mi* 1974
Cor te 
Métropole
1 *0 7 4 1
29774211
1 394 03
26168242
7 7 ,34
87,88
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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L législatives 
P présidentielles 
E européennes
TAUX DE PROCURATION PAR RAPPORT AUX INSCRITS
t t  s s * a s ss t s : f t  s<*W j  -* -I •. ^ w d
Source: Tuf felli (1982)
La région Corse (1970-1979)
Le Trafic Passagers 1970 1979
(Entrées + Sorties): — -
Ports.................... 785 600 1 730 900
Aéroports.............. 660 100 1 338 400
Tctiai.......... 1 445 700 3 069 300 •
Le Tourisme :
Nombre de touristes . 445 000 1 150 000
La Production Agricole :
Vin ...................... 1 500000 hi 1 532 765 hi
Agrumes............... 7 000t 27 200 t
La Corse en France (1978)
Corse France
Avoirs en fin d’année dans les Caisses 
d’Fp?»r£ne par habitant .................... 4 896,7 F 
861 F 
37 
22,6
1
7 097,4 F 
1 691 F 
37 
22,4
Impôt sur le revenu par habitant (francs) . .. 
Véhicules automobiles pour 100 habitants .. 
Telephones pour 100 habitants.................
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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L législatives 
P présidentielles 
M municipales
TAUX DE PARTICIPATION
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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L législatives 
P présidentielles 
M municipales 
E européennes
ÉVOLUTION DES INSCRITS ET DES VOTANTS
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
443-
ÉVOLUTION DE LA GAUCHE
1945-1981
L législatives
P présidentielles
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
- 4 4 4 -
15
00
00
ÉVOLUTION GÉNÉRALE DES SUFFRAGES OBTENUS
1945-1981
? 5 5 ? !  8 8 S 8 2 S 8 8 -
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
”  445 ”
APPENDIX FOUR 
MISCELLANEOUS FIGURES AND DOCUMENTS
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Deux départements depuis 1975
Corse du Sud Haute Cone
Population ¡975 .................................. 101 640 hab. 125 785 hab.
Dont :
Population active.......................... 36 000 hab. 45 310 hab.
Activités économiques :
Agriculture........................................ 5 325 hab. 10425 hab.
Industrie.......... .......... .................... 2 080 hab. 2 850 hab.
Bâtiment TJ*....................................... 7 195 hab. 7 840 hab.
Tertiaire............................... ............ 19 760 22 030
Statistiques agricoles :
Terres labourées................................. 2 430 ha 6 800 ha
Vignes.............................................. 4 550 ha 22 000 ha
Vergers d'agrumes .............................. 335 ha 2 700 ha
Autres vergers..................................... 505 ha I 469 ha
Châtaigneraies.......... ......................... 9000 ha 16 000 ha
Oliveraies ......................................... 4 300 ha 6 300 ha
Horticulture et maraîchage.................... 250 ha 465 ha
Organisation administrative.................... 2 arrondissements 3 arrondissements
20 cantons 29 cantons
124 communes 236 communes
Superfìcie ......................................... 4 166 km1 4 555 km1
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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L ' H EBERG EM EN T H O TELIER  ET LES V ILLA G ES DE VACANCES
Por;
Propria
♦ Village de vacances
*  Village naturiste
^  Village du Club
Méditerrannée 500
400-500
300-400 200-300 
100-200
0-100 chambres 
Capacité de réception hôtelière
Bastia
Porto Vecchio
Bonifacio
Source: Renucci, in Partponi et al LA CORSE (1984)
- 448 -
superficie en vigne
Source:
LE VIGNOBLE CORSE
Renucci, in Partponi et al LA CORSE (1984)
■ superficie en agrumes
So u rce :
LE VERGER D AGRUMES CORSE
Ranucci, in Panponi et cil LA CORSE (1984)
- 450 “
militen de 
tau rin «
900
«00
700
600
800
L 'EVOLUTION OU FLUX TOURISTIQUE 
ISO.
LE T R A F IC -PA SSA G ER S  AU COURS DE L ‘ ANNEE 1977 
I En tré« «  So rti«  I
/.»/
Source: Rermcci in F. Panpani et. al. La Corse (1984)
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Fig. 46. —  Le dynamisme démographique 
de la plaine orientale 1962-1968
Sources : RcgiMrr» des naissant« rt dp» dvccï domiciliés. 
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Evaluation numérique du dépeuplement 
(de l'époque du maximum k 1967) 
cr* î Rccrn*rmrnt>. Sondxçr au vingtlèmr dt  l'IN S E E  1963.
- L'intensité du dépeuplement
Régrtuion rcb livr de U population drpuis l'époque du 
maximum r i jusqu't 1962.
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Evolution 
de la Population insulaire.
Population Population Taux d'accroissement
Recensée Estimée moyen annuel
Corse
i
France
1954 ............... 247 000 170 000 0.37 %
• 1962 ............... 275 000 176 000 3,3 516 1,2 %
1968 ............... 269 000 .209 000 1,1 % 0,8 %
1975 ............... 289 000 227 000
1982 ............... 240 178 0,8 % 0,4 %
Les métamorphoses de l’économie agricole
1962 1975
Exploitants agricoles.............................. Il 020 6 385
Salarits agricoles................................... 5 180 9 350
Toi m ..................................... 16 200 15 735
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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ATTENTATS EN HAUTE-CORSE EN 198j* ET 1985
MprHHM
pM«M
toif»
tillOR
Bailli Cthrt Caria CMsa-RICCll
Vittt-
trili
Tftil
C m
Tttal
N ie*
Total
Gcndir-
■erlt
84 es 84 85 84 85 84 85 84 85 84 85 84 85 84 85
Gendaimerie 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 1
Police ....... 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4
Militaire . . . 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4
Administra­
tion ........... 3 5 3 4 2 2 3 2 0 0 11 13
Banque ___ 6 S 2 6 * 2 0 4 1 0 11 17
Particulier 96 104 25 27 16 8 41 37 15 12 193 189
Total ......... 109 118 32 39 21 13 44 46 17 12 223 228 5? 71 171 157
Source: Hermant and Bigo (1986)
Numéro Date
Dépar­
tement
2A
Dépar­
tement
2B
Nombre
atiéntala
NUITS BLEUES 1983
1 09.04.83 — — 11
2 23.05.83 — — 60
3 01.07.83 — — 10
4 12.07.83
m — 12
5 14.07.83 — — 10
6 07.09 83 — — 10
7 07.10 83 — 14
8 30.11.B3 — 21
148
•Oit 25 %
du total
NUITS BLEUES 1984
1 10.01.84 10 3 13
2 27.03.84 1 9 10
3 31.03.84 25 — 25
4 16.04.84 — 9 9
S 18.04.84 8 — 8
6 09.05.84 10 — 10
7 13.05.84 13 2 15
B 18.06.84 19 1 20
9 10.07.84 15 — 15
10 13.07.84 11 36 47
11 21.11.84 4 9 13
12 02.12.84 B 3 11
196
soit 40 %
du total
NUITS BLEUES 1985
1 06 05.85 25 — 25
2 10.05.85 — 21 21
3 15 05 85 — 21 21
4 01.07.85 22 25 47
~94
soit 23 %
du total
NUITS BLEUES 1988
Néant au 12.02.1986
Source: Hermant and Bigo (1986)
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1960
1964
1966
1967
1970
1973
1974
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
A.P.C.
U.P.C-
U CUMUNU
U.LC 
+ C.S.C.
F.C. I— —A / C.GN.C
F.P.C.
✓
C.l. AN
P.P.C.
M.C:.s.
A DIASPORA
I
Schema of the development of radical regionalism 
Source: Hermant and tìigo (1986)
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MOUVEMENTS SÉPARATISTES
SIGIES MOUVEMENTS rtMOQESBACTIÏITtl ACTION*
CI.C. Comité pour l'Indépendance de U Corse 1962 Propagande auto­
nomiste (leader Le 
Bohin. arrtté pour 
atteinte Sbrpté de 
l'Etat) j
CL Corse Libre 1968 Attentats
G.P. Ghjiustlti* Paohn* Mai 1973/tin 1975 Attentats '
F.P.C.L. Front* Paesanu Corsu tfi Libérazione Octobre 1973/ 
Mars 1976
Attentats.
GS Gbiiustisip Sampiero Mai/Juin 1974 2 attentats é 
Bastelica.
G.C. Ghjiustisia Cors» Novembre 1974/ 
Septembre 1975
2 attentats.
F.R.C. Front Révolutionnaire Corse Septembre 1175 2 attentats i  
Ghisonaccia.
C.R.C. Commandos Révolutionnaires Corses Septembre 1875/ 
Décembre 1975
Attentats.
F.L.N.C. Front (te Libération Nationale Corse Mai 197«/
C.S-R. Comité de Soutien Révolutionnaire Nov. 1975 3 attentats.
A.R.C. Armée Révolutionnaire Cors* Décembre 1975/ 
Février 1976
Attentats et mets.
ARC. Action Révolutionnaire Corse Décembre 1875/ 
Ro 1976
Attentats et tracts.
C.N.L. Cumitati di Libérazione Nasiunale Janvier 1976 Tracts.
6P.C.C Groupe des Patriotes Communistes 
Corsas
Janvier 1876 ?
6.A.C.0AC. Groupement d'action clandestine paur 
la Oélense du Agriculteurs Corses.
Avril 1976 Attentats
GRC Groupe Révolutionnaire Corse (issu *c 
la Ligue Communiste)
Juillet «76 ?
F.R Front* Corsu pour les intérêts du plan 
routwr de la Corse
JuiBet 1976 Menaces écrites
F.R.B. Front Révolution Bonitacien Septembre 1976 ?
CJLCF Comité Anti-Cor se Français Septembre 1976 ?
O.F.R.A. Organisation des Forces Révolution­
naires Actives
Octobre 1976 Attentats
A.L.C Armée de Libération Corses Mars 1977 T
MP.L.C. Muvimenlu per a Libérazione di a 
Corsica
Mars 1978 T
U.I.L.C. Muvimentu per rMépendenza e a 
Bbéranone di a Corsica
Avril 197S ?
V.L.D.C. A Voci Libéra Oi a Corsica (La voit 
libre de la Corse)
Septembre 1978 Emission radio 
pirate.
B.R.C. Brigades Révolutionnaires Corses Janvier 1983/ Attentats.
A. INC Armée 6e Libération Nationale Corse Juillet 1983/ Attentats
MOUVEMENTS ANTI-SÉPARATISTES
M U «OUVEMtni K M »rAcnvim ACTBRS
P.F. Présence Française (ou Action 
Française)
Existait déjà 
avant-guerre Se 
manifeste encore 
de temps en temps
Tracts et lettres.
C.D.L.C Comité de Oélense du Littoral Cargésien Juin 1975 Communiqué de 
presse.
61 Gbfiustiiia e Liberia Septembre 1975/ 
Juillet 1976
Attentais.
F.BAI Front de Baiagne Anti-Italiens 
ôtvttnl
Octobre 1975
Attentats
F.CA.I Front Corse Anti-italiens Novembre 1975/ 
Juillet 1976
G.FC Gltjiustizia Francésa e Corsa Novembre 1975 1 attentat t  Pic* 
naie
CM Ghjiustizia Morandma Novembre 1975 Incendie bungalow 
el tracts
LAI Ligue AntMtaNenne Janvier 1976 1 attentat.
SC Sampiéro Corsu Janvier 1976 Attentats
OAS O A S Corse Janvier 1976 T
AP.N. Aciion Pied Noir Septembre «076 î
F.CL France-Corse Libre Ocl-Nov t976 1 attentat
CCV Comité Corse pour la Vérité Janvier 1977 1
ACV Action pour la Corse Française Février 1977 Attentats
FR A N C1 A Front d'Actton Nouvelle contre (Indé­
pendance et l'Autonomie
Avril 1977/ 
Janvier 1911
Attentats
PM La Paii ou la Mort Septembre 1978 Affichettes.
Source: Hermant and Biçp (1986)
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La Population urbaine
--
Nombre % du total Ajaccio + Bastìa
1891 ..................... 55 000 20 96 37 000
1954 ..................... 70 -  75 000 42% 54 000
1962 ..................... 75 -  80 000 48% 60 000
1968 ..................... 100 -  105 000 50% 80 -  85 000
1975 ..................... 120 -  130 000 56% 100 000
1982 ..................... 120 -  130 000 54% 100 000
I
Les Secteurs d’Activité ( % )
1962 1975
Corse France Corse France
Primaire............. 32,7 20,6 20.6 9.5
Secondaire.......... 21,5 38.7 25.5 39.2
Tertiaire.............. 45,7 40.7 53.9 51.3
-
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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Evolution de la Structure par Ages ( % )
Ages 1962 1968 1975
0 - 19 ans \ ......... 27.7* 274 24,5
20 - 39 ans .......... 25 % 26.6 28.6
40 - 59 ans --- 24,9 % 23.8 23,8
+ 60 ans......._____ 22.4 % 22,1 22.6
y
Evolution de la Population active
Actifs 1962 1968 1975
Hommes............... 41 600 51 520 64 300
Dont étrangère........ 3 680 10 760 21 520
Femmes................ 9 500 11 860 17010
Ensemble............... 51 100 63 380 81 310
L'Evolution de l’Emploi
Activités
Economiques 1962 1968 1975
Evolution 
62-75 %
Agriculture.......... -16 500 15 740 15 750
» «
- 5
Industrie............. 4 320 4 140 4 930 + 14
Bâtiment........
Travaux Publics . . . 6 560 11 380 15 035 + 129
Tertiaire............. 23 060 30 800 41 790 + 81
Source: Tuffelli (1982)
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7. Sondage « Nouvel Observateur- 
S.O.F.R.E.S. réalisé entre les 28 et 30 août 
1975 en Corse
Les événements d 'A léria  rou i ont-¡la surpris m  bien, au con­
traire , est-ce que vous «sas attendiez à une explosion de mé­
contentement en Cone ?
— Les événement* d 'A léria m 'ont suipris . .  3 7 %
— Je  m 'attendais I  une explosion de mécon­
tentement .................... .. ........................  59 %
— Sans opinion............. ...............................  4 %
100*
Pensei-voas que l'action  des autonomistes de TA .R .C . 1 Ale- 
ria  était, au départ, justifiée ou pas justifiée ?
— Ju s tifié e .................................................... 62 %
»  %
17 %
10 0 %
Rendez-vous les Pieds N o iis responsable* da mécontentement 
des agriculteur* cone* ?
— Entièrem ent.............................................  1 1 %
— En  p a rtie ..................................... ............  49 %
— P u  do tou t............; .................................  1 9 %
— Ne sait p a s ................................................ 11 %
100 %
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French translation by Charles Santoni of the Chjama di Castellare
HAK  I F E S T E
Le Peuple Corse, lui aussi, i  droit I  la parole.
Au nota de toutes les générations du passé, qui firent 1« 
tradition-nationale de la CORSE, nous parlons pour notre Patrie.
Nous disons le danger, qu'on ne saurait taire, et l'espoir 
qu'on no saurait perdre.
Mous déclarons que le Peuple Corse a reçu de la  Mature et de 
l 1 H istoire,le droit Inaliénable d'étre »aftrc de son destin et de son 
sol : l 'Ile  de CORSE.
Ce droit qui est leinôtre demeure Intact, alors nine que de 
longue date une nation étrangère se l'e s t arrogé.
Bien que vaincue e t soumise, la nation Corse, qui trouva 
avec Pasquale PAOLI son tccomplisscaent et sa gloire,' existe encore 
aujourd'hui. E lle  ne peut disparaître que par la destruction de son 
peuple.
C'est de cela précisément qu 'il s 'ag it aujourd'hui..
HOUS ACCUSOHS l'impérialisme français de tenter de détruire 
le peuple corse, en le chassant de chez lui par des noyens ¿¿tournés, 
afin d'en faire un; population dispersée ds quénndeurs.
liOUS APPELONS tous les patriotes corses I  se rass& tler. dans 
une Urilon ce la Patrie, afin de conjurer cette tenace.
L'heure est venue d'en fin ir  avec deux siècles de colon! a ll sis; 
et de prétendue asiio iU tion , qui font obstacle 2 tout progrès politique, 
éconocique, social et culturel en CORSE.
L'heure est venue de prendre en nains neus-RÎmcs nos noyens de 
production et d'échanges, afin de parvenir au plein épanouissecent do r.os 
possibilités .hunuines dans le cadre de notre ni lieu naturel, ce qui signi­
fie  d'aborf pouvoir gagner sa vie, s'éduqixr dans notre pays.
L'heure est venue de faire la CORSE nfltre. la CORSE, corse.
Meus disons au peuple français qu 'il est pour nous un peuple 
frère, en dtpit des deux siècles de denination que nous ont Inposés Ses 
gouvernants. I l  n acquis sa plus grands renommée dans le sonde par sen 
Immortelle DECLARATICil DES DROITS DE L'IICKÆ.
11 a établi dans son Droit public les principes fondamentaux 
du droit des peuples i  disposer d'eux-nëæs.
Nous entendons sinpleacnt faire application de ces principes 
au Peuple Corse.
Nous engageons aujourd'hui une action ¡légale, conforte aux 
dispositions de la Constitution française, pour assumer L'AUTONOMIE 
INTERNE.
Celle-ci nous donnera la possibilité de retrouver, (tons la na­
tion corse, notre identité cu lturelle, notre dignité et les Doyens de 
notre renaissance économique, d 'établir une véritable démocratie p o liti­
que, de favoriser l 'amélioration du sort des travailleurs, et le retour 
sur la terre corse de ses enfants expatriés.
Alors seulement pourra s'épanouir la société hanaonicuse I  
laquelle noas aussi sonnes en droit de prétendre. »,
Source: Dottelonde (1983-4)
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Lë PROBLEME
LE LIVRE BLANC édîté par c . c £ ^
'-."-ki
PREFACE
C* ïw» U «  ••ITom» ¿. prtMKlw U pollim* «CORSE, étm m m J i
*‘9**^ " *  »UyU, r«fMÎM u n *  « m  anom fe^rûcn -
«•la.
R l'tRonm, fgaltnMl «Ttrv^ u f, lu soiuùoni mhrtwitm à m m v 
U*—. « M .  b
I  rfyaaén » b "»> ■!«< i»  ralnwiw pu la fatum«
'■«* •• b C w  «ait wi d fp M M I — f.n , «(
capaSfaa.
*  ™ i "  f a i »  t  M M »  aaa Ca<w, n i t m  <Uu »•- ...-. j ,  
a lto  la  * •%  I M |  l u i  a* bar U « l  1— r r-rit. |SI| « m  ln> .
"•** ^  bar fcrtniva, «  «1*3 ■> « pW pba. fw  «w. & im  J ~ n ■ * <1 m  itAtnm h rakr f«A M ha*a« #«
«ri m b «  4m b *fc«fa.t. i« M .4na * «
ôiw — e»(vi o t  , | Sutm nu  J> (dEdin*.
LA CORSE  
V. SON PASSÉ -  SON AVENIR
t A CORSE fui longtemps le çrenier de ROME t t  * celte épo- qvrt> t  | on écrit, un» ère de prospérité inouïe assagit tout k Uit le» miuleires, chei 1««quels auparavant les révoltes naissaient com- 
rnt ¡les têtes de l'hydre
II I»  compléteront esploité» nourrissait sa population et l'abon- 
d  || variété de ses produits laisait le» délices des Romains.
Mais la convoitise de ses voisins lui impcsè'e une lutte impito- 
ytUe pour recouvrer son indépendance.
Cette lut!» séculaire ne cessa qu'avec l'épopée napoléonienne, 
car, ai cuneui que cela paraisse, les corses, è cette époque, n eurent 
pas l'impression d avoir été conquis par la Fran*. mao plutfit d avoir 
conquis ce pays, ce qui |«ur permettait de voir plus grand «t de se ten- 
l’if chez em, même au delà de leurs tromières. 
f
Après l'Empire vint Téprpée coloniale, dans laquelle le Corse M 
taxa avec toute sa longue, ce qui fit dire au grand colonial que Kit le 
Maréchal I.YAU1EY : • Sans les Corses la Fiance n'aurait pas 
d'Empire.*
Ou» reste 1 1  de tout cela ?
Lequel parmi les Corses, quelques soient ses opinions politiques 
n'a pas ressenti, en voyant s'écrouler en quelques années une eruvre 1 
iaquele i  avait tant contribué et qui fanait l'admitaticn du monde entier, 
un ptneenent au cceur aggravé par b  constatation qj* cet effondrement 
était ''oeuvre de l'homme du 18 jum 1SJ0, l'hom-ne tequel S avait ac­
cordé sa iv ilàn ce  et sacrifié tant de SrS U»
Peuple corse, U> es hcr, a“ s.i essayes h  de cahier les peines, tes 
appréheMiov, miis tu es «iei*!ri et >u es amené t  penser avec angoisse 
k l'aven* de tes f-ls dans cette France où le mensonge est ro>. cette Fran­
ce qui voit les meilleurs de ses épiants embi*t,t!és ou fuselés, parce qu'ils 
n'ont pas voulu trahir lejr -serfTHnt
En un mal tu songes a l'indéfendable, mais tu songes t  scs con­
séquences combles • (on s'est efforcé, depuis toujours,! •* (aire croire 
que ion psv» était uop pauvre pou* se suif-'re 4 lu> mt-H*.)
>
C'est b in  ton pays a été rendu p w n r voila tout, cai ta France 
avait besoin de chur t  canons pour ir t  ikéltres esté iews et encours* 
geait im  depa-ts too> tes compatru>!es.
Aussi v^on -nous maintenant cette De s> pauv » convoyée el eaplor 
tée par un ramaisis d'aventu'ien, pendant Q-tt ic i entants en soi>t ré 
d-<its à lutte' pou> obtenir de maigies prnsions qu'ils ont gagnées en 
consacrant itur jn iiiii*  au serricc « de ce qu'on essaie de lui la ire 
appeler la inèfe patiie > ■
En pa'lanl é av*r.|ui>is, il ne tau! prs inckire ces • PieJ» Noirs a 
Oui se sor. itp1*i tfrfj r cus, v-irtimei comme i oui des mensonges du 
Pouvoir, ter ceuv-U sert nos l.ères ¿sn» U m s^ur t l leur place est 
i  w »  cblés
Ccust, noi-s nocs lert-r-s un devoi’ de le t  o jiît  qce ton Ile 
regorgt de iici.eue*, de t» piojvcr que ton lie e t  autie c ta 'e  qu'un 
puits de chair i  c»-o>s et qu'el*e est ci doit ieil*- ton orgueil, •» la i­
ton de vnv».
L *  A U T O N O M I E
Au derrùer • consullr > drs 'or-es qui a tenu ses assises t 
CORTE, il a «té d sh iu t une interessant» b<o:Kure IraiUnt de l'iu lo
> onwe interne ce jui constitue un grand pas en avant dans la pris» de 
comcencr i  la situation désastreuse de Ile  el de ses habitants.
Mai» hélat, tl t*adée est tentante si elle es! mètne séduisante, 
d.ms la pratique ellr es*, malheureusement, irréalisable.
La imk< est bien simple ■ car le Giuverwmtnt liarcas fort des 
•{suhal« d*un référendum qui con.iitur p'es. 14 rr*rm une escioqiKne 
<> 'oub'ions ras q/rf é M  sut tout constitué ü» oui • rv r, ■ el oui « mais ;) 
reluaeia t  S  Corse, ce a^'il ne peut pn , sous ptine £r 11« de. eccorder 
a la B 'e lii 'r ,  aus P « s  Btvques e 'c .
Par a-F»»-s en rdmetlant que la Cose seuW bénélic« d- cette 
mesure, s Tadviendirii «I ?
Une levé* de Loutl.ru de la pari de teui qi-i « "I ir.téiél è ce 
q j f  c» te l*r 't» tr i t  qv'elie est, un p«ys charnw'it entes, a >qutl m  
diktiibve «r» lilies le* p*us- batteurs, mais un p i)» s?jm>t ion dr aa
Source: Dottelonde (1983-4)
République Irançaisi, qui lui interdira lout développement susceptible de 
porter atteinte aux profils tcandaleui qu* U < Finrmtf » internationale 
tire de I* Côte ¿'Azur en particulier et d'autres lieux en général, sous U 
■ubrique ■ Tourisme ». .
Et pjis, t  quoi bon U  caîHer, l'autonomie conduit tOt ou taré k 
"indépendance et.il nous parait impensable de prévoir dtu» révolutions, 
itors qu'une seule suffit pour mettre fin t  nos malheurs.
L ’INDÉPENDANCE.
• Certains esprits chagrins oot trop tendance à  considérer 
que (Indépendance con luit à  l'cnarchie. en itayaot leur jugement 
sur le jirécédent des peuples admis récemment k ce stade.
Or, et qui est vrai pour certains paya, ne Test pus pour U 
;ôrxe, qui disposera, quoiqu’il arrive - el t  tous les ecnelons. de 
ladres administratifs tris appréciés et tris recherd és.
D’une Magistrature ayjDt (ail la preuve de sa compétence, 
sa droiture et aa haute valeur juridique ;
D'ud Corps Enseignant i  la hauteur de sa tâche et qui ne 
demande qu’à en faire davantage si op lu! en donne le  moyens ;
D’un Corps Médical dévoué et éminent ;
De Force de l'Ordre, tant police, gendarmerie et armée, 
ayant donné sous tous les cieux la preuve de leur courage, de 
leur compétence et de leur eaog.froid ; .
D'Hommes ¿'Affaires dynamiques, qui sont hélas trop son- 
vent freinés, faute de moyens financiers et toujours en bute i  
une fiscalité écrasante et inadaptée i  la Corse ;
Et enfin. Hommes Politiques et Légistes de valeur ne nous 
manquent pas. Ifs ne peuvent souvent, bêlas, donner la preuve 
de leur attachement à la Coite.
Débarrassés de ce carcan qu’est pour eux un Gouverne­
ment centralisé i  l’eitréme, qui de Par» décüie de nutre sort, 
sans se souder de nos aspirations légitimes et de nos protesta­
tions. ces bommes politique pourront, sans aucun doute, adminis­
trer U ^ )reave de leur valeur et de leur attachement t  b  Corse.
Aussi leur detfÜhdoos-Dons d'ouvrir les yeux et tfabao-
doocer leurs idées prrtot.çuei, •i’uuiilitT leurs querelles partivo, 
nés pour se joindre t  &l*js et eeavrer. I-bies de toutes contraintes, 
au bonheur de noir* Patrie commune.
Le s  m o yen s f in a n c ie rs  
Les p o ss ib ilité s  de  t r a v a il
La nécessité d'uac ion» neutre ci franchi en \if J:terrao»e 
s'échappe i  perse un» et la Cor<c. 1 « t  r.’arü une x >
ne idéale d'abord de par sa sUiutwa gevjmphique. ensuite k>u -t 
è ses possibilités qji fui permettraient d •■»ffrir non »eulenieut <its 
abris naturels faciles a aménager, mais envoie -le vastes en:rc).A!s 
■de distribution dans i-.'j; le bassin meiiirrrjoéen.
Aussi, un système bancaire copi*- fur 1a Suisse fis- mit. in­
dubitablement de ¿rot capitaux di«* l'il*. ce qui cous:iU~a j  oju 
seulement ooe sou:ct de revenus pujr le lutitr Etal, nuis rus-re 
ooe source de riches;: pour le mouür ilu Travail.
'■'très possibilités qui auraient une influence bénéfique o r
l'économie du P i j  j  :
a — les nombreuses sociétés privées de navigat;oa se 
raient heureuses de disposa au cœur de la Méditerranée d'un pa- 
tilkiL. de parts, d'entre ;»ôts. d'équipaga «ombreux et compétents.
Conséquences bénéfiques t aménagements de ports e' de 
cales seîhe*. do-ie emploi massif de la main d’œuvre locale t 
tous l^ s échelons et surtout perspectifs de travail en permanence 
pîur nos m irini q ii actuellement siUunneat les mers auus pa- 
villu; iraa(iis el qui risquent. a ree la dispvilion de l'Empt'e, 
voir leurs oavires désarmés à t<Mis instant.
De pins, la position de 111e permettra d'envisager ace 
plaque tuurointe en faveur des compagnies aériennes, assortie de 
tar-fi raisounxbles. ce qui constituerait eoe nouvelle luis- une 
suuice de profits pour le monde du travail
Qje dire des profits possibles et qii. comme ceux qui oot 
déjà été énumérés, éfereraieot le oireao de vie de tous.
b — Station' télé radio corn me» riales, qui couvriraient 
tou: le banin médilerratiéeo sans nbis (frat.ee, Italie. Espagor,
i
Alrique du Nord, eje..) ;
t  — Pédjei ioduslrialiséf» ;
. d. — Cimenteries qui permettaient de fabriquer sur pla. 
ce le fibrociment à un prit raisonnable, grâce à l'amiante du Cap. 
expédié actuellement da-is te Nurd de 11 Fracce el qui nuus re­
vient t  des prix tellement Ions que la eonstruc’ioo en Curte p’ar. 
riw  pas t démarrer
e. — L'agriculture, l'ciploilntion d*s f.-rits. l'arboricultu 
ra, les conserverie» qui permettraient dencoaa*er les plantations 
d arbres fruitiers e'c...
J1 serait ram d'essayer d éoumeier t l a.-ance toutes les 
possibilités de file. Elles sont immenses tt d ;  parleur vaiiélé 
constituent uo ensemble qui permettra i  tou! h monde de trou­
ver as place.
Les capitaux T II c'en manque pis q.i cherchent i  >* 
manifester sur un terraic neutre. «or. cC le fisc nt ffra I l>s* 
trop exigeant, dans un pays uoi. rèillemeot lit-e d«n »*.« *n >i 
vements, en bref, un pays qui. comme M-jnjcu. n’e*! pj$ * t ne
pourra ttre menacé d'étouffemeot. car sa position de neutre et 
la  position géographique la mettront définitivement è l'abri de 
voisins trop exigeants.
Ainsi verrons nous dans ce monde tourmenté la Corse 
devenir on pays neutte. heureux, ns servant pas de terraic d’ex- 
périeaces de bombes A ou H et autres engins de mort.
Nou* verrons également nue Hé où tocs tes pays franco, 
phones, récemment admis t  l'indépendance, mats dépourvus de 
cadres, puiseront, pour essayer de pouvoir mener I  bien l'eeuvre 
k laquelle Ils se sont attelés.
Le C.C.I. n'est pas un parti politique, c'est à-dire un 
parti eooiioe l'entendent certains politiciens rerreu* ; il 
est la CORSE -de DEMAIN.
CORSES UNISSEZ-VOUS f
votre- salut est t  ce p ii I
C C I
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LES RAISONS D'UN ECHEC.
I l  «v» t |« n * «‘I uh | I K  a m t t V  r i  m * m  4 r »  a ir  H l r  e t
«I«*» (Wkfx tir IV\|rfirur Mtt* rralilc,
dr rritr rwuMltc mmu» rw «tflrr «»***• iMWvrtV
M ai*. il
HHii U til ilrtr« * à lü «MfHirr d r  Hm*  auiltilH iiu . m rtt*-
« |ttr Ir» |irr> 4tiit>  r t r r r r r »  Mir Ir* tNwvuifi» |*u lilir»  ¿ rM ru rriH  
ljípT U f«« iihiiN'rüHl«*», \4«irr nuil«*«.
I** nMiwriii r*i t r u u  A- ihhi» d r m a m l r r  m hiI Ir» (*r«>-
I«mm|<*« «Ir iHrfrr r rU rr .
ItHH 4 at«»r«l. n kn« ( jitw  «)ur i**h. liwil«*» m «4»<rmr
•I.** tliriit il rM |»lu» i|t«r 4«mlntx aftTrlIr* p«*ír*r«»t •
« -I Ir* Mil Ir» rrl^iMVf rñ-tutMiHic íj»r«r, r*i u4i«»Htd«M 4an» 1« MN-ilIrurr
l*'t»*Ml«‘«r «|««r di> irlt«» «uk m íiK  iiiM tU írr». 1*4 jh iÍp.
c t i n t i t i - i H t H »  \rrf im i-H l l ‘*»|»tNÍ«H« I w a l r .  à  l»Mli<«ri n a r ln * *
|w r  IV t|«*< «; «Ir- I r r i i r »  M U  I T  mu r n m r f  | o r  U  |M iM tral***n  «Ir
***** | fi «***•• l i n a i t l  I*** N «*trr l u t t r t r  m* Ik  au% m4 wI í**mo 4 t i
i* | 4 r  U  ju ri» |w ii4 « M H r, n u i »  « |«»rltr «*«4 Irtar |n t r | f r  «i r A d m ¡i i¡ i4 r » li« ii  
i *T ii» r , r t  |i u i w |i t r  | r  l 'iN im ir  l«r* I # »  |i r t « |i l f w n  a tr  lV»Ml |n t r
|U u |iH iiii'r« iN t )J M u j*  h>* (t i i i lr * .
l'ar a i lh u « .  I* \«)MÍMÍ»lr.ilHM« di>já fk lrrw rnirM i m iira ltM T  n*rmt*
*•**»'*■ ')»'• d r . hiIiMm« .  a|>|rit*iiMo «  |i*w(r» |f> |Mrlir» «lu Irrri-
’ Hit* im IÍim u I. I r .  <-«•> lili rr|«tRrMt —  K llr r ta in l la «*mla|ti«m
•Ir I —  I ^  «i<Hir|i(i>Ni «ptVIlr «pr f<aáa J r  «r> ra|t|M«rl» a\n- pe»
" ■ rt’dltil Mirfli* |V*|Mf1rHkrMl i, un AlMl J r  NH'wlHilr aO**< ÍHlitViallW
•,m k itin ilM iii. ( nr ir llr  JtalMMi iwmi* «-«»Miluíl m r t tM ^a^r *»•**• l^ jr ir in r
m  P R O B L E M E  C O R S E  
UNE SOLUTION CORSE
"■g-jETTWy
MANIFESTE SUR L'AUTONOMIE INTERNE
Par MoxMrur P A l’I. M M IC SKT V.
dr »  aricm-r» /»Jitufur*, d iïrfur  m tm r iM w / r r  du \*t |<wi | W iî
ftmr t'.tuHtiitliim dr» C V * f i du Xillf  .|rnw*(iunniwi de / 'u n i, 
et jmr rtttJitraHUrmr (jnrw.
r i  Moniteur Yvr» 11! IIOM IN .
Hntrrprcucnr R . T. /*.. Srrrcl*irr fftmrrmi tir ht d'Himtr*
r* dr /ir/w iir , dr'rgmr i  tm ranmltr pmr h  knÎi-rmium rvgiitnmlt* 
drs tïnlr^firmrur* du flétimrmt et drx Trmt*«% î'h Ià u x .
I .K  S\ S T R M K  î  •  fían / f r r  mmi f r r ,  h  Frm m v m trr  */«*.« «W #r m *  dr» 
ftilvrmlitm* *nn*wrrr lt*tr» um WrrV pur /V*milktm ».
J . * l .  (# lï A\ I M l  •  t'nri* r í  / r  / V w f  f  n m r n i i  » .
<|MÍ, an*»¡ U r n  ¿ a m  le  r a i r r  «|r U  JJ^nUtr  «p ir  dan- l r  r a d r r  .Xafi*»-««!'. 
p r i i t  r rx H H lrf  l r  p r u lI r N if  |*a  r i  i n i t i e r  « |itr  fHH' M r r  II**.
I tr  | i  ai» « rtjff « r^a n ÍM tii«  *+ f r v r lr  U rprm rvil m |» r l a i ( r  »iwm Mt 'i.i** 
d rlrr ia tr iih r . U  fnulli|*ltritr- «lr» RKKiiiiiH'nt» m an- <iM>r«liiu *»*.*
|w rfa il f  <ir* m m il i c a t in iu  r t  rfro d ’ar|i*rt*. IÍm «Mirr. r i t i l r r u l ñ -
r\«T«»i{ a|l*i i^ fia rr  lr«  a (IfNM iilr* •  al»*- •  Talilr» r«*tial«  ^ * .  r t  la iliTt*i«îi
4 r  n a iio ra liiM , 4r la aew>ir»w r  lr«mt*mr. fiim iitur riW H Í4riaM rm m l 
« iru rp  aie la ri|NMle.
I V  f a f tm  f r o r r a l r ,  la  ■ w 'd m rr ilr  J r  n n »  rr^tillal«- |m i  lr*
i lr faM l a ir a t iw ir in r .  la  al<* iW r r  p n v t a w w r .  l r  « lr  r|*t'f-
H  | '« ln »ww  «lr
\in*i mu»* Iftmvnn^uw»« «Imanl 4rn\ ^ r i r .  |i*i»|>IV-«t*«-> à rrw»»««l»»* •
— i.\ H»R\H I.\TION II I m :  ix m : t k im  v ih h  r i s ^ w r  \
i .*i :i .\h i ; i s s i :m i a t  im : v > s  h i m a o u  x i i u n s  ;
ruTuunni 
i.\ \ii>i. \t i m i n t  n i  m  u n i  m m :
LA DOCTRINE.
|) r*| i l o t i f i l u i '  « r r t a i «  i|ttr l r  r»4 r-« r m n K  *lr l ‘ ll»* « r  | « ‘  * V B c » .
Itirr «U ih  !•*» niM itiliiNk« « lr  ft*lr| r  in h i> « u l t i » « ! ^
r i  al«H> l r  i l im a t  A- 4 « 'li.tn i*r «|ih* o » ii im ¡ '* *w *
|j* p>nial>»-|>UH I I!»' (a'Ml'IÑ-H- - m  IMIHtifW- • •»•mil'«' JMf **»*!•
la i tH  i-i4 *'* «'a|)|wi>‘t i t n  U -jn»-.mp |<lti- *  w i f  *1.- • | o m U ÍM t t  «h i »•.
riilimimlKrti »mr «••»Mtr «Ir »••clri**»**m« til »-f m* « |  IN i I««
Source: Dottelonde (1983-4)
Ir fuît tju’ il e«4 mi» fn  application par i)e< Icd in o c r ik «  d*ìmjH>rtnlton, un  
t r i piati la i* «  fB J iK û f i la più* grande jw n ie  de l'e^pare in»ul;tire el dotte 
1« j»ruplcf. Ain*l In jw pu liliu n  ■•(•elle le »(‘iilìn inU  d 'ì lre  lenite deli« 
iN-rrmeul f »  dthnr» du pian. De rr  «eutÌuirnt il« fruMrdlitMi «fi d'iniptii»« 
a n r r  jMmrraìrut dtVuitler dan» Pavrnir dea ri«i#i]iieurc* extrême* ijue mm« 
iliMrtHin éviter.
A iimM apparali«*! dr* à présent, d r dé lia it tini* doctrine
•pii tV««àt »MUirer aux jin.ulnìrr» Ir iu-nrfirc exr/uai/ du plaît d r  rrm ivutiaii 
n i  If iir  donnant W-» moieax l.ECAUX de le réali«er TAK EUX-MEMES KT 
DON C  POUR K U X M EM ES .
f il i  (ìoTuf, più» i |u '« illr v r « , le m k ttv  de lo u lr  e n lre p c W  «rrla m e  
T a p p ili r i  1' i iU Ì r i i ‘M'ttirnl de Pe p in u m  lu ra lr . O r mai* «avrai» Im i« i r l  que 
1«  M n u lu r r  m itr a lin a lr ie r  r i  dr»p o tiq u r de rnw in *tÌtulim i» ad m |m «tra liv r* , 
rvonoinu pir*  r l - i i ì a n r i i f f »  a j»m riM )iir la  n iÌA r  de r«**unmi'Mi i iu u U t r r ,  
« I f ir r m in r  |V m ifra ii< M  d r  k  jru n ra a »  C u ra r, (« v e n ir  la * | im iU lh m  d r  
£n>ii|ar» d * in trfrl» , f a r i l i i r  !*«rbu raire  de radanìnaalratim i et la vùalaluut 
p ar r r l lr -o i  dr* r t ^ ln  de d m il et d m  déeiaiauu de ju 4 i f f ,  mn* q u 'a u ru u r 
M inrim n N>hh mt«m> au«*4 que la  Haute a d n in M r a lit in  b '« 1
q u ‘u itr  m a rh in r a a ilil, de p réfrrenre au «rrVtce de» ptiMnawre« finartrìèm *.
l / m r ir h iw m m t  d r  qtarlqur» * iu rrM e ri •  p f m J r  b  m ia c  d r«  irmi* 
latm *, I r  r m lr a li» in r  à r e i rpard n 'r la n t  que I r  paravent ro uuM id r d 'arti*  
vii»*» elaitdrrftinr». I)sn» tou« le« dniM Ìnem  |*a««im ìUlM A |»urr r i  « ìm p lr .d r  
I I V  «Uk déparlrutnat* un4 r ip u lita la «  «pftaralt enanaar la  u n u irr  r*Mi4a ii l«  
«Ir h<h l/au irw m r d r  quelq ur» m Ì* rra b lr» « a f a J f w m U . qwi h>hi»
vm H d*«»llrur» am »rd r*  à r u n l i? < u u r ,  ne n a d ü im  n i  r v n  r H  f ia t , d r  fa ll.
Par rm w rqurn l, parlant du p r ia r ip r q u r  Ir cararirer a rrirrr. mal* 
( a i t i t i  r i «Mdrafirirr dr mitre erotralUme adm inistratif rul dn a rw ir d r  t«Mr 
Iru ip »  la cau*e première de m»» m n ,  nw u  propuaocu c o n n t  renu-dr la
ductriar tir I/A U T O N O M IE  IN T ERN E . C rttr duririitr, lu in  d*ètrr h i 
i»ytl*c, K*i»imarît ita iu  ta: réalité dea rrglr» cuiulilulÌM inellck de la plupar; di<* jMija di'ntocralitjue^'
L'AUTONOMIE INTERNE.
NOUS NE R E D IR O N S  jA M A IS  ASSEZ Q U E  L 'A U T O N O M IE  
IN T E R N E  N 'KST  PAS
—  UN E D O C T R IN E  SEPARATISTE
—  UN E D O C T R IN E  P O L IT IQ U E
—  UN E D O C T R IN E  D 'O PPO S IT IO N
M A IS  QU*E1XE EST
—  U N E  D O C T R IN E  FE D ER A L IST E
—  U N E  D O C T R IN E  A D M IN IST R A T IV E
—  U N E  D O C T R IN E  EC O N O M IQ U E
L*»ul«mi»m»e Interne ar prraente romm e u n  ayatrme de ( M l i u  adm i­
nistrative f r ir e  auque l le* puuvmr* d r la réfiou , « t r o } ^  par l ’E u u  m l  
«ufTammment étendu* r t  d im r HTieare» puur permettre le développement 
priorita ire  d u  patrim oine régional.
¿m a lrm m t  raarttmomir in trnar nV>4 qu 'une dérentralÎM lion pc ianV  
|M*rmettant rt fa rilitan l dam* Ir  radrr ua linna l Peainleare de« liberté r f | ^  
natr» r t  a ^ ir a n t  la plrtwe rHVtrwre de« d ffW aa* pria*» « r  le plan Ineal. 
irÎMT aai a )« lf in r  d*a«*rmblrv* |rrritn«4alr» rlwrr rt d*im c ir o K lf  régional
Dan* rr|lr **|*tûpie, l'autonom ie n*f4  n u lle m m l un  prnklrm r p*»li- 
Ittjue mai* un protilfn ir d*«»rilrr purranm t adm inistratif. I r »  partM in» du  
rm (ral»>mr drfnrm rn i plu« mi n n î t i '  «**irmmml la «i^ni6mti*ui d r  l'aut«**
iN«mif rt» tui dmtiiant un r, porter p«»ltti«ptr à la*jwrllr » mi« irfw««n- dr 
MHhffirr.
I*r pouvoir Ir- i-blif drfrnu par |‘a««rm li'rr rr fitm a lr n r  p«»rlr ip tr 
aur I f t  R u lir tr«  jtrf»w < |»r Ir «talnt « 1 n « r  nw M iitilH m iirlIrm rn l
|Mir l'E ta t. Kn nu lrr . Ir rrp rr^n tan l alu pm n fr iK Wf iH pt*»«rdr w i d n û t  d r  
n.nlr*tle w r  le« i}rri‘ l«t»< pri»r« Nir Ir plan r ^ im u l .
Qtwnl à ra«lmi«i»iilrali*M» vrgMmalr. r l l r  r*t r r m it r r  rt  apjMtintfr par 
IV ^ r n i l i f  n ’pAnal du«pir| r l lr  d rp rnd . Clrtlr adm inM fatî*u i rpfHwu'r rr*- 
ni>|i> parfailrtiH-tti a » «- itnr adm ini»lnitù*n d 'K la t. rhartm r a%anl Hnr 
r rm p r lm c r  d iirrm in i’r.
| O t l f  r«Mrf|t{Htn aitmi*ii«tralivr n r  rwrre»|«ra*d pa* â u w  ul«»|*ir «ni
j m im  «rHi'n>a rr,***lt»ii*m»ui»rr'. mai* à un  irwwlr d r  jw i i f r n r m n i l  rr-|Mimlii 
dan* la m a jn rilr dr* |w>%« *u«4 l**m rurH|<mi< ip i’anu*r#r*in». En rralit«- 
Ir ««>lrtnr pranzai« d»*nH*urr u»i^ r\rr|rfimt. |*ni U rîl'an lr du t***»r. rntrr* 
Irn ttr r| ru ltiv fr  a ir r  un «nin I«hi| parlirw lirr par !*■* manu»pi*^ du ir t ilw »  
li*m r i|in m> n n r iil^ n i qurl* *|ur M tinii If* rr^im r*.
l'«Mtrlan| r r  «*«u Uiru |(t«tr>ntal* dti e**nlrali*u*«* «pii n*«ul |aa* ru 
m lap tfr In tr« infllwtd«*-  ^ île g►HivrriH*»nrul â rri«ilu li»*n di' iauMl«*ri#r
r i ip iî ««»itt à r«rij:i**r d r  tanl d^ dr«a«lrr* mr*»rr |r»*p rrtrwU  |»*ur r lr r
M ilillr«,
l e  <:k \t r \i .i s m i : w k v i t  m \is . l \ o r n s i .  s e  m l i i i t .
MaU ¡1 n*r*l |w< tnu tilr q u r  rfna im uto iparUpir* » m5\ perrlnnit U 
d r  n«^ - inM itiiliiiih  a<Ìnimi«lrali«r». \ rr| rB rt. -mliiitwi»» «pu* I** 
l  i lr r  \l d«- U  (iiwHiiiiilitM «Ir la ll«'|nilkli«p»i» |-'ra»»çai-** prrvm i «pi «n  rai» 
m u  dr Irn r «iliiMMm j»arliii»l»»^r. Ir*. iV'iKUlrnH'HN d »itflfr-nwT pru>rn l
ia îrr  r*»bjrt im^>ur«> d*»da|*tat»*ui d r  lt‘iir rr*iu*r '»-(ei^Ulif rt d** l*ntr 
•«rgani*att«Mt adui*uif4rali\r. Il»* plup. »ri*»« Ir J*uriia t IW hm ‘1 du  11 A«m*M 
OâV, nimiI d«*liuii» nunu»r di'*|Marlrui**ul» d*tuitrr«mrr :
— O l i  X ¿W Û V T  S I T I  ¿ 5  o lt h e - \ ik «  PA II lU m iU T
A LA A IETHOIH ILK >.
( ir  m rm r l i l r r  de ki nm»lilutâ««n poA tfit. »pi*«tulrr l o  di'*|iarlrmrH|i> 
d r  !a MH-irMp*»le, rru\ d*wutrr«mrr rt Ir» riui| Irrrita irr» Ai'TOtNOMES dr jà  
r\»Uni>s d 'au tr t»  n ir^w r ir«  d r  trrriliu rr» |>ru%mt rt re rrfre» par la Iam .Nmu» d rm a m lii»  m nuiM*i|iimre s
— «p«*uiu* !•>< d r f in ÎM 1 VIU> d r (ii«r«r rti tant i|ue rrjciMii antum unr el lu ì 
rrt'uunai^m* un  Maint a ilm in ii4ratir. fr»KHHn«i|ur rt fi^*al |iariirulirf dan» 
Ir rad rr d r  la KrptiL/ifjMc fr a n ç a iif  aaae rt
—  i|i» r t r  (^imim'ÎI C f n r r a l  d r  la ( I n n é  mu! r r i ^ r  r u  tf*prml«lôe te rriu irL ite , 
rr-1 r - r i  d r tr i ia n t  u n  |**m<vmif l r |i * U l i Î  n i r  Ir» analirr**» A 'i r j t t im  p a r U; 
M atui li’*^al H  dri>iÿiuN l u n  r t r r u l i l  rr«pwu»al»lr du«pirl d 4- |in u lra  |'ailm i< 
H irfntM M  rrp û m a lr .
- -  ip ic  lu pttpulalMwi d r  T i r  mh! r r r i i r m r n t  a»—f n V  i«ar r i i i l r r n i r d ta i r r  
d*1 «n> r rp rff trn ta n t»  é lu *  à  ra ^ r m l» liV  tr r r i lo r ia l r  r l  u r  «r> uc|ani«*iluaM  
p n ifo M M iiiir ll»  ftrtiu p rr»  a u  « ria  d 'u u r  a « r m l* lf r  r n m « m ii |i i t  rrjtû m aV , 
a u  v«t|r d u  p la n  d r  dr»vrl«ip |»rtnrnl r l  d r  rrdreM <rm rnl.
Ain>i. d»*|MMaut «ur pkair dr« uu liU  de mi**-»«« rt d r  ¿ralum  adini* 
n io lra lh r  r t  d*Hroan! la m|HMMilNlHr d r  tout re i|UÌ rw H rrnr Ir* Inlérft* 
litrau i. Ira Cnr«r» « rm n l r f fr r iiv rm m l Ir» arti«an» eì Ir» brnrfîrâairv* du 
rr li'vrm rnt d r  Iru r pa t* . I imH m  lai»«ant à la métropole le h *îm de rrgfrr 
lm  prnUIrmr# d ’ in trrrt naluM ul.
L*awt«M»oMiir a n lrm r n’a m r  plu» iju r pit»4l»V rn  Vs* * *  qu i. t im  
•ju*rnuuMni*|urn>rMl r**u»HlinrlMp|irr, p«M*rdr m  m a ih r ltr  u n r rlrtr mrni- 
|*rru«r r l  Mu4ruile dati» Mm* Irn damainr».
•“  t  aut^nutnle adm lnUttaUrc permrttra è nnmUre d r  f(MMii<wnalrf» 
l4»r<N#> d r  la irr  rarrit*rr «air plarr,
“  ft‘ *ut«wH»fnir Knatirifrr autor»*rra Uwalr» M>rtp* d 'rm pru iit»  dr«4im*» 
a rrrrr 1 in lra»truHurr fnHinmif}ur «pii ««»m («U drfau l H  ilV ITrrlurr Ir« 
prand« travaux d 'in trrrt |Mit>ür.
 ^L auUiaowiir (x-alr «rra lr  Hmm ru  d r  dt**r'nj»prr rt d r  |tnH«'‘jcrr 
** artiv ilr* l i r p  n i ^ a n k «  Imit m  rRn>nraf»aiM la rrra iiun  d r  n«Htvrllr>
rrttrrprUra m ip n i« rm rn l »w»ri»4re*.
AÌn*i le re lrrrm rn l d r  | f n « a m ir  iit«ti*airr, m a « r r  par d r  d«*tt%
d r dr«prtti«mr rrntrHli>dlrur r| ruiitaV |iar la nwtnrrrriMV r ^ i j i ^ i t r r  
p a "•,'1f«»|M»lr rt d r  I \frù|i«r du >«»rd. r*t-îl i4i|ii:a|HÌrnnnrt Ih* à l ' ^ l r n i  
pM lim ina irr  d.- rA l*T t>NOM IE IN T ERN E .
L’O R G A N IS A T IO N .
. . ^  n ’r *4 p»« dirntrufe qu*an d«jMr1 u n r |r| r  d»wirîi*r ltr«ir|rra
* a I«h* Ir* trnant* dti M d rfflf d r  dom ination  a d m im ^ ra ln r  aiii*t «pir 
*Trî**"r >f,M,|,f‘^  d ’in l ‘*fr|» parlirularr* dM-imuW-P. «»m* l'ap|«arrm-r d r l ‘Ì*»* 
I ffrm 'ral. U*» im* ««»iHinr |r* autre*. «l«'|orH*a**t im irr d «« lr in r  *hi r»*a\anl 
, f  ^  I »pprikiTirr p u  r uiiru\ la d ftru irr .
Au
l u  «<iMM'<|Mrnl, il i*r li ut pa* rm i* M triu irr â  un  larn' i iw»wi'-di»|, 
rnntrairr. un r pKa «> tr^n-ilturr appara ît p i w o i i r .  au rt»ir* d r  la q u rre , 
r la vatrm  dr no lrr iKfa»ii*«|»AN d«'|»*-ndra Ir » iit ir«  d r w». ir trH fliia ltii« * . 
Au tratrr» d r ft* m«iiilr«4ati»*it> rm pirhpar«. *|n«a4M|iit> rt di’-Mii*
* rorjÉwolvui,^, «M urllr « «m lJr . ■«> rrcar«l d r . |*i»l*lir«.
r lr r  dcNii'ur^r au «lad«* d«> rad«d^*rrnrr. rr «pii «-\plHpw la m a i^rr »mnmh»' 
d««ut «m a «itu lu la«pwrritrmrul mm> ^ratifirr, p i i s in l  «¡«V llr miffirail à 
ra liw Y  ru ilrr lurlw ilrnre juv i’*nilr.
I æ* p r« rr rd r a  emploirh* j iK | u ' à  r r  j*Hir. »“il*  rta ïrn t «|N *rla n ib iir* . 
n r  ré ta ira il que p a ir  amt* «ru'a.
En ronaéqum er. aum» dru»*** m v i ^ r r  U  rrî«»ulr d r |’nr|:ant*atM*ii 
rs t^tan tr d r  Îaçmi â  a rm u lr r  «a r rp n V m ta lt iitr . rrnf*»rrr» «a m b > i« n  ri 
¡»ariani arm HTirurttr. P inir aM rindr r r  l*ul, il r*l ai-*i*«airr d r  r r m  « » •
Mr|tani*alûui Ir l lr  q u r . rtuwrntraul Ir* L»rrr- »n r*  dr* l / i i 'r »  d r  I llr  r i  d<-
iV i I r r im r .  q u r ‘|r qu r aaait l»*ur appartm aurr m i  Maadirab*. rll«-
pfrnu*ttr u n r  r i p H r  iium rd ia lr . m  m rm r lr**»|t- «(mVIIt r**uipli**«‘ I
d ‘«>r|!ani«iiir i t r lM iln , d r  liaii***n r| «l’in fnrm alw«.
Ih irant la pfrnadr |ran*it«drr nnu» d n «H *  a llirr à  la I t lH t . l .  
IVK\I^RI^SSION qu i rniwm* d«- n*4rr d«*1ri»^. L\ H M H .I. H I. I*RI>M *IN
•pii *r «It'taer >w’i y w j i i r i‘Wir <tl iI ’m w  «*rf«fl»*alN»U »Irnrl»»»«^.
Il** Im ilr  façiui à *a d*w|ràur r%*du«V dr l ’ \| H lN O M IK  IN T I.R M  
d«iii r*irrr«|Hnidrr un r l)M(»\N|S^TION M IN iî l  |tlNN|.|.|,|. dtttt-r ilr  *•»■«***!« 
d ’in(»irnia|if«n r l d ’ripre«*H»n rrnm*f*.
[Naît* fa Unit* n û lr f la ri»nrlu«i»>fi de M. J *F. Grattar • Avant qu il 
n r  «a il Irn p  lard , « n r  n m n r l lr  «util du 4 \«*ûi d«nt wr»lfc»r un a irrlr ri 
d rm l de priiilrjre« parh irn*  r i  d ’a ln^ra liun  rrntrali*at»ire ».
F*•:;n-
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